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study reveals that Britain and the United States used sea power for commerce 
protection, but also believed that it could be used to further long-term economic goals. 
However, the different ways in which Britain and the United States used sea power 
affected Anglo-American diplomatic and naval relations. In Britain, the government and 
commercial sectors were unified in their belief that sea power could be used for 
commerce protection and to push African factors of production into legitimate 
commerce. In the United States, the government only reached a consensus that sea 
power could be used, during peacetime, for commerce protection and promotion. When 
these goals of the nations conflicted, tensions increased as their interests clashed. 
America abhorred a strong military, but deployed naval force to fight piracy. But 
Britain combined slave trade suppression with economic policy and wanted American 
help along the West African coast. The Americans expanded their West African 
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squadron, but focussed only on economic goals. These differences strained relations, but 
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Chapter One: Introduction 
In the early nineteenth century, Britain and the United States were part of an Atlantic 
economic matrix. They both had interests in the equatorial Atlantic, a region that 
embraces the coastal zones of the Gulf of Mexico, Central America, Northern Brazil, 
and, across the Atlantic, the African coast from the Cape Verde Islands to South of the 
Congo River. This investigation will focus on the efforts of Britain and the United 
States to suppress piracy and the slave trade in this region between 1819 and 1863. It 
will show that they used sea power to attain these objectives, though the degree to 
which it was applied, and the nature of its application, varied according to wider 
political, diplomatic and strategic considerations. In essence, Anglo-American naval 
relations in this theatre not only served as a barometer of the vacillating relationship 
between the states, but also acted as a safety valve that could be adjusted to alleviate 
tension when conflicting policies threatened the peace that prevailed, sometimes 
precariously, between them. 
Figure 1.1 The Equatorial Atlantic 
Source: AGIS 1.62: A GIS for Windows (Franklin, Tasmania, Austrialia: AGIS 
Software, 1999). 
Andrew Lambert opined that naval relations reflected Anglo-French rivalry. He 
concluded that this was "the mechanism whereby Britain and France clarified their 
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relationship; France challenged British maritime supremacy, and Britain responded. "' 
This hypothesis, which has it that naval relations are an important cog in the broader 
diplomatic wheel, will be tested in this study in the context of Anglo-American 
diplomacy. The examination will elucidate the extent to which the interests, diplomatic 
and naval relations of the two states interacted. 
This study defines Anglo-American naval relations, during this era of relative 
peace, as the levels of co-operation and friction between naval powers. As will be 
discussed in Chapter Two, Britain and the United States often deployed their navies in 
the same regions. The American navy was divided into several squadrons: 
Mediterranean, Pacific, Home, South America, and Africa, as well as others when 
required, such as the West Indies squadron. 2 But American naval policy fluctuated with 
the interests and power of supporters and opponents. 3 On the ocean, it encountered the 
larger Royal Navy. British policy-makers intended their fleet to meet the next two 
largest fleets, namely the French and Russian, but it also supported colonies and trade. 4 
In the Atlantic, the Royal Navy deployed to its North American and West Indies station, 
South East Coast of America, the Mediterranean and Africa. 5 The compatibility and 
conflicts between each navy comprise the state of Anglo-American naval relations. 
Economic interests shape political decisions, but also naval relations. In this 
period, the extent of the unity of the interests of the government and business class, in 
each nation, dictated naval policy. In Britain, the government and business class were 
1 Andrew Lambert, "Politics, Technology and Policy-Making, 1859-1865: Palmerston, 
Gladstone and the Management of the Ironclad Naval Race, " The Northern Mariner/Le Marin du nord, 
8: 3 (July 1998): 13. 
2 United States, Annual Reports of the Secretary of the Navy, 1820-1860. 
3 John H. Schroeder, Shaping a Maritime Empire: The Commercial and Diplomatic Role of the 
American Navy, 1829-1861 (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1985), 3-18 and 37-41 and Craig L. 
Symonds, Navalists and Antinavalists: The Naval Policy Debate in the United States, 1785-1827 
(Newark: University of Delaware Press, 1980), 11-19. 
° C. J. Bartlett, Great Britain and Sea Power (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1963), 1-2,34, and 125- 
128. 
5 Britain, Public Record Office (PRO), Navy List, 1820-1861. 
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connected and unified in their goal to protect and promote trade. They agreed to avoid 
conflict with other nation-states, but that they could use sea power against those who 
threatened legitimate commerce. To those ends, the political elite determined that 
commercial growth in the equatorial Atlantic would only occur if they pushed factors of 
production away from the slave trade and into legitimate commerce with naval force. 
But in the United States, because of the power of domestic slavery interests, the 
government only reached a consensus on commerce protection, conflict avoidance, and 
the peaceful development of trade. The connection between slave trade suppression and 
commercial growth was a forbidden topic. The difference between the political 
economy of British and American naval deployment caused tensions in the equatorial 
Atlantic, but the similarity - maintaining peace while advancing economic objectives - 
created a common peacetime concept of sea power that allowed their naval relations to 
be a path through which Britain and America avoided conflict with each other. 
During the war against pirates, both nations sought commerce protection. 
However, Britain was wary that forceful action against pirates and Spanish privateers 
would drag in other European powers before British commercial objectives were met. 
The British were suspicious that the American deployment was a prelude to seize Cuba, 
but the Royal Navy avoided overt espionage on American activity, knowing it might 
harm Anglo-American relations. Consequently, naval actions were adjusted to prevent 
conflicts with other nations and from becoming embroiled in the Spanish-American 
rebellions. When the piracy crisis ended, the Americans retrenched, leaving the Royal 
Navy the dominant force in the Atlantic. 
But Britain also wanted the United States to police the slave trade. As part of the 
anti-piracy patrol, Washington dispatched vessels to the West African coast. They 
protected trade and provided assistance to American colonies. With post-crisis 
retrenchment, Britain wondered when the American efforts might resume. In response, 
Britain adhered to a liberal philosophy, lobbied other nations to suppress the slave trade, 
but avoided war over the issue. Still, the Royal Navy stopped suspected American- 
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flagged slavers, which increased Anglo-American tensions. Nevertheless, because both 
nations believed that sea power could foster long-term goals peacefully, both concluded 
that they could advance their different interests without battling each other. 
Under the terms of the Webster-Ashburton Treaty (1842), the US deployed a 
squadron to West Africa, hoping it would eliminate the need for the Royal Navy to stop 
US-flagged ships. Still, Britain and America continued to have separate objectives that 
interfered with each other and raised tensions, in particular when they touched closer to 
American shores. Only Britain combined slave trade suppression with commerce 
protection, expansion, and strategic concerns; America believed they were separate 
issues. The contradiction generated tension between the nations. Regardless, both reined 
in their officers when they caused offence; navies policed the "peace, " but left serious 
disputes to the diplomats. Instead, their naval relations were a conduit through which 
they could reduce conflict. The mechanism reveals that in the Anglo-American 
relationship, they were neither friends, nor enemies, but they worked to reconcile their 
differences so they could further their separate objectives. 
Anglo-American Relations Studies 
This thesis deals with international relations and the use of sea power in support of 
national interests. Previous studies have failed to offer significant comparative insight 
into piracy, slave trade suppression, and Anglo-American relations during this period 
(see Appendix: Piracy and Slave Trade Studies). Consequently, the investigation will 
place the use of sea power within the broader context of Anglo-American relations, a 
field that studies how Anglo-American interests converge and clash. To bridge the gap 
between naval history and Anglo-American relations, I will use an "interest theory" of 
naval analysis. Influenced by the so-called "New Naval History, " this study will show 
how national interests, moulded by domestic and international commercial goals and 
political decisions, shaped naval relations. It will accomplish its objectives using a 
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comparative methodology applied to policy, diplomatic and naval documents, in the 
context of those interests and the equatorial Atlantic. 
This study's objectives lie in the historiography of Anglo-American relations in 
the wake of the War of 1812. The conflict focussed on American commercial and 
maritime rights, and the nation's relationship with Britain. Meanwhile, nations who 
believed in exclusive trade between colonies and the mother country governed the 
world. Mercantilist practices excluded the United States from British colonies in the 
West Indies, with whom New England had a lucrative trade before the Revolutionary 
War. Under the "Rule of 1756, " the British declared that mercantilist doctrine also 
applied in war. If a nation, like France, allowed only its vessels to carry trade between a 
colony and France during peace, the same had to occur in war. 6 Consequently, an 
undercurrent of tension strained Anglo-American relations. 
Tensions increased during the Anglo-French wars. Under the "Rule of 1756, " 
Britain stopped American vessels from trading with France. Furthermore, the British 
practised impressment - searching any vessel for British subjects to press into service of 
the Royal Navy. 7 Americans were divided on the best approach to take with Britain. The 
Federalists increased national defence, but "pursued a pro-British foreign policy 
abroad" to preserve peace and promote trade. Federalists, with supporters largely from 
the North, believed that war was too risky; Republicans took a harder line to promote 
American rights. Nevertheless, talks to resolve the disputes with Britain failed, and the 
8 Republican administration of James Madison declared war on Britain in 1812. During 
6 Howard Jones, Crucible of Power: A History of American Foreign Relations to 1913 
(Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources Inc., 2002), 70-71 and Julius W. Pratt, A History of United States 
Foreign Policy, 2nd Edition (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1965), 40 and 57-58. 
Scott Thomas Jackson, "Impressment and Anglo-American Discord, 1787-1818" (PhD diss., 
University of Michigan, 1976), 17-55 and 56-90 contains discussion of British manning problems, 
impressment, American commerce, and the degeneration of Anglo-American relations that led to the War 
of 1812. See also, Kevin A. Payne, "Naval Impressment in Hull, 1793-1815" (MA diss., University of 
Hull, 1998). 
a American domestic and international affairs formed a nexus with the War of 1812. Madison 
and the Republicans hoped to confirm American independence and unite their party. Donald R. Hickey 
concluded that "many Republicans had come to believe that the rewards of war outweighed its risks" 
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peace talks, Washington wanted the British to abandon impressment, the "Rule of 
1756, " and to define rules for blockade. But on land and sea, each win by one side was 
met by the other. When Britain defeated Napoleon, the Americans lost an advantage; 
still, the Duke of Wellington advised peace rather a long war that would further harm 
Britain's finances. Rather than resolve the outstanding issues between them, both 
nations accepted a status quo ante bellum codified in the Treaty of Ghent. They restored 
seized territory and established joint commissions to settle boundary disputes. 9 They 
also agreed to discuss the future of slave trade suppression. 1° Howard Jones concluded 
that the "treaty was ultimately an armistice by two countries that finally realized their 
best interests lay in peace. "" But the US Navy had held its own against the Royal Navy, 
and "[a]fter 1812 the British took America seriously as a naval power[ . 
]"12 
The historiography of Anglo-American relations has therefore sought to 
understand the nature of the status quo ante bellum. But historians differ on when the 
Anglo-American "special relationship" developed. Most studies have been published in 
the wake of important events: World War II; the height of the Cold War; and the 200tn 
anniversary of American independence. The field functions along a continuum where, at 
one pole, after the Revolutionary War, Britain and America were friendly and disputes 
were aberrations that had to be resolved. At the other limit, the nations were enemies 
who only recently became friends as common threats, like Germany and Soviet Russia, 
threatened them both. Within this context, historians disagree on the role of the Anglo- 
(Hickey, The War of 1812: A Forgotten Conflict [Urbana, Il: University of Illinois Press, 1989], 5-8,26- 
28,46-47,102, and 162-164). 
9 H. C. Allen, Great Britain and the United States: A History of Anglo-American Relations 
(1783-1952) (London: Odhams Press Ltd., 1954), 336-345; Pratt, United States Foreign Policy, 66-67; 
and Hickey, War of 1812,281-299. 
10 W. E. Burghardt Du Bois, The Suppression of the African Slave-Trade to the United States of 
America, 1683-1870 (New York: Russell & Russell, Inc., 1965), 133-135. 
11 Jones, Crucible of Power, 84. 
12 Andrew Lambert, War at Sea in the Age of Sail 1650-1850 (London: Cassell & Co., 2000), 
202; see also pp. 190-202 for details of the major naval battles of the War of 1812. 
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American economic relationship in this diplomatic relationship. Several significant 
works are illustrative of the trend in the field. 
H. C. Allen, the elder statesman of the field, believed (1954) that Britain and 
America were only friends by World War II. Their prior relations were tense, almost 
going to war on several occasions such as during the Venezuela boundary dispute in 
1895. He placed the emphasis on the United States for causing the problems in the 
relationship. Most disputes were territorial, within North America, pressing more on 
American sensitivities than British. Others involved maritime rights issues, ranging 
from access to Atlantic fisheries zones and the Navigation Acts. But in London, the 
parent had the maturity necessary, Allen believed, to be aware of its prior faults and to 
avoid "future dangers [. ],, 13 
Nevertheless, Allen also placed emphasis on the growing Anglo-American 
economic connection in their relationship. Early in the relationship, America was 
dependent on Britain as a major creditor. The economic dynamic created tensions, but 
during the nineteenth century, it maintained their connection "no matter how much she 
[America] disliked to admit it. "14 Charles S. Campbell (1957) agrees with Allen's 
general assessment, and concluded that the Anglo-American relationship was hostile 
until Britain wanted America's help with China and Germany in the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries. 15 Kenneth Bourne (1967) also believed that Anglo-American 
friendship came late. After the War of 1812, some people promoted the benefits of 
trade, but others like John Quincy Adams believed that the nations conducted a "warfare 
of the mind. 9,16 
13 Allen, Great Britain and the United States, 2 and 17. 
14 Allen, Great Britain and the United States, 54 and 92-94. 
1s Charles S. Campbell, Anglo-American Understanding, 1898-1903 (Baltimore, MD: Johns 
Hopkins Press, 1957), 1-24 and 346-347. 
16 Kenneth Bourne, Britain and the Balance of Power in North America, 1815-1908 (London: 
Longmans, 1967), 3-10. 
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At the other end of the spectrum, Frank Thistlethwaite (1959) believed that their 
economic relationship united the countries closer "than any two other sovereign 
states. "17 Thistlethwaite believed that factors of production flowed from Britain to 
America, providing the latter with needed capital and people for its growth. The nations 
became linked; Britain most closely with the Northeast American coast as its power 
grew over the South. People like Jeremiah Thompson brought New York and Liverpool 
together in the cotton and cloth trade. British banking houses provided credit for 
growing American canals and railways, for example the Baltimore and Ohio and the 
Camden and Amboy lines. Americans opened their interior and British bankers 
provided the needed fiscal experience. 18 
There were ripples in the economic relationship that affected wider Anglo- 
American relations. When recession hit in 1839, Jacksonians attacked "the sinister 
influence of British bankers; and the shock in London caused by the defaulting on their 
bonds by great American States ... 
induced a classic case of Anglo-American 
friction[. ]" But the Atlantic economy recovered in the 1850s, and with it, Thistlethwaite 
opined, Anglo-American relations. 19 He concluded that the economic relationship 
"supported a structure of social relations" that "bound together important elements in 
Britain and the United States" such as Quakers, Utilitarian MPs, trades unions, Christian 
and peace groups, abolitionists and women's suffrage movements. 20 But the connection 
was with reformers and the rising Northern industrial class. Therefore, Britain was 
unable to exert influence over all Americans and overcome severe diplomatic crises 
such as resulted in the War of 1812.21 
17 Frank Thistlethwaite, The Anglo-American Connection in the Early Nineteenth Century 
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1959), 3-4. 
18 Thistlethwaite, Anglo-American Connection, 9-18. 
19 Thistlethwaite, Anglo-American Connection, 18-34. 
20 Thistlethwaite, Anglo-American Connection, 39-70 and 85-133. 
21 Thistlethwaite, Anglo-American Connection, 172-175. 
13 
H. G. Nicholas (1963 and 1975), meanwhile, believed that the Anglo-American 
relationship changed with the evolving "power ratio, " but also agreed that war became 
less likely because of their civilian connections. 22 Campbell (1974) conceded that 
diplomacy kept the nations from going to war after 1815, while their economic and 
cultural connections fertilised their friendship. 3 Martin Crawford (1987), however, 
believed that common Anglo-American ties helped the nations settle disputes with 
diplomacy, while newspapers like The Times, were lines of communications. 24 
Historians have offered a range of opinions on the status of the Anglo-American 
relationship. But Lionel M. Gelber, writing before and after the Second World War, 
believed that the nations came together if it suited their individual interests, rather than 
for altruistic motivations. 
He concluded (1938) that the American Revolution swayed the United States 
away from Britain. The War of 1812 and the Civil War reinforced the hostile American 
attitude. But by the late nineteenth century, when Anglo-American interests overlapped 
and they faced a common threat, the relationship became friendly. He concluded that 
after the Spanish-American War, stability was important and "Britain could begin to 
consider the United States an associated part of her defensive system" as the German 
threat increased. Britain and America, Gelber opined, would be wise to maintain their 
friendship with the rise of totalitarian Germany and Russia. After the war, he concluded 
(1961), that Britain owed its protection to America during the Cold War. Historically, 
22 H. G. Nicholas, Britain and the United States (London: Chatto & Windus, 1963), 11-31 and 
166-180. Nicholas refined his argument that trade promoted friendly relations, in The United States and 
Britain (Illinois: University of Chicago Press, 1975), for example see Chapters 1-3. 
23 Charles S. Campbell, From Revolution to Rapprochement: The United States and Great 
Britain, 1783-1900 (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1974), 1-8 and 191-204. Marshall Bertram, in The 
Birth of Anglo-American Friendship: The Prime Facet of the Venezuelan Boundary Dispute: A Study of 
the Interreaction of Diplomacy and Public Opinion (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1992) 
supported Campbell's conclusions but believed that newspapers and public opinion unified the 
relationship (for example, see his chapter 1). 
24 Martin Crawford, The Anglo-American Crisis of the Mid-Nineteenth Century: The Times and 
America, 1850-1862 (Athens and London: University of Georgia Press, 1987), ix and 1-14. 
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their relationship sometimes clashed, but rather than go to war, it had "long exhibited a 
dialectical process" and policies were reconciled for the "common" interest. 25 
The "special relationship, " advanced by some historians of Anglo-American 
relations, was virtually non-existent from 1819-1863. There were unresolved disputes, 
such as the right of search, that led British and American interests to clash on the high 
seas, in particular over slave trade suppression. Anglo-American naval relations in the 
equatorial Atlantic provide new insight into the dynamic of the Anglo-American 
relationship. During this period, it was analogous to that theorised by Gelber. They tried 
to reconcile their differences and avoid war. But co-operation was illusionary as they 
modified their naval policies, furthered objectives, and reduced or limited tensions. 
Anglo-American naval relations in the equatorial Atlantic reveal that Britain and the 
United States were neither friends nor enemies. The smallest dispute could spark the 
potential of unwanted war while they sought to further their separate national interests 
using sea power. But their naval relations became a device through which they could 
accommodate each other, while maintaining their separate positions. 
The historiography of Anglo-American relations shows that their relations often 
revolved around economic, maritime, and trades issues. Consequently, an analysis of 
their naval relations surrounding piracy and slave trade suppression in the equatorial 
Atlantic is an important measurement of the dynamics of their connection. This study 
will show that a dialectic existed between their naval and diplomatic relations in the 
early nineteenth century. Between 1819 and 1863, Britain and the United States 
remained wary that war might erupt between them over unresolved issues. But the 
analysis will show that while tensions remained, they worked to keep them from 
spiralling out of control. They modified their maritime policies to accommodate each 
u Lionel M. Gelber, The Rise of Anglo-American Friendship: A Study in World Politics, 1898- 
1906 (London: Oxford University Press, 1938), 1-17,31-36, and 274-275 and Gelber, America in 
Britain's Place: The Leadership of the West and Anglo-American Unity (New York: Frederick A. 
Praeger, 1961), 1-16. Although largely a textbook, David H. Burton, in British-American Diplomacy 
1895-1917: Early Years of the Special Relationship (Malabar, FL: Kroeger Publishing Company, 1999) 
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other while fighting piracy, the slave trade, and adhering to their wider domestic and 
international objectives. 
Naval History 
Naval historians have often dealt with sea power in support of national interests. Alfred 
Thayer Mahan is considered the father of naval history, but it has a broader foundation. 
It can be traced to John Knox Laughton. Laughton, a Cambridge trained mathematician, 
entered the Royal Navy in 1853 as an instructor. Cambridge instilled in him a rigorous 
scientific ethic that Andrew Lambert concluded he retained "for the rest of his life. " 
Laughton applied scientific method to his work on oceanic meteorology; collecting data 
to test an hypothesis, and then applied the same approach to naval history, advocating 
others do the same. Laughton understood that naval history was a part of international 
and domestic history, and contributed to the "understanding of those wider pictures. "26 
Laughton hoped to develop a "new doctrine for the ironclad era" and conceived 
some important concepts. For example, studying (1873) naval tactics for the period 
1794-1805, he concluded that an enemy could meet their objectives "by avoiding 
decisive action" and creating "strategic defeats" for their enemies. Force concentration 
and skill were important to achieve true victories. Consequently, strategic plans "had to 
be developed that would force [emphasis in original] a reluctant enemy to fight[. ]"27 
Laughton's concepts and scientific methodology influenced other naval historians like 
Sir Julian Corbett, Admiral Sir Herbert Richmond, and Mahan. 
Laughton recruited Corbett into the Navy Records Society, and suggested he 
study the Spanish War of 1585-87. Using an archive-based approach, Corbett moved 
into strategic studies and found in Clausewitz "a theoretical structure that could contain, 
observed similarly that World War One showed that "national self-interest need not be divisive" (Burton, 
6). 
26 Andrew Lambert, The Foundations of Naval History: John Knox Laughton, the Royal Navy 
and the Historical Profession (London: Chatham Publishing, 1998), 11-17,25 and 47. 
27 Lambert, Foundations, 44-47. 
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develop and elucidate the strong strategic and doctrinal framework provided by 
Laughton. s28 Laughton also influenced Richmond, when the former passed along 
projects. Richmond, like Laughton used "academic study as the foundation for national 
strategy" and stressed "that naval operations merely formed a part of strategy [. ]9,29 In 
the United States, Mahan concluded that great battles between naval powers often 
decided history. He looked to the past to find the elements of sea power that made a 
nation great: its geography, natural resources, population, and the character of the 
people and government. 30 Mahan acknowledged Laughton's influence, and the latter 
was pleased that Mahan's work was "history teaching by examples[. ]"31 Lambert 
concluded that they learned from each other and shared a belief in "the importance of 
history in demonstrating the central role of naval power in national policy. "32 
Laughton's lasting influence was methodological. Richmond, on Corbett's 
death, wrote that "history is the raw material out of which a knowledge of the principles 
of strategy and tactics is built[. ]"33 Several authorities on British and American naval 
history are relevant to this study because they have focused on the use of sea power in 
the national interest, while using historical methodology. 34 In the polemical strain, for 
28 Lambert, Foundations, 157 and 224-225. 
29 Lambert, Foundations, 195-197 and 221. 
so Alfred Thayer Mahan, The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660-1805 (Englewood 
Cliffs, NF: Prentice-Hall, 1980), 30-33. This work is a one-volume edition of The Influence of Sea Power 
upon History, 1660-1783 and The Influence of Sea Power upon the French Revolution and Empire, 1793- 
1812. Mahan also wrote other works, for example, a biography, The Life of Nelson: The Embodiment of 
Sea Power of Great Britain (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1899). He expressed his theory of 
history skilfully in "Subordination in Historical Treatment, " Annual Report of the American Historical 
Association for the Year 1902 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1903). For more on the 
influences on Mahan's theories see Thomas R. Pollock, "The Historical Elements of Mahanian Doctrine, " 
Naval War College Review, 35: 4 (1982): 44-49. 
31 Lambert, Foundations, 127. 
32 Lambert, Foundations, 126-130. 
33 Richmond in Lambert, Foundations, 220. 
34 Mahan cautioned that there were other factors than the role of sea power in establishing a great 
nation, a warning that most naval historians have ignored. See Paul Kennedy, "The Influence and the 
Limitations of Sea Power, " The International History Review, 10: 1 (February 1988): 2-17. 
17 
example, Harold and Margaret Sprout (1939) intended their study of American sea 
power as a warning to the United States to remain prepared for war. The Battle of 
Yorktown, during the Revolutionary War, led to the capture of Cornwallis and, 
according to the Sprouts, the eventual defeat of the British. In a similar style, other 
historians, like Craig L. Symonds (1980), have focussed on the "character of the people 
and government" in Mahan's paradigm, and the continual battle between American 
ocean and land interests - the navalists and antinavalists. 
35 
But other historians, in the tradition of the historical academy, have taken a 
broader approach to assess how sea power was used in support of national interests and 
what it may reveal about international relations. Richmond believed that armed force 
"constitutes a weapon which defends some vital interest" and nations with overseas 
interests developed a fleet that was "a flexible instrument, apt to the needs of the 
country[. ]"36 Sea power developed because of "spontaneous economic or social 
movements" and overseas development. Other nations, not dependent on the sea, also 
strove for sea power to acquire territory or trade "for the added wealth and strength and 
influence which it would confer[. ]" As nations grew economically, rivalries occurred 
that spawned the desire for greater sea power. He believed that the "need for security of 
an interest upon which the life and fortunes of the peoples depended brought it [sea 
power] into existence[. ]" The English, for instance, developed sea power when their 
interests became "more widely diffused, [and] contact, and consequently the possibility 
of friction, with states far removed from the Channel" became more likely. 37 
While Richmond (1934) focused on the broad need for sea power, C. J. Bartlett 
(1963) concentrated on policy development. He believed that strong individuals, like 
Lord Palmerston, were important in moulding naval policy. But Bartlett also postulated 
35 Harold and Margaret Sprout, The Rise of American Naval Power 1776-1918 (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1939), 7-12 and Symonds, Navalists andAntinavalists, 11-12. 
36 Herbert Richmond, Sea Power in the Modern World (London: G. Bell & Sons, Ltd., 1934), 5- 
6. 
37 Richmond, Sea Power in the Modern World, 16-35. 
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that economics and the "triangular struggle" of naval, foreign, and domestic affairs also 
played a role. 38 Andrew Lambert showed that British naval development met threats 
from rivals, like France. When the threat declined in the 1860s, calls from navalists like 
Sir Baldwin Walker for more iron warships were met with economising through smaller 
vessels. But leaders like Aberdeen had also used the navy as instruments of diplomacy, 
"[i]n the Mediterranean he called for two less battleships than the French, to salve their 
wounded pride[. ]"39 
Interest-Based Naval Analysis 
Mahan has influenced the development of naval history, but others also advanced the 
field. From Laughton, Mahan, Richmond and others, there has been continuity in naval 
history, but also historical rigour to understand the influence of broader factors on naval 
affairs. Recent maritime and naval historians have advocated a renewed systematic 
approach to naval history that also takes into consideration more than just battles, 
tactics, and the great commanders' role in war. One aspect of "New Naval History" is to 
link naval affairs and wider history. John B. Hattendorf wrote that naval power was one 
way nations implemented national policy. Therefore, he opined, naval historians must 
acknowledge the interconnectedness of traditional naval topics and broader national 
contexts to understand navies and their use. 4° 
An interest-based approach to naval history allows for a broader analysis than a 
focus solely based on battles and tactics. In turn, this reveals the dynamics of policy 
formulation, and the relationship between sea power and international relations. Like 
Bartlett, Paul Kennedy believed that broader variables had to be used to understand the 
38 Bartlett, Great Britain and Sea Power, 101-102 and 104. 
39 Andrew Lambert, Battleships in Transition: The Creation of the Steam Battlefleet 1815-1860 
(Oxford: The Alden Press, 1984), 13-19,83-85 and 117-118 and Lambert, The Last Sailing Battlefleet: 
Maintaining Naval Mastery, 1815-1850 (London: Conway Maritime Press, Ltd., 1991), 39. 
ao John B. Hattendorf, (ed. ), Doing Naval History: Essays Toward Improvement (Newport, RI: 
Naval War College Press, 1995), 1-4. 
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development of British naval policy. He believed that notions of "naval mastery" and 
"sea power" could only be understood by analysing "national, international, economic, 
political and strategical considerations [j"41 But how did nations use navies in support 
of national interests, short of war? Corbett recognised, while discussing war, that 
national policies influenced naval deployment and even small navies could be used to 
implement national policies in localised areas without achieving complete command of 
the sea. 42 Meanwhile, Lambert revealed in his study of the Crimean War, for example, 
that the Royal Navy could influence Russian strategy without drawing the Russian Navy 
into battle. 43 The nature of the interests shapes the level of naval involvement in 
implementing national policy. This study will reveal this is particularly true in an era of 
relative peace. Therefore, an "interest theory" school of naval relations is important. 
Late twentieth century naval strategists have articulated an "interest" theory of 
naval strategy further. A speaker at the Adderbury Maritime Strategic Dialogue 
concluded that "[m]aritime forces are particularly useful for interest-based strategies" 
and the interests of two sides might "only clash at certain points. s44 Meanwhile, Jan 
Glete theorised that forces like the navy acted "as instruments for a state in accordance 
with the demands of the interest base behind that state[. ]" Glete postulated an "interest 
41 Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery (London: Penguin Books, Ltd., 
1976), xv-xvii, 24-27 and 98-110. 
42 Julian S. Corbett, Some Principles of Maritime Strategy (New York, Bombay, and Calcutta: 
Longmans, Green and Co., 1911, reprint New York: AMS Press, 1972), 1-9,14-27,87 and 100-10 1. For 
more on Corbett and Richmond see James Goldrick and John B. Hattendorf, (eds. ), Mahan is Not 
Enough: The Proceedings of a Conference on the Works of Sir Julian Corbett and Admiral Sir Herbert 
Richmond (Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 1993) in particular, Hattendorf, "Mahan Is Not 
Enough: Conference Themes and Issues, " 7-12; Daniel A. Baugh, "Admiral Sir Herbert Richmond and 
the Objects of Sea Power, " 13-38; and Donald M. Schurman, "Julian Corbett's Influence on the Royal 
Navy's Perception of its Maritime Function, " 51-63. 
43 Andrew D. Lambert, The Crimean War: British Grand Strategy, 1853-56 (Manchester and 
New York: Manchester University Press, 1990), 169 and 293. But Basil Greenhill cautioned that British 
officers, like Keppel, were looking for a battle with the Russian fleet, unaware that the Royal Navy had 
defeated the Russian navy's Baltic squadron by "simply being there" (Basil Greenhill and Ann Giffard, 
The British Assault on Finland, 1854-1855: A Forgotten Naval War [Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute 
Press, 1988], 289-291). 
as Eric Grove, Maritime Strategy and European Security. Common Security Studies No. 2 
(London: Brassey's, 1990), 140. 
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aggregation" of those willing to "cede their right of using violence[. ]" Consequently, 
while the state acted "as an economic coordinator of resources brought or extracted 
from the society[, ]" nineteenth century "Euro-American cruiser forces" became the 
"chief instrument of violence control" according to interest demands. 45 
To such ends, piracy and the slave trade involved both the United States and 
Britain, and their domestic and international interests, within the same zone. This study 
will reveal that Britain and the United States, in support of the "interest aggregation, " 
exerted regional influence to further their national interests, while avoiding war, during 
their actions against piracy and the slave trade. Yet, piracy and slave trade suppression 
studies have largely ignored issues of international relations and naval policy (see 
Appendix: Piracy and Slave Trade Studies). An analysis that compares and contrasts 
British and American efforts to suppress piracy and the slave trade provides a 
significant indication of the role of sea power to support national interests and what it 
reveals about Anglo-American relations. Their use of sea power allowed the nations to 
relate with one another and mitigate potential conflicts. 
This thesis will argue that Britain and the United States reacted differently to 
piracy and the slave trade, depending on their national interest aggregation, as each 
sought to protect and promote commerce and further wider objectives. Consequently, 
their different reactions and national interests shaped their naval deployment and 
relations. Divergent goals and strategies often interfered with each other and generated 
Anglo-American tension. But their underlying policies moulded their use of sea power 
for "peaceful" purposes; conflict avoidance with each other while furthering economic 
goals. Rather than go to war, the nations sought a conciliatory approach to their 
conflicting naval policies. The analysis is significant because it adds to the field of 
Anglo-American relations studies to show that Britain and America accommodated each 
other in the equatorial Atlantic to reduce tensions and the chance of war. 
45 Jan Glete, Navies and Nations: Warships, Navies and State Building in Europe and America, 
1500-1860.2 vols. (Stockholm: Almqvist and Wiksell International, 1993), 400,477-482 and 486. 
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Comparative Methodology and Sources 
This study will offer a deeper understanding of the role of sea power, international and 
naval relations, and the suppression of piracy and the slave trade. To correct the 
inconsistencies and oversights of prior piracy and slave trade suppression studies (see 
Appendix: Piracy and Slave Trade Studies), it will use a comparative methodology. 
Dennis E. Showalter concluded that naval history must address "systematically and 
comparatively the problem of choice in state policy, strategic planning, and force 
structures" to create "a `new naval history. ' 46 In 1995, Paul G. Halpern wrote that 
comparative naval history could compare and contrast the operations of two or more 
navies or geographic regions. Sources and methods similar to non-naval studies could 
be used: first person accounts, official records, and records from "the enemy" covering 
the same event. Using such a technique, this study will attempt to satisfy William R. 
Thompson's suggestion that naval historians ask explicit questions and make explicit 
comparisons. 47 
By comparing Anglo-American interests, policy formulation, and its impact on 
shaping naval deployment and co-operation, important insight will be gained into the 
circumstances under which Britain and the United States used sea power and co- 
operated. To link elements of naval history, the sources used to assess how piracy and 
slave trade suppression reflected national interests and Anglo-American relations 
comprised several groups. These included newspapers; policy, diplomatic, and naval 
documents; and economic and naval statistics. British and American sources are often 
46 Dennis E. Showalter, "Toward a `New' Naval History, " in Hattendorf, (ed. ), Doing Naval 
History, 138. 
47 Paul G. Halpern, "Comparative Naval History, " and William R. Thompson, "Some Mild and 
Radical Observations on Desiderata in Comparative Naval History, " in Hattendorf, (ed. ), Doing Naval 
History, 75-114. Several other authors have written works of comparative naval history. For example, 
Clark G. Reynolds, in Command of the Sea: The History and Strategy of Maritime Empires (London: 
Robert Hale & Company, 1976) sought to "discover the strategic alternatives and constants governing 
navies and empires throughout the continuum of history by raising hypotheses to be tested by historical 
examination" (Reynolds, xv-xvi) Meanwhile, George Modelski and William R. Thompson, in Seapower 
in Global Politics, 1494-1993 (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1988) used aggregate ship 
counting to track "fluctuations in the concentration of global reach[. ]" (Modelski and Thompson, 
Seapower, 27-97). 
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interlocking and complementary. But each type of source has limitations and 
advantages. 
People, for example, often have agendas, while reporters can embellish stories 
while telling horrific tales of piracy. Nevertheless, newspapers accounts are important 
because they reveal what the public was being exposed to regarding an issue. The 
historian can use documents from the policy making, diplomatic, and naval deployment 
levels to fill in the details for an analysis. But these sources also contain personal or 
nationalistic bias while only officially sanctioned records are often published. 
Meanwhile, all sources contain gaps and the researcher can only use those that survive. 
Consequently, a comparative methodology, using similar sources for two countries, can 
increase the accuracy and reliability of the analysis. Halpern advocated a "mirror 
technique. " Record gaps can be filled and biases reduced by looking in the archives of 
opposing governments, departments and navies. 48 
Used comparatively, British and American sources allow the dynamics of the 
Anglo-American relationship to be analysed at various levels. For example, newspapers 
like the American Commercial and Daily Advertiser and The New York Times provided 
"real-time" details of events and the opinions of interest groups. The Annals of 
Congress and the Congressional Globe provided information about congressional 
opinion, including petitions requesting support for African endeavours. Additionally, 
documents contained in National Archives (NA), Record Group (RG) 45, Naval 
Records Collection of the Office of Naval Records and Library, Records of the 
Secretary of the Navy, contained correspondence from American merchants and other 
parties interested in matters relating to piracy, slave trade suppression, African 
colonisation, and trade. 
Several American sources were then used to analyse American decision making. 
Among them, the memoirs of John Quincy Adams revealed White House policy 
48 Halpern, "Comparative Naval History, " in Hattendorf, (ed. ), Doing Naval History, 81-91. 
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debates, in particular during President James Monroe's tenure. Adams' memoirs also 
provided his personal reflections on the decisions, in particular over the contentious 
issue of dispatching American naval forces to the West African coast. The papers of 
Secretary of State Daniel Webster were especially important in analysing the decisions 
made during the early 1840s, when the United States established a permanent West 
African force. The American sources reveal the ease with which leaders made decisions 
to police piracy, but how, at the same time, they found it hard to make decisions 
regarding the slave trade. The sources reveal the political, economic and geographic 
constraints on those decisions. 
This study also examines the ramifications of the American political process on 
international relations and naval deployment. American dispatches from US 
ambassadors in Britain, contained in the General Records of the Department of State 
(RG 59), reveal the interface between the American and British positions, as did British 
Foreign Office and Admiralty documents. The U. S. Serial Set and Navy Department 
records contained at the National Archives divulged the opinions of naval officers and 
how political considerations shaped naval policy. American naval deployment was also 
examined using Annual Reports of the Secretary of the Navy, and sources contained in 
the Naval Records Collection of the Office of Naval Records and Library, Records of 
the Secretary of the Navy (RG 45), like Commodore Matthew Perry's letter books, the 
copious volumes of correspondence received by the Secretary of the Navy from 
squadron commanders, and the Secretary's "confidential" letters. 
This study compares and contrasts American naval deployment, constraints and 
freedoms with their British counterparts. From the British perspective, one source for 
gathering information on diplomatic and naval relations, and naval deployment, were 
published British Parliamentary Papers, like the Irish University Press series, in 
particular the series on the slave trade. This well-indexed source contains British policy 
papers, diplomatic and naval correspondence, and statistics on slave trade seizures. 
Charles Webster warned that these "Blue Books" might be misleading. Lord Palmerston 
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admitted, for example, that he could withhold materials from Parliament. But he also 
realised that he depended on public opinion for support, deceiving them could backfire, 
thus he demanded that "[a]ll important negotiations had to be fully recorded in the 
public despatches[. ]" Webster also concluded that diplomatic correspondence was a 
special case. If the government published false records, the offended government would 
know, for it would have a copy of the actual correspondence. Metternich, for example, 
was so concerned about the authenticity of "Blue Book" diplomatic correspondence that 
he often "withheld communications" because "they might be produced to Parliament. "49 
But to balance the possible biases in parliamentary records, this study also used 
American diplomatic records like dispatches from American ambassadors in London, to 
develop a truer picture of the diplomatic process. For key periods, such as during the 
piracy crisis and later tension with the United States over slave trade suppression and 
Central America, Admiralty (Adm) records were also consulted, including 
correspondence from the government and naval officers. For the critical 1840s, I also 
consulted the papers of Sir Charles Hotham, British commodore along West Africa, 
held by the Brynmor Jones Library Archives, University of Hull. Containing letters 
from the government, personal correspondence, and his general and secret dispatches, it 
painted a wider picture of British West African policy and how it fitted with larger 
geopolitical and strategic concerns. A pattern emerged in the totality of the documents 
that explained national policies and how naval and diplomatic relations interfaced with 
other objectives, while the nations sought to mitigate disputes between them. 
British naval deployment shaped by their policies was investigated and given a 
wider perspective using various sources. In addition to the Hotham papers, during the 
earlier piracy crisis, Adm 2/1585-1589, Out-letters, showed British decisions. The 
logbooks of admirals like Sir Charles Rowley (Adm 50/136) and Jamaica station 
correspondence (Adm 1/273-275 and Adm 128/34), for example, revealed policy 
49 Charles Webster, The Foreign Policy of Palmerston 1830-1841: Britain, The Liberal 
Movement and the Eastern Question. 2 vols. (London: G. Bell & Sons, Ltd., 1951), vol. 1,61-63. 
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ramifications in-theatre. Critical Foreign Office (FO) comments on West African policy 
are contained in FO 2/4, Africa and FO 84/775, Slave Trade Department. Meanwhile, 
policy directives issued during a period of Anglo-American tension in the Gulf of 
Mexico in 1858 are in Adm 1/5699, In-Letters, From Foreign Office, 1858. Important in 
comparing general Anglo-American naval relations was Adm 7/712, an Admiralty file 
on the US Navy. Finally, Royal Navy deployment in West Africa was examined using 
African station correspondence in Adm 123/164, Adm 123/167, Adm 123/173, and 
Adm 123/177. 
These sources revealed the impact of policy on British naval deployment against 
pirates, its freedom against slavers off West Africa, and the problems the Royal Navy 
faced when Anglo-American interests clashed. Admiralty and US Navy Department 
sources, specific naval operations and the observations of one navy on the other, also 
helped assess the dynamic between Anglo-American relations and their use of sea 
power during this period. Finally, the influence of national interests on naval 
deployment in the Atlantic was followed statistically for the Royal Navy and US Navy 
with time series developed from Annual Reports of the Secretary of the Navy and 
Britain's Navy List. In addition, the accuracy of official slave trade observations was 
tested against a database on slaving voyages compiled by David Eltis, Stephen D. 
Behrendt, David Richardson, and Herbert S. Klein. 50 
This work intends to explain how Anglo-American naval policy was a tool in 
defining their relationship. Using the sources and methodology described, eight chapters 
and a conclusion divide this study. Chapter Two places British and American goals, and 
navies, within the context of their economic development, growing interests and 
relations in the equatorial Atlantic. Chapter Three and Four reveal that both nations 
worked toward a common policy during the Spanish American rebellions, but kept the 
so David Eltis, Stephen D. Behrendt, David Richardson, and Herbert S. Klein, The Trans-Atlantic 
Slave Trade: A Database on CD-ROM (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999). Hereafter, Eltis, 
et al., Slave Trade: A Database. Readers should note that, as this is a CD-ROM, citations will not contain 
page numbers. Results are generated through st tured query language (SQL) calls to the database. 
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use of sea power to protecting commercial interests from pirate attacks. Unable to reach 
a consensus, both went their separate ways, while still fulfilling similar objectives. The 
chapters reveals the ease with which the United States deployed force to protect against 
pirates, while Britain was restrained by her commitments to the Concert of Europe. But 
Britain faced fewer constraints on the other side of the Atlantic against the slave trade. 
However, in that war, London was unable to convince the United States to co-operate 
against the slave trade. Instead, Washington deployed a minimal naval force to West 
Africa in hope of placating the British while supporting private colonisation efforts. 
Chapter Five shows that by the 1840s, the American use of sea power included 
furthering strategic objectives overseas. It formed a nexus with British policy and 
allowed both nations to relate and avoid war. Their strategic view of the peaceful use of 
sea power allowed them to develop a common strategy for West Africa in hope of 
mitigating disputes. The United States deployed a permanent West African squadron to 
protect and promote commercial development and eliminate the need for Britain to stop 
US-flagged ships. Meanwhile, London believed the Royal Navy could suppress the 
slave trade and encourage legitimate commerce under the free trade banner. To 
emphasise differences in Anglo-American policy, Chapters Six and Seven analyse 
British and American naval policies off West Africa after 1842. They reveal that by the 
late 1850s, their differing goals continued to generate Anglo-American tension. But 
Chapter Eight explains that they modified their use of sea power to reduce tensions and 
safely move individual interests forward. Britain and the United States were neither 
friends nor enemies, but their concept for peacetime sea power was a mechanism 
through which the nations co-existed. 
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Chapter Two: The Atlantic Theatre 
The French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars left the United States and Britain the 
major players in the Atlantic. The economic conditions in this region are significant 
because the policies and growth of Britain and the United States shaped their naval 
deployment and their relations. Their growing and often divergent goals created 
conditions that could increase Anglo-American tensions in regions of common interest, 
like the equatorial Atlantic. While Britain and the United States eyed each other with 
suspicion, the "interest aggregation" in both countries preferred peaceful development 
of objectives. The nations met on the "great common" in the West Indies and West 
Africa, two important regions for their emerging policies. 
During times of crisis, Britain and the United States were wary of each other. 
But their adherence to using sea power peacefully, to protect and promote trade, 
provided them with a mechanism with which to relate without driving each other from 
the sea. In Britain, capitalists wanted peaceful growth and protection of overseas 
commerce. Therefore, political leaders avoided provoking naval rivals, like France and 
the United States, into combining to threaten British interests. Instead, London hoped to 
further economic goals through an emerging freer trade policy, conflict avoidance, and 
"peaceful" use of sea power. In the United States, while American leaders also felt that 
sea power could be used peacefully for a similar purpose, policies wavered as the nation 
struggled over continental or maritime expansion. 
The Atlantic Theatre 
During the early nineteenth century, Western Europe was the most developed region in 
the Atlantic with London the world financial centre. Table 2.1 and 2.2 show that 
Europe's share of manufacturing output and levels of industrialisation grew, with 
Britain at the forefront. The United States lagged behind in terms of manufacturing 
output, only surpassing Britain in the early twentieth century, but it was growing. As 
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British and American industrial might and hunger for more markets and resources grew, 
they backed up control with mechanised firepower. ' 
Table 2.1 Share of World Manufacturing Output, 1750-1900 (Percentage) 
Country 1750 1800 1830 1860 1880 1900 
Europe 23.2 28.1 34.2 53.2 61.3 62.0 
(UK) (1.9) (4.3) (9.5) (19.9) (22.9) (18.5) 
US 0.1 0.8 2.4 7.2 14.7 23.6 
Third World 73.0 67.7 60.5 36.6 20.9 11.0 
Other 3.7 3.4 2.9 3.0 3.1 3.4 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Source: Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and 
Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000 (London: Fontana Press, 1988), table 6,190. 
Table 2.2 Levels of Industrialisation, 1750-1900 
Country 1750 1800 1830 1860 1880 1900 
Europe 88 11 16 24 35 
UK 10 16 25 64 87 100 
US 49 14 21 38 69 
Source: Kennedy, Rise and Fall of the Great Powers, table 7,190. 
Note: UK = 100 in 1900. 
Still, a balance of power strategy governed geopolitical relations in this world. European 
powers worked to prevent France's aggressive rebirth and its relative share of power 
fell. Meanwhile, conservative attitudes, like those of Prince Metternich, played a part in 
British strategic thinking. 2 The continuance of the "rule of law, " or "legitimacy, " 
philosophy helped govern Britain's foreign policy. Thus, Imlah concluded, the system 
maintained order in Europe and "helped to prevent [the] balance of power [strategy] 
0 from degenerating into mere competition for power. 
1 Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict 
from 1500 to 2000 (London: Fontana Press, 1988), 183-193. 
2 Kennedy, Rise and Fall of the Great Powers, 204-218; Modelski and Thompson, Seapower, 
249-250 and 305; and Reynolds, Command of the Sea, 332. 
3 Albert H. Imlah, Economic Elements in the Pax Britannica: Studies in British Foreign Trade in 
the Nineteenth Century (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1958), 2-4. 
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The Gentlemanly Capitalists and British Strategy 
In this context, Britain developed a free trade policy and political leaders grew to adhere 
to a liberal view of foreign relations that meant interference with other powers only if 
British interests were threatened. Early British trade policies constrained British naval 
objectives during the piracy crisis. As the former evolved, London felt it could work 
with other powers to achieve its economic goals while maintaining Britain's strategic 
commitments. Barry Gough concluded that "the term Pax Britannica ... encompasses 
the maintenance of order and stability in various regions of the world" for the peaceful 
development of British interests. This economic and diplomatic policy moulded 
Britain's use of sea power and her relations with the United States. 
The political elite and London's financial centre, "The City, " dominated British 
goals to further commercial development "peacefully. " They were a cohesive group 
with similar backgrounds, while other groups lacked sufficient political power. The 
City, with its government connections, wished commerce increased and kept a freer 
trade imperative prominent. In the Western Atlantic, the British wanted access to 
Spanish markets, while checking the moves of other powers. Along West Africa, while 
radical free traders sought to disband the African squadron, the political elite dominated. 
This study will reveal that they would not let the other political groups stall their policy 
or drag them into war. Consequently, they sought to further their interests with sea 
power, and modified its use when it threatened relations with other nations, like the 
United States. As Gough surmised, for gentlemanly capitalists, "[a]mphibious 
diplomacy required a deft hand. s5 
Studies of the connection between the British financial and government sectors 
are nothing new; their connections and interests influenced the dynamics of British 
° Barry Gough, "Profit and Power: Informal Empire, the Navy and Latin America, " in Raymond 
E. Dumett, (ed. ), Gentlemanly Capitalism and British Imperialism: The New Debate on Empire (London 
and New York: Longman, 1999), 73. 
5 Gough, "Profit and Power, " 79. 
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foreign policy. Leaders like Lord Palmerston warned investors of those countries to 
avoid, while governments saw the advantage of British financial penetration into 
regions of British political interest. 6 D. C. M. Platt commented that "[b]usinessmen, 
politicians, and officials shared their beliefs, social status, and general interests to such 
an extent that they acted together. " He reminded us that "Lenin wrote of `the 
"interlocking" of bankers, ministers, big industrialists and rentiers'[. ]" 7 But in the most 
succinct study of the phenomena, P. J. Cain and A. G. Hopkins concluded that the 
connection between the London financial sector and British policy makers provided The 
City with considerable influence at the Treasury, Colonial, and Foreign Office. 8 
Rooted in the British landed aristocracy, the English gentlemanly class held 
money made from physical labour and production "in low repute. " Instead, banking and 
finance, based at the City of London, appealed to them. Therein rose the famous 
banking families of the Barings, Rothschilds, and Grenfells. The City made money in 
acceptable ways, remained loyal to the traditional, governing class, and connected the 
gentlemanly capitalists and government officials. Both were educated for the elite at 
universities such as Oxford and Cambridge and held similar world views because of 
their "gentlemanly ethic[. ]"9 They recognised "Britain's status as an international 
service centre" rather than her "position as the world's workshop. " And abroad, the 
gentlemen nurtured similar groups with whom they could deal-10 
Cain and Hopkins concluded that the gentlemanly class linked economics and 
government policy. The ability of the government to pay high post-war debt worsened 
during the depression of the late 1830s and early 1840s. Therefore, expansion, co- 
6 D. C. M. Platt, Finance, Trade, and Politics in British Foreign Policy 1815-1914 (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1968), 12,18 and 25. 
7 Platt, Finance, Trade, and Politics, 3-5 and 23. 
8 P. J. Cain and A. G. Hopkins, British Imperialism, 1688-2000,2"d Edition (London: Longmans, 
2001), 120-121. This is a one-volume edition of Cain and Hopkins' original British Imperialism. 
9 Cain and Hopkins, British Imperialism, 38-43,47 and 122. 
10 Cain and Hopkins, British Imperialism, 48-51. 
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ordinated by The City, would increase trade and provide the government with increased 
revenues to meet its debt obligations. Decreased tariffs would increase foreign supplies 
of food for the growing British population, while providing British manufacturers with 
new markets. " The City was the world's creditor and financed the development of 
Europe and the United States. Increased world trade would be "handled, transported and 
insured by British firms. " The gentlemanly capitalists saw empire as a "means of 
generating income" in acceptable ways, protected and promoted by the government. 12 
Tory and Whig ministries dominated early nineteenth century governments. 
Tories were concerned with stability and aristocratic ideals. Whigs held similar views, 
but also believed in gradual reform and had support from The City and rising 
manufacturing classes. Largely from the same class, British governments supported the 
gentlemanly view. Tories Lord Castlereagh and George Canning, for example, believed 
in developing trade links to Latin America. 13 This connection, Cain and Hopkins 
concluded, also explains Palmerston's "aggressive imperialism during the severe 
depression of the 1830s and 1840s[. ]" It was meant to expand British markets and keep 
the "lower" classes content and "at arm's length. s14 Palmerston, a Whig, believed in 
free trade and was willing to impose it on "reluctant rulers, to evict recalcitrant ones, 
and to advance `legitimate commerce' by putting down the slave trade. " His philosophy 
was logical because "he inherited beliefs espoused by the gentlemanly elite[. ]"15 The 
Royal Navy was a natural instrument to aid such "gentlemanly" interests, but at all 
levels London adhered to a liberal policy of minimal interference overseas. 
11 Cain and Hopkins, British Imperialism, 82-85. 
12 Cain and Hopkins, British Imperialism, 55-57. 
" Cain and Hopkins, British Imperialism, 46-48 and 246. 
14 Cain and Hopkins, British Imperialism, 52. 
15 Cain and Hopkins, British Imperialism, 99. 
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During this period, with short exceptions as during the Conservative 
administrations of Sir Robert Peel, George Canning and Lord Palmerston dominated 
British foreign policy. Canning was Foreign Secretary from 1822 to 1827, when he 
briefly became Prime Minister before his death. Thereafter, with brief interruptions 
from 1830, Palmerston was Foreign Secretary, and then Prime Minister, until his death 
in 1865. But both men placed Britain's interests first. 16 As will be discussed in Chapter 
Three, Canning wanted to placate other nations, but act at the best moment to secure 
British commercial interests. 17 Palmerston followed in the tradition of Canning, but also 
held a liberal foreign policy philosophy; an "amalgam of progress and stability[. ]"1S 
E. D. Steele concluded that Palmerston's use of force depended on the 
circumstances. He was willing to use force, for example, against Brazil, Japan, and 
China, but it was "not evident in his handling of relations with France and America[. ]" 
The commercial and public sectors wanted peace and stability. They wanted Britain to 
play a part in Europe, but "they expected to enjoy [this] without a war ... 
[that] might 
jeopardize prosperity[. ]i19 Consequently, Palmerston sought to use other states to 
counter larger powers. He used Turkey, for example, to counter Russia and supported 
the Greek independence movement. He realised that "France ... was the rival of 
Britain 
overseas and the greatest danger to British security. " But rather than war, he believed 
that French power was better "checked by cooperation[. ] , 20 Britain adhered to a liberal 
philosophy, protected its merchants from physical harm, and promoted economic 
16 M. E. Chamberlain, "Reading History: New Light on British Foreign Policy, " History Today, 
1985,35 (July): 45-48. 
17 Harold Temperley, The Foreign Policy of Canning, 1822-1827: England, the Neo-Holy 
Alliance, and the New World, 2nd Edition (London and Edinburgh: Frank Cass & Co., Ltd., reprint 1966), 
42-45 and 447-475. 
18 Kenneth Bourne, The Foreign Policy of Victorian England, 1830-1902 (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1970), 29-32. 
19 E. D. Steele, Palmerston and Liberalism, 1855-1865 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1991), 5 and 8. 
20 Webster, Foreign Policy ofPalmerston, vol. 2,784-786 and 792. 
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growth, but maintained a laissez-faire mentality unless other countries threatened 
British interests. 
The Empire of Free Trade and the Equatorial Atlantic 
The Foreign Office was therefore keen to create a supportive overseas atmosphere for 
British merchants. But when speculative ventures went wrong, such as loan defaults in 
Latin America, London refused to intervene. Palmerston was sensitive to their cause, 
but maintained a liberal policy. 21 In 1848, for example, he told British representatives 
abroad that they were to be "earnest and friendly" in promoting the interests of British 
investors. Only under the extreme circumstances of dramatic losses would Britain bring 
such private matters into the diplomatic realm 22 Instead, Britain shifted to a freer trade 
mentality to further commercial development, moving away from securing exclusive 
access to trade. In the early 1820s, William Huskisson, the new Board of Trade 
President, renewed calls for tariff reductions to promote trade. Meanwhile, reciprocity 
treaties reduced the scope of the Navigation Acts and in 1825 London extended the 
policy to specific British colonial "free" ports, as long as it was reciprocated. 
23 
With Britain at the forefront of the Industrial Revolution, the capitalists wanted 
trade barriers lowered so they could buy cheap primary resources and "undersell 
continental rivals" in a spirit of "free trade. " Parliament enfranchised the "middle class" 
in 1832, with the first Reform Bill, and they too began to support the free trade 
movement. Meanwhile, by the 1840s, the government lowered duties on wool and 
21 Bourne, Foreign Policy of Victorian England, 3-4. 
22 PRO, Foreign Office (FO) 83/110, reprint in Bourne, Foreign Policy of Victorian England, 
Doc. 46, Palmerston's Circular to British Representatives abroad, 15 January 1848. 
23 Bernard Semmel, The Rise of Free Trade Imperialism: Classical Political Economy, the 
Empire of Free Trade, and Imperialism, 1750-1850 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970), 218 
and Imlah, Economic Elements in the Pax Britannica, 17 and 3-14. The navigation laws applied to cargo 
imported into Britain and covered European, colonial, African, Asian, American, the coasting and 
fisheries trades. Traders had to bring goods directly into Britain in British ships, defined from both home 
and the colonies as British built and owned with her master and three-quarters of her crew British (Sarah 
Palmer, Politics, Shipping and the Repeal of the Navigation Laws [Manchester: Manchester University 
Press, 1990], 41-42,50-53 and 74-80). 
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cotton imports and coal exports. By the early 1840s, one supporter of free trade was Sir 
Robert Peel, the Prime Minister. The 1848 continental revolutions made the government 
wary of innovation, but Peel's government obtained vague commitments from other 
powers, like Prussia and the United States, to open trade to Britain, if Britain repealed 
the Navigation Acts. They were repealed on 13 June 1849, but the British coasting trade 
remained protected and the government had the power to retaliate against any country 
that failed to grant British shipping similar concessions. 24 
Figure 2.1 British Exports, Imports, and Re-exports, 1815-1861, £ millions 
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Source: Based on data from "External Trade 2. Official Values and Values at Current 
Prices of External Trade - United Kingdom 1796-1853" and "External Trade 3. Values 
at Current Prices of External Trade - United Kingdom 1854-1980, " in B. R. Mitchell, 
(ed. ), British Historical Statistics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 451. 
Note: Computed or Declared Values. 
Economically and strategically, a new empire was "founded to obtain a 
commercial end[. ]"25 Figure 2.1 reveals the increase in total British commerce during 
the early nineteenth century; exports for example, rose to £125.1 million by 1861. As 
24 Ralph Davis, The Industrial Revolution and British Overseas Trade (Leicester: Leicester 
University Press, 1979), 62; Semmel, Free Trade Imperialism, 139-141; Reynolds, Command of the Sea, 
329-330; Imlah, Economic Elements in the Pax Britannica, 15; and Palmer, Politics, Shipping, 98-113 
and 154-163. 
25 Semmel, Free Trade Imperialism, 150 and I57. 
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tables 2.3 and 2.4 show, trade between Britain and the United States became the most 
valuable. That between Africa, Latin America, and Britain also expanded, although 
trade growth with Latin America stagnated after its initial increase in the 1820s. But 
British trade with all regions grew in the decade following Peel's reforms. The United 
States, the West Indies, Latin America, and Africa, on opposite sides of the Atlantic, 
were important regions in Britain's economic web. In these regions, London hoped to 
balance economic interests with maintaining peace and stability. 
Table 2.3 Select British Export Destinations, £000 
Years Africa USA 'Vest Latin 
Indies America 
1814-6 353 7348 6906 2476 
1824-6 372 5695 4123 5009 
1834-6 967 9438 4117 5047 
1844-6 1368 7162 3866 5634 
1854-6 2623 20078 3947 8974 
Source: Ralph Davis, The Industrial Revolution and British Overseas Trade (Leicester: 
Leicester University Press, 1979), Table 38, Exports (£000), 89. 
Table 2.4 Select British Import Sources, £000 
Years Africa USA West Latin 
Indies America 
1814-6 703 3976 16656 6227 
1824-6 681 6061 8577 3109 
1834-6 2017 13223 7946 3380 
1844-6 2898 14058 5937 4905 
1854-6 5218 30282 8709 9698 
Source: Davis, Industrial Revolution, Table 40, Imports (£000), 93. 
The British had colonial interests in the West Indies: Jamaica, Barbados, and 
other islands where, until emancipation in 1833, slave-produced crops fuelled Britain, 
although trade with the West Indies generally declined. But in the 1820s, London also 
wanted to secure access to other parts of Latin America. A deeper analysis of the 
motives behind these statistics reveals that gentlemanly capitalists 
hoped for 
commercial expansion in this region, despite its stagnation until the 
1850s. Often 
ignoring the lower classes, they believed that the demands of their gentlemanly 
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counterparts represented that of an entire population. Consequently, for example, 
"[o]ptimists saw in Latin America ... limitless opportunities 
for the expansion of trade. " 
Upper class Britons created an image of opportunity although the population of the 
region was too poor to purchase many British commodities. 6 In 1829, Reverend Robert 
Walsh, for example, visited shops in Villa Rica, Minas Geraes, and reported them 
"filled with cotton goods from Manchester, broadcloths from Yorkshire, stockings from 
Nottingham, hats from London, cutlery from Sheffield[. ]" But Platt concluded that 
"[m]any travellers, consuls or commercial men were by class and temperament 
disinclined to visit local markets and examine the goods on display. " Instead, they 
visited gentlemanly shops along the main plazas that serviced the "small upper class" 
with "goods of the latest fashion. "27 
Latin America looked like an avenue of gentlemanly expansion, but in reality, 
supply outpaced demand. Regardless, British merchants flooded the region with a 
variety of commodities. John Luccock, a Rio merchant, received wallets, but exclaimed 
that such items were useless as there was no paper money. Meanwhile, "Lima, in 1826, 
was overflowing with British shawls and dresses; 40,000 muslin dresses had arrived in 
one vessel, consigned to a single mercantile house. " The British Committee of 
Merchants exemplified the elite's narrow analysis. The Committee opined in 1824 that 
Argentina lived on British imports. But Platt concluded that their "argument was 
exaggerated, based on a knowledge of the more accessible provinces and on a 
disinclination to look as far down as the bottom levels of society. "28 Hopes and dreams 
encouraged interest in these regions and moulded diplomatic and naval relations. 
In Latin America, Anglo-American relations were more likely to clash because 
of the proximity of US and British interests, the collapsing Spanish American Empire 
26 D. C. M. Platt, Latin America and British Trade 1806-1914 (London: Adams & Charles Black, 
1972), 3-9. 
27 Cain and Hopkins, British Imperialism, 18 and Platt, Latin America and British Trade, 18. 
28 Platt, Latin America and British Trade, 21-25. 
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and its last strongholds of strategically important Cuba and Puerto Rico. With the 
homeland in chaos, during the Napoleonic Wars, the Spanish-American colonies 
declared self-rule in the name of King Ferdinand. Spain was too weak to prevent its 
Spanish-American colonies from rebelling, refused to recognise them, and began 
waging war. One by one Spanish-American colonies declared independence and 
launched privateers, while pirates took advantage of the turmoil to plunder trade. 
Guatemala declared independence in 1821; Mexico and the Central American states in 
1823; then Argentina, Chile, Venezuela, Bolivia, Peru, and Paraguay. Spain used the 
"Balance of Power" system to justify their existence during upheavals. The disputes 
drew in America and Britain because Cuba and Puerto Rico were strategically important 
maritime locations and the Spanish upheavals threatened yet another revolution that 
would draw in conservative Europeans. 29 A positive image motivated Britain to exploit 
regional problems to secure access to markets and keep rivals away. As the next chapter 
will reveal, latent British mercantilism conditioned diplomacy, and naval policy, but 
they first wanted to disrupt the moves of other powers. 
Bourne surmised that Canning feared the rise of the United States, rapidly 
becoming a competitor in that region. Cuba was of particular concern because of its 
strategic location that gave any nation controlling it the power to threaten trade passing 
through the region. Canning also feared France and America combining their naval 
power against Britain. Consequently, Bourne concluded, "British policy in the 
Caribbean ... was primarily defensive, keeping an eye on the Americans, trying to tie 
their hands by formal diplomatic arrangements, and removing all excuse for 
intervention [by the European Concert Powers] by curbing the activities of Spanish 
29 Modelski and Thompson, Seapower, 273; Jay Kinsbruner, Independence in Spanish America: 
Civil Wars, Revolutions, and Underdevelopment (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1994), 
5-37,46-69 and 81-100; Richard Pennell, "State Power in a Chronically Weak State: Spanish 
Coastguards as Pirates, 1814-50, " European History Quarterly, 25: 3 (1995): 353-355; and Jenifer Marx, 
Pirates and Privateers of the Caribbean (Malabar, FL: Krieger Publishing Company, 1992), 267-268. 
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pirates operating from Cuba. , 30 Therefore, Britain avoided too much pressure like 
occupying Cuba to stop piracy, or being too forceful with local Spanish authorities over 
privateers. The same was true with British policy toward the Cuban slave trade 
throughout this period. Too much force might drive the island from weaker Spain into 
American hands, posing a greater threat to British interests. 31 Samuel Flagg Bemis best 
summed up that British policy was "to balance European powers in rivalry while Great 
Britain continued unmolested to consolidate her territorial gains of 1815 and ply the 
markets and maritime trade of the world. "32 
West Africa was another region in the equatorial Atlantic of concern for the 
"free traders. " But if the gentlemanly prognosticators were correct, as will be discussed 
in Chapter Six, its development also needed guidance. African supplies to Britain would 
only increase if force shifted factors of production from the profitable foreign slave 
trade to legitimate commodities. There were alternatives to the slave trade within the 
African economy. The lubricant industry, for example, could use palm oil, a use that 
would transform the African palm oil trade. The strategy was to "draw Africa into 
Britain's sphere of influence by the creation of economic linkages and the development 
of dependent African economies" - an informal empire. 
33 
30 Bourne, Britain and the Balance of Power in North America, 64-66. 
31 Andrew Lambert, Trincomalee: The Last of Nelson's Frigates (London: Chatham Publishing, 
2002), 56-59. 
32 Samuel Flagg Bemis, A Diplomatic History of the United States, 5`h Edition (New York: Holt, 
Rinehard and Winston, Inc., 1965), 203. 
33 Ronald Robinson and John Gallagher, Africa and the Victorians: The Official Mind of 
Imperialism. 2"d Edition (Hong Kong: MacMillan Press, Ltd., 1981), 1-8; Martin Lynn, "The 
`Imperialism of Free Trade' and the Case of West Africa, c. 1830-c. 1870, " The Journal of Imperial and 
Commonwealth History, 15: 1 (October 1986): 24; and Hugh Thomas, The Slave Trade: The Story of the 
Atlantic Slave Trade: 1440-1870 (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1997), 564-565. For details of African 
political economy see Joseph C. Miller, Way of Death: Merchant Capitalism and the Angolan Slave 
Trade 1730-1830 (Wisconsin: University of Wisconsin Press, 1988), 43-54 and 104-106. The so-called 
Robinson and Gallagher thesis of informal, free trade, empire in Africa has been controversial. Lynn 
believed that they were too prone to see early British activity in Africa in terms of the scramble for Africa 
later in the century. Lynn concluded that policy in London was different from what occurred in Africa. 
There was British "commercial penetration, " but little control. British power was limited, the navy lacked 
the ability "to strike inland[. ]" The Ashanti people were the true power until the 1870s, and defeated the 
British in 1806,1823-24,1863 and 1869 (Lynn, "Imperialism of Free Trade, " 28-29 and 34-35). For more 
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British trade with West Africa grew as the Industrial Revolution continued. The 
Industrial Revolution in Britain demanded "legitimate" African goods. Initially British 
participation in West African trade was limited to rich entrepreneurs who could afford 
to undertake the risk involved. Exports from British West Africa to the United Kingdom 
rose from £252,814 in 1854 - largely composed of palm oil (40.2%) and timber (36.4%) 
- to £1,099,256 in 1884, largely palm oil (53.9%) and nuts for oil (25.9%). The 
establishment of regular steam communications brought a marked change in British 
mercantile activities along the coast. Regular steam ship routes meant that merchants 
could arrange for a quicker turnover in merchandise, smaller inventories, and they no 
longer needed to manage both the shipping and merchandise sides of business. 34 
But there was little desire in official Britain for direct control of West Africa. 
British abolitionists convinced the government to establish colonies at Sierra Leone 
(1808), Gambia (1816) and the Gold Coast (1821), to use as centres from which 
legitimate commerce would replace the slave trade. 35 Elsewhere, the British signed free 
trade and anti-slave trade treaties with natives and policed the slave trade usually only 
with the permission of other countries. The goal was to protect British merchants, 
promote legitimate commerce, and "achieve a virtual industrial monopoly for" Britain 
under the protection of the Royal Navy. 36 British mercantile and shipping activities 
along the West African coast suited British foreign policy. Freely traded goods from the 
African coast fed British industry and the British could refrain from the expense of 
formal African colonies. 
on the Robinson and Gallagher debate see Wm. Roger Louis, (ed. ), The Robinson and Gallagher 
Controversy (New York and London: New Viewpoints, A Division of Franklin Watts, 1976). 
34 Peter N. Davies, "Shipping and Imperialism: The Case of British West Africa, " in Gordon 
Jackson and David M. Williams, (eds. ), Shipping, Technology and Imperialism (Hants, England: Scholar 
Press, 1996), 48-61 and table 2.1. 
31 Philip D. Curtin, The Image of Africa: British Ideas and Action, 1780-1850 (Madison: 
University of Wisconsin Press, 1964), 468-470 and Robinson and Gallagher, Africa and the Victorians, 
27-30. 
36 Semmel, Free Trade Imperialism, 150 and 157. 
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The Royal Navy held the "keys" to world trade routes for the gentlemanly 
capitalists. Gough opined that this "gave Britain enhanced means of protecting trade, 
stamping out illegal trade ... and encouraging the legitimate prosecution of commerce, 
whether it be British or non-British. "37 Thus, Britain seized strategically important 
regions along important trade routes, locations like Lagos, Hong Kong, the Falkland 
Islands, Singapore, and Aden. 8 Bourne concluded that "[g]unboat diplomacy would 
compel reluctant countries and peoples to open their doors to western trade, while vast 
battlefleets warned off would-be rivals[. ]"39 But it would take a concerted effort to rally 
international support to end the slave trade. If other countries, like the United States, 
refused to let the Royal Navy stop their slave trade, it could only be suppressed if that 
nation then deployed a naval force to police its on citizens. However, British activities 
along the African coast instilled fear and jealousy in American naval officers. 
British Naval Strategy and Deployment 
The British therefore used sea power during the early nineteenth century to meet "Grand 
Strategy" and economic needs. Economic growth, policy, and strategic interests 
conditioned naval deployment. The "triangular struggle" of domestic, foreign, and naval 
matters dictated naval policy in this period. British politicians agreed that the nation had 
to maintain a navy that could counter the next two or three largest naval powers. 
40 The 
Royal Navy deployed around the world, but general British strategy was directed 
toward her Indian possessions. Safe passage through the Mediterranean and around the 
Cape was important to maintain British communications with India. 41 But Bartlett 
37 Gough, "Profit and Power, " 71. 
38 Davis, Industrial Revolution, 10 and 65-69 and Kennedy, Rise and Fall of the Great Powers, 
187-200. 
39 Bourne, Foreign Policy of Victorian England, 4-5. 
40 Bartlett, Great Britain and Sea Power, 1-2 and 34. 
41 Glete, Navies and Nations, 426-432. 
41 
concluded that the navy was also useful in Canning and Palmerston's foreign policy 
because they could apply naval power to the problems they encountered, and it was 
friendly to the economic restraints and feelings of Parliament. 42 Andrew Lambert 
concludes that when relations with Russia and France were good, "ships could then be 
sent to more distant stations. "43 
Cain and Hopkins concluded that Britain's "Blue Water" strategy flowed from 
the gentlemanly strategy. The role of the navy was defensive: to "prevent France from 
blockading her [Britain's] trade with the continent and to frustrate any attempt at 
invasion. " But Britain also realised that it could never "control continental Europe" and 
used its naval power to compensate. °{ In the wake of peace, Britain abandoned few of 
her colonies and used the Royal Navy to exert influence over new regions. British "free 
traders" wanted access to places like Africa and Central America. 45 Paul Kennedy 
concluded that the British government relied on "the informal influence of the trader, 
the financier, the consul, the missionary and the naval officer[. ]" The Royal Navy was 
the "stick" that enforced the benefits of commercial trade. 46 
In periods when the elite grew to believe in overseas expansion, 
contemporaneously, those with influence on naval policy also favoured protection of 
such objectives. Lord Ellenborough, Peel's First Lord of the Admiralty, for example, 
believed in the navy's traditional peacetime role of commerce protection and, having 
been Governor-General of India, was interested in "Indian resources and the distant 
stations. " In the face of the French threat, and the crisis with the United States over 
Oregon, he believed in a show of strength. But Lord Aberdeen, the Foreign Secretary, 
42 Bartlett, Great Britain and Sea Power, 63-64,101,116-123,136,144 and 277. 
43 Lambert, Last Sailing Battlefleet, 52. 
44 Cain and Hopkins, British Imperialism, 89-90. 
45 Glete, Navies and Nations, 426-432 and Richard Harding, Seapower and Naval Warfare 1650- 
1830 (London: University College London Press, 1999), 36. 
46 Kennedy, British Naval Mastery, 150-154. 
42 
wanted tensions reduced, and Peel believed that disputes with America could be 
resolved peacefully. 47 John Russell's appointee, George Eden, Lord Auckland, and 
Palmerston in the Foreign Office, continued British strategy. Auckland was willing to 
work with the French, but also counter their moves. To meet Palmerston's fears, 
Auckland reacted to deter the French in the Mediterranean and English Channel, but he 
was "anxious to keep the ships of the two nations apart, if only to avoid accidents. s48 
British liberals believed that trade would replace war and the concept culminated 
during Pax Britannica. While Britain was a powerful nation with a strong navy, 
imposing her will unilaterally on other nations threatened retaliation, military or 
economic, that would hurt trade. Because of Britain's distant colonial holdings and 
"commercial interests" it was in her interest to maintain peace. Imlah concluded that 
Britain's commercial interests dictated "moderate policies" and the nation's role "in the 
Concert of Powers was, therefore, essentially a mediating one. "49 "Grand Strategy" 
considerations went along side trade considerations. Britain's trade with the US was 
great and would also be hurt if Britain held steadfast to her old ideas. By 1856, and the 
Declaration of Paris, for example, the "New Rule" replaced mercantilist naval practices. 
Most nations, except the United States, rejected privateering, and shipping free from 
"contraband" was finally free from naval harassment. Palmerston told a gathering of 
Liverpool merchants that the New Rule meant that war would be limited to battles 
between professional government forces that left private commerce alone. The subtle 
influence of the navy, and engagement, were preferable ways to implement policy and 
so maintain watch on other nations. 
47 Lambert, Last Sailing Battlefleet, 38-39 and 47-48. 
48 Lambert, Last Sailing Battlefleet, 50-54. 
49 Imlah, Economic Elements in the Pax Britannica, 5-6. 
50 Kennedy, British Naval Mastery, 200-201 and Bernard Semmel, Liberalism and Naval 
Strategy: Ideology, Interest, and Sea Power during the Pax Britannica (Boston: Allen & Unwin, 1986), 4, 
8-10,18-23 and 53-57. 
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Figure 2.2 Royal Navy Deployment Atlantic (Percentage of Ships). 1820-1830 and 
1843-1861 
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Note: Vessel deployment in British Home Waters is not included. 
The Atlantic deployment pattern of the Royal Navy reveals the dynamic of 
British geopolitical and economic considerations. Immediately following the 
Napoleonic Wars and the War of 1812. the largest percentage of Royal Navy vessels in 
the Atlantic were concentrated along the North : American coast and in the West Indies. 
But figure 2.2, to be further decomposed in later chapters. reveals that the 
Mediterranean was becoming the focus for the Royal Navy. Deployment along the 
African coast. from West Africa to the Cape. also grew. peaking in the 1840s and 1850s 
- with the exception of during the Crimean War. This study will show that British 
economic factors shaped Royal Navy deployment in the Gulf of Mexico and along the 
African coast. The analysis will reseal the nexus of British goals, and how they affected 
Anglo-American relations in the equatorial Atlantic. Britain used sea power to expand 
her economic interests. but modified its use when it threatened American sensitivities. 
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American Maritime Policy 
Diverse regions in the equatorial Atlantic were important to British economic power: 
The West Indies, West Africa, and the United States. While the British moved towards 
freer trade, the Americans turned increasingly to coastwise trade while its industries 
favoured protectionism. The focus of British and American maritime policy differed. 
But it is significant because it also shaped the use of American sea power. American 
commerce also needed protection in these regions. The Royal Navy protected the 
United States from any European disturbances and the Americans invested instead into 
economic development and encouraged foreign investment. Meanwhile, as will be seen, 
the British hoped that the United States would work with it in concert over issues of 
common interest. 51 
While British gentlemanly capitalists believed in overseas development, as the 
Civil War era approached Americans turned increasingly inward. Unlike in Britain, 
there was little continuity of support for overseas American economic expansion. Deep- 
sea American trade suffered from 1821, as Northern factories demanded more and more 
cotton, thus feeding the coastal trade. That trade, by 1831, "supplanted foreign trade as 
the major activity of the merchant marine. " Of the "distant trades" the most profitable 
was in the Pacific, in particular with China. In the 1850s, a vessel travelling from New 
York to California could make $80,000 in one voyage, and then make another $50,000 
by carrying tea to London from Hong Kong. In contrast, African trade was a minuscule 
percentage of total American trade. It may have almost doubled from 1840 to 1860, but 
52 it only represented a growth of 0.6-1% by 1860. 
51 Kennedy, Rise and Fall of the Great Powers, 229-230 and K. Jack Bauer, "The Golden Age, " 
in Robert A. Kilmarx, (ed. ), America's Maritime Legacy: A History of the U. S. Merchant Marine and 
Shipbuilding Industry Since Colonial Times (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1979), 27-36. 
52 Bauer, "Golden Age, " 45 and 57-59 and Bauer, A Maritime History of the United States: The 
Role of America's Seas and Waterways (Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 1988), 84- 
92. On the China trades see, Paul E. Fontenoy, "Ginseng, Otter Skins, and Sandalwood: The Conundrum 
of the China Trade, " The Northern Mariner/Le Marin du Nord, 7: 1 (January 1997): 1-16. Fontenoy 
concluded that the "American attempts to penetrate this mythical market relied on massive exploitation of 
every opening, leading to market saturation and collapse, whereupon the cycle was repeated with a new 
commodity" (Fontenoy, "Ginseng, Otter Skins, " 1). 
45 
The North benefited from the growth in the shipping trades before 1807 and they 
developed insurance companies, a shipping infrastructure and business capital. When 
the re-export trade began to decline, Northern merchants shifted their activity to the 
cotton trade and New York grew as cotton's financial centre, dependent on the 
prosperity of the South. Meanwhile, New Orleans, on the coast of the Gulf of Mexico, 
gained prominence as a seaport for shipping from the Mississippi, Missouri and Ohio 
Rivers. The English textile industry demanded cotton and turned to the Southern United 
States; from 1815 to the Civil War, the Southern economy was centred on cotton. 53 
After the War of 1812, the United States enacted its own Navigation Act in 
1817. Under this Act, goods imported to the United States had to be brought in 
American vessels, or vessels owned by the manufacturing country. Yet such a policy 
could be lifted if another country put American shipping on an equal footing to their 
own. But the most significant aspect of the Navigation Act (1817) was the provision 
that barred foreign vessels from involvement in the American coastwise trade. H. David 
Bess and Martin T. Farris concluded that "this formal reservation of the coastal traffic 
known as cabotage provided the so-called first pillar of modern U. S. maritime policy. "54 
American shipping turned away from trade between other countries and 
focussed on American imports, exports, and the coasting trade. While the shipping 
industry liked free trade, the rising commercial manufacturing sector supported 
protectionism. Former "maritime" States, like Connecticut, Massachusetts, New Jersey, 
and New York became manufacturing States and increasingly protectionist. The result 
was that "by the outbreak of the Civil War the United States had forsaken her maritime 
orientation. , 55 Improvements in Great Lakes' transportation and railway construction 
53 Douglass C. North, The Economic Growth of the United States, 1790 to 1860 (Englewood 
Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1961), 62-71 and Bauer, "Golden Age, " 45 and 57-59. 
54 H. David Bess and Martin T. Farris, U. S. Maritime Policy: History and Prospects (New York: 
Praeger, 1981), 17 and Bauer, Maritime History, 104-107 and 117. 
55 North, Economic Growth, 77 and Bauer, "Golden Age, " 45 and 57-59. 
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also increased trade flows between the West and East. The result was increased East- 
West trade and the development of urban centres, like Chicago and Cincinnati along 
strategically important shipping points. 56 The result was dramatic for American 
commerce. 
Figure 2.3 American Vessel Trades, 1815-1865, Percentage Involvement, Registered 
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Figure 2.3 shows that American shipping was increasingly involved in the 
coastwise trade. American shipping patterns can be divided into three periods: Foreign 
trade declined from 1815 to about 1835; from 1835 to 1855, the coastwise trade was 
dominant, but the foreign trades were again ascending. Finally, post-1855 marked a 
steep decline in foreign trades and a rise in the coastwise trades just before the outbreak 
of the Civil War. These trends are significant because they parallel the focus of US 
naval assets, and helped shaped Anglo-American naval relations. This study will reveal 
that American naval interest was focussed close to home waters during the earlier 
56 North, Economic Growth, 135-146 and 153. 
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period, to the detriment of West African deployment. American interests in using sea 
power to further long-term West African interests peaked over the middle period, but 
declined again as home waters took on renewed importance by the final period. In 
periods of overseas decline, Americans who supported Atlantic expansion feared that 
the opportunity cost of neglect was British dominance. 
America's Naval Policy 
The pattern of American economic growth affected its use of sea power. US shipping 
during this period was involved in the coastwise trades and foreign expansion was 
largely in non-British possessions. Consequently, the United States was more concerned 
about its strategic and trading interests close to home and the Pacific. American naval 
policy focussed on trade protection and meeting, reactively, any threats. Naval support 
for other, non-trading, issues arose, but it quickly foundered on the American fear of a 
strong military, dislike of colonies, and fear of becoming involved in European 
problems. US naval policy was inconsistent, waxing and waning with temporary threats 
and the desires of individual leaders who supported its use for longer-term goals. 
Figure 2.4, to be further decomposed in subsequent chapters, reveals that the 
general trend of US naval deployment from 1820 to 1860 was close to home and 
towards the Pacific. Sudden changes in deployment were to meet immediate threats. For 
example, as will be shown in Chapters Three and Four, during the piracy crisis of the 
1820s, and during the Mexican-American War centring on 1845, to be discussed in 
Chapter Seven, vessels were moved to home waters. Meanwhile, Chapter Eight will 
reveal that the Pacific saw a sudden drop in 1858 as US warships were moved to Home 
waters and South America to meet threats during diplomatic disputes with Paraguay and 
Britain. 
American naval deployment reflected their interest in using the force to protect 
trading interests. During peacetime, vessels sailed the Mediterranean, Latin American 
coasts, and the Pacific in support of American interests. The American goal was only to 
48 
use its battleships to break any potential British blockade of its coast. Jan Glete 
concluded that the "pre-1812 nayalist ambitions of using the battle fleet as a force to 
influence European power politics proved unrealistic in an age when Great Britain ruled 
the oceans. " The primary duty of the l [S Navy was "policing activities against much 
weaker nations or to fight trade warfare against the only nation that had a superior navy 
that mattered. Great Britain. "'' 
Figure 2.4 US Navy Deploy ment (Percentage of Ships). 1820-1830 and 1842-1860 
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Before the outbreak of the Civil War, the main role of the US Navy was the 
protection of American lives and commerce. As the nation approached the Civil War era 
the government began to use the navy to initiate trade contacts, collect scientific and 
ý 
ý% /,,. ý/ 
57 Glete, Navies curd Nations. 439-440. 
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commercial information, and undertake diplomacy. But the Navy Department lacked 
consistent leadership advocating expansion and an active US Navy. American trade, 
commerce, and shipping grew during this period, but commercially America remained 
tied to traditional markets in Europe and North America. Yet, some Americans believed 
that the American destiny lay in the South and Pacific. They advocated a larger navy 
and commercial expansion. 58 
The "Navalists" wanted the navy to suppress piracy, "show the flag" to impress 
other nations, and protect "American economic and political interests overseas. " But 
Thomas Jefferson, a Virginian, rejected a strong navy and wished people to focus their 
energies on the land. Jefferson's "Republican" party, with support from the interior, 
gained power in the elections of 1800 and marked a decline in American naval policy, 
focusing instead on coastal forts at strategic points, floating batteries and gunboats. 
59 
After the War of 1812, Americans shifted their focus from war and defence to 
commercial endeavours through diplomatic means. American leaders, like John Quincy 
Adams, worked to acquire new territory within North America, like Florida, and 
promoting American Pacific interests. 60 President Andrew Jackson, an "agrarian" 
Democrat, epitomised American naval philosophy of the period. A small peacetime 
navy to protect home waters was enough. He concluded that the "wide seas" separated 
the United States from threats and America had no fear of invasion by nations whom 
American might "dread[. ]"61 
Exploration and commerce protection was the main goal of the US Navy. 
Secretary of the Navy Samuel L. Southard ordered individual warships on survey 
58 Schroeder, Shaping a Maritime Empire, 3-5. 
59 Symonds, Navalists and Antinavalists, 11-19 and Sprout and Sprout, Rise of American Naval 
Power, 12,54-55,71,107-111. See also, Spencer C. Tucker, The Jefferson Gunboat Navy (Columbia, 
SC: University of South Carolina Press, 1993), 10-35. 
60 Schroeder, Shaping a Maritime Empire, 13-18. 
61 PRO, Admiralty (Adm) 7/712, "Extract from the President's Message December 1830, " 
newspaper clipping, 4 January 1831. 
50 
cruises in the Pacific. The Secretary of the Navy reported in 1833 that the navy had 
extended its "intercourse" with the Portuguese and African coasts, presumably the 
Northern African coast. Meanwhile, American warships had made cruises to the Indian 
Ocean, while the West Indian squadron became more of a "home squadron" with parts 
of it making annual visits to "Atlantic ports. " In March 1836, the Board of Navy 
Commissioners and the Secretary of the Navy proposed a focus on the defence of the 
Gulf of Mexico, the Mississippi Valley, and other commercial routes close to home 
waters. 62 John H. Schroeder concluded that American naval policy adhered "to a 
traditional view that the navy was responsible for combating pirates, preserving neutral 
rights, and responding to the periodic outrages" rather than actively aiding in the 
expansion of US commerce. 3 But by the late 1830s and early 1840s, the United States 
also began to use sea power to further long-term economic goals. 
Secretary of the Navy Abel P. Upshur became the strongest American advocate 
of the use of sea power to protect commerce, but also to advance long-term American 
commercial interests. American merchants had established outposts along the Chilean 
coast, the Columbia River, and Upper California, and they needed protection. He told 
Congress that other countries, like Britain and France, had large navies to support their 
commercial endeavours. In 1842, he explained that America needed a stronger force in 
the Pacific "to prevent other nations from subjecting our trade to injurious restrictions 
and embarrassments[, ]" particularly by the British. But even with Upshur, home waters 
were the focus. The Gulf of Mexico was important to national trade, including States 
farther inland along the Mississippi and its tributaries. Most trade passed through the 
Gulf of Florida, and steam-frigates could blockade it. Upshur concluded, "if we be 
62 PRO, Adm 71712, "Extract of the Report" [of the Secretary of the Navy, 30 November 1833]; 
Schroeder, Shaping a Maritime Empire, 13-28 and 35-36; and Sprout and Sprout, Rise ofAmerican Naval 
Power, 12,54-55,107-111. 
63 Schroeder, Shaping a Maritime Empire, 37-41. 
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without a naval force, that commerce may be annihilated at a cost which would not be 
felt by any tenth-rate maritime power! "64 
On the eve of the Civil War, through conservatism and regional differences, 
naval strategy was little different from that of the War of 1812. Opponents who saw no 
need for a strong navy under the circumstances quelled calls for naval expansion. 
65 A 
shift in US policy came with the election of James Buchanan as President in 1857. The 
Democrat supported his party's 1856 election platform that called for freedom of the 
seas, free trade, and rigid enforcement of the Monroe Doctrine. However, Secretary of 
the Navy Isaac Toucey assured Congress that the Executive was not pushing a large 
peacetime navy to compete with "commercial powers. " The resulting Buchanan policy 
was therefore reactive, responding again to a crisis using the small US Navy. 
Meanwhile, Northern anti-slavery advocates did not support an expanded shallow-draft 
navy for a slavery South with expansionist goals. 66 With such divergent views, the US 
Navy only supported US commerce, particularly in the Pacific, and in regions where 
minor crisis or short wars erupted. In contrast, the Royal Navy focussed its attention in a 
variety of locations, but largely in the Mediterranean. This study will show that the 
problem for the British was to convince the Americans to dispatch warships in support 
of British humanitarian and economic goals, such as slave trade suppression, without 
precipitating war. 
64 Sprout and Sprout, Rise of American Naval Power, 118-120; United States, Congressional 
Globe, 27`h Cong., 2"d less., 1841-42, Appendix, 16-23, A. P. U Shur, "Report of the Secretary of the 
Navy, 4 Dec 1841" and United States, Congressional Globe, 27 Cong., 2"d sess., 1842-43, Appendix, 
40-48, A. P. Upshur, "Report of the Secretary of the Navy, Navy Department, December 1842. " 
65 Schroeder, Shaping a Maritime Empire, 63-65,95-99,117, and 121-128 (for examples of the 
exploring expeditions see Schroeder chapters 6,7 and 8) and Sprout and Sprout, Rise of American Naval 
Power, 123-150. 
66 Schroeder, Shaping a Maritime Empire, 130-132 and 188. 
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Anglo-American Economic Relations 
The "dynamic" of this Atlantic economy involved the flow of trade, labour and capital. 
There was an alliance between British and American interests. Anglo-American 
diplomatic relations were less easy than their economic relations, but the latter probably 
kept them from degenerating into war. The US Civil War marked a cooling of Anglo- 
American relations and brought the countries close to war. Historians, like Allen and 
Thistlethwaite, have concluded that a common culture, economy and political 
philosophy connected Britain and America. The British shared their connections with 
the Northern intellectual and commercial class, while the Southern States were linked 
with the old British Tory class that was "waning in force. , 67 A peaceful and stable 
United States, that encouraged foreign investment, was important for the gentlemanly 
capitalists. They could invest in America and hope for returns as it expanded. 68 
British investment in the United States during the early nineteenth century was 
small and concentrated in areas of potential growth. Backed by influential British 
banking houses like Baring Brothers, investment provided American banks with 
liquidity and railways with stimulant capital. As one among many regions in the 
equatorial Atlantic for the gentlemanly capitalists, they desired stability to nurture their 
investments. 69 Platt concluded that the "Barings and Rothschilds, amongst others, had 
nursed American credit so that by the late 1840s and early 1850s British investors were 
ready once more to place their money in America. "70 Politically, London sought to 
smooth relations with the United States and avoid war. It was no coincidence that Peel 
67 Allen, Great Britain and the United States, 101-121,195,382-415 and Thistlethwaite, Anglo- 
American Connection, 172-175. See also the discussion in this study's Chapter One, 10-15. 
68 D. C. M. Platt, Foreign Finance in Continental Europe and the United States, 1815-1870: 
Quantities, Origins, Functions and Distribution (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1984), 140-171. 
69 Platt, Foreign Finance, 140-146. See also Platt, Foreign Finance, Appendix III "United States 
of America: Foreign Investment in Railway Securities (US$m. )" which reveals $300 million of British 
investment in 1852, and peaking at $400-500 million by 1857. 
70 Platt, Foreign Finance, 157. 
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dispatched Lord Ashburton, of the Baring family, to Washington in late 1841 to reduce 
Anglo-American tensions. To those ends, as will be discussed, he concluded an 
agreement over naval co-operation in the equatorial Atlantic as a method to mitigate 
Anglo-American disputes over the application of sea power during peacetime. 
Anglo-American economic relations and trade flows are significant because they 
connected the nations as trading partners and shaped their relations depending on the 
economic and geographic circumstances. The cotton trade was important in the success 
of such British ports as Liverpool, and Liverpool merchants developed close ties with 
American merchant houses in New York and Philadelphia. British merchants settled in 
Philadelphia and New York forming little British communities like in Greenwich 
Village. By 1801, there was established an American Chamber of Commerce in 
Liverpool. The United States was also one exception to the British implementation of 
the navigation laws as far back as 1815. Under the Reciprocity Treaty of 1815, Britain 
allowed American ships to import American-produced goods into Britain without being 
subject to discriminatory duties. 71 
The reciprocity treaties between the United States and Britain are an indication 
of British reaction to growing American economic and shipping power after the War of 
1812. The treaties set rules to their trade and competition. Sarah Palmer concluded that 
reciprocity divided "Anglo-American business between the ships of the powers to the 
exclusion of other maritime nations" and it allowed British shipowners to retain a "share 
of this business. " Reciprocity was not free trade; Britain allowed American ships to 
carry their own country's products to Britain, and the British could only ship their own 
products to America in British ships. 72 Yet British access to the American coasting trade 
was not granted and talks to let British ships deliver goods to California failed. While 
41-45.71 
Thistlethwaite, Anglo-American Connection, 5-18 and 35-36 and Palmer, Politics, Shipping, 
72 Palmer, Politics, Shipping, 53-54,168-169 and 176-186. 
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the British moved toward freer trade, the Americans went in the opposite direction. 73 
While Britain turned to free trade, the United States was wary of its rivals. British and 
American economic philosophies would condition their relations at the diplomatic and 
naval levels, especially over piracy and slave trade suppression. 
Table 2.5 Select US Export Destinations, 1821-1860 ($ millions) 
Year Canada Cuba Mexico Britain Asia Africa 
1821-25 11 23 6 123 8 
1826-30 11 28 20 117 7 
1831-35 16 25 28 188 7 
1836-40 18 30 18 274 6 
1841-45 27 25 8 222 11 
1846-50 40 28 11 349 13 
1851-55 86 33 14 494 14 
1856-60 128 51 19 694 26 
Source: "Series U 317-334. Value of Exports (Including Reexports) of U. S. 
Merchandise, by Country of Destination: 1790 to 1970, " columns 319,320,321,325, 
329, and 334, in Wattenberg, (ed. ), Statistical History of the United States, 904. 
Note: Blank indicates low value or no data. Wattenberg indicates no exports to Africa 
until 1865. 
Table 2.6 Select US Import Sources, 1821-1860 ($ millions) 
Year Canada Cuba Mexico Britain Asia Africa 
1821-25 33 1 152 41 
1826-30 30 5 138 33 
1831-35 5 44 5 220 45 
1836-40 8 56 5 255 50 
1841-45 4 38 5 178 40 
1846-50 12 52 4 295 50 
1851-55 41 89 5 564 88 
1856-60 102 157 6 602 130 
Source: "Series U 335-352. Value of General Imports, by Country of Origin: 1790 to 
1970, " Columns 337,338,339,343,347, and 352, in Wattenberg, (ed. ), Statistical 
History of the United States, 907. 
Note: Blank indicates low value or no data. Wattenberg indicates no African imports 
until 1865. 
The resulting American trade flows reflected the focus of the American 
economy. Table 2.5 reveals that Africa is so insignificant that it fails to even register in 
the aggregate statistics. Meanwhile, exports to Cuba, Mexico, Canada, and Asia grew. 
73 Allen, Great Britain and the United States, 75-77. 
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Table 2.5 shows that Britain was the main destination of American exports. Exports to 
Britain rose from $123 million to $694 million over the period 1821-25 to 1856-60. 
Table 2.6 reveals a similar pattern for imports to the United States. Again, African 
imports were insignificant. Imports from Britain rose from $152 million in the period 
1821-25, to $602 million by 1856-60, while Cuba and Asia were the next most 
important sources. 
But the early nineteenth century also marked the beginning of the shift in Anglo- 
American economic relations. British exports to the United States fell from 18% to 10% 
of total British exports to the world between 1825 and 1840. American imports to 
Britain rose from 13% to 26% of America's total exports. Allen believed that this 
marked a shift in the Anglo-American balance of trade "finally and irrevocably into 
America's favour. " Later, America's total relative exports to Britain, as a percentage of 
her exports to the whole world, fell approximately 20% from 1880 to 1908. But the 
relative decline was a result of American economic growth, and penetrating new 
markets. For example, American exports to China increased by 126% from 1887 to 
1897.74 
The nineteenth century was a period of American growth. European demand 
for 
American primary resources, like cotton, integrated the Atlantic economy. Cotton was 
the dominant American export product, composing over 50% until the outbreak of the 
Civil War. The need for fresh soil and slaves drove calls in the United States 
for 
acquiring Texas, Cuba, and Mexico. It also fed the view that the Federal government 
unnecessarily criminalised the slave trade to the detriment of the national economy. In 
such an atmosphere, the White House, often sympathetic to the South, had little desire 
to follow through on any substantial slave trade suppression efforts. 
75 While there was 
an Anglo-American economic connection, it was tenuous and Anglo-American interests 
74 Allen, Great Britain and the United States, 58-63. 
75 Allen, Great Britain and the United States, 54 and Du Bois, Suppression of the African 
Slave- 
Trade, 151-158. 
56 
could clash easily. The United States and Britain were trading partners, but they also 
acquired resources, and sold goods, in common regions like the Gulf of Mexico. Britain 
held overwhelming dominance in other regions, in particular Africa. Meanwhile, 
Americans desired expansion into regions sensitive to British interests. 
But after the War of 1812, Britain maintained a balance of power strategy in 
North America to keep the United States from gaining Canadian resources and strategic 
points in the West Indies. On the American continent proper, this meant securing 
boundary settlements with the United States and in the West Indies, stemming 
American seizure of absolute control. 76 The period marked the settlement of many 
Anglo-American territorial and trade issues. Trade relations improved on 29 September 
1827 when the British made overtures to settle boundary problems. Meanwhile, Andrew 
Jackson's administration asked Britain if they would like to renew US-West Indian 
trade and the British agreed to the plan. By 29 May 1830, the British began letting 
American ships back into West Indian ports. Talk rather than war also settled the 
Oregon boundary problem probably because the Americans wanted to devote their full 
attention to their conflict with Mexico rather than fight two-front war. From 1849 to 
1853, the Whigs governed the United States and relations with Britain were good. The 
Democrats, under Presidents Franklin Pierce and James Buchanan, were in power in the 
late 1850s, bringing some ripples in Anglo-American relations, but there was 
understanding on the British side. 77 Conflict was to be avoided; for with the Civil War, 
Joshua Bates, a Barings' partner, worried that a long war "will be destructive of 
commerce and will materially reduce the profits of B. B. & Co. "78 
76 Allen, Great Britain and the United States, 336-340 and Kenneth Bourne, Britain and the 
Balance of Power in North America, 53-69 and 85. See also Bourne, Palmerston: The Early Years, 1784- 
1841 (New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., Inc., 1982), 577-580,597 and 618-620. 
n Allen, Great Britain and the United States, 101-121,195,382-415 and Thistlethwaite, Anglo- 
American Connection, 172-175. 
78 Joshua Bates quoted in Platt, Foreign Finance, 147, fns. 35 and 48. 
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Anglo-American Naval Relations 
In the first decade after 1815, Britain was confident in its naval supremacy as French 
naval development stagnated. Instead, London was concerned about US naval 
intentions. Impressed by the US Navy's ships in the War of 1812, Britain feared their 
potential if Washington undertook a major commitment to naval development. By the 
1840s, the Anglo-French naval rivalry resumed and placed the nascent US Navy in a 
new perspective. The French realised the benefit of allies and "the Admiralty was also 
sensitive about this possibility, particularly fearing a war with both France and the USA 
at the same time. " Consequently, the Admiralty urged a "three-power standard" to 
match Russia, the United States and France. 79 Britain was concerned about other 
European powers, and saw the US Navy as a threat during periods of tension. London 
dreaded a "coalition of her enemies, and especially one of Europe and America[. ]"80 
While prepared to fight a war, London also took special care to select squadron 
commanders, like Sir Charles Hotham, with a reputation for co-operating with potential 
enemies and the tact to minimise conflict. This study will reveal that sea power, while 
protecting commerce, provided a mechanism through which the nations could relate 
because they also used it to further long-term national objectives during peacetime. 
Britain and America could use naval relations as objects of diplomacy that they could 
rearrange or modify to reduce Anglo-American tension and forward separate objectives. 
American naval policy varied with the commitments of political leaders. Regardless, 
British leaders, united in their objectives, maintained watch on the US fleet. 
From 1820 to 1842, a general search of The Times, with traditional connections 
to the elite, for general articles on the American Navy turned up about a dozen reports. 
81 
The Times reported US naval construction and even manning problems. If anything, 
79 C. I. Hamilton, Anglo-French Naval Rivalry 1840-1870 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993), 1-13. 
80 Bourne, Foreign Policy of Victorian England, 7-8 and 10. 
81 Crawford, Anglo-American Crisis, 17-19. 
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newspapers presented the British public with a picture of a small, infant force that was 
hardly any threat to the British. The Times even concluded that Anglo-American naval 
relations were harmonious and probably would continue to be so in the future. A decade 
later it concluded the US Navy posed no threat to Britain. 82 A reprint from the 
Edinburgh Courant concluded in early 1841 that Britain's steamships were superior and 
"the Americans must plainly foresee, in a war with this country, the total destruction of 
their foreign trade. s83 
Official Admiralty assessments of the US Navy paint a similar picture. In 1826, 
the Admiralty sent a naval officer to tour American naval facilities. He observed 
American naval construction, but also that some American officers believed that naval 
expansion would founder for a lack of sailors. Meanwhile, another Royal Navy officer 
observed in 1826 that the Americans thought their steamship, the Fulton, was a failure. 
By 1838, the British also had a low opinion of the US Navy. The British ambassador at 
Washington concluded "I believe that the United States are less prepared for War at 
this moment than they have been at any previous period since the date of the Treaty of 
Ghent [emphasis in original]. "84 
Britain only became wary of the US Navy during a crisis. For example, during a 
Canadian rebellion in the late 1830s, Britain received intelligence that the US Navy was 
preparing for war and monitored American naval activity. Nevertheless, when the 
United States went to war, for example with Mexico in the 1840s, London discovered 
that Washington respected non-belligerent rights. Washington ordered its Gulf 
commander to continue the war with "vigour" but to "show every consideration to 
82 The Times (London), 10 November 1820,3, column b; 31 January 1823,3, column c; 5 
February 1827,2, column d; 15 August 1828,2, column f and 3, column a; and 7 July 1829,2, column c. 
83 The Times (London), 6 October 1825,2, column c; Edinburgh Courant, reprint in The Times 
(London), 10 April 1841,4, column e. 
84 PRO, Adm, 7/712, Admiral Sir Alexander Cochrane to Viscount Melville, 24 December 1826, 
Ambassador Fox, memo, 16 June 1838, William Gray, memo, 12 July 1838, and "Extract from a letter 
received from Commander Crawford Dulls ... 
17 November 1838, on the State of the American Navy at 
New York. " 
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neutral commerce. " Although the Crimean War was years away, the British saw the 
benefit of the emerging "New Rule" of the freer trade era and peace with potential 
enemies. 85 The threat of the US Navy could be managed. This strategy suited British 
policy only to interfere with other nations as a last resort to protect important interests. 
Conclusion 
During the early nineteenth century, Britain and the United States developed policies to 
further and protect their commercial interests. The British elite hoped to further 
overseas commerce peacefully, in a freer trade environment. The Royal Navy deployed 
to protect and further that objective. American commercial policy was largely directed 
inward and overseas commitments varied with the domestic climate and the views of 
individual leaders. But both Britain and the United States developed in the equatorial 
Atlantic and their differing views created conditions whereby tensions could rise. 
Americans held a protectionist outlook, while Britain feared the United States if she 
combined with another power during war. Their relations remained tense, but it was in 
their interests to maintain peace and mitigate disputes in the equatorial Atlantic before 
war erupted. Their common view that sea power could be used to protect their interests, 
and develop them peacefully, provided a mechanism through which the nations could 
relate and adjust their maritime polices rather than go to war. 
83 PRO, Adm 7/712, Foreign Office memo, 3 May 1839, "Extract of a letter from the Post Office 
Agent at Lisbon, dated 27`h May 1839, " Foreign Office memo, 16 August 1841, and Rear Admiral Sir 
George Seymour, 29 January 1848. 
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Chapter Three: From Pirates to Slavers: Anglo-American Policy Making, 1819-1834 
British efforts to enlist American co-operation to suppress the slave trade originated in 
the war against piracy in the Gulf of Mexico in the 1820s. During the 1820s, the United 
States only reached a consensus to use sea power to protect trade from predatory attacks 
and left activities along the Eastern equatorial Atlantic, in West Africa, largely to the 
endeavours of a private colonisation society. Similarly, the British believed in 
diplomatic manoeuvres to achieve objectives in Central America. Until Britain achieved 
policy goals, London worked to protect commerce, but softened its use of sea power for 
fear that it might spark a conflict with jealous rivals. Britain sought diplomatic co- 
operation with the United States, but remained suspicious that Washington wanted to 
seize Cuba. Nevertheless, London accepted American positions, such as the Monroe 
Doctrine, because it helped further larger British goals of warning off the other 
European powers while securing access to Latin American markets. In the Gulf of 
Mexico, Britain and the United States used their navies for immediate commerce 
protection, while leaving market access and expansion to the diplomats. But they also 
began to use sea power to further long-term objectives without resorting to war with 
each other when their views differed. 
In Britain, the Enlightenment brought the ideas of free labour and support for 
abolition to end the plight of slaves and their cheaply produced goods. But the United 
States maintained slavery and many Americans feared the consequences of freedom for 
Africans in America. The status of the slave trade caused Anglo-American relations to 
be tense as each developed different policies toward slavery. Despite the differences, 
Britain and America moved toward reconciling their differences so that sea power could 
be used to further long-term objectives in the equatorial Atlantic while reducing Anglo- 
American tension. The White House hoped to placate the British demand to suppress 
American involvement in the slave trade, but only undertook actions that were 
domestically acceptable. Washington dispatched single ships from their Gulf of Mexico 
61 
anti-piracy patrol, to the West African coast, and combined it with limited support for 
colonisation efforts to repatriate freed American slaves. In response, Britain decided to 
wait to see the results rather than push the United States further. The added role of sea 
power in the equatorial Atlantic became a mechanism through which Britain and 
America could resolve their disputes peacefully within the confines of their domestic 
and international interests. 
British Policy and the Gulf of Mexico 
In the wake of the European wars, London believed that sea power was for providing 
immediate trade protection while market access was left to merchants and diplomats. 
Consequently, Britain, while waiting for favourable conditions to recognise the rebel 
states, moderated her diplomatic and sea power policies to keep conservative European 
nations from intervening in Latin American disputes. Nineteenth-century British interest 
in Latin America went back as far as the younger William Pitt. But Britain was tied to 
her European commitments and Spain refused to let Britain into colonial markets. The 
British believed that friendship and trade with an independent Latin America was a way 
to circumvent Spain's monopolistic practices with her colonies and further English 
economic growth. ' Britain played little part in the revolutions, although Sir Home 
Popham attacked Buenos Aires in 1806 on his own initiative and precipitated an 
unwanted temporary British occupation. 
Popham was the son of the British consul to Tetuan, Joseph Popham. The 
Pophams returned to England and Joseph received a £200/year pension after he was 
"made the scapegoat for the Government's inability to reach a reasonable relationship" 
with Emperor Ben Abdallah. Home moved within elite circles, attended Westminster 
School, and was admitted to Trinity College, Cambridge, but it is unclear if he accepted 
1 C. K. Webster, (ed. ), Britain and the Independence of Latin America, 1812-1830: Select 
Documents from the Foreign Office Archives (hereafter SDFOA), 2 vols. (New York: Octagon Books, 
reprint 1970), 8-11. 
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the offer. Nevertheless, after the Buenos Aires affair, London merchants supported 
Popham because they hoped to access markets in South America because Napoleon had 
blocked access to Europe. Despite Popham's court martial, the Merchants and 
Underwriters of Lloyd's Coffee House welcomed him home as a hero. 2 
Meanwhile, when Napoleon threatened Portugal after he invaded Spain, Britain 
protected the Portuguese Royal family as it sailed for the Portuguese colony of Brazil, 
and obtained a trade agreement in return. Forcefully opening trade during war was one 
thing, but during peacetime it was a delicate matter, although British merchants 
supported such endeavours in either case. Traders then replaced British military leaders 
as Britain tried to develop trade with the Americas, while hoping to prevent other 
powers - in particular France - from gaining a strong foothold. But it was clear that 
foreign powers, even Spain, only entered Latin American waters with British 
permission. Even revolutionary leader Simon Bolivar recognised in 1823 that Britain 
protected the rebel states from European interference. 3 
When liberal revolution rocked Spain in 1820, the US Ambassador to Britain, 
Richard Rush, was aware of the influence it might have on Spanish-American relations 
and with Spain's South American colonies. Rush told Secretary of State John Quincy 
Adams that the Spanish revolution attracted great interest in England, in particular from 
merchants. British merchants urged the government to follow America's lead and 
recognise the rebel states. Rush concluded that despite British silence, their actions - 
opening their ports to the new states - spoke more loudly than words. But Britain, he 
concluded, had to consult with its Congress of Vienna allies before recognising the new 
republics, and as things stood it seemed unlikely that Britain would grant formal 
recognition soon. A Colombian representative asked Lord Londonderry to recognise the 
new state, but Londonderry rejected the proposal and cited Britain's European 
2 Hugh Popham, A Damned Cunning Fellow: The Eventful Life of Rear-Admiral Sir Home 
Popham, KCB, KCH, KM, FRS, 1762-1820 (Cornwall: Old Ferry Press, 1991), 1-5 and 166-175. 
3 Webster, (ed. ), SDFOA, 8-11 and Bemis, A Diplomatic History of the United States, 203. 
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commitments. Echeverria, a Colombian representative, told Rush that Londonderry 
surmised that the US was able to recognise the independence of the South American 
states because it was "freed from the incu[mbrance] of the Holy Alliance. " But the 
British press, merchants, and parliamentary leaders voiced increasingly loud concerns 
over the spring and summer of 1822 that Britain was not taking enough action against 
the pirates and privateers that the turmoil had spawned. Rush concluded that it was 
unlikely Britain could hold out much longer against this commercial interest 
aggregation. 4 
The British did not want to provoke Spain or her allies and was reluctant to take 
aggressive actions, especially against Spanish privateers. But Britain still wanted to 
paint Spain as weak to heighten the stature of the rebels and increase the acceptability of 
recognition at home. Thus, London sat on the fence and British merchants and 
newspaper correspondents complained that the government's attitude hurt British trade 
and honour because the US Navy used the force that the proud Royal Navy should be 
using. The disordered state of the West Indies and the growth of piracy began to hurt the 
British trade that George Canning, Foreign Secretary, wanted expanded. He told the 
Duke of Wellington that the conflict had "let loose a multitude of pirates and 
buccaneers, who lurk on the coasts and in the harbours of the Spanish Colonies. " The 
pirates hid in Spanish controlled territory, yet because of his overall strategy, Canning 
was reluctant to take forceful actions. He told Wellington that Britain should accept 
Spanish weakness, press them no further, and only take actions against pirates "where 
we experience the evil[. ]"5 Weak Spanish control of Cuba suited British goals best if 
Britain could not have the island herself. 
° United States, National Archives (NA), Record Group (RG) 59, General Records of the 
Department of State, Dispatches from United States Ministers to Great Britain, 1791-1906 (hereafter, 
Dispatches, Britain), no. 116, Richard Rush to John Quincy Adams, 19 March 1820, no. 251, Richard 
Rush to John Quincy Adams, 10 June 1822, no. 254, Richard Rush to John Quincy Adams, 24 June 1822, 
and no. 257, Richard Rush to John Quincy Adams, 24 July 1822. 
s PRO, FO 92/48, reprint in SDFOA, vol. 2,73-75, George Canning to the Duke of Wellington 
(No. 4), 27 September 1822 and George Canning to the Duke of Wellington (No. 9), 15 October 1822. 
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Canning, once Foreign Secretary during the French Wars, later replaced Lord 
Castlereagh, again as Foreign Secretary. Canning opposed the Grand Alliance and the 
concert of Europe. He espoused an "English" policy as opposed to a "European" one. 
He wanted to spur each nation to act on their own, then use British power at the right 
moment to secure British objectives. Canning wished to recognise the rebel Spanish- 
American states, gain access to their markets, use them to counter growing American 
military and economic power, and bring them onto Britain's side if they were needed 
strategically. At the Congress of Verona (1822), Canning told Wellington not to support 
any interference in Spain by the other European powers. Canning wanted Cabinet, 
which included many members who were strongly anti-revolutionary, to support his 
move and as part of his plan voiced his annoyance at Spain for its disruption of British 
trade in the Gulf of Mexico. By November, painting Spain as the guilty party, he told 
Cabinet that Spain had refused to co-operate and that Britain needed a naval force to 
protect British shipping from further attack. 6 Canning felt it was good to show that 
Spain was weak, allowing privateers and pirates to run free, so that Cabinet would be 
more likely to support the rebels. 
US Policy against Pirates and Privateers 
American policy toward the rebel Spanish colonies was simpler than Britain's policy, 
but market expansion remained the objective through diplomatic initiatives. The US 
Executive's primary goal was to convince the Spanish to recognise American 
possession of East Florida and Texas. John Quincy Adams, President James Monroe's 
Secretary of State, became the primary negotiator. His work led to the Adams-Onis 
Treaty of 1819 under which Spain recognised American control of Florida in exchange 
for $5.5 million in compensation, while the Americans abandoned claims to Texas. 
6 Temperley, Foreign Policy of Canning, 42-45 and William W. Kaufmann, British Policy and 
the Independence of Latin America, 1804-1828 (New Jersey: Yale University Press, 1951, reprint Archon 
Books, 1967), 136-144. 
65 
Henry Clay continued to press for American recognition of the rebel states, and as 
speaker of the House of Representatives, he wielded influence. Adams held his ground, 
but when the Spanish wanted the Americans to rule out recognition, Adams replied that 
it would violate American neutrality to take any position. By 1820, the liberal 
revolution enveloped Spain and within a year, Spain capitulated on the Florida treaty. 
On 4 July 1821, Adams, his goals met, recommended to President Monroe that 
Congress recognise the new states. By May 1822, Congress appropriated funds for 
American diplomatic missions, and within the next four years Colombia, Mexico, the 
Central American Confederation, the United Provinces of La Plata, Chile, and Peru 
received various levels of recognition. From 1826 to 1856, the United States and the 
various new nations signed treaties of commerce and amity that provided for the 
appointment of consuls and most-favoured-nation trading status. 7 
When Spanish-American territories began to revolt against their colonial 
overseer, it caught American commerce in the crossfire. In response to the growing 
threat Washington sent naval forces into the region and enacted anti-piracy legislation 
on 3 March 1819. The 1819 Act authorised the President to send warships to protect 
American shipping from pirates. American commanders were authorised to capture any 
armed ship and crew which committed any piracy against an American or foreign 
vessel, deliver it into an American port for trial, and free any American ship held by 
pirates. The courts were authorised to sell the pirate ships once condemned, while those 
convicted of piracy could face the death penalty. 8 
7 Allen, Great Britain and the United States, 364 and 372-374; Wesley P. Newton, "Origins of 
United States-Latin American Relations, " in T. Ray Shurbutt, (ed. ), United States-Latin American 
Relations, 1800-1850: The Formative Generations (Tuscaloosa and London: The University of Alabama 
Press, 1991), 20-23; and Bemis, A Diplomatic History of the United States, 201. 
a United States, Register of Debates, 18th Cong., 2nd sess., Appendix, 31 January 1825,49, 
"Report of the Committee of Foreign Relations of the House of Representatives, on Piracy and Outrages 
on American Commerce by Spanish Privateers" and United States, U. S. Statutes at Large (hereafter, 
Statutes at Large), vol. 3,510-514 and 600. 
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During the early stages of the revolutions, the US Navy only undertook limited 
policing efforts to counter the piracy that erupted. By 2 March 1822, Congress, 
concerned about US coastwise trade, concluded that "the intercourse between the 
Northern and Southern sections of the Union, by sea, is almost cut off. " On 6 December 
1822, Monroe wrote to the House of Representatives and reported on the increased 
activities of Caribbean pirates. The President believed that the navy needed a strong 
force that could operate in the shallow waters where the pirates hid. The House resolved 
into a committee of the whole to discuss legislation to authorise the President to fight 
West Indian pirates. 9 
Representative Gideon Tomlinson, an "Anti-Jacksonite" from Connecticut, 
supported the proposal to improve the navy. He told the House that growing American 
trade gave the nation its resources and it deserved the navy's defence. The new Act 
authorised the President to purchase and deploy those ships he deemed necessary to 
protect US shipping against pirates in "the Gulf of Mexico, and the Seas and territories 
adjacent. " For such purpose, Congress allocated $160,000. Despite ongoing debates, 
new ships were authorised and Congress made the temporary 1819 Act permanent on 30 
January 1823, with little discussion. 1° While American tradition historically abhorred a 
strong naval and military force, this gave way when American economic concerns were 
directly threatened. With Congress firmly behind the Executive, the Navy Department 
tasked one of the most famous American naval commanders, Commodore David Porter, 
to suppress pirates and privateers. 
9 United States, Annals of Congress, 17ih Cong., I" sess., 1173-1175, House, 2 March 1822; 
Advocate, reprint in American Commercial and Daily Advertiser (hereafter ACDA), 7 March 1822,2, 
column c; ACDA, 4 April 1822,2, column d and e; and United States, Annals of Congress, 17`h Cong., 2"d 
sess., 349 and 371, House, 7 December 1822, President James Monroe to the House of Representatives of 
the United States, 6 December 1822. 
10 United States, Annals of Congress, 17th Cong., 2nd secs., 371-381, House, 7 December 1822 
and 33-35, Senate, 16 December 1822; and Statutes at Large, vol. 3,720-721. 
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British Manoeuvres and Anglo-American Diplomacy 
While the Americans "quickly" settled on a policy with respect to the pirates, Canning 
fell under greater pressure to do the same. The Times, "appealed to a wide spectrum of 
middle- and upper-class opinion[, ]" was often influenced by the political elite, and is an 
important "mirror of British governing-class attitudes. "" In early October 1822, it 
concluded that London had failed to take enough action against piracy. Significantly, 
the editorial asserted that the minister responsible had forsaken the people's trust, 
merchants had suffered, and British trade in the West Indies was damaged., 2 In 
November 1822, Canning, under pressure, took a firmer stand. 
He told Cabinet on 15 November that he feared that if Cuba was seized by any 
power - like the United States - it would give that power the ability to choke British 
trade to Jamaica, especially if war erupted. Canning concluded that the best way to 
protect British interests in the region was to settle the problems between Spain and her 
rebel colonies. He recommended that the government install civil agents in the various 
Spanish-American ports, and continue efforts to protect British trade. Spain, he wrote, 
would force Britain to abandon its neutral stance by seizing British ships simply for 
trading with the rebel colonies. The revolution in Spain was no reason to be Soft. ' 3 But 
Canning had insufficient support to go further and was forced to declare British 
neutrality. He virtually gave France permission to invade Spain, but warned her to stay 
out of Portugal. On 6 April 1823, the French acted, swiftly overran Spain, and restored 
King Ferdinand to the throne. 14 
Behind the scenes, the British took a stronger diplomatic stand against Spain by 
threatening to use the Royal Navy. In early 1823, Cabinet prepared to send a fresh 
11 Crawford, Anglo-American Crisis, 17-19. 
12 The Times (London), 5 October 1822,2, column d, 8 October 1822,2, column c. 
13 PRO, FO 72/266, reprinted in SDFOA, vol. 2,393-398, "Canning's Memorandum for the 
Cabinet, " 15 November 1822. 
14 Kaufmann, British Policy and the Independence of Latin America, 144-148. 
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squadron to the West Indies to seize Spanish ships in reprisal for continued Spanish 
operations against British shipping. Richard Rush asserted that when Spain became 
aware of British intentions, she acquiesced and released British ships. Rush concluded 
that Britain's handling of the affair was "considered as the first decided act of Mr. 
Canning's foreign administration[. ]" He recommended that other powers should 
remember the British tactic if they ever came to blows with the great power. 15 Rather 
than fight American designs, Canning endeavoured to make her an ally against a French 
incursion into Latin America. 
During the summer and autumn of 1823, the British and Americans discussed 
their Caribbean strategies. While they failed to agree to a joint position, they reached an 
understanding and assured each other their designs were honourable. The Americans 
were worried that France might seize Spanish colonies. Rush told Canning that he 
hoped that the British would prevent it if that was the French intention. Canning replied 
that he believed the French would refrain from such action, but he hoped that the British 
and Americans could formulate a common policy to counter the French. Meanwhile, the 
British agreed they would do nothing to stop the colonial rebellions, but Rush was 
unable to press Canning for a stronger declaration of support, and talks stalled. The 
White House would only agree to a joint position if the British first recognised the 
rebels' independence, something Canning was unwilling to do for fear of tipping his 
hand too early to the Concert of Europe. Nevertheless, Rush assured Britain that the 
Americans had no desire to seize the colonies either. 16 
. 
Balancing his loyalties, Canning decided to give France another chance, met 
French representative Prince de Polignac from 3-12 October 1823, and secured France's 
1823. 
15 NA, RG 59, Dispatches, Britain, no. 289, Richard Rush to John Quincy Adams, 17 January 
16 PRO, FO 5/176, reprint in SDFOA, vol. 2,45-496, Stratford Canning to George Canning (No. 
56, Confidential), [date unclear]; NA, RG 59, Dispatches, Britain, no. 323, Richard Rush to John Quincy 
Adams, 19 August 1823, no. 325, Richard Rush to George Canning, 23 August 1823, no. 330, Richard 
Rush to John Quincy Adams, 8 September 1823 and no. 331, Richard Rush to John Quincy Adams, 19 
September 1823. 
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commitment to stay out of Spanish-American affairs. Next, Canning wanted to conceal 
that he was actually plotting against the Europeans; in this, Rush was his Achilles' 
heel. 17 Rush believed that Britain was more worried about containing France than 
anything that was happening in Spanish America and used the United States for its own 
strategic ends. He believed the British Cabinet wanted the constitutional system of 
Spain to collapse, but only if its ramifications did not harm "British interests and British 
ambition. " As for the naval situation in the West Indies, Canning informed Rush that 
orders were about to be issued to the squadron to protect British trading interests. The 
squadron was authorised to retaliate against Spain if Spanish orders to refrain from 
attacking British shipping were not renewed. Canning told Rush that Britain was taking 
a similar stand with Colombia and wanted reparations for attacks on British shipping. If 
the British failed to see results, they would blockade a Colombian port in response. 
Britain wanted America to communicate the threat. ' 8 
The Monroe Doctrine 
The Americans also went their own way by the end of 1823. Having already established 
a trading outpost near San Francisco in 1816, the Russians declared ownership of the 
entire coast in 1821 and professed that they would bar anyone from fishing or trading 
anywhere down the coast to 51° North. The Americans, probably as a warning, told the 
Russians that Washington would not stand idly by if a European power, other than 
Spain, tried to re-arrange or restore any Spanish territories within the Americas. Within 
the context of Russian moves and the break-up of the Spanish-American Empire, 
Monroe issued his famous speech of 2 December 1823 that later became known as the 
Monroe Doctrine. It warned the European powers to stay out of the Americas. He meant 
the declaration as a warning to Russia and Europe against interference in South 
17 Kaufmann, British Policy and the Independence of Latin America, 156-158 and NA, RG 59, 
Dispatches, Britain, no. 336, Richard Rush to John Quincy Adams, 10 October 1823. 
18 NA, RG 59, Dispatches, Britain, no. 336, Richard Rush to John Quincy Adams, 10 October 
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America. European reaction was mute, although by 1824 the Russians and Americans 
agreed to set the Alaska boundary at 54°40" North. 19 But the doctrine was significant 
because it declared the Americas in the economic and strategic sphere of the United 
States. 
Canning tolerated Monroe's declaration of American control of the region 
because at the time it embodied Canning's other goal to keep other European powers 
out of the region while advancing British interests. Still, he was upset at Monroe's 
declaration of American hegemony. Canning asked how America could declare such a 
thing when "America's geographic limits were actually unknown[. ]" Nevertheless, the 
British moved forward, rather than focus on a matter of semantics with the Americans. 
By early February 1824, Britain was prepared to recognise Spanish-American 
independence; she would only do so after Spain. Rush concluded that Britain would 
eventually take the "more direct and consistent course of the United States" towards the 
rebel states. 20 
In Europe, Canning tried to put forward the Polignac Memorandum as the 
prelude to Monroe's declaration. For their part, the other powers largely ignored 
Monroe's statements. The French proposed the establishment of Bourbon monarchies in 
Spanish America, and after 1823 thought that the US should be excluded from any 
conferences on the issue. Dexter Perkins concluded that Monroe's statement spurred the 
British to a more active policy in the region, but the doctrine's real significance lay in 
the future. Publicly, Canning denied that the British and Americans were secretly co- 
operating over Latin American affairs, but he stopped trying to quell discussions of his 
1823. 
19 Allen, Great Britain and the United States, 375; Bemis, A Diplomatic History of the United 
States, 205-208; and Dexter Perkins, The Monroe Doctrine, 1823-1826 (Gloucester, MA: Peter Smith, 
reprint 1965), 3-17. 
20 NA, RG 59, Dispatches, Britain, no. 354, Richard Rush to John Quincy Adams, 27 December 
1823; Canning in Allen, Great Britain and the United States, 379; Allen, Great Britain and the United 
States, 376-378; Perkins, Monroe Doctrine, 17-32; and NA, RG 59, Dispatches, Britain, no. 361, Richard 
Rush to John Quincy Adams, 9 February 1824. 
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talks with Rush. In South America, Canning managed to swing opinion to Britain's side 
as the influence behind Monroe's statements. Britain's stock rose in Latin American 
eyes and Canning's next plan was to disrupt the European Alliance. In the end, the other 
European powers remained split on the status of Latin America, so Canning decided to 
act over the following eight months. He wanted to be sure that recognition of rebel 
colonial states would not come back to haunt Britain, and that they were significantly 
pro-British to make recognition profitable. 21 
After a British commission to Mexico, Colombia, and Buenos Aires reported 
they were sympathetic to the British who had established businesses there, Lord 
Liverpool brought forward a proposal to recognise Mexico and Colombia by November 
1824. In establishing formal diplomatic relations, Britain would not seek special 
commercial treatment. The states were pleased, and Mexico, Colombia, and Buenos 
Aires entered into trade treaties with the British, although the final treaty was not signed 
until 1827. The result was a temporary boom in Latin American investment. Canning 
was cautious in his foreign policy decisions and preferred to wait until both public 
opinion, and diplomatic conditions, were such that all would support a policy decision 
22 that would be successful. 
US Naval Retrenchment 
In the United States, by 1825, reports of piracy against US shipping declined and so did 
American interest in co-operation with Britain over a common policy. President Monroe 
believed that the United States should use greater force against the pirates, but the co- 
operation of Spanish and Cuban authorities should be secured. The President concluded 
that the options available to the United States were to pursue the pirates onto foreign 
21 Perkins, Monroe Doctrine, 142-143,248 and 260 and Kaufmann, British Policy and the 
Independence of Latin America, 165-175. 
22 NA, RG 59, Dispatches, Britain, no. 412, Richard Rush to John Quincy Adams, 30 December 
1824 and Kaufmann, British Policy and the Independence of Latin America, 175-181. For the nuances of 
Canning's foreign policy, see Temperley, Foreign Policy of Canning, 447-475. 
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territory; make reprisals against the property owned by residents where the pirates hid; 
or blockade Cuban ports known to contain pirates. 23 When debate resumed in Congress 
about appropriations for 1825 anti-piracy duties, it quickly centred on whether the 
United States even needed a navy. Congress agreed to continued American naval efforts 
in the Gulf, but at a price. 
In the final analysis, "the present was a bill for the suppression of piracy, and not 
for the increase of the Navy. " In rebuttal, Representative Daniel Webster, "Anti- 
Jacksonian" from Massachusetts, told the House that if the British were able to have 80 
to 100 large ships deployed variously around the world, surely the United States could 
build at least ten new ships. The final version of the Bill became a compromise between 
those who still supported a strong navy, and those who believed its time had passed. 
Section two stipulated that the President "is hereby authorized to cause to be sold ... as 
he shall judge best for the public interest, the whole, or a part, of the vessels which were 
purchased under the authority of the act[. ]" Finally, in late 1825, Canning tried to 
initiate a tripartite agreement between France, the United States, and Britain, respecting 
piracy suppression and Cuba. Canning intended to maintain the status quo over 
strategically important Cuba, and assure Spain that no one would take advantage of 
situation to occupy it or any remaining Spanish possessions. But the other countries 
declared that such a statement was now unnecessary; the crisis had ended. 24 
23 United States, Register of Debates, 18th Cong., 2nd sess., 198-199,13 January 1825, James 
Monroe to the Senate of the United States. 
24 United States, Register of Debates, 18th Cong., 2nd sess., 729-732, House, 1 March 1825; 
Statutes at Large, vol. 4,131, "An Act to Authorize the building of ten sloops of war, and for other 
purposes[; ]" PRO, FO 27/328, reprinted in SDFOA, 194-195, George Canning to Viscount Granville (No. 
58), 23 August 1825 and "Projet of an Engagement either Tripartite or Between (1) France and England, 
(2) England and the United States, and (3) The United States and France; " and NA, RG 59, Dispatches, 
Britain, no. 3, Rufus King to George Canning, 24 August 1825 in Rufus King to H. Clay, 24 August 
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Britain Achieves Dominance 
Canning's policy toward Latin America was to use trade and influence to obtain 
regional support. He avoided direct alliances or naval power to advance British trade, 
and sought to keep rivals from gaining a strategic foothold. The British finally checked 
the Americans at the Panama Congress in 1826 which was called to discuss an 
American confederation, maritime rights, the Monroe Doctrine, Puerto Rico and Cuba. 
As the Americans became bogged down in domestic squabbles over Latin American 
policy, the British used their influence to mould events. The Americans were left 
virtually impotent and Canning achieved a similar result as he had with the European 
Alliance. The United States was expected to attend, and Adams favoured sending 
representatives. The British selected Edward J. Dawkins in March 1826 as their 
representative and ordered him to advocate that the conference embrace British 
maritime law. Kaufmann concluded that Dawkins' suggestions "came to nought, but 
thereafter such was the moral pre-eminence of Great Britain that the United States fell 
into a dark and chilling shade. " US Ambassador Albert Gallatin observed in 1827 that 
the British intended to continue naval operations from Kingston, Jamaica, but also make 
Bermuda an important naval station. In the end, Webster asserted, "Canning had 
completely established British influence in Hispanic-America. " Britain had more 
capital, a global trade network, and her "navy was far more important and much more in 
evidence. "ZS 
The result was that the US concluded that London had succeeded in 
consolidating its commercial interests. By the early 1830s, tension between the United 
States and Mexico was increasing. The Americans assured the British that they did not 
intend to occupy any part of Mexico, and that territory would only be transferred by sale 
if both nations agreed. American "squatters, " however, had started to occupy the border 
zs Kaufmann, British Policy and the Independence of Latin America, 202-217; NA, RG 59, 
Dispatches, Britain, no. 57, Albert Gallatin to Henry Clay, 13 February 1827; and Webster, Britain and 
the Independence of Latin America, 52. 
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region. Louis McLane, American ambassador to Britain, attune to British gentlemanly 
interests, believed that British commercial and mining interests in Mexico and "a 
disposition to limit our control in the gulf of Mexico" put pressure on the British 
government to ensure that "European policy [was] predominant in the New American 
states, and more especially in Mexico[. ]" He further opined that, "the supposed 
dependence of the Mexican government upon the interference and protection of Great 
Britain against Spanish aggression, gives to the People and government of this country 
[Britain] an influence which, if there be the disposition, may be exerted most 
"26 prejudicially to our future relations. 
British and American Slave Trade Policy 
While Britain and America had similar goals in the equatorial Atlantic, there remained 
an undercurrent of economic and diplomatic tension. Such tension increased over the 
simultaneous issue of slave trade suppression. While the British wavered on policing 
piracy in the Gulf for strategic reasons, their policy against the slave trade was clearer 
and they began using sea power to further their long-term objective of slave trade 
suppression. But Washington feared that London wanted to restrict American freedom 
of the seas, although Britain hoped to convince the Americans to help suppress the slave 
trade. When the latter became impossible because of American domestic concerns, 
Washington used its commitment to piracy suppression to placate the British and deal 
with West African interests and slave trade suppression. Rather than fight over slave 
trade suppression, both sides sought mitigation of their dispute so they could further 
their separate economic objectives. 
The British campaign against the slave trade began as a humanitarian enterprise 
that then acquired economic and strategic overtones as Britain sought to institute an 
"informal" empire to feed her industrial growth. London mounted a lone campaign to 
26 NA, RG 59, Dispatches, Britain, no. 18, Louis McLane to Martin Van Buren, 21 May 1830. 
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end slavery and the slave trade. Meanwhile, Africa took on a trade importance to Britain 
that rivalled British North America. While slave-produced products were interrupted 
during the American Revolutionary War, for example, slavery continued to be a vital 
part of the British colonial economy when, it seemed, Parliament suddenly decided to 
abolish the practice. British slave-grown goods like coffee and sugar remained 
competitive with those grown by the colonies of other nations, like Cuba and Brazil, 
until the British ended their use of slaves. David Eltis concluded that Britain, in 
particular the merchant and landed-gentry classes, for economic reasons, should have 
campaigned for the continuance of slavery and the slave trade, but instead committed 
econocide. 27 
Ideas were important in this age and the shift in British opinion against the slave 
trade emerged. The slow shift in British political opinion resulted from the rise of 
published ideas from the Enlightenment. Seymour Drescher concluded that a change in 
mentality caused the abolition movement. He argued that support for abolition came 
from the preconditioned mind of newly industrialised Northern England. Northern 
workers were predisposed to be sympathetic to those, like the Africans, who were also 
separated from their families. The people of Manchester, for example, submitted 101 
petitions to Parliament without first being organised by a lobbying committee. In 
contrast, at the same time, Liverpool, involved in the slave trade at many levels, failed 
to respond. Manchester's support for abolition came in the face of facts that the city's 
exports largely went to regions whose economies depended on money generated by 
slave-supported industries. 28 
27 David Eltis, Economic Growth and the Ending of the Transatlantic Slave Trade (New York 
and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987), 4-6. 
28 Seymour Drescher, Capitalism and Antislavery: British Mobilization in Comparative 
Perspective (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987), 67-87. See also, Drescher, "Whose 
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Crusaders like William Wilberforce, MP from Hull, then took up the cause in 
Parliament. Ending the slave trade would be good for Britain and would encourage the 
development of "a self-sustaining labor force" in the colonies that would buy British 
goods and expand the home economy. A colony was proposed in 1787 for Sierra Leone 
for freed slaves and under the plan the British government would pay £12 per black. On 
1 May 1807, Parliament passed a Bill outlawing the slave trade, and the last legal slaver, 
James de Wolf, turned his financial attention to textiles. 29 British involvement in West 
Africa had begun and so had the intertwining of humanitarian and economic motives. 
The demise of the slave trade coincided with a realignment of the capital-labour 
relationship within Britain. The British applied laissez-faire market principles to the 
British labour market and they linked productivity, wages, and consumerism in a more 
modern fashion. The ideology of the utilitarian and British Evangelicals formed a nexus 
whereupon Africa and the slave trade was conceptualised as another mechanism that 
could be destroyed in favour of the free-market economy and free labour. By the 1830s, 
coinciding with first Reform Bill, support for abolition shifted from the working class to 
the emergent middle class. 30 There arose the belief that free labour was simply better. 
With slavery and the slave trade banned at home and in the colonies by 1833, the 
problem for London was stopping the slave trade of other powers that fuelled 
competition from slave-produced goods. In this era of peace and a war-wary Europe, 
liberal Britain could hardly go to war to suppress the slave trade. Instead, the British 
undertook a diplomatic policy to persuade other powers to end and suppress their slave 
trade, or give Britain the authority to do so. London attempted to secure treaties with 
other countries whereby ships of each nation could be stopped and inspected to assess if 
they were involved in the slave trade. The British preferred a mutual right of search 
treaty because it gave them the most flexibility to do as they pleased. Suspected slavers 
29 Thomas, Slave Trade, 494-498, and 539-556. 
30 Eltis, Economic Growth, 18-21 and Drescher, Capitalism and Antislavery, 153. 
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were tried at Mixed Commission courts and if found guilty the vessels broken up. The 
British signed such treaties with the Netherlands (1822), Sweden (1824), Brazil (1826), 
Norway and Spain (1835), and Portugal (1842). 31 
This system would have been effective, but slavers switched flags as they moved 
from treaty-country to non-treaty country. Rather than sign a mutual right of search 
treaty, the French agreed to station warships off West Africa to intercept slavers under 
their flag. During the 1840s, the British signed similar treaties with the Portuguese who 
sent up to six warships to the West African coast. In all, the slavers faced a combined 
naval force of up to sixty warships. 32 The main British problem was with the United 
States. The Southern States were a slave economy and thus the Federal government was 
wary about an overseas commitment to suppress the slave trade. Meanwhile, they feared 
British interference with its growing sea trade if they granted the British the right to 
police the slave trade on their behalf. British and American economic goals conflicted 
and increased Anglo-American tension. 
Slavery had existed in the United States from before the Revolutionary War. 
From 1774 to 1776, with American colonies in rebellion, the US Continental Congress 
restricted the importation of slaves. When Thomas Jefferson wrote his first draft of the 
Declaration of Independence, he condemned slavery, but under pressure from Georgia 
and South Carolina, the final draft of the Declaration and the Articles of Confederation 
failed to condemn the slave trade. As one of the first of many compromises, the 
Constitution declared that Congress was forbidden to end the slave trade until 1807, but 
it could impose duties, no more than $10 per slave, on slave imports. But it was left to 
individual States to decide upon the slave trade under their jurisdiction. 33 Henceforth, 
31 Eltis, Economic Growth, 85-86. 
32 Eltis, Economic Growth, 86-88. 
33 Thomas, Slave Trade, 478-482 and 499-501. 
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slavery issues were controversial matters of States' rights that the Federal government 
had to consider when making policy. 
The process of outlawing the slave trade in the United States was therefore 
gradual, conservative, rather than a radical change that might threaten the Union. 34 On 
22 March 1794, for example, Congress passed a law that forbade any citizen or resident 
of the United States from equipping ships to buy and import slaves - they could loose 
their ship and receive a fine. On 3 April 1798, the law was extended to include the 
Mississippi territory, whereby slave importation henceforth was forbidden under threat 
of large fines, and any new slave imported would be freed. Americans were also banned 
from serving on vessels, both American and foreign, engaged in slave transportation 
between other countries. This same Act also authorised the nascent US Navy to "seize 
vessels and crews employed contrary to the act. " In December 1806, President Thomas 
Jefferson reminded Congress that the 1807 deadline for a decision on the slave trade 
was approaching. Legislation to abolish the trade was signed into law on 2 March with 1 
January 1808 the deadline when importing slaves into the United States would become 
illegal. The legislation contained provisions to ban Americans from outfitting slavers, 
and imposed fines, but contained no enforcement provisions. 35 
Nevertheless, slaves, for example, were still landed at independent Texas, then 
imported into the United States. Similar practices occurred in Florida, Alabama, and 
Georgia. Meanwhile, Baltimore shipbuilders, such as Stewart and Plunkett, supplied 
ships for the trade, and American firms insured slave ventures. In Washington, support 
for active measures to suppress the trade lagged. The Secretary of the Navy, Paul 
34 David Brion Davis, "The Uncertain Antislavery Commitment of Thomas Jefferson, " in 
Lawrence B. Goodheart, Richard D. Brown, and Stephen G. Rabe, Slavery in American Society, 3rd 
Edition (Lexington, MA: D. C. Heath and Company, 1976), 83-95. 
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Hamilton, was a slave owner and when he wrote to Charleston's senior naval officer, he 
seemed less than concerned about the trade. President Madison, for his part, asked 
Congress to consider greater means to enforce America's anti-slave trade laws. But in 
the end, the 1807 Act only banned the international slave trade, did nothing about the 
domestic slave trade, and it was virtually impossible to prove slave origins. Once in the 
United States, slaves were often shipped to Charleston or New Orleans, where they 
were sold. The Virginia Times estimated that 40,000 slaves were sold in 1835 alone. In 
the interim, Americans continued their involvement in the Brazilian and Cuban slave 
trades. Du Bois found that enforcement of US anti-slave trade laws in the Gulf of 
Mexico shortly after the War of 1812 was poor. Despite reports from government 
officials in the region, Washington only dispatched some revenue cutters in the late 
1810s to suppress piracy from Amelia Island. When slavers were captured in the region, 
it was largely because of coincidence. 36 
Early Anglo-American Slave-Trade Diplomacy 
Early joint Anglo-American efforts against the slave trade foundered because it was 
incompatible with American domestic interests and goals for sea power. While 
Washington wanted to meet some of Britain's concerns, there were domestic constraints 
on American policy. Washington feared that agreeing to British demands would 
interfere with American trade protection objectives. Such concerns dominated American 
focus at the political and naval levels. The White House tried to reconcile the 
differences between American and British policy through attempts to meet the British 
halfway on a mutual right of search treaty. But the White House was wary of a formal 
naval commitment for West Africa, a region far removed from American commercial 
interests during a time of national trepidation over slavery issues. Instead, Washington 
committed to a minimal West African naval deployment, as part of the West Indies anti- 
piracy patrol, and hoped it would protect American interests and reduce British 
36 Du Bois, Suppression of the African Slave-Trade, 116 and Thomas, Slave Trade, 569-572. 
80 
criticism. Meanwhile, Britain declared that she would use only diplomacy to persuade 
other powers to suppress the slave trade, rather than upset their national sensibilities 
with overt displays of naval force. Both nations sought to minimise potential disputes, 
rather than exacerbate them. 
On 12 May 1816, Adams, in his capacity as US Ambassador to Britain, met with 
Castlereagh to discuss the Barbary Powers. Castlereagh commented that he was unable 
to convince Portugal and Spain, but would not go to war with those powers over the 
matter of the African slave trade. He also warned the Barbary Powers that Britain would 
leave them alone "so long as they never applied it [slavery] to her [Britain's] 
subjects[. ]"37 By 21 August 1816, the British wanted all Christian slaves released and 
told the Barbary Powers they were in a state of war with the British. But Castlereagh 
told Adams that the British were apprehensive about deploying a major naval force to 
the region because the other powers were jealous of British naval strength. The British 
were-willing, instead, to co-operate with other powers over issues of mutual concern. 38 
But co-operation with the Americans over slave trade suppression stagnated. 
During a meeting on 23 December, Castlereagh observed that slavers still operated out 
of Southern US ports under Spanish and Portuguese flags. He suggested that the powers 
that had abolished the slave trade, like the United States and Britain, should use their 
naval forces co-operatively to arrest slavers that flew the flags of any nation that had 
banned the slave trade: the mutual right of search. Castlereagh admitted that it was not 
his "intention to propose that the United States should take part in this system, " and so 
Adams, wary of such proposals, refrained from giving an opinion. 39 During 1817, 
Adams met William Wilberforce, acknowledged Wilberforce's influence in Parliament, 
37 John Quincy Adams, Memoirs ofJohn Quincy Adams: Comprising Portions of his Diary from 
1795 to 1848,10 vols., vol. 3,12 May 1816. Charles Francis Adams, (ed. ) (Freeport, NY: Books for 
Libraries Press, reprint 1969), 358-359, (hereafter, Memoirs and volume number). 
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but concluded that Britain's right of search proposals were just an attempt to obtain in 
peacetime the right of search that they abused during the late war. 40 Initial hopes for 
joint Anglo-American policing operations against the slave trade died. The Americans 
voiced renewed objections to British claims of right of search, still a sore point after the 
War of 1812. 
The Americans continually rejected calls from the British to join a bilateral anti- 
slave trade treaty for a number of reasons. The US believed in total freedom of the seas, 
whereas the British thought that there should be limitations. The British believed that 
freedom of the seas only applied to legal trade and that those suspected of being 
involved in illegal activities, or flying suspicious flags, could be stopped. The 
Americans believed that their vessels were to be left alone no matter what they were 
doing, although they agreed that piracy and slaving were wrong. Christopher Lloyd 
concluded that the Americans had in essence "extended the Monroe doctrine to cover 
their trading vessels at sea. No interference on the part of a European power was 
admissible[. ]"41 John Quincy Adams exclaimed that if any American vessels were 
stopped by another nation in peacetime it would meet with "universal repugnance" by 
the American public. The Americans believed in the "freedom of the seas" and felt it 
was in Britain's nature to restrict such American freedom with impressment, as during 
the War of 1812. But the British countered that any slave trade treaty would be 
reciprocal, revocable, and limited to "specified coasts and a definite number of [war] 
ships. " If any party objected to the arrangement, they could simply abandon it rather 
than sour their relations or go to war. 42 
40 John Quincy Adams, 6 June 1817, Memoirs, vol. 3,556-558. 
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The Americans rested assured that the High Court of Admiralty's ruling on the 
case of the French slave ship, Le Louis, restricted London's peacetime use of sea power. 
The Queen Charlotte, a Sierra Leone colonial warship, captured Le Louis on 30 January 
1816 near Cape Mesurado, Africa. Judge Sir William Scott believed that the 
condemnation of the ship rested on the legality of the visitation, because the captain of 
the warship had no way of knowing if there were slaves on board unless he stopped and 
searched Le Louis. The judge ruled that there was no provision in the law of nations for 
the visit, search, and seizure of a vessel in peacetime. The simple statement of France 
that they had abolished the slave trade was insufficient legal authority for another 
nation's warship to seize Le Louis. Meanwhile, the only law that banned the importation 
of slaves into French colonies dated from January 1817; it was prospective and 
therefore inapplicable to Le Louis, seized in 1816.43 Because of this ruling, the British 
had to seek agreements with other countries to search their ships for slaves, or risk war. 
America's Minimalist African policy and the 1819 Anti-Slave Trade Act 
However, Anglo-American treaty talks continually failed over the right of search and 
the White House moved forward with unilateral action to protect and promote American 
interests. As in their diplomatic talks over a Gulf of Mexico policy, negotiations over 
the slave trade languished under the burden of divergent policies. The United States was 
a hybrid nation with slaveholding regions in the South and regions containing free 
blacks that many feared would ruin the nation. The divisive slavery issue, and slavery's 
status in new American territories like Missouri, prevented the administration from 
taking decisive action against the slave trade for fear of causing domestic turmoil. 
Instead, Washington made decisions that could be supported domestically. They 
decided on minimal naval deployment to the West African coast to support "privately" 
" IUP, vol. 64, Further Papers Relating to the Slave Trade, II, 9-11, "Case of the French Slave 
Ship Le Louis[. ]" A good introduction to prize law is Donald A. Petrie, The Prize Game: Lawful Looting 
on the High Seas in the Days of Fighting Sail (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1999). 
83 
run American colonies that repatriated freed Africans. It initiated American West 
African economic interests and provided a naval presence that Washington could also 
use to placate British concerns. 
In the early 1800s, slave revolts fomented fear among the slaveholding class that 
slavery and movements for abolition would undermine their society. They felt a way 
was needed to rid their territory of free blacks that, so many in the South believed, were 
the source of agitation. 44 Pressure from organisations like the American Colonisation 
Society (ACS), who wished freed slaves repatriated to Africa, helped carry forward a 
minimal African commitment that could be achieved politically. The US Navy acted in 
support of the colonisation efforts and only detached the occasional ship from the West 
Indies piracy patrol to the West African coast. 45 American legislative action during 
1819 is significant because naval efforts along the West African coast began as an 
indirect method of providing government support to private American colonisation 
societies using the 1819 Anti-Slave Trade Act. But as will be revealed in the next 
chapter, when piracy was suppressed, the US Navy retrenched, and Americans along 
West Africa noticed the British as sole arbiter. 
In 1816, the ACS formed to promote the repatriation of freed Africans and 
colonisation. The Society devised a scheme to resettle Africans in a colony similar to 
that established by the British at Sierra Leone. The movement's leader, Reverend 
Robert Finley, hoped that wealthy Americans and the government would finance, 
promoted, and protect the settlement. He believed that the United States could become 
the flag-bearer of Christianity in Africa. But the First Annual Report of the ACS also 
revealed the more sinister goal of ridding America of an idle "vicious and mischievous" 
race of freed blacks. The Society gained many high-profile supporters, like Henry Clay, 
44 David M. Streifford, "The American Colonization Society: An Application of Republican 
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Amos J. Beyan, The American Colonisation Society and the Creation of the Liberian State: A Historical 
Perspective, 1822-1900 (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1991), 2-6. 
45 Du Bois, Suppression of the African Slave-Trade, 98. 
84 
speaker of the House, Daniel Webster, then Congressman from New Hampshire and 
naval advocate, and James Monroe. 6 In January 1817, the Society asked Congress to 
help support its colonisation efforts, but shied away from mention of slavery. Yet 
Congress wavered and feared a free black settlement on the African coast would 
generate conflict with other powers. 47 
The Society had a supporter in Congress, Representative Charles Mercer, who 
introduced the new anti-slave trade Bill in March 1819. The Bill proposed that the 
Federal government would assume the task of policing the slave trade. It passed with 
relatively little debate especially compared to the anti-piracy legislation that was 
introduced and passed at the same time . 
48 The 1819 Act gave the President the power to 
send American warships wherever they were needed to fight the slave trade, in 
particular along the African coast. Commanders were ordered to capture any vessel that 
had slaves on board or was outfitted for the slave trade in violation of the 1808 anti- 
slave trade law, and bring them into an American port. The 1819 Act also gave the 
President the power to deport any freed slaves and appoint agents to oversee operations. 
To accomplish the goals of the legislation, Congress allotted $100,000.49 
Monroe's Compromise 
President Monroe used the provisions of the 1819 Act to support the ACS with the US 
Navy, and provide an American presence along West Africa. Before the War of 1812, 
along with William Pinkney, Monroe had negotiated an agreement with the British that 
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University Press, 1961), 12-34; Beyan, American Colonization Society, 2-6; and Streifford, "American 
Colonization Society, " 201-209. 
47 United States, Annals of Congress, 14d' Cong., 2d sess., 481-483, House, 14 January 1817, B. 
Washington, President, ACS, "To the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States ... " and 
United States, Annals of Congress, 14d' Cong., 2"d sess., 939-940, House, 11 February 1817. 
48 United States, Annals of Congress, 15d' Cong., I' sess., 1771-1774, House, 18 April 1818; 
Staudenraus, African Colonization Movement, 48-51; and United States, Annals of Congress, 15d' Cong., 
2"d sess., 1430-1431, House, I March 1819. 
"Statutes at Large, vol. 3,532-533. 
85 
would have resolved wartime trade and blockade issues. But an uncompromising 
President Jefferson summarily rejected the Monroe-Pinkney Treaty. During the war, 
Monroe served as Secretary of State, acting Secretary of War, and remained wary of 
British motives over trade issues and maritime rights. 50 Consequently, when Anglo- 
American talks for further US action against the slave trade failed, President Monroe's 
minimal support became American policy until 1842. Through this Act the White 
House delegated responsibility for freed slaves largely to the ACS, while Washington 
provided the Society with a minimal level of naval support. This policy met the mood of 
the nation and the President's style of leadership. In the era of the "Missouri 
Compromise" and increasing tension between North and South, such a policy was all 
that the White House could accomplish. Monroe, while listening to other people's 
opinion, was a supervisor of affairs, but he was also the final arbiter, especially with 
foreign affairs. When matters like the Missouri Compromise divided Cabinet, Monroe 
took his own course and worked with Congress. 51 
The Missouri Compromise reveals the pressures that Monroe's government was 
under during the period. Northern members saw the slavery issue as a national problem, 
while members from slave holding States believed that how a State organised itself, 
slavery or otherwise, was its own responsibility. A national debate followed that 
threatened to destroy the Union. Privately, in correspondence of 10 January 1820, the 
President expressed his desire that no new States be admitted to the Union unless 
slavery was prohibited in them, but a compromise was needed to save the nation. 
Senator Jesse B. Thomas proposed a compromise: slavery would be forbidden in 
regions of the Louisiana Purchase above 36°30", but Missouri would be permitted entry 
as a slave State. 52 
50 Hickey, War of 1812,14-16,233 and Jones, Crucible of Power, 71. 
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Congress passed the compromise legislation and Missouri and Maine - which 
prohibited slavery - entered the Union. The issue was, like all slavery issues, difficult 
for the government. Monroe convened Cabinet to discuss the issue, but only after 
Congress passed the legislation. He wanted to know if Congress had the right to 
legislate slavery; the Cabinet agreed it did. The President also wanted to know if the 
compromise was only in force as long as a region was a territory. Monroe was unable to 
obtain a consensus so he rephrased the question and asked if the provision was 
constitutional; Cabinet agreed it was. 53 During and after the Missouri Compromise 
debate, it is no wonder that Monroe's administration was reluctant to tackle anything 
related to slavery. 
Contemporaneous to the Missouri controversy, the American Colonisation 
Society hoped that the navy would support its plans for African colonisation. With both 
the colony and the navy on the West African coast, freed Africans could be repatriated 
and the slave trade curtailed. Monroe met with his Cabinet in December 1819 and 
discussed American efforts against the slave trade. Among the Cabinet members was 
William H. Crawford, Treasury Secretary, who was also the Society's Vice-President. 
Crawford argued that the government's appropriation for slave trade suppression from 
the 19 March 1819 Act should be handed to the Society for management, but other 
members of Cabinet objected. Secretary of the Navy Smith Thompson was wary about 
the endeavour. So was Adams, who not only feared spiralling costs but also the 
ramifications to America if it led to the establishment of formal African colonies. 
Moreover, he felt the government had no permission to spend the appropriation to 
sustain freed Africans along the coast. Harmon concluded that Monroe "disregarded the 
opinions of Adams" and provided funding to transport freed Africans back to Africa. 
53 Cunningham, James Alonroe, 102.104. 
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Monroe also placed the endeavour under the auspices of the Navy Department to spend 
the $100,000 budget. 54 
The President had no qualms and the ACS continued to press Monroe. They 
asked that he appoint a US agent to handle the freed Africans and provide limited 
support to the Society's efforts, like dispatching a warship, rather than establish a 
formal government colony. 55 Monroe had to face steady opposition, in particular from 
Adams, who remained wary of overseas colonies and suspicious of the ACS's motives. 
Adams confided to his diary that he felt that some slaveholders probably hoped to use 
the colonial system to rid themselves of freed blacks at the government's expense. The 
President, echoing the sentiments of the ACS, believed that freed slaves were 
troublesome and that repatriation would rid the country of an element "who lived by 
pilfering, and corrupted the slaves[. ]"56 
Adams told his diary that the Society had "got the ear of the President, and 
Crawford" and had "already got their fingers into the purse[. ]" The government was 
therefore going to pay for half the cost of the charter vessel readying for the coast, that 
would bring the colonists to the planned settlement at Sherbro Island. The President 
authorised the money for the voyage and decided to send Congress a letter detailing the 
expenses, but only after the fact. 57 Du Bois concluded that these US anti-slave trade 
actions "may be regarded as the last of the Missouri Compromise measures. "58 Adams 
distanced himself from the entire colonisation effort and gladly handed it over to the 
Secretary of the Navy. Adams «Tote that "[t]here is so much management in this affair, 
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that I have no doubt much money will be expended to no useful purpose. "59 The 
compromise atmosphere allowed support for the American Colonisation Society and the 
goal to rid the United States of "troublesome" freed slaves. 
The compromise is significant because it also allowed the United States to 
placate British concerns, and claim that the United States had modified its use of sea 
power and had a naval presence along West Africa. On 23 December 1820, Monroe's 
Cabinet met to discuss the British proposals for suppression of the slave trade that were 
submitted on 20 December. Secretary Thompson believed that "by declining it [the right 
of search] we shall expose ourselves to the imputation of insincerity as to our purpose of 
suppressing the trade[. ]" The British Government would then use it with the Europeans, 
against the Americans, in Britain's global strategic moves. But Secretary of War John 
C. Calhoun disagreed and believed that Britain used slave trade suppression to buttress 
British power. 60 
Calhoun was from South Carolina, a slaveholder, a conservative, and he was 
under pressure to protect Southern interests. In the 1810 congressional elections, he was 
elected as one of the "War Hawks" advocating a strong stand against Britain in the 
prelude to the War of 1812.61 During the Missouri compromise debate, he refrained 
from making public statements, but was "strongly with the compromisers[. ]" Irving H. 
Bartlett concluded that Calhoun feared Southern reaction if they believed "that property 
in slaves was" threatened. 62 On 24 April 1820, for example, Thomas B. Robertson, 
formerly Representative from Louisiana, wrote Calhoun about the strategic issues the 
region faced. He feared the Northern abolitionists who were diverting the nation's 
priorities. Robertson despised Washington spending "hundreds and Thousands of 
59 John Quincy Adams, 6 January 1820, Afemoirs, vol. 4,496. 
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dollars" to employ US warships "in protecting the Slaves of Africa and escorting them 
back" while "our Coast and the adjoining seas are exposed to the most daring 
depredations that the world has witnessed[. ]" The people of New Orleans suffered at the 
hands of the pirates who descended on the coast and stole property, including slaves. 63 
With this backdrop, Calhoun told Cabinet that Britain had banned the slave trade 
of its citizens and now wanted other nations to follow suit because British trade was 
under pressure from cheaper slave-produced goods. In this new era, Calhoun professed, 
Britain "could not bear to see a profitable trade enjoyed by rivals[; ]" slave trade 
suppression was the only way to increase British economic growth. America should 
refuse to agree to British proposals on nationalistic grounds, for if the United States 
agreed, it would simply be a British satellite. Thompson was finally outnumbered when 
Adams came down on Calhoun's side. Nevertheless, Adams reminded Cabinet that 
London was under pressure from abolitionists and had to be seen to "conciliate them. " 
Consequently, Monroe listened to all sides and agreed that the government should hold 
firm against the British. If anything, the President believed that the American position 
would strengthen its stand against searching ships in wartime to impress sailors. 64 
But to allay British concerns, Cabinet discussed several options, among them a 
permanent and separate US naval force for the African coast. This was ruled 
"inconvenient" and Cabinet wanted to keep its options open to meet other national 
needs, like those demanded by Robertson. Thompson, while disagreeing with Calhoun, 
admitted that a formal treaty would "deprive us of the power of adapting the disposal of 
all our naval force to the exigencies of circumstances from time to time. " Instead, 
Cabinet agreed to remind London that the US had "a vessel constantly cruising on that 
coast, and that it was intended to keep such force there[. ]" The Executive felt, in 
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combination with its other African policy, it could modify its use of sea power as a 
compromise. Cabinet agreed that they could order US naval commanders on the African 
coast to co-operate with the British. They could cruise together, if "useful or 
convenient, " and exchange intelligence "for the furtherance of the common object. "65 
Anglo-American discussions languished for several years, and an attempt in 
1823 on a compromise treaty that would have declared slavery equal to piracy failed. 
Naval ships would have been allowed to capture pirate-slavers of each nation, but they 
would have to be sent to their home country for trial. 66 The British agreed to the terms 
of the treaty, and Cabinet agreed to submit it to the Senate for ratification, over the 
objections of Adams. But one of the biggest failures of Monroe's administration was its 
final rejection by Congress who amended the treaty to limit the right of search to the 
African coast, which London rejected at that time. Adams still had to deal with the 
British and their repeated requests for joint Anglo-American co-operation against the 
slave trade, but British leaders realised the domestic constraints Washington faced. 67 
During the early 1830s, Sir Charles Vaughan, British ambassador in 
Washington, told Lord Palmerston that Washington was wary of upsetting the South at a 
time when "Anti-Slavery Societies have roused the jealousy of all the Slave- 
holders[. ]"68 The British sought to bring the Americans into a treaty with the French, but 
again Washington rejected the proposal. Palmerston respected the American objections 
to the right of search being extended to their coastline. He concluded that it was 
"sufficient reason for not further pressing the adoption of such an article. "69 It would go 
65 John Quincy Adams, 23 and 30 December 1820, Memoirs, vol. 5,218-219 and 222-223. 
66 Soulsby, Right of Search, 26-37. 
67 Cunningham, James Monroe, 170 and John Quincy Adams, 7 May 1824,19 and 20 June 
1823, Memoirs, vol. 6,148-151 and 321-322. 
6$ IUP, vol. 14, Correspondence with Foreign Powers (hereafter, Class B), 84, no. 120, Charles 
R. Vaughan to Viscount Palmerston, 12 December 1833. 
69 IUP, vol. 14, (Class B), 85-92, enclosures no. 121, no. 122, and no. 123, Charles R. Vaughan 
to Louis McLane, 25 December 1833, Louis McLane to Sir C. R. Vaughan, 24 March 1834, and 
Palmerston to Charles Vaughan, 7 July 1834. 
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against liberal ideals to push too hard. Instead, Britain and the United States respected 
each other's opinion on the application of sea power and sought to mitigate tension by 
developing alternative uses of their navies that were acceptable to their wider interests. 
Conclusion 
During the 1820s, Britain and the United States used diplomatic manoeuvres to secure 
their long-term objectives in the equatorial Atlantic. Britain, fearful of sparking 
European intervention in Latin America, carefully avoided provoking other nations 
while Canning balanced his strategy and sought diplomatic co-operation with the United 
States. While Britain was freer to act against slavers, domestic American unease over 
slave trade issues, and British motives, curbed efforts to formulate a common policy 
over slave trade suppression. Divergent economic and political interests meant that the 
nations went their separate ways in the development of equatorial Atlantic policy. Both 
deployed navies to fight piracy, but only the Royal Navy also fought the slave trade. 
Meanwhile, the US Navy deployed to West Africa to provide minimal support for 
private colonisation efforts in conjunction with anti-piracy duties. When the immediate 
need to protect commerce ended, patrols were reduced, and West African deployment 
languished. But while there, the United States offered to co-operate with the British 
over slave trade suppression, if convenient. There were signs that the peacetime use sea 
power to further long-term objectives might be used as common ground to calm 
disputes in the Anglo-American relationship. 
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Chapter Four: Operations against Pirates and Slavers, 1820s and 1830s 
Britain and the United States believed in using sea power to meet immediate threats to 
commerce. But the political and economic considerations of the nations shaped their 
naval response to pirates and privateers during the 1820s. The US Navy protected 
American shipping, instituted convoys, and hunted pirates in their lairs. The squadron 
protected the Gulf of Mexico and provided West African colonial support, but the 
former was the priority. West African expansion was left to the endeavours of the 
Colonisation Society. The reality of the US Navy deployment was sporadic, rather than 
the "constant cruising" Washington hoped would placate the British. The Royal Navy, 
in response, policed the seas for pirates and privateers and monitored American naval 
activity. London dispatched naval reinforcements to the Gulf of Mexico, but they spent 
little time in the region. British naval deployment was more complicated and suffered 
from political constraints in London. 
Figur e 4.1 Gulf of Mexico 
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Britain was suspicious of the American presence; nevertheless, the Royal Navy 
refrained from provoking the US Navy, or other nations, in the Gulf of Mexico. London 
and Washington were wary of each other, but kept the peace. In the Gulf, the only plan 
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for mutual co-operation was when circumstances arose and at the discretion of local 
commanders. While the White House hoped that the British would co-operate with the 
naval force the US was able to dispatch to West Africa, when piracy declined in the 
Gulf the Americans reduced their naval commitment. Consequently, there were even 
fewer US Navy cruises to the West African coast. When American vessels left the coast, 
Britons wondered when the Americans might return. 
In contrast, the Royal Navy in that region was free to act as it chose against 
privateers, pirates, and slavers. They suppressed the slave trade for humanitarian 
reasons, but Royal Navy officers also told London of the economic potential of the 
region, in particular places like Fernando Po, that could rival the West Indies. Still, 
divergent American and British policies, and accompanying domestic and global 
restraints, affected Anglo-American naval deployment and Britain's goal of greater 
American activity along the West African coast. Again, co-operation was limited to that 
undertaken as chance arose. But while their relations were tense, Britain and America 
co-existed in the equatorial Atlantic. Both nations sought to control their use of sea 
power, rather than spark conflict, while furthering their growing objectives. 
American Naval Response 
The American naval deployment in the equatorial Atlantic was in response to the piracy 
threat. When the Spanish-American colonies rebelled, they threw the region into chaos. 
After 1815, surplus maritime resources poured into Central and South American waters. 
Starkey concludes that this "flow of Baltimore schooners and American seafarers, 
together with the picaroons of former Spanish and French privateersmen, contributed 
significantly to the course independante and the wars of liberation. ", Privateers from 
both sides fought each other and interfered with British and American shipping. Pirates 
also took advantage of weak Spanish power and launched raids from Cuba and the 
David J. Starkey, "Pirates and Markets, " Research in Maritime History, 7 (December 1994): 
76-77. 
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Yucatan Peninsula on the shipping of all nations. 2 While this market returned to 
equilibrium, piracy was deemed a threat to commerce and navies were "dispatched to 
eradicate, reduce or at least police it "3 Before 1819, the Americans conducted few 
forceful naval operations to protect their trade against pirates or privateers. When a 
constitutional government was restored in Spain in March 1820, most Spanish forces 
withdrew from Spanish America, but General Morales, the Spanish commander, 
declared that the 1200 miles of Spanish-American coastline under dispute was under a 
blockade. 4 
The US Navy had to protect US shipping from pirates and from interference by 
privateers of Spain and her rebels. The extended US 1820 Anti-Piracy Act covered 
piracy against, and committed by, all ships and citizens, not just those of or against the 
United States. 5 Operations against pirates were simple because they were the enemy of 
all nations. American operations were free from European complications, although by 
1824 Washington was wary they would test the Monroe Doctrine. United States naval 
deployment in the early 1820s was primarily for trade protection. American forces 
supported American commercial interests, rather than altruistic activities like slave trade 
suppression. 
The House of Representatives Committee on Naval Affairs reported on 2 March 
1822, while discussing piracy, on the distribution of the American navy. At that time, 
the Franklin, Constellation and Dolphin were in the Pacific on a mission to protect 
American commerce and US whalers in particular. Meanwhile, the Constitution, 
2 Using J. L. Anderson's terminology this piracy was episodic and tied with the disruption of 
trade and also intrinsic and part of the local economic system (Anderson, "Piracy and World History: An 
Economic Perspective on Maritime Predation, " Journal of World History, 6: 2 (1995): 175-199). For more 
on the piracy in the region during this period see Mark C. Hunter, "Piraten im Golf von Mexiko im frühen 
19. Jahrhundert" in Hartmut Roder, (ed. ), Piraten - Abenteuer oder Bedrohung? (Edition Temmin, 2002) 
52-65. 
3 Starkey, "Pirates and Markets, " 65-66. 
° United States, Register of Debates, 18`h Cong., 2nd sess., Appendix, 31 January 1825, "Report 
of the Committee of Foreign Relations of the House of Representatives, on Piracy and Outrages on 
American Commerce by Spanish Privateers" and Statutes at Large, vol. 3,510-514 and 600. 
5 Statutes at Large, vol. 3,510-514 and 600. 
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Ontario, and schooner Nonsuch, were in the Mediterranean, tasked with commerce 
protection and insurance against the Barbary Powers. The navy also had ships deployed 
in the Gulf to protect against the pirates: the Hornet, Spark and Enterprise, the 
schooners Alligator, Shark, Grampus, and Porpoise; and gunboat numbers 158 and 168 
patrolled the Florida and Georgia coastline while the Macedonian would soon sail from 
Boston to the Caribbean. 6 
For most of 1822, the Americans patrolled against, and sent out warnings about, 
pirates and Spanish privateers, and the rebel forces seemed to respect the Americans. 
The Americans hunted for pirates, tried to dislodge them from their lairs, and instituted 
convoys for the protection of shipping. One important concept was to escort merchant 
ships past the areas which pirates frequented. The Hornet, for example, Robert Henley 
commanding, sailed in February 1822, from Havana to Pensacola, Florida, with a 
convoy of twenty-two ships, mostly American. But American support of the rebel 
American states hurt their fight against the pirates around Cuba. The Charleston Courier 
reported on 17 April 1822, that the Cubans, still loyal to Spain, were annoyed at 
President Monroe's desire for Spain to recognise the rebel Latin American states and 
suppress lucrative piracy. 7 
By May 1822, the US Navy settled into a pattern of dispatching a warship to 
convoy vessels from Havana to America every Sunday. Still, the actions of the 
privateers irritated the Americans, and by July the Cyane was prepared to sail, under the 
command of Captain Robert T. Spence, "with extensive powers to put a stop to the 
outrages committed on our flag by Spanish Privateers. "8 Spence, and other American 
officers, wrote Spanish authorities and told them to leave American shipping alone. But 
6 United States, Annals of Congress, 17`h Cong., 1" sess., 1173-1174, House, 2 March 1822. 
7 ACDA, 21 February 1822,2, column e; Norfolk Beacon, 22 February 1822, reprint in ACDA, 
26 February 1822,2, column f and 3, column a; and ACDA, 2 March 1822,2, column d; Charleston 
Courier, reprint in ACDA, 24 April 1822,3, column a; and ACDA, 24 April 1822,3, column c. 
8 ACDA, 15 June 1822,2, column b and 12 July 1822,2, column a. 
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the protests seemed in vain and Spanish privateering activities continued, with the US 
merchant brig General Andrew Jackson captured by the Spanish privateer General 
Pereira on 22 July 1822. The Spanish representative, Don Francisco Gonzalez de 
Linarez, told Spence that the Spanish authorities at Puerto Rico were unaware of illegal 
actions taken by Spanish privateers and Washington would have to seek redress from 
"the treasury of Spain[. ]"9 Nevertheless, pirates continued to operate from Spanish 
territories, namely Cape San Antonio and Matanzas, Cuba (see figure 4.1, Gulf of 
Mexico). 
Increased US Action 
Under continued pirate attacks, and pressure from Congress, the White House tasked 
Commodore David Porter to command the expanded Gulf squadron on 21 December 
1822 and it sailed in February 1823.10 The US Navy was most active in the Western 
Atlantic and the Gulf of Mexico during 1823, especially against the pirates. Yet, under 
the auspicious of the anti-piracy patrol, Washington also dispatched ships to West 
Africa. Secretary of the Navy Samuel L. Southard later reported that since the passage 
of the Act "authorizing an additional Naval Force for the suppression of Piracy" more 
ships were sent to that station. From the squadron's base on Thompson's Island, Key 
West, the Secretary ordered Porter to suppress piracy, protect US merchant ships, 
convoy specie to the US from Mexico, and co-operate with any other nation's navies in 
the pursuit of pirates. Secretary Thompson stated, vaguely, that Porter had some leeway 
to pursue pirates into uninhabited regions where Spanish authority was ineffective. But 
9 United States, Annals of Congress, 17`s Cong., 2nd sess., Appendix, 1227-1229, "Statement of 
Arthur Edgarton, mate of the brig General Andrew Jackson, " undated autumn 1822, and Robert Trail 
Spence to Smith Thompson [recounting details of meeting with de Linarez], 3 September 1822. Spence 
and de Linarez carried on lengthy correspondence over these issues, see copies in United States, Annals of 
Congress, 17'h Cong., 2nd sess., Appendix, 1230-1244. 
10 David F. Long, Nothing Too Daring: A Biography of Commodore David Porter, 1780-1843 
(Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1970), 203-205. 
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warned him to avoid chasing pirates onto Spanish territory or provoking a confrontation 
with any foreign power. " 
On station, Porter ordered the Shark, under Matthew Perry, and three small 
schooners to patrol along Southern Puerto Rico. Porter intended the entire squadron to 
sortie for San Juan to stop Spanish privateers preying on US shipping. His interaction 
with the Spanish was tense and led to the death of one American from the Fox when she 
entered San Juan harbour and was accidentally fired upon by nervous Spanish 
soldiers. 12 After telling Miguel de la Torre, the governor of Puerto Rico, that the US 
Navy was there to protect US shipping, Porter sailed from Puerto Rico and returned to 
hunting pirates. Hunting for pirates and destroying their lairs was the primary goal, 
while the squadron also convoyed shipping safely out of their range. Porter had 
difficulty differentiating pirates from privateers. Nevertheless, he told Washington that 
every Spaniard he encountered was well armed and could be a potential pirate, but if he 
stopped every Spanish ship "their coasting trade would soon be entirely broken up. " 13 
Since his arrival, five pirate ships that had watched his fleet were disbanded, but 
he dispatched two schooners leeward of Matanzas to investigate more reports. But 
Porter concluded that the squadron had two conflicting duties that divided his fleet - 
convoying, and search and destroy - and he decided to give more weight to protecting 
commerce until more warships arrived. By mid-April 1823, the squadron had 
established its base at Thompson's Island, landed their supplies, equipped barges, and 
11 Britain, British Foreign and State Papers (hereafter, BFSP), vol. 11,33, Samuel L. Southard, 
"Report of the Secretary of the Navy, " 1 December 1823; Long, Nothing Too Daring, 207-208 and 
United States, U. S. Serial Set, vol. 89,18`h Cong., IS'sess., Senate Documents, enclosure in Document no. 
1,190, D. Porter to Secretary of the Navy, 19 November 1823. Hereafter, the US. Serial Set will be cited 
according to the recommended Library of Congress style, for example, S. Doc., No. 1,18`h Cong., 1 S` sess., 
190. 
12 Long, Nothing Too Daring, 210 and S. Doc., No. 1,18`s Cong., 15` sess., 186, D. Porter to S. 
Thompson, 3 March 1823. 
" S. Doc., No. 1,18th Cong., 1' sess., 136-139 and 147-148, David Porter to Governor of Puerto 
Rico, 4 March 1823, Miguel de la Torre to David Porter, 6 March 1823 and D. Porter to Smith 
Thompson, 28 March 1823. 
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deployed at various points around Cuba. Regardless, Porter was displeased that he was 
forced to use the small schooners for convoy duty rather than hunting pirates. 14 
By 24 April 1823, after almost two months on station, Porter declared victory 
against the pirates. Convoying continued and he had recently dispatched two barges to a 
bay near Point Yeacos to search for three pirate ships. Porter told Secretary Thompson 
that there were no pirates larger than an "open boat" operating along the Cuban coast 
anymore. He also acknowledged that it was not just the American squadron that forced 
the pirates to hide. The larger pirate ship Saragarina had finally been captured "in her 
flight, from here [Matanzas], having been taken by two British sloops of war at the east 
end of the Island. " 15 
The squadron's presence had a "moral effect" on both sides: Spain recalled some 
of her privateers, the rebel states were more careful in issuing commissions, and the 
pirates were under control. It was only with the presence of a naval force and the co- 
operation of local authorities could they stop piracy. The Secretary of the Navy also 
believed that piracy was suppressed around Cuba, and he extended the squadron's range 
to include West Africa. It would give aid to the African colonist societies, and on the 
return voyage watch for slavers. Porter replied that if his West Indian force was larger, 
then a ship could sortie to Africa every six weeks. 16 Because of the increased patrol 
area, Porter divided the squadron into two divisions. He planned "by a constant routine, 
[in] giving equal protection to our colony on the coast of Africa and guarding against 
the slave trade [. ],, 17 
14 S. Doc., No. 1,18th Cong., 1' sess., 147-148 and 150-153, D. Porter to Smith Thompson, 28 
March 1823 and D. Porter to Secretary of the Navy, 16 April 1823. 
15 S. Doc., No. 1,18th Cong., 1' sess., 150-156, D. Porter to Secretary of the Navy, 16 April 1823, 
C. K. Stribling to S. Cassin, 8 April 1823 and D. Porter to Smith Thompson, 24 April 1823. 
16 S. Doc., No. 1,18t1' Cong., lu sess., 189-192, D. Porter to Secretary of the Navy, 19 November 
1823; Long, Nothing Too Daring, 216-217; and Britain, BFSP, vol. 11,33-35, Samuel L. Southard, 
"Report of the Secretary of the Navy, " 1 December 1823. 
" Long, Nothing Too Daring, 219; and S. Doc., No. 1,18d' Cong., 2nd sess., 116-117 and 119- 
120, D. Porter to Samuel Southard, 20 January 1824, D. Porter to S. L. Southard, 8 April 1824. 
99 
The seed was sown for US naval expansion to West Africa, but it was 
conditioned by Washington's use of sea power in home waters against immediate 
threats to commerce, rather than any real desire to suppress the slave trade. Washington 
also realised that it had to be careful in exercising its use of sea power close to the 
interests of other nations. Significantly, Washington removed Porter from command, 
replacing him with Commodore Lewis Warrington, when the former threatened 
relations with Spain. Porter had received accusations from an American merchant, 
Stephen Cabot, that Spaniards had robbed him and fled to Fajardo, Puerto Rico. On 14 
November 1824, in response to the arrest of an officer gathering intelligence on the 
island, Porter and 200 men went ashore and demanded redress. Porter's landing 
occurred in a region under direct Spanish control and Washington feared the action 
would test Monroe's doctrine. Porter, Washington opined, showed poor diplomatic 
skills and was found guilty of conduct unbecoming, insubordination, and disobeying 
orders. ' 8 
Decline of US Naval Operations 
While Washington was wary that the Monroe Doctrine might be tested, the US also 
found that pirate activity in the Gulf had changed. As piracy declined so to did US naval 
efforts. By late 1824, Secretary Southard concluded that the piracies were no less 
traumatic for the victims, but the pirates hid in the creeks and bays, venturing forth only 
to attack lone ships. Warrington also attributed the decline in piracy to the US naval 
deployment along the Cuban coast. 19 Convoying and hunting patrols had forced the 
pirates to change their tactics. They attacked in small, open boats, and only if no 
18 Long, Nothing Too Daring, 227-229. 
19 Britain, BFSP, vol. 12,571-572, Samuel L. Southard, "Secretary of the Navy to the President 
of the United States, " 1 December 1824; and S. Doc., No. 2,19`h Cong., 1S` sess., 104-105, L. Warrington 
to Samuel L. Southard, 15 February 1825 and L. Warrington to Samuel L. Southard, 10 March 1825. 
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warships were around. l-hen thev fled to a new place "far removed from the scene of 
their late exploitj. I.. ", 
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Given the pirates. their tactics and strategy. Warrington concluded that it was 
virtually impossible to stop the remaining piracy everywhere. The only strategy to 
employ was to search every bay and creek where pirates were suspected of hiding. and 
examine every ship deemed suspicious. ' I Regardless. by December 1825. Southard 
declared that the war against piracy was over. The West Indian squadron still had the 
barges. the sloop llor iiet. brie Spark. the frigate Constellation and the corvette John 
Adams. but the schooner Fox was the only ship purchased under the anti-piracy naval 
appropriations that remained in service. 22 Although the piracy and privateering threat 
2uS. Doc., 
.Ao. 
2, I9`h Cone.. I" sess., 117-119 and 122-I23, L. Warrington to Samuel I. 
Southard. 27 April 1825. 
S. Doc., tiu_ 2,19°' Cone.. I" sess.. 117-119 and 122-123, L. Warrington to Samuel I.. 
Southard, 27 April 1825. 
22 S. Doc., No. 2.19'x' Cong.. 1" sess., 104, Samuel L. Southard. "Report from the Navy 
Department. " and Appendix A. 2 December 1825. 
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declined, the American naval presence was still strong close to home waters. 
Consequently, the African naval commitment was sporadic, with deployments in 1820, 
1822, and 1830, for example, as the need arose for commerce protection (see figure 
4.2). 
British Naval Deployment against Pirates and Privateers 
The Royal Navy's North American and West Indies squadron accomplished piracy 
suppression, but station commanders worried about how far their forces were stretched. 
Throughout this period, the Royal Navy had the strength to cast a wide net to catch 
those who hurt British interests. For example, on 19 September 1820, the British ship 
Eliza was attacked by a privateer, the Venganza, from Margarita, at 22°56"N by 
58°45"W. The suspect, whose fate is unclear, was bound for the Mediterranean and the 
Admiralty issued orders to several stations - the Mediterranean, Gibraltar, Tenerife, 
North American, Jamaican, Leeward Islands, South American, and Coast of Africa - to 
apprehend the ship. 23 But British geopolitical concerns reduced the strength of this net 
in the Western equatorial Atlantic. While the Americans expressed some concern over 
their relations with other nations, the British had European allies they had to deal with 
until Canning settled on his policy. London, while monitoring the activities of other 
nations, like the United States, mitigated its use of sea power, rather than threaten 
relations with other nations over "minor" issues, and draw them into the region. 
The British sent out naval reinforcements, but only in response to complaints 
from British merchants that the Americans were doing the honourable work of the 
Royal Navy. The British, too, were suspicious of the US naval deployment and feared 
that it threatened its strategic interests in the Gulf. Nevertheless, when piracy was 
suppressed, and the troubles in Latin America subsided, congressional support for naval 
23 PRO, Adm 2/1585, Croker to Sir Graham Moore and others, 12 January 1821, Croker to 
Senior Officer of HM Ships at Gibraltar, 12 January 1821 and Croker to Captain Bartholomew, 12 
January 1821. 
102 
expansion waned. The Americans were then left knowing that the security and stability 
of the region depended on the long-term presence of the Royal Navy. 
Contrary to some newspaper reports, the Royal Navy acted against the pirates 
and privateers in the West Indies. West Indian officers reported that while they stopped 
some vessels suspected of piracy, they had insufficient proof to condemn them and 
overall the officers reported no attacks on British shipping. The Admiralty believed that 
pirates had settled at Cape San Antonio and watched for warships. But on station, 
officers believed that even pirates knew basic naval tactics. When a warship stationed 
off Cape San Antonio was blown off shore, the pirates emerged and attacked. 
Regardless, the Admiralty believed this was still the best strategy. Following the pirates 
into the dense jungle of Western Cuba was not an option; what was needed was for the 
Spanish government to send an adequate naval force to the region to suppress piracy. 24 
J. W. Croker, at the Admiralty, wrote to Admiral Sir Charles Rowley about 
piracy around Cuba, and the government's futile efforts to convince the Spanish to 
tackle the problem. The Admiralty had received "representations" from the insurance 
underwriters and merchants of Britain about pirate attacks emanating from Cape San 
Antonio, Cuba, costing money and hurting British trade. But because of the geopolitical 
ramifications, the Spanish government had to be asked to act or to let the British onto 
their territory. Consequently, Croker told Rowley that "in the mean while you [are to] 
send one of your cruizers off Cape [San] Antonio to protect the British commerce, and, 
if it be possible without violating the Spanish Territory [emphasis added]" stop the 
pirates. Rowley took few stronger actions, although for example, the warship Tyne 
sailed into St. Jago de Cuba on 14 June, liberated the Swift, and obtained compensation 
for her illegal seizure by a Spanish privateer. 25 
24 The Times (London), 24 July 1822,2. 
25 PRO, Adm 2/1585, J. W. Croker to Sir Charles Rowley, 23 March 1822; and PRO, Adm 
50/136, Rear Admiral Sir C. Rowley, Journal, entries for 22 March, 10 April, 1 May, 30 May, and 24 
June 1822. 
103 
Meanwhile, Rowley ordered his ships to act against pirates. By 16 May, he 
ordered one of the warships stationed off Cape San Antonio, the pirate lair, to help 
protect British commerce until he received word that the local Spanish authorities 
intended to act. When Rowley obtained intelligence from customs officials that pirates 
infested the waters around Sambero and Dog Island, the Admiral ordered a ship "to 
examine those places frequently. " By July 1822, Rowley seemed to have settled into a 
patrol pattern that tried to balance trade protection with hunting for pirates. For 
example, on 5 July 1822, he ordered the Sybille to sea and sailed to convoy trade for 
Savanilla, Santa Martha, and Carthagena. The Tamar would soon sail to escort trade to 
the Gulf of Mexico and "look into the inlets in the neighbourhood of Cape [San] 
Antonio, and endeavour to get hold of the pirates[. ]" But Sir Charles, the youngest son 
of Sir Joshua Rowley, was from a naval family and wary that the squadron was "fully 
occupied. " He feared any more requests from merchants for help. 26 
Part of Canning's stronger action in late 1822 was the dispatch of naval 
reinforcements in response to calls at home from greater trade protection. But he also 
hoped to allay the fears of other nations over this exercise of sea power. The French, for 
example, were concerned, so Canning asked the British ambassador to France, Sir 
Charles Stuart, to allay French fears. Cuba was the focus of anti-pirate operations, but 
the British naval commander was ordered to consult first with the local Spanish 
authorities before acting. Canning wrote that if the Spanish accepted the British offer, 
the navy was to give its "active assistance for dislodging and punishing the offenders. " 
But if the local authorities refused, the Royal Navy was only "reluctantly" to seek out 
the pirates in their lairs and ashore. 27 Britain had to balance the needs of the 
26 PRO, Adm 50/136, Rear Admiral Sir C. Rowley, Journal, entries for 16 May, 25 June, 5 July, 
and 27 July 1822; and Dictionary of National Biography, s. v. "Rowley, Sir Charles" and "Rowley, Sir 
Joshua. " 
27 PRO, FO 27/265, reprinted in SDFOA, vol. 2,109-110, George Canning to Sir Charles Stuart 
(No. 14), 1 December 1822. 
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gentlemanly capitalists and the use of sea power if it threatened Canning's wider 
diplomatic goals and relations with other nations. 
Thus, the Seringapatam, under Captain Samuel Warren, the Redwing, Captain 
George Trefusis, and the Grecian, Lieutenant Cawley, were sent to the Cuban coast to 
hunt for pirates. The small task force arrived at Cape San Antonio on 21 November 
1822 and found the Hyperion sailing for Jamaica with thirty captive pirates. On 22 
December, another British warship, the Scout, sailed into Havana with nineteen 
prisoners, eight French and eleven Englishmen, captured in Honduras Bay. But the 
small task force gave up quickly and on Christmas Eve 1822 sailed for England. 28 The 
Admiralty believed that Rowley's force was sufficient to provide convoys, but they 
would provide more ships if needed. On 29 November, J. W. Buckle, Chairman of the 
Ship Owners' Committee, wrote to the Admiralty Office requesting convoys for the 
West Indies; the Admiralty replied that convoys had been established. 29 
The half-hearted efforts of the British to fight piracy in the West Indies during 
1822 were noted by the American press. The City Gazette of Charleston declared on 6 
January that it was glad that British warships in the West Indies were "at last following 
the laudable example" set by the American navy. The American press was surprised at 
the complacency of the British government over piracy. The American and Commercial 
Daily Advertiser exclaimed that "[i]t is a matter of surprize, that the British Government 
does not keep a force, as the U. States do, in the neighbourhood of Cuba, for the 
protection of their commerce. " Meanwhile, American Ambassador Richard Rush was 
amazed that "in this year of 1822, we should have witnessed the [surprising] fact ... of 
the commerce of England having been protected" by the US Navy. 30 But in London, 
28 Hampshire Telegraph, reprint in The Times (London), 3 February 1823,3, column b. 
29 PRO, Adm 2/1586, J. W. Croker to Sir Charles Rowley, 11 November 1822; and J. W. Croker 
to J. W. Buckle, 30 November 1822, printed in The Times (London), 2 December 1822,2, column e. 
30 Reprint in ACDA, 14 January 1822,2, column e; ACDA, 15 June 1822,2, column e; and NA, 
RG 59, Dispatches, Britain, no. 269, Richard Rush to John Quincy Adams, 28 September 1822. 
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The Times' editorialised that while the Americans deployed under Porter, London took 
"things with their usual apathy and indifference, and take no notice of these 
depredations. "31 
Considering London's wider geopolitical policy, the Admiralty warned its 
commanders they had to be careful not to become inadvertently involved in the ongoing 
regional wars. Admiral Rowley's orders reflected the Admiralty's restraint. On 30 
January 1823, he ordered Captain James Lilliecrap to sail for St. Jago de Cuba and seek 
restitution for Spanish privateer attacks. Nevertheless, if Havana refused to address the 
problem, Lilliecrap was to "immediately leave port" and inform the Cuban Captain- 
General that he would detain any Spanish privateer entering or leaving port. Rather than 
take greater action against Spain, Rowley ordered Lilliecrap to look for pirates at the 
Bay of Honda, Colerados reef, and Cape San Antonio. While convoys were established 
to escort vessels past Florida, London also wanted strict neutrality maintained. The 
Admiralty warned Captain Thomas J. Cochrane that British warships were forbidden to 
"convoy any Merchant Vessels avowedly loaded with Articles Contraband of War" for 
the belligerents. 32 In early 1824, Vice Admiral Halsted forwarded to the Admiralty a 
request from the Secretary of State of Colombia requesting Royal Navy protection for 
specie transportation from Jamaica to Colombia. But even here, the Admiralty declared 
that the navy must maintain strict neutrality in the ongoing regional disputes. Consistent 
with British goals, the navy was only permitted to convey specie if "the goods were 
bound for England or belonged to British merchants. "33 
Royal Navy operations continued against the pirates in 1824, but analysis of 
head money awarded for captured pirates also shows that after 1824, piracy declined. 
31 The Times (London), 6 May 1823,4, column a. 
32 PRO, Adm 1/273, C. R. [Charles Rowley] to Captain Lilliecrap, 30 January 1823; PRO, Adm 
2/1586, J. W. Croker to Sir Charles Rowley, 24 April 1823, letter 2; and PRO, Adm 2/1586, John Barrow 
to Captain Thomas J. Cochrane, 19 July 1823. 
33 PRO, Adm 2/1587, John Barrow to Vice Admiral Halsted, Jamaica, 5 June 1824 and Barrow 
to Halsted, 4 June 1825. 
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Table 4.1 Royal Navy Pirate Captures for which Head Money Awarded, 1821-1847 
Year Gulf of Mexico/ African Med Grecian East Other Total 
West Indies Coast -iterranean Archipelago Indies 
1821 11 
1822 314 
1823 718 
1824 44 
1825 44 
1826 1168 
1827 246 
1828 11 
1829 
1830 
1831 
1832 
1833 11 
1834 11 
1835 
1836 55 
1837 
1838 11 
1839 
1840 11 
1841 
1842 
1843 22 
1844 213 
1845 11 
1846 11 
1847 11 
Total 16 24 15 14 2 53 
Source: Britain, British Sessional Papers, vol. LV, paper 114,49, J. T. Briggs, 
Accountant-General of the Navy, Admiralty, 6 March 1850. 
Note: For missing years there were no reports of captures of pirates for which head 
money was awarded. The "Other" category indicates an unclear geographic location. 
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There were few captures for which Royal Navy crews were awarded head money and 
Royal Navy anti-piracy operations had moved on to other regions (see table 4.1). For 
example, the Admiralty issued a briefing on 22 September 1827 to the West Indies 
senior commander, Vice Admiral C. E. Fleming and to Commodore Francis Augustus 
Collier, son of Vice Admiral Sir George Collier34, on the Africa station, reporting that a 
British ship was attacked by pirates while sailing from Africa to England. Again, on 22 
March 1828, the Admiralty issued similar orders to African and West Indies 
commanders when the New Prospect, a London merchant ship, was attacked by a pirate 
at 22°23"N by 36°41"W. London wished the navy to use all necessary means to stop the 
pirates, despite the locations of the attacks. 35 Action to protect British gentlemanly 
interests was one thing; action against privateers and local authorities was another. 
Anglo-American Naval Relations and Piracy Suppression 
Faced with a common threat, Britain and the United States used sea power to provide 
immediate commerce protection. But suspicious of each other, and constrained by their 
own objectives and diplomacy, their joint use of sea power occurred only as 
circumstances arose. While the US Navy was effective in limited, regional efforts when 
their interests were threatened, the Royal Navy, deployed all along the North American 
and West Indies station, was the only force capable of policing the wider seas. As US 
anti-piracy efforts ended in the late 1820s, and American naval policy makers again 
retreated, the American government realised that even the region close to shore 
depended on the Royal Navy for protection. As instances of piracy periodically flared 
again, the Americans and British co-operated, but with the pirates moving farther and 
34 Dictionary of National Biography, s. v. "Collier, Francis Augustus. " 
35 PRO, Adm 2/1588, J. Barrow to Vice Admiral C. E. Fleeming [also Flemming and Fleming in 
the records] and copy to Commodore [Francis Augustus] Collier, Africa station, 22 September 1827 and 
PRO, Adm 2/1589, Barrow to Commodore [Francis Augustus] Collier, C. B., Coast of Africa with similar 
letter to Vice Admiral C. E. Flemming, Jamaica, and the Senior Officers of HM Ships at Barbadoes [sic], 
10 May 1828. 
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farther afield, it was the Royal Navy that had the wide net needed to capture them and 
protect economic interests in the equatorial Atlantic 
But when the piracy crisis erupted and the Royal Navy and US Navy found 
themselves operating in the same waters, the former power was suspicious that 
American motives could upset the regional balance of power. In early 1823, for 
example, William Gray, British consul in Virginia, told Admiral Rowley that the 
American deployment to Key West was really planned as "a more permanent footing in 
Cuba. " British Ambassador Stratford Canning believed that the Americans would even 
use "intrigue" to prevent the island falling into the hands of another power, but tried to 
allay Rowley's fears. Nevertheless, under the circumstances, Rowley concluded that it 
was prudent to dispatch HMS Athol to gather intelligence about American activities. 36 
An American officer, probably Lieutenant Lawrence Kearney, told Captain 
Bourchier, of the Athol, that he was patrolling for pirates and the Key West base had 
only minimal provisions and a guard of about 100 marines. Bourchier decided that it 
would raise suspicions, or offence, if he sailed to Key West to gather more information, 
but he concluded that the Cubans wished to remain under Spanish sovereignty. 37 Even 
after the British laid aside their suspicions of the Americans, co-operation between the 
powers was limited. The British co-operated with the Americans against pirates, but 
joint suppression of privateer actions never entered discussions. Yet, Anglo-American 
naval relations in the Gulf were amicable. 
Porter made special mention of the Jamaica station of the Royal Navy when he 
filed his 1823 report. Porter thought the American squadron was large enough to carry 
out its duties and declined British offers of assistance; instead, he left Anglo-American 
co-operation to "circumstances. " Although he failed to provide any examples, one case 
36 PRO, Adm 1273, William Gray to Rear Admiral Sir Charles Rowley, undated, enclosure in 
Charles Rowley to J. W. Croker, Admiralty Office, 17 March 1823, [Stratford] Canning to Sir Charles 
Rowley, 7 February 1823 and Sir Charles Rowley to Captain Bourchier, [undated], c. 27 March 1823. 
37 PRO, Adm 1274, Captain Bourchier to Charles Rowley, 10 April 1823. 
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of Anglo-American naval co-operation occurred in 1823. Two American naval 
schooners joined HMS Bustard, commanded by Captain R. Maclean, deployed to hunt 
pirates. Later, when Maclean joined Porter in the Sea Gull, they cruised along the Keys, 
tested the accuracy of Admiralty charts, and Porter provided aid to some of Maclean's 
sick crew. The Admiralty was pleased "at the good understanding and cooperation 
which has taken place between the British & American Squadrons. "38 
When Commodore Porter was replaced, his successor Warrington seemed more 
inclined to co-operate with the British. On 21 March, for example, an American 
formation, under the command of Lieutenant Commander Isaac McKeever, fell in with 
a British detachment from UMS Dartmouth, also pirate hunting. The team united and 
began their search for a pirate ship that had recently attacked shipping. 39 The British 
searched for the pirates, but had no intelligence as to their location. McKeever had 
information and proposed a united front. The British agreed with his suggestion that the 
schooners remain in Cadiz Bay, along with the Sea Gull, while McKeever took a barge 
and two small cutters to sail in company with a British barge and two of their cutters. 40 
At Jutia Gorda Key, they discovered a suspicious vessel, which raised the 
Spanish flag. The pirates attempted to fire their guns, with little luck, while the 
formation's boats bore down. McKeever hailed the pirate ship and told her commander 
to go on shore and hold his fire. The pirate captain was captured, another escaped, but 
gunfire erupted. The British and Americans stormed the pirate ship, some pirates 
scurried below deck, while others fled into the bushes. The force failed to find the 
pirates, so they took the prize and sailed on to the pirate lair at Key la Cosinerra, set it 
38 PRO, Adm 1/275, Captain R. Maclean to Commodore Porter, 23 July 1823, R. Maclean to 
Admiral Owen, 20 September 1823 and 26 September 1823; S. Doc, No. 1,18th Cong., Is` sess., 191, D. 
Porter to Secretary of the Navy, 19 November 1823; and PRO, Adm 2/1586, J. W. Croker to Sir Edward 
Owen, 6 October 1823. 
79 S. Doc., No. 2,19's Cong., 1° sess., 113, L. Warrington, 3 April 1825. 
40 S. Doc., No. 2,19'bCong., 1° sess., 114,1. McKeever to L. Warrington, 1 April 1825. 
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ablaze, and sailed back to Jutia Gorda, where they burned pirate shore facilities 41 
Warrington applauded the British "for their efficient co-operation. " The Admiralty was 
also pleased with the outcomes of co-operation, but again warned their commanders to 
be careful to stay clear of becoming embroiled in the region disputes. 42 
The British use of sea power was moderated by the geopolitical strategy of 
London. The Royal Navy could hunt for pirates out to sea, but had to be careful about 
going ashore, or forcing local Spanish authorities to take stronger action, while Britain 
decided how to recognise the rebel states and further commercial objectives. British 
policy also helped shape her responses to the United States. The Americans wanted a 
common Anglo-American policy towards Latin America, but insisted on British 
recognition of the rebel's first. Britain then wanted a common policy taken toward Cuba 
and piracy, but by this time piracy was checked, and the Americans saw a formal 
agreement as unnecessary. Their only true commonality was trade protection and 
conflict avoidance. 
During the conflict in the Gulf of Mexico effective Anglo-American co- 
operation against pirates and privateers was affected by the personal opinions of US 
commanders and British European and regional strategy. The early war against the slave 
traders was connected and reveals a similar pattern. Domestic American policy impaired 
Anglo-American co-operation, while the Royal Navy was free to act against slavers 
with few constraints against non-American flagged vessels. American efforts along the 
West African coast were in support of their colonisation schemes and American naval 
deployment was limited to occasional vessels diverted from their anti-piracy duties. 
When those duties ended, and Washington reduced the anti-piracy force, American 
4'& Doc., No. 2,19"' Cong., I'sess., 114-117,1. McKeever to L. Warrington, 1 April 1825. 
42 S. Doc., No. 2,19th Cong., I' sess., 113 and 116-117,1. McKeever to L. Warrington, 1 April 
1825 and L. Warrington, 3 April 1825; PRO, Adm 2/1587, John Barrow to Vice Admiral Halsted, 15 
April 1825 and J. Barrow to Vice Admiral Halsted, 4 June 1824. 
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naval efforts off West Africa also declined. Americans along the coast then found 
themselves with the Royal Navy as their sole protector. 
The ACS, Colonisation, and Limited US Support 
The White House hoped that its limited West African response would placate the British 
and the American Colonisation Society (ACS), but before the 1819 US anti-slave trade 
Act, the ACS had little experience on the West African coast. They started colonisation 
efforts in November 1817 and dispatched the Reverend Samuel J. Mills and Ebenezer 
Burgess to look for land suitable for a colony between Sherbro Island and Sierra Leone 
(see figure 4.3, West Africa). Colonisation efforts stagnated as the ACS gathered 
funding and government support. Moreover, US African agent Samuel Bacon warned 
Secretary Thompson as early as 1820 that the role of American colonisation efforts 
should be clear and explained to prevent misunderstandings with other powers. 43 For 
domestic and international reasons, Washington agreed and was wary of too forceful a 
presence along the coast. 
The ACS's actions were most forceful under the tenure of their African agent 
Jehudi Ashmun. Ashmun told the Secretary that the colony was in a state of war with 
the natives and 800 had attacked the colony on 11 November 1822, but were repulsed. 
One Captain Laing, of the British Light Infantry, negotiated a settlement, but an 
American warship was needed. Ashmun believed that relying on British aid put both the 
US government and the Colonisation Society in a position of obligation to the British 44 
43 Frankie Hutton, "Economic Considerations in the American Colonization Society's Early 
Efforts to Emigrate Free Blacks to Liberia, 1816-36, " The Journal of Negro History, 68: 4 (Fall 1983): 
376-277; Beyan, American Colonization Society and the Creation of the Liberian State, 51-53; NA, RG 
45, Naval Records Collection of the Office of Naval Records and Library, Records of the Secretary of the 
Navy, Correspondence of the Secretary of the Navy relating to African Colonization, 1819-1844, Letters 
Sent (hereafter, Letters sent relating to African Colonization), Smith Thompson to Samuel Bacon, 17 
January 1820, and NA, RG 45, Correspondence of the Secretary of the Navy relating to African 
Colonization, 1819-1844, Letters Received (hereafter, Letters received relating to African Colonization), 
Samuel Bacon to Smith Thompson, 12 March 1820. 
44 NA, RG 45, Letters sent relating to African Colonization, Samuel Southard to Dr. John Peaco, 
2 April 1827; S. Doc., No. 1,18`h Cong., 1" sess., paper f, 122-123 and paper g, 124, J. Ashmun to 
Secretary of the Navy, 26 November 1822 and J. Ashmun to Secretary of the Navy, 7 December 1822; 
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Figure 4.3 West Africa 
Source: Base map from AGIS 1.62. 
Note: Locations are approximations only. 
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By the spring of 1826, Ashmun started carrying out all-out war against the slavers using 
a readily available naval force: Colombian privateers who had expanded their 
operations to the West African coast. One American, Captain John Chase, commanded 
the Colombian armed schooner Jacinta. Ashmun took thirty troops, sailed in the Jacinta 
for Trade Town, and off shore joined another Colombian cruiser, the El Vencedor, and 
fired broadsides into the town, driving the natives into the woods. 45 But the Secretary of 
the Navy and the President condemned Ashmun's actions. The government had not 
"intended to authorize ... a 
forcible and warlike attack upon the citizens or subjects of 
any nation ... to advance the cause of humanity. " The new agent was warned to 
keep 
the business of the Colonisation Society and the US Agency separate. 46 
Washington wanted a discrete approach to West Africa that respected the 
national mood and minimised potential conflict with other nations. Instead, Ashmun's 
actions gave ammunition to those who condemned the President's Africa plan. Senator 
Robert Young Hayne, Jacksonian of South Carolina, declared that Ashmun's actions 
reflected poorly on the United States and threatened the trade of other nations along the 
coast. Congressional support for US West African efforts fell so far that by 23 May 
1828 the House of Representatives passed a Bill closing the US African agency. The 
House abolished the agency and the Senate began a full, but small, debate on funding 
for slave trade suppression; many agreed that the Society's use of government funds 
was improper. Consequently, by 3 March 1831, they asked the President to resume talks 
with other maritime powers for the suppression of the slave trade. 47 
and Staudenraus, African Colonization Movement, 89. 
45 S. Doc., No. 1,19`h Cong., 2nd sess., 98-99, John Chase, 31 July 1826. 
46 S. Doc., No. 1,19`h Cong., 2nd sess., 99-101, Samuel L. Southard to John W. Peaco, 10 August 
1826 and Staudenraus, African Colonization Movement, 161-168. 
47 United States, Register of Debates, 19`h Cong., 2nd sess., 290-296 and 326-334, Senate, 7 and 9 
February 1827; United States, Register of Debates, 20`h Cong., Is` sess., 2753, House, 23 May 1828; 
United States, Register of Debates, 201h Cong., 1s` sess., 808-809, Senate, 24 May 1828; and United 
States, Register of Debates, 21" Cong., 2nd sess., 850, House, 3 March 1831. 
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Nevertheless, domestic imperatives were clear. On 28 March 1832, those in the 
Senate against colonisation expressed their displeasure because it threatened the Union 
and Southern sensibilities. They opined that any discussion of colonisation would 
"undoubtedly tend to increase the excitement which now prevails in one quarter of the 
Union" respecting abolition. 8 Perhaps to avoid a full US overseas commitment, 
Congress had placed the onus on the White House to enter talks with the British for a 
more effective means of suppressing the slave trade. But when talks failed the White 
House abandoned the issue. In the long term, as tempers between North and South 
flared, little else could be accomplished so long as American expansion in Africa and 
possible slave trade suppression were linked. 
Limited US Naval Support 
The limited naval support for West African endeavours reflected the limited 
government support for African colonisation. The government only provided US Navy 
support with forces it could spare from other duties, namely the West Indian piracy 
patrols. When the force on that patrol was reduced, it had ramifications for early US 
African efforts. Judd Scott Harmon concluded that the US Navy and the American 
Colonisation Society had a "marriage" whereby they complemented each other in the 
effort to suppress the slave trade. 49 Harmon claimed that the navy made regular voyages 
to the coast, but failed to state whether a November-December cruise, for example, 
meant 30 November to 7 December, or an entire two-month patrol. In reality it was 
hardly a "naval force" on "constant patrol of the coast[; ]" US warships were only there 
for brief periods at the end of piracy patrols. S° 
48 United States, Register of Debates, 22 "d Cong., I51 sess., 642-646, Senate, 28 March 1832. 
49 Judd Scott Harmon, "Marriage of Convenience: The United States Navy in Africa, 1820- 
1843, " American Neptune, 1972,32(4): 264-276. 
50 Harmon, "Suppress and Protect, " 264-276. 
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As the piracy crisis deepened, US warships first had to tackle that immediate 
threat before sailing to a region far removed from American interests. For example, 
after relinquishing some pirate prizes, the Shark, Matthew Perry commanding, arrived 
on the African coast on 23 August 1822, but left again nine days later. Perry reported 
that he found, or heard, of no American ships involved in the slave trade. The Cape 
colony was fine and relations good with the natives. The latter observation reveals how 
little time Perry must have spent on the coast, given the tensions that erupted into native 
attacks by November. The Shark then returned to the West Indies, sailed by the pirate 
lair of Cape San Antonio, and onward to Norfolk via the Gulf of Florida. " Meanwhile, 
the Cyane arrived off the West African coast in the spring of 1823 after a "long cruise in 
the West Indies" patrolling for pirates. Captain Robert T. Spence, exhausted, filed his 
report from quarantine in New York after a year on patrol. 52 
By 1826, the US Navy reduced its efforts against the pirates as that crisis waned. 
On 4 August 1826, Ashmun noticed the impact of what had transpired on the other side 
of the Atlantic and believed it had ramifications along the West African coast. The 
English, French, and Colombian "navies" had put the pirates and slavers on the 
defensive. Already, on 20 July 1826, pirates had attacked an American brig and 
schooner and seized $5000 worth of cargo. The American settlement was deeply in debt 
to the Royal Navy, then cruising in the Bight. The Royal Navy had the widest net in 
which to catch pirates and slavers, but Ashmun feared the colony's fate without 
American aid. 53 
On 18 March 1827, Lieutenant Commander Otho Norris, USS Shark, confirmed 
some of Ashmun's observations. Norris sailed from the Chesapeake for Mesurado on 30 
51 S. Doc., No. 1,18`h Cong., 1u sess., paper h, 125, M. C. Perry to Secretary of the Navy, 12 
December 1822. 
52 S. Doc., No. 2,18`h Cong., 1" sess., paper j, 128 and paper L, 130-134, R. T. Spence to J. 
Ashmun, 1 April 1823 and Robert T. Spence to Secretary of the Navy, 27 June 1823. 
53 NA, RG 45, Letters received relating to African Colonization, J. Ashmun to S. L. Southard, 4 
August 1826. 
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November 1826 and arrived at the Cape on 12 January. The Shark arrived at Trade 
Town on 29 January and chased a small French schooner for ten hours. It was a slaver 
manned by seventeen French sailors, flying the French flag, and armed with. a brass 
pivot gun. Meanwhile, the colony was doing well, but a pirate brig that had attacked an 
American merchant ship at Mesurado Roads in August 1826 was captured in December 
by a British warship. 54 
As the 1830s ended, slavers continued to hide under the American flag. 
American naval response continued to be reactive: as a result of the reports, the 
Secretary of the Navy, J. K. Paulding, and the President decided to send a warship to the 
coast. Paulding wrote that it would protect commerce and pursue "these pirates [slavers] 
who thus make the American flag a cover to such disgraceful purposes. s55 In all, US 
naval actions along the West African coast were limited and confined to tacit support of 
colonisation efforts. Due to the character of West African policy, the navy took little 
significant action against the slave trade. With such a small naval force, and a reluctance 
to agree with British proposals for co-operation against the slave trade, Anglo-American 
naval co-operation was also limited and informal, as had occurred in the Gulf of 
Mexico. But off West Africa, the less constrained Royal Navy used sea power more 
fully in support of British policies. 
The Royal Navy off West Africa 
During the 1820s and early 1830s, the Royal Navy off West Africa was responsible for 
meeting the immediate goal of suppressing the slave trade and hunting stray pirates. But 
the Royal Navy had to contend with slavers who had at least the tacit approval of their 
governments. By the 1840s, some other nations participated in anti-slaving operations 
54 S. Doc., No. 1,20'h Cong., 1" sess., 224-225, Otho Norris to Charles Ridgely, 18 March 1827. 
55 NA, RG 45, Letters sent relating to African Colonization, J. K. Paulding to Thomas Buchanan, 
22 July 1839. 
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Figure 4.4 Royal Navy Vessel Deployment Atlantic. 1820-1830 
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but the Royal Navy realised blockading ports was ineffectual. 56 During the Victorian 
era, Africa was also important to the British as a secondary trade route to India. The 
presence of the Royal Navy along West Africa would help suppress the slave trade and 
meet the concerns that other powers could block British access to India via the Cape of 
Good Hope. 57 But during the 1820s, the Royal Navy also told London that the African 
coast had great potential to contribute to Britain's economic growth. This too had to be 
protected from pirates, privateers, and slave traders who all interfered with the 
expansion of legitimate British commerce. 
After the passage of the 1807 British anti-slave trade Act, London created the 
West African squadron to patrol the 3000 miles of West African coast for British 
ships. 58 Lloyd concluded that the West African squadron was of little import to the 
Admiralty with only an average of ten warships on station. Eltis supports this view with 
calculations that show only about 4% of British naval manpower was devoted to the 
coast during the 1820s and 1830s. 59 Nevertheless, British naval deployment matched 
their strategic philosophy for the period (see figures 4.4 and 4.5). The West Indies 
peaked during the piracy crisis, while the Mediterranean became increasingly important, 
as indicated by the doubling of armament deployed from 576 guns to 1082 guns over 
1828-1830, during the deepening crisis over Greek independence. The squadron 
fluctuated with British strategic concerns. But by the 1840s, as will be shown in Chapter 
Six, the British combined slave trade suppression, trade promotion, and their desire to 
protect control of this important route to India from potential French threats. 
56 W. E. F. Ward, The Royal Navy and the Slavers: The Suppression of the Atlantic Slave Trade 
(London: George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., 1969), 38-39 and 196-199. 
37 Robinson and Gallagher, Africa and the Victorians, 13-14 and Reynolds, Command of the Sea, 
333-343. 
58 Thomas, Slave Trade, 574 and 576. 
59 Lloyd, Navy and the Slave Trade, 69-73; Ward, Royal Navy and the Slavers, 97 and 113; and 
Eltis, Economic Growth, table 2,92. 
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The size of the West African squadron, relative to the long coastline, had an 
impact on the strategy it employed. A blockade along the entire coast to suppress the 
slave trade was "impossible, " instead the Royal Navy cruised between "specific points. " 
The patrol area comprised Senegal to Sierra Leone, Sierra Leone to Cape Coast Castle, 
and from Cape Coast Castle to the Bights. From 1832 to 1839, the West African station 
was combined with the Cape station and responsible for an area from 10°S on the East 
coast to Cape Verde. Even when the Admiralty took the West African squadron out of 
the Cape command again, it was expanded to include the area from Cape Verde to 
Benguela. 60 
While the British were interested in suppressing the slave trade for humanitarian 
reasons, naval officers also told London of Africa's economic potential. In 1821, 
Commodore George R. Collier reported that the interior of the country might soon be 
opened to British trade. In addition, the island of Fernando Po, with soil that rivalled 
that of the West Indian colonies, was also in a strategic location to help stop the slave 
trade. Collier believed that if warships were stationed at Fernando Po they could 
blockade the Camaroons, Del Rey, Calabar and Bonny Rivers, and sortie just below the 
equator. Merchants from Glasgow and Liverpool were interested in Fernando Po, wood 
was also plentiful, as were oysters and fish. Collier and his crew even managed to trade 
with some of the natives who came out to the beach. 61 
The region had potential, perhaps a region that English "gentlemen" could help 
develop. But first the slave trade had to be suppressed to shift local production factors 
into "legitimate" commerce. British merchants complained about the duties that King 
Peppel forced them to pay on the Bonny River, while the slave traders received 
preference. Peppel professed that the slave trade was his primary means of support, but 
60 Lloyd, Navy and the Slave Trade, 69 and 78. 
61 IUP, vol. 64, Further Papers Relating to the Slave Trade, IV, Communications to the 
Admiralty, 16,23-27 and 29, no. 17, "Extract of a Report from Commodore Sir George R. Collier, " 27 
December 1821. 
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he would end it if the English monarch sent a 74-gun ship annually to his kingdom, 
loaded with tribute. Commodore Sir Robert Mends believed the warship would help 
keep the reluctant King an ally. Nevertheless, the Americans and French proved more 
troublesome than the natives did. After encounters with their merchant vessels, Mends 
concluded that the French and Americans "had determined to put every one of our 
people to death who fell into their hands[. ]" Consequently, he believed that sea power 
was needed to further and protect a variety of British interests in the region. 62 
General Admiralty instructions to Commodore Mends and others provide an 
indication of Royal Navy duties during the 1820s. They were to provide assistance to 
British African settlements and stop the slave trade by British ships and those countries 
with whom Britain had anti-slaving treaties. In contrast to the Gulf of Mexico, the 
Admiralty told Mends to hunt Spanish slavers because Spain's right to take slaves from 
below the equator had expired, and all Spanish slavers could be searched. Meanwhile, 
orders to stop Spanish and Portuguese slavers, in accordance with treaty stipulations, 
were sent from 6 February 1821 to 21 March 1822 to vessels on the East Indies, Cape of 
Good Hope, South American, Leeward Islands, and Jamaican stations. 63 
The navy found that slavers often loaded their human cargo up rivers, hoping to 
stay clear of British warships. For example, on 10 August 1821, the Myrmidon found 
six French slavers in the Bonny River. Meanwhile, the British tried in vain to seize 
some Spanish ships, but they became embroiled in a firefight. Captain Henry Leeke 
decided to take the Myrmidon upriver "to punish the renegadoes for their insolent 
conduct. " The Spanish abandoned their ship when the warship approached, and 130 
slaves were freed from the schooner and 154 from the brig. Leeke preferred this course 
62 IUP, vol. 65, Communications received by the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, from 
Naval Officers, since the 21st March 1822,6-13, no. 4 and no. 5, "Copy of a Report on the state of the 
Slave Trade on the Western Coast of Africa, by Commodore Sir Robert Mends, " 26 June 1822 and 
Robert Mends to John Wilson Croker, 17 April 1822. 
63 IUP, vol. 64, Further Papers Relating to the Slave Trade, IV, Instructions to Naval Officers, 
33-36, "Extract from the Instructions issued by the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty ... to 
Commodore Sir Robert Mends, " 31 October 1821. 
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because, reportedly, the King of Bonny preferred slavers and refused to deal with 
legitimate British merchants. Only if the slave trade was suppressed, some officers 
believed, would legitimate commerce take its place. 64 
Along with slavers, the Royal Navy met threats to legitimate commerce from 
privateers that operated along the West African coast during this period. Commodore 
George R. Collier concluded that Spanish and Portuguese slavers were the biggest threat 
in the early 1820s. Meanwhile, he opined, "piracy" and the slave trade were linked. The 
biggest cause of slavery on the West African coast was the "piracy" in the New World. 
Despite the fact that Spain had signed an anti-slaving treaty with Britain, Spanish 
subjects carried on the trade, and slavers often hid under the guise of a privateering 
commission. For example, on 16 February 1821, the Myrmidon stopped the 2-gun 
Spanish privateer Charlotta before she bought slaves at Gallinas. 65 
As late as September 1825, Commodore Charles Bullen reported that armed 
"Spanish" ships also arrived daily along the coast and annoyed British traders. He 
concluded that the Spanish ships obtained "their cargo for trade chiefly by plunder; by 
which means they are enabled to purchase their slaves at a much more reasonable rate 
than other vessels[. ]" Bullen tried to chase one of the pirates, the Spanish brig Alerta, 
but it ran into Lagos Roads, loaded her slaves, and quickly sailed for Havana before he 
could stop her. Ships involved in the slave trade took advantage of letters of marque, 
issued by the Spanish, under which to hide their activities. For example, in November 
1825, William Pennell, British consul in Bahia, reported that the Carlota, a Spanish 
64 IUP, vol. 64, Further Papers Relating to the Slave Trade, IV, Communications to the 
Admiralty, 4, no. 7, "Copy of a Letter from Commodore Sir G. R. Collier to J. W. Croker, Esq., " 12 March 
1821 and IUP, vol. 65, Communications received by the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, from 
Naval Officers, since the 21st March 1822,3-4, no. 1, Henry John Leeke to Sir Robert Mends, 12 
September 1821. 
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J. Leeke to George Collier, 20 February 1821, enclosure with "Copy of a Letter from Commodore Sir 
Geo. R. Collier, " 4 March 1821. 
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privateer, had sailed with seven British sailors, and was probably involved in the slave 
trade. By 25 February 1826, the Admiralty passed along the intelligence regarding the 
Carlota to its vessels along the African coast. 66 
Early Anglo-American Naval Co-operation 
Both navies were deployed to use sea power in different parts of the equatorial Atlantic 
for divergent "short-term" objectives, like commerce protection. But the conduit of 
Anglo-American naval relations illuminates the state of their wider relations. The 
nations had different objectives, therefore their co-operative uses of sea power were 
minimal and intended to stave off potential conflict rather than truly resolve outstanding 
issues between them. The Americans hoped to placate the British with American sea 
power to reduce tensions over slave trade suppression. The sporadic effort failed to 
impress London and the Royal Navy remained the only force willing to police the entire 
equatorial Atlantic. But to achieve their economic goals, London needed American co- 
operation to suppress the slave trade and encourage legitimate commerce. 
During early Anglo-American talks, John Quincy Adams was under pressure 
from the British to step up efforts against the slavers. On 30 December 1820, Adams 
explained that the President desired some form of co-operation with Britain to suppress 
the slave trade. Adams professed, despite the clear evidence that the US naval presence 
on the West African coast was sporadic, that US warships had "for some time [been] 
kept stationed on the Coast which is the scene of this odious traffic. " The British tacitly 
agreed on Anglo-American co-operation, and the Admiralty was told to pass on the 
understanding to its African squadron. Adams stalled and only told the American Navy 
Department of the agreement on 15 September 1821. Meanwhile, in 1820 and 1821, the 
66 IUP, vol. 68, Communications received by the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, from 
Naval Officers, since the Ist January 1824,7, no. 6, Commodore Bullen to J. W. Croker, 12 September 
1825; and IUP, vol. 68, Instructions issued by the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to Naval 
Officers, since 1 January 1824,19, no. 7 and enclosures I and 2 in no. 7, John Barrow to Commodore 
Bullen, 25 February 1826, William Pennell to Consul Chamberlain, 23 November 1825, and W. Pennell 
to Viscount of Queluz, 21 November 1825. 
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Hornet and John Adams had sailed with HMS Snapper, and the British and Americans 
exchanged intelligence. 67 
Britain accepted the American position, but quickly realised it was too good to 
be true. In May 1821, the Admiralty ordered its warships to give "general assistance" to 
any US warships as long as it was "consistent with the existing treaties and rights of 
both nations, and with the friendly relations and perfect amity subsisting between 
them. " Stratford Canning, British ambassador to Washington, attempted to foster a 
degree of commonality between the nations and forwarded to Adams details of the 
Admiralty's instructions. Canning hoped that it would provide guidance for the 
composition of orders to "any American vessels destined to cruise on the coast of 
Africa. " But he told the Admiralty that "[i]t does not appear that the American 
government has, at this moment, more than one vessel, a schooner, expressly 
commissioned against the Slave Trade[. ]"68 
Nevertheless, Canning told Adams that the British would consider American 
proposals for some system of joint patrols, rather that fight over their differences. His 
government was willing to consider a proposal that would see the "cruizers of the 
several maritime powers [merged] into one common force for the protection of the 
African coast[. ]" The White House wanted Anglo-American forces to co-operate "by all 
suitable means. " But only if it was convenient were the American ships to cruise with 
the Royal Navy and provide the British with any information related to the slave trade. 69 
67 Earl E. McNeilly, "The United States Navy and the Suppression of the West African Slave 
Trade 1819-1862" (PhD diss., Case Western University, 1973), 51-52 and NA, RG 45, Letters received 
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In 1821, Commodore George R. Collier reported that in response to the passage 
of strong American laws against slaving, the American officers carried out their task 
with "the greatest zeal[. ]" Stratford Canning also had some praise for the limited 
American effort. The American schooners along the African coast in the early 1820s 
had some effect. The US ship Alligator had captured four slavers believed to be 
American ships. But he noticed the weak American commitment. The Alligator had left 
the coast and Canning had no idea when another ship might appear. 70 The nations had 
hit upon a limited form of co-operation, but the Americans were along the coast for 
other reasons. The American policy-making process and goals resulted in limited 
numbers of ships to the West African coast. Thus, Anglo-American co-operation was 
largely informal and unsuccessful. But while relations were tense, the nations opted for 
limited co-operative efforts with sea power, while hoping for better arrangements over 
points of contention. 
The most successful operations resulted from intelligence sharing. For example, 
in late 1821, the Royal Navy stopped the slaver Dolphin, but the Dolphin's captain was 
confident that the British would free her because she flew American colours. 
Meanwhile, the British had a plan for Anglo-American co-operation. They offered to 
repair and man the Augusta and put her under the command of an American officer, 
Midshipman Harry D. Hunter. If the ship encountered an American slaver, Hunter 
would seize it; otherwise, the British would seize the ship. By 5 February 1822, Captain 
Benedictus Kelly, commanding British West African forces, sent an officer to the 
Augusta and handed over intelligence about the Dolphin, then reportedly in the Rio 
Pongo. Hunter told Secretary Thompson that "[i]n pursuance of my duty as the only 
Thompson [unaddressed], 15 August 1821; and IUP, vol. 64, Further Papers Relating to the Slave Trade, 
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Naval Officer on the coast" he sailed in the Augusta to investigate. Hunter located the 
vessel and concluded from the ship's log that she also went by the name Florida, until 
she sailed for the African coast from Charleston to get slaves. Fresh from success, 
Hunter and the British continued their patrol. 71 
Nevertheless, by the close of the decade, and US naval retrenchment, the Royal 
Navy was the only effective force across the equatorial Atlantic. After the coronation of 
King William IV, US Ambassador Louis McLane provided Washington with details on 
what was being done by the British and Americans to fight the last remains of piracy 
along the West Indian-West African route. The brig Manzanares, accused of piracy, 
sailed from Havana on 31 August 1829 for the African coast, and en route it had 
attacked the Boston vessel Candace. The American government stationed warships off 
Havana and Matanzas and ordered the Manzanares captured. But on 14 July 1830, 
McLane received word from Lord Aberdeen that they had found the ship. The Royal 
Navy brig Black Joke captured the Manzanares on 1 April 1830, off Gallinas, and 
delivered it to the Mixed Commission court at Sierra Leone. It had violated the Anglo- 
Spanish treaty on the slave trade, and the British found on board over 300 slaves. 72 
Conclusion 
During the 1820s, Anglo-American relations remained tense, but they sought to use sea 
power and minimise disputes while furthering their separate objectives. When the 
disintegration of the Spanish-American Empire threatened British and American trade, 
they deployed navies to protect it. Traditional American naval policy abhorred a strong 
navy, but when US interests were threatened, policy makers reached a compromise. 
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They sent Commodore Porter to the Gulf of Mexico, and the US Navy patrolled for 
pirates, warned off privateers, and instituted convoys. After the United States secured its 
territorial desires, the navy had clear objectives and little political interference from 
Washington, but avoided provoking other nations. In contrast, the Royal Navy was 
subject to the policy restraints imposed by Canning. He wished conditions to be ripe 
before recognising the rebel states, and London was wary of forceful actions for fear of 
sparking European intervention before British objectives were secured. Consequently, 
naval reinforcements were restrained. 
While wary of the US in the Gulf, London wanted a larger US force along the 
African coast and had few qualms about giving access to a potential rival. Strategic 
considerations along the West African coast mirrored the Gulf of Mexico. The British 
had a clear objective: slave trade suppression for humanitarian reasons and they needed 
Washington's help to stop slavers hiding under the US flag. While the Americans 
reached a consensus to deploy a large naval force to suppress piracy, slave trade 
suppression was more complex because of American domestic constraints. Still, the 
Americans diverted the occasional vessel from the Gulf piracy patrol to the West 
African coast to appease Britain. Meanwhile, London and her officers became aware of 
the economic potential of the West African coast. When the piracy threat ended, US 
naval retrenchment left the West African coast devoid of American warships, and the 
Royal Navy unchallenged in the equatorial Atlantic until it was in American interest to 
establish a permanent African squadron. 
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Chapter Five: Forging a Naval Conduit, 1830-1842 
By 1842, Anglo-American interests converged sufficiently to allow an agreement 
governing naval co-operation along the West African coast. The tactical use of sea 
power to hunt slavers and provide immediate commerce protection generated Anglo- 
American conflict. But the strategic decision to use sea power to further long-term 
objectives peacefully provided a conduit through which both nations could reduce 
tensions. In Britain, lobbyists, like Fowell Buxton, pressured the government to use the 
navy to suppress the slave trade to promote legitimate African commerce. But leaders 
like Lord Palmerston and Sir Robert Peel subscribed to the liberal philosophy of only 
pushing other powers so far over minor issues like slave trade suppression. Co- 
operation was preferable to war. Politically, London connected African commerce 
growth with slave trade suppression, but refrained from war to impose its views on 
"established" nation-states like the United States. In America, Washington also came 
under increasing pressure from Northern merchants to protect and promote avenues of 
increasing commerce, such as along the West African coast. 
By the early 1840s, Secretary of State Daniel Webster and Secretary of the Navy 
Abel P. Upshur promoted using the US Navy for peaceful strategic goals like protecting 
and promoting African commerce. However, the political climate in the United States 
remained wary of slavery issues and Anglo-American tension remained high over 
freedom of the seas. The Amistad and Creole cases raised the ire of many in the South, 
fearful of how the legal slave trade may be interfered with. But a rebellion in Canada, 
and the Maine-New Brunswick border dispute, opened an opportunity to settle 
outstanding issues between the United States and Britain. In London, the new free trade 
Prime Minister, Sir Robert Peel, dispatched Lord Ashburton, of the Baring family, to 
Washington for talks with Webster. They settled the border dispute and developed a 
plan for West African co-operation. British liberalism and America's growing 
commercial hopes meant a compromise was possible over the use of sea power along 
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the West African coast to preserve Anglo-American relations and to move forward their 
separate objectives. American and British warships would cruise in pairs. To avoid 
Anglo-American conflict, the US Navy would stop suspicious American-flagged vessels 
and the Royal Navy would only stop suspicious vessels of other nations. 
Palmerston's Foreign Policy, the Slave Trade, and the United States 
Henry John Temple, an Irish land owner, and later Lord Palmerston, was a member of 
the elite. He first gained a prominence in foreign affairs when Canning kept him in the 
War Office, and grew in importance as Foreign Secretary (1830-34; 1835-41 and 1846- 
51) and finally as Prime Minister (1855 and 1859-1865). Palmerston studied the works 
of Adam Smith in Edinburgh during his youth, but believed that there was a role for 
diplomacy. ' He accepted the liberal, laissez-faire philosophy, but also wanted to protect 
British interests. He supported free trade, despised the slave trade, and pushed other 
powers, like the United States, to suppress it. But if they really objected, peace was 
more important. Muriel E. Chamberlain concluded that Palmerston adhered to Lord 
Castlereagh's doctrine of non-interference in the affairs of other nations so long as 
British interests were maintained. Consequently, Palmerston "pleaded for a right to 
`interfere' in every way `short of actual force'. "2 Because of his duration and influence, 
Palmerston symbolises the remarkable continuity in British foreign policy during this 
period. 
The "Eastern Question" and its relationship with the "Liberal Movement" 
illustrate Palmerston's style of foreign policy. Overseas, the drive for Greek 
independence from the Ottoman Empire in the late 1820s was something that public 
opinion in Britain, France, and Russia, supported as a liberal movement. But London 
also had to balance liberalism with her strategic concerns. The European powers 
1 Bourne, Foreign Policy of Victorian England, 84-86. 
7 Muriel E. Chamberlain, Lord Palmerston (Britain: GPC Books, 1987), 33-40. 
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supported Greek independence, joined together, and destroyed the Turkish and Egyptian 
fleets at Navarino (1827) that sought to stifle Greek independence. Yet, another danger 
was clear: "[fJrom Constantinople she [Russia] could challenge the whole British 
position in the Mediterranean[. ]" Britain had to strengthen Turkey to counter Russia and 
balance the strategic loss suffered by the political success of liberalism. 3 
The "Liberal Movement" believed in "representative government" and "majority 
rule[. ]" The French revolution of 1830 liberalised the constitution and established a 
constitutional monarchy; "order prevailed, the bourgeois [emphasis in original] were in 
control, the business of France and Europe could continue. " The revolution showed 
Britain, and members of the elite like Palmerston, that gradual evolution was possible. 
Domestically, it enabled the first Reform Bill (1832) to be realised, giving a broader 
constituency power. 4 But the Turkish vassal in Egypt, Mehemet Ali, also caused 
problems. He vied for more power and threatened British trade routes through the Red 
Sea to India. Meanwhile, "wherever the British found their progress impeded by the 
Egyptians they found the French behind the Egyptians. " Anglo-French relations grew 
tense when Thiers became French Premier and openly supported Ali. S 
By 1839, Foreign Secretary Palmerston was concerned that the Russians would 
take advantage of the situation, and the Royal Navy deployed to the Dardanelles. 
Palmerston hoped that Ali might be satisfied if he and his family were given "hereditary 
possession of Egypt" in exchange for the end of his occupation of Syria. 6 Ali refused, 
and the British bombarded Acre in response. But the French failed to support Ali and, 
with the other interested powers, signed the Straits Convention of 13 July 1841, 
J Webster, Foreign Policy of Palmerston, vol. 1,76-87. 
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forbidding warships to cross the Dardanelles in peacetime. 7 British support for "higher" 
goals was predicated on maintaining her security and economic interests. 
Palmerston's approach was to use force when needed, but he sought co- 
operation with other powers to further British objectives. This philosophy matched his 
liberal views and foreign policy objectives. In 1837, for example, Palmerston linked his 
foreign and trade policies when discussing another crisis, over access to China, with 
Lord Minto at the Admiralty. Palmerston concluded that unless Britain wanted to go to 
war with every maritime power to "maintain a monopoly" on trade, the nation must 
accept "American & French settlements in the Eastern seas. " Besides, he concluded, 
commerce and "civilization" brought to the "savage races" would help all "civilized & 
trading nations. ,8 Only when another power, like France, threatened a monopoly would 
Palmerston support intervention. His primary goal remained "the balance of power in 
Europe, as the essential prerequisite for the security of the United Kingdom. "9 
Furthermore, the British applied such "pragmatic" liberalism to Anglo-American 
relations over the slave trade. 
Palmerston supported the idea to replace the slave trade at its origins in Africa, 
with legitimate British commerce, but he was also conservative and initially voted 
against abolition. Still, he recognised that British public opinion was against the slave 
trade, making it good political capital. He had failed to appreciate this fact when he first 
ran for Parliament in Cambridge, and it eroded some of his support. For several reasons, 
personal and economic, Palmerston constantly pressured other world powers, like the 
United States, to secure slave trade suppression treaties. He rested recognition of Texas 
on it agreeing to a slave trade treaty, and when the Portuguese seemed reluctant to meet 
their treaty obligations Parliament gave him the power to "treat their slavers also as if 
7 Chamberlain, Lord Palmerston, 54-55. 
8 Bourne, Palmerston, 552 and 624-625 and Palmerston to Minto, September 1837, quoted in 
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they were British criminals. " Bourne concluded that Palmerston's zeal against the slave 
trade became part of his "personal mythology[. ]"10 
While growing to support slave trade suppression, Palmerston's liberal 
philosophy also meant that he was "personally uninterested in adventurous schemes to 
contest American power. " When it came to the US-Canada border disputes, for 
example, Bourne concluded that "his policy was merely to postpone the matter by 
arranging joint surveys and commissions ... until American 
feelings were quietened 
down[. ]" Lord John Russell feared an Anglo-American war over the Canadian 
boundary, but concluded that "Palmerston was definitely playing it down in order to 
concentrate on Egypt" and Mohammed Ali, a more important concern. British 
adherence to liberalism meant that they desired to relate with the United States without 
going to war unless important British interests were threatened. Palmerston furthered 
avenues of opportunity when they materialised, but while trying to obtain a slave trade 
treaty with Texas, for example, he refrained from action to secure greater influence in 
Texas. '' 
But in the United States, petitions against slavery flooded Congress and 
Southern members decided to put an end to the debate. The political climate was cool 
toward anything connected with the divisive slavery issue and shaped American 
diplomatic and naval relations with the British. During his Presidency, Adams avoided 
dealing with slavery and its suppression. Southern opinion, and that of the nation, 
forbade any talk of ending it. By 1836, Congress, in the face of opposition from Adams, 
then in Congress and claiming that debate was an issue of freedom of speech, instituted 
the so-called "Gag Rule" and suspended debate. A climate of fear had settled on the 
nation, while President Martin Van Buren agreed to veto any Bill that tried to suppress 
slavery in the capital or any of the States. Bemis wrote that a "white terror backed up 
10 Bourne, Palmerston, 622-624. 
11 Bourne, Palmerston, 586-587 and 597. 
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the heavy legal censorship with vigilance committees and lynch law. " 12 Britain's option 
was either war with the United States to force opinion change, or continued diplomatic 
pressure. 
Market Expansion and Anglo-American Diplomacy in the 1830s 
During the 1820s piracy crisis, the British feared that the Royal Navy would interfere 
with the government's desire to secure exclusive access to trade in the Western 
equatorial Atlantic. But during the 1830s and early 1840s, London also used sea power 
to further the growth of national wealth under the joint banner of slave trade suppression 
and free trade. The combined pressure from a variety of sources led Britain to end 
slavery formally in all her colonies. Britain then increased efforts to use sea power to 
end the slave trade. But many believed that it continued because of US participation in 
the trade, slowing British success. London believed that the US had to be convinced to 
police American citizens involved in the traffic, or slavers of other nations that hid 
under the protection of falsely flying the American flag. 
During the late 1830s, British Quakers, Buxton's Society for the Extinction of 
the Slave Trade, and others, continued pressuring the British government for action. 13 
Britons, like Buxton, hoped to encourage the development and expansion of legal 
African goods, like palm oil. He concluded that the Royal Navy could be used to "drive 
them [slave traders] out of a river and keep them out, then the African's hunger for trade 
goods might lead him to turn to oil. "14 The two primary methods to implement the new 
strategy were to "Impede the Traffic" and "Establish Commerce. " He thought that 
natives would welcome trade with Europeans, and they only needed encouragement. 
12 Samuel Flagg Bemis, John Quincy Adams and the Union (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1956), 
326-340 and 352-383. 
13 Thomas, Slave Trade, 650-658. 
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Journal, 10 (1950): 38-39. 
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Buxton urged the government to sign treaties with natives along the coast and inland, 
and "settle factories and send out trading ships. s15 He reminded a Colonial Office, 
connected to the gentlemanly capitalists, that Africa offered the potential of "millions of 
customers, who may be taught to grow the raw material which we require, and who 
require the manufactured commodities which we produce. "16 Buxton thus appealed 
directly to the gentlemanly capitalist ethic that might see Africa's investment potential, 
helped by the power of the Royal Navy. 
Palmerston agreed with such a use for the navy and secured the lucrative island 
of Fernando Po for the British. By 1841, the British sent a naval expedition up the Niger 
in search of new avenues of trade. The expedition signed treaties with natives to abolish 
the slave trade and trade with the British in legitimate goods. The expedition was 
largely a failure, succumbed to African disease, and returned home in disgrace. '? But 
British humanitarian goals for slave trade suppression had formed a nexus with their 
economic goal of developing Africa and it established British strategy for the Eastern 
equatorial Atlantic for the next 20 years. Nevertheless, as the United States was a major 
market for slaves, they needed American co-operation to further British policy. London 
was unwilling to go to war with Washington to force a change in American attitude. 
Instead, London continued to apply diplomatic and naval pressure on the 
Americans. While slavers hid under the US flag, British strategy was futile. American 
representatives in London were aware of the British position and the pressure the public 
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placed on the government. In 1833, the US Ambassador told Washington about the 
zealots and lobbyists who sent petitions to the government, and the public outcry against 
the slave trade that left the government with little diplomatic manoeuvring room. 
Regardless, the British tried to woo the Americans informally to let the Royal Navy stop 
US-flagged ships. Each time, the Americans reiterated their belief that the British 
position would violate the freedom of the seas. 18 Slowly over the 1830s, Anglo- 
American disagreements over the slave trade accumulated. The British reported that US 
ships were continually involved in the slave trade and Britain wanted America to act 
against them and enforce American laws. 
The 1830s was a bad decade for the slaves. After the Haitian revolts in the early 
century and British abolition of slavery in her colonies, including the West Indies, Cuba 
and Puerto Rico met the demand for cheap, slave-grown sugar and coffee. 19 During 
1831-35,104,641 slaves were embarked along the African coast and 88,493 were 
delivered to their destination. The next five-year period was even more horrific. The 
number of slaves embarked increased by three times to 328,540 slaves, of whom 
282,416 were delivered successfully to their destination. The majority of the slaves 
captured during the 1830s originated from the West African coast. West-Central Africa 
accounted for 35% of the slaves captured during 1831-35; the Bight of Biafra (27.7%); 
the Bight of Benin (23.8%); Sierra Leone (11.3%); Senegambia (1.52%); the Windward 
Coast (0.45%); and the Gold Coast (0.31%). Data collected by today's scholars 
indicates that during 1836-40, the slave trade focussed particularly on West-Central 
Africa (50.50%). Other regions were less prominent than during the previous period: 
Southeast Africa (26.3%); the Bight of Biafra (8.82%); the Bight of Benin (8.56%); 
"NA, RG 59, Dispatches, Britain, no. 67 and no. 68, Vail to Edward Livingston, 22 May 1833 
and Vail to Edward Livingston, 29 May 1833. 
19 Herbert S. Klein, The Atlantic Slave Trade (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 
39-40 and 184. 
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Sierra Leone (4.22%); Senegambia (0.72%); the Gold Coast (0.53%); and the 
Windward Coast (0.33%). 20 
This was the height of the slave trade during the mid-nineteenth century. During 
1831-35, there were 329 slave trade voyages; the number increased by about three times 
by 1836-40, to 957 voyages. It is difficult to assess the origins of vessels involved in an 
illegal activity cloaked in secrecy, but there is no indication of any involvement in 
slaving voyages from the ports of New York, Baltimore, or New Orleans. However, 
statistics indicate that during 1831-35, one slaving vessel was built in Maryland and 
during 1836-40, the number increased to three vessels. It is likely that these statistics are 
an indication of a wider, better-concealed involvement by the port of Baltimore and her 
famous clipper ships. Indeed, historians have found that during 1831-35, there were two 
vessels involved in the slave trade registered in the United States; by 1836-40, the 
number had risen to 34 vessels. 21 
The 1286 voyages - an average of 129 per year - which occurred during the 
1830s, brought slaves from Africa to largely New World destinations. Of the 329 
voyages that occurred during 1831-35,241 (73.3%) were deemed successful, while the 
British managed to stop 81 (24.6%) voyages. The remaining 2.1 % of voyages met with 
various other unsuccessful outcomes. The main destination of the slaves was Cuba 
(64.7%). Other regions lagged behind considerably: Sierra Leone (14.6%); Rio de la 
Plata (8.10%); the Southeast Coast of Brazil (5.0%); Bahia (4.21%); while other 
destinations comprised the remaining 3.39%. Of the 957 voyages that occurred over 
1836-40,670 (70.0%) were recorded as successful, while the British stopped 267 
(27.9%). The remaining 2.1% of voyages also met with various other unsuccessful 
outcomes. The destinations of the slaves were somewhat different. Demand shifted to 
the Southeast Coast of Brazil, which received 54.9% of the slaves. Cuba was the second 
20 Eltis, et at. Slave Trade: A Database. 
21 Eltis, et al., Slave Trade: A Database. 
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most prominent destination (28.7%); Sierra Leone (6.10%); Pernambuco (3.91%); 
Bahia (2.52%); while other destinations comprised the remaining 3.81%. 22 
The battle was going poorly for the British. The slaver voyage success rate had 
fallen by 3.3%, and the British capture rate had increased slightly by 3.3%, but the 
number of slaving voyages had increased dramatically. 23 Palmerston was convinced that 
the Americans were to blame, but he believed that if pressured, they would act. During 
the 1830s, he forwarded numerous reports of specific US-flagged vessels involved in 
the slave trade. He enclosed extracts from the British commissioners at Havana, who 
believed that the slavers were encouraged by the President's declarations that he would 
sign no slave trade treaty. 24 
Despite the diplomatic pressure, the United States rejected British proposals, 
offered few suggestions of their own, and remained focussed on the immediate goal of 
commerce protection. The Americans only became interested in negotiations with 
Britain when the internal American "coastal trade" in slaves was threatened. During late 
1837 and 1838, Washington asked the British to enter into an agreement to govern 
slaving vessels that, involved in the "legitimate" internal US slave trade, found 
themselves shipwrecked on nearby British possessions. By November 1838, US 
Ambassador Andrew Stevenson told Washington that the British refused to consider 
such a treaty. Palmerston told the Americans that it was inconsistent with British policy. 
He concluded that if Britain made such an agreement with the United States, then other 
nations, like Spain and Portugal, would want similar agreements and it would collapse 
u Eltis, et al., Slave Trade: A Database. 
23 Eltis, et al., Slave Trade. A Database. 
24 NA, RG 59, Dispatches, Britain, no. 14, Palmerston to A. Stevenson, 17 December 1836, in A. 
Stevenson to John Forsyth, 22 December 1836 and "Extract from British Commissioners at Havana, 25 
October 1836, " in Palmerston to A. Stevenson, 17 December 1836, in A. Stevenson to John Forsyth, 22 
December 1836. 
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the British campaign. Stevenson concluded that any further talks with the present 
British government were futile 25 
London felt that increased American investment in the Cuban sugar trade had 
sparked an increased demand for cheap slave labour on the island. And in the 1830s, the 
slavers took advantage of the state of Anglo-American diplomacy over slave trade 
suppression and circumvented suppression activities. Flying the US flag would protect 
the slavers by the threat of a diplomatic dispute that would ensue if the Royal Navy 
stopped an American-flagged vessel. If the vessel encountered the rare US warship, then 
it could show foreign papers, flag, and be no concern to the Americans. But the British 
concluded that the slavers hid extensively under the American flag by 1836, and by 
1837 the navy encountered them on the African coast. The British concluded that "[i]t 
will be seen that Spanish, Portuguese, and Brazilian Slave Traders, with out-laws and 
pirates of all nations, are now flocking under the cover of the American Flag. " British 
representatives opined that ships were built and equipped in American ports, sailed to 
the Cape Verde Islands - or Havana - under the American flag, and were handed over 
to Portuguese or Spanish owners. The Royal Navy encountered such American ships as 
the Washington, Joseph Hand, and Cleopatra operating under such a scheme in late 
1837. The British concluded that the people of Baltimore were particularly involved. 26 
Statistics provide some support for the British case: slaver voyages from Havana 
had increased from 173 voyages over 1831-35 to 214 voyages over 1836-40.27 The 
Venus, a Baltimore built ship, was one such case that the British found in 1838. In 
August 1838, she sailed for Brazil under US colours, then switched to the Portuguese 
flag, and sailed to the African coast. The British concluded there were no legal papers 
25 NA, RG 59, Dispatches, Britain, no. 56, Lord Palmerston to Stevenson, 10 September 1838 
and Stevenson to John Forsyth, 5 November 1838. 
26 IUP, vol. 19, Correspondence with Foreign Powers relative to the Slave Trade (hereafter, 
Class B) [Further Series, 1840], United States, 165 and 169-170, first enclosure in no. 159, H. S. Fox to 
John Forsyth, 29 October 1839. 
27 Eltis, et al., Slave Trade: A Database. 
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legitimising the transfer, and "in any case, her outward voyage, with equipment for the 
Slave Trade, was protected by her American character. " By early 1839, Rear Admiral 
Elliot concluded that the slavers became too sure of themselves. They failed even to 
have an American on board to take over as captain if stopped, and simply kept one of 
their crew on hand with a certificate of naturalisation as an American. 28 Their main 
weapons were paperwork to hide under a flag of convenience. 29 
In response, Britain sent several slavers to the United States to pressure 
Washington to act. In some cases it worked. For example, the District Court of New 
York condemned the slaver Wyoming on 15 October 1839 for violating US maritime 
law. But the case against the Butterfly was weak and rested on the fact that she had large 
boilers, and other items, that could be used in both the slave trade and in legitimate 
commerce. Nevertheless, the judge found that "I am constrained, under this view of the 
various circumstances connected with the case, to declare that there is strong prima 
facie proof that this vessel was, when arrested, employed in the Slave Trade. " The 
Butterfly's master, an American, was found guilty of involvement in the slave trade, 
fined $2000, and imprisoned for two years. 30 
Palmerston was pleased with the reaction of the Americans to the bold British 
actions. He reminded them that under US law ships had to meet several conditions to be 
legally American. They had to fly the US flag, have a two-thirds American crew, and 
the captain, first, second and third mates had to be American citizens. If the Americans 
agreed, the British could use that definition, and the Royal Navy could seize slavers 
28 IUP, vol. 19, (Class B) [Further Series, 1840], United States, 165-167, first enclosure in no. 
159, H. S. Fox to John Forsyth, 29 October 1839. 
29 IUP, vol. 20, Correspondence with Foreign Powers, Not Parties to Conventions Giving Right 
of Search of Vessels Suspected of the Slave Trade (hereafter, Class D), 110, second enclosure in no. 124, 
"Copy of a Paper found on the person of the Captain in command of the schooner `Catherine, ' when 
captured by the 'Dolphin, ' and proved on the trial. " 
30 IUP, vol. 20, (Class D), 71,102-106 and 110-111, first enclosure in no. 85, Thomas Stilwell 
and Sons to Palmerston, 29 April 1840, no. 121, "Judgement. The United States v. the Schooner 
"Butterfly. " 13 April 1840, " and James Buchanan to Palmerston, 17 August 1840; and Warren S. 
Howard, American Slavers and the Federal Law (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California 
Press, 1963), 38-40. 
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who raised only the US flag whenever a warship challenged them. But Washington 
rejected the proposal and by December 1839, Palmerston received a discouraging 
opinion from the Queen's advocate. Neither the ship nor cargo of the suspected slavers 
brought into New York could be condemned under US law for participating in the slave 
trade, only for irregularities in their papers. Consequently, Palmerston ordered the 
British consul in New York, James Buchanan, "not to take charge of such vessels" in 
the future. 31 Palmerston had made his point and refrained from pushing the Americans 
too far over the issue of slave trade suppression if they were unwilling to co-operate. 
American Economic Interest in West Africa 
While formal Anglo-American talks stalled, American Ambassador Stevenson 
continued informal discussions with Palmerston, who still wanted the Americans to 
suppress the slave trade. British and American discussions are significant because they 
reveal Washington's desire that US commerce be protected, but their unwillingness to 
do anything significant about the slave trade because of continued domestic 
considerations. The British also realised that their naval force interfered with legitimate 
American commerce, but London exclaimed that there was no choice unless the United 
States dispatched a naval squadron to the West African coast. Palmerston believed that 
"great good" could be accomplished if they let British warships inspect suspicious 
American-flagged vessels. 32 While the British no longer sent seized US ships to the 
United States, the Royal Navy continued to harass US-flagged ships. It was a campaign 
of irritation, short of war, that caught legitimate trade in the middle, and increased 
Anglo-American tension. 
31 IUP, vol. 19, (Class B) [Further Series, 1840], United States, 138,186 and 189-192, no. 141, 
third enclosure in no. 162, enclosure in no. 167, and no. 168, Palmerston to H. S. Fox, 3 August 1839, J. 
Buchanan to B. F. Butler, 4 November 1839, New York Morning Herald, 2 December 1839, and 
Palmerston to James Buchanan, 31 December 1839. 
32 NA, RG 59, Dispatches, Britain, no. 88, A. Stevenson to John Forsyth, 29 February 1840. 
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As harassment continued, pressure increased on Washington to send US 
warships to Africa to protect growing American trade, in particular that of the Northern 
States who sought new overseas markets and resources. One such case occurred to the 
Edwin, owned by Farnham and Fry of Salem, Massachusetts, and used by P. J. Farnham 
and Co. of New York in their West African trade. The company traded cloths, beads, 
and other items with the natives at Ambriz, North of Angola, in competition with 
English trading stations. 33 The Edwin's captain told American officials that the Edwin 
sailed from Ambriz with some cargo when, on 22 July 1839, the HM sloop Columbine 
fired on and boarded the vessel. The Edwin's captain reminded the British lieutenant "of 
his having received and hospitably entertained" him "at the factory of Messr. P. J. 
Farnham and Co. about a month before" and they were involved in a legal trade. But 
despite this assurance the British refused to release the Edwin until they finished their 
search and discovered nothing. Palmerston told the American ambassador that the 
matter would be investigated, but it would help if the Americans sent their own 
warships to the West African coast to enforce the law. 34 
Over the early nineteenth century, the growth and potential in American 
economic interests focussed Northern attention on naval protection for long term 
economic growth. Consequently, Britain and the United States came to share a common 
belief that sea power could be used to further the growth of national wealth, although 
they disagreed over the position of slave trade suppression within this equation. New 
Englanders, and others with West African interests, pressured Washington to protect 
and promote American West African endeavours with sea power. The economic 
opportunities also found sympathies in politicians who later held power over the 
73 IUP, vol. 19, (Class D) [Further Series, 1840], United States, 41, enclosure in no. 72, George 
W. Slacum to J. Forsyth, 16 October 1839 and George Elliot, 22 July 1839, in George W. Slacum to J. 
Forsyth, 16 October 1839. 
34 IUP, vol. 19, (Class D) [Further Series, 1840], United States, 42-43 and 43-44, enclosure in 
no. 72, and no. 73, Depositions of James Dayley, Richard Darling, and others, 12 October 1839, in 
George W. Slacum to J. Forsyth, 16 October 1839 and Palmerston to A. Stevenson, 15 February 1840. 
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nation's foreign policy. These people, especially Daniel Webster, Secretary of State 
(1841-1843 and 1850-1852) and Abel P. Upshur, Secretary of the Navy (1841-1843) 
and later Secretary of State (1843-1844), believed in using sea power to protect and 
further trade, and compromised with Britain to further these wider goals. The evolution 
of the American position allowed for a much-anticipated resolution of Anglo-American 
maritime difficulties along the West African coast. 
During this period, the American Northeast, including the Mid-Atlantic States 
and New England, industrialised and serviced the whole country rather than just the 
local market. The wool and boot industry, largely based in Massachusetts, grew along 
with the iron industry, which supplied railway ties, iron stoves, and other consumer 
products. Douglass C. North concluded that the "surge of expansion that began in 1843 
was an era in which the Northeast had ceased being a marginal manufacturing area and 
could successfully expand into a vast array of industrial goods. s35 With increased 
growth in the American economy in all regions, but in particular the Northeast, trade 
with other regions increased. West Africa was one such region. Merchants in Liberia, 
like one Mr. Carey, shipped coffee to Richmond, Virginia; others shipped rice, palm oil, 
dyewood, and ivory. In turn, Liberian "elites" liked Western goods, like bread, butter, 
ham, and molasses, and frowned on local produce. 36 
The American African trade was the domain of smaller New England merchants. 
From 1832 to 1864, there were 558 arrivals from Africa to Salem carrying camwood, 
palm oil, and other items traded "along the Guinea, Liberian, Ivory and Gold Coasts[. ]" 
Samuel Eliot Morison concluded that West African trades "afforded a good living to 
many swapping Yankees, who had insufficient capital for the grand routes of 
commerce. "37 African products entered America virtually duty free, never charged a 
35 North, Economic Growth, 156-176. 
36 Beyan, American Colonization Society, 116-118. 
37 Samuel Eliot Morison, The Maritime History of Massachusetts, 1783-1860 (Boston and New 
York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1921), 33 and 221-222. 
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Figure 5.1 US Exports to Sierra Leone, 1824-1865, £ thousands 
Source: Calculated from George E. Brooks, Jr., Yankee Traders Old Coasters & African 
Middlemen: A History ofAmerican Legitimate Trade with West Africa in the Nineteenth 
Century (Boston, MA: Boston University Press, 1970), Appendix E, "Value of Sierra 
Leone Imports, 1824-1885 (in sterling), " 305-306. 
Note: Total also includes small amounts of lumber/shingles and flour, omitted from this 
graph. 
Figure 5.2 US Imports from Sierra Leone, 1824-1865, £ thousands 
Source: Calculated from Brooks, Yankee Traders, Appendix F, "Value of Sierra Leone 
Exports, 1824-1885 (in sterling), " 307-308. 
Note: Gaps in graph represent missing data from Brooks. Total also includes 
insignificant amounts of peanuts and camwood, omitted from this graph. 
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duty of more than 10% on most goods. Given these opportunities, American merchants 
prospered as never before. George E. Brooks, Jr., concluded that these were the golden 
years for the West African trade. "38 
At its peak, American trade to Africa was primarily in rum and tobacco. In 
return the Americans obtained palm oil, peanuts, ivory, and hides - in particular in 
demand in New England, for example in Salem's growing shoe industry. The trades 
were small and concentrated, which helps explain its absence from official, aggregate 
statistics, as too insufficient to record. Figure 5.1 indicates that trade with Sierra Leone, 
for example, began its growth during the mid-1830s; American imports never exceeded 
£50,000, largely tobacco. Exports to the United States (figure 5.2) were of similar 
values, never exceeding £50,000 a year, largely hides and palm oil. American trade 
declined after the 1870s, pushed back by increased competition from monopolistic 
European trading companies and cheaper goods shipped from Europe by steamers. 39 But 
Washington came under increasing pressure from the North to protect and promote 
overseas commerce with the navy during the "take-off' phase. 
While trade was small, it was growing and important to those Americans with a 
financial stake in West Africa. Salem merchants such as Robert Brookhouse, Jr., David 
and Thomas P. Pingree, and Charles Hoffman were involved in the African trades. They 
wrote the government and pleaded for greater US naval involvement off West Africa. 
For example, in 1836, Secretary of the Navy, Mahlon Dickerson wrote Stephen C. 
Phillips, an associate of Charles Hoffman 's40, and said that the government supported 
38 George E. Brooks, Jr., Yankee Traders, Olds Coasters & African Middlemen: A History of 
American Legitimate Trade with West Africa in the Nineteenth Century (Boston, MA: Boston University 
Press, 1970), 95-97. 
39 Brooks, Yankee Traders, 6-7,97 and 126-129. 
ao Daniel F. Vickers, historian of maritime Salem, notes that Hoffman, recorded in his database, 
first voyaged to Africa in 1833. Hoffman worked his way up Salem society, marrying Ruth Felt, whose 
family was involved in "fisheries and coasting. " After his wife's death, he remarried in 1840 to Eliza 
King and was in the "top wealth decile on Salem's tax lists from 1835 ... until 1850" when the Vickers' 
group stopped tracking him (D. Vickers to M. C. Hunter, personal correspondence, 26 April 2002). 
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US West African interests, but Hoffman wanted more. Hoffman suggested that the navy 
dispatch a brig or schooner to the coast along with a barge to sail the coast from Sierra 
Leone to Cape Verde. American trade with Gambia was important to Hoffman and 
recently trade had liberalised to the benefit of Americans. George Rendell was the 
colony's governor and was "very friendly to free trade and commerce with 
Americans[. ] "41 
Yet, as discussed in Chapter Two, this was an era of growing freer trade, not free 
trade. The London firm of Foster & Smith, Hoffman reported, had "waged a war against 
the trade of the United States" to Gambia and had succeeded in imposing a 6d tariff on 
American liquor, tea, and other products "except tobacco and lumber. " If the London 
and American firms both had liquor, natives preferred the former. Hoffman believed 
that the long-term benefits of sea power were clear. The chief cause of restriction of 
trade on the River Nunez were British factory owners who established their facilities on 
shore first. Hoffman concluded that these "monopolizing factors" fleeced American 
profits and British warships convinced local Kings to discriminate against Americans. 42 
Nevertheless, the pleas of interested Americans languished in Washington. On 6 
November 1839, a representative from the "Colonization Rooms, " a lobby group, wrote 
to the Secretary of the Navy, J. K. Paulding, about the slave trade and West African 
commerce. The representative, whose name is illegible, also concluded that the British 
had a monopoly on West African trade, and he was suspicious of Buxton's emerging 
plans for the African coast. The Rooms' author concluded that if the slave trade was 
suppressed under Buxton's plan, the British would control all the trade along the coast 
to the detriment of America. Moreover, the show of British naval force had instilled 
native "respect" for the British. Their ships were left untouched if run ashore, while 
41 NA, RG 45, Letters received relating to African Colonization, Charles Hoffman to Mahlon 
Dickerson, 26 July 1836. 
42 NA, RG 45, Letters received relating to African Colonization, Charles Hoffman to Mahlon 
Dickerson, 26 July 1836. 
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American ships were often pillaged. Consequently, America must send a naval force to 
the region and give the ACS more power to build colonies, purchase more land, and 
establish shore factories for the benefit of American trade. 43 Americans feared the 
trading moves of other powers, in particular Britain, and in mercantilist form worried 
that they would lose trade to the British unless Washington made a political decision to 
nurture economic growth with sea power. 
Contemporaneous to the growth in US trade were incidents close to American 
waters that threatened to bring the issue of freedom of the seas and slave trade 
suppression to a violent climax between the nations. First, the Amistad case created 
problems for American diplomats. Slaves being transported in the vessel along the 
Cuban coast revolted, but at night the crew secretly made their way toward the United 
States. By August 1839, the vessel arrived at Long Island, New York, and eventually 
the US Supreme Court upheld the slaves' freedom; their case presented by John Quincy 
Adams. It is significant because it showed the futility of the American position and the 
1819 US Anti-Slave Trade Act. If illegally captured slaves who found their way to the 
United States could be declared free, it could open the door for other nations, close to 
US waters, to free slaves captured by illegal American slavers. Soon thereafter, on the 
legal coastal slave-trade vessel Creole, slaves revolted and took their ship to Nassau, a 
British possession. The British hung those responsible for killing crewmembers, but 
released the other slaves as freemen. Southerners cried out that it was yet another 
example of British interference. 14 
By February 1840, Washington had time to digest Palmerston's continual 
suggestions, but concluded that it was still politically impossible for Washington to shift 
its position. Washington reminded London that the earlier 1824 attempt had failed, and 
43 NA, RG 45, Letters received relating to African Colonization, [illegible], Colonization Rooms, 
Washington, DC, to J. K. Paulding, 6 November 1839. 
°4 Bemis, John Quincy Adams and the Union, 384-413. 
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the domestic political situation was no better almost twenty years later. The US State 
Department wrote that: 
[t]he opposition then manifested, and which compelled great caution and 
reserve in future dealings, with the subject, has, it must be admitted, been 
strongly fortified by recent events [the Caroline incident and Northeast 
boundary dispute], and especially by the present state of the relations 
between the different powers who have entered into conventional 
arrangements upon the subject 45 
Adams, meanwhile, concluded that Anglo-American relations had reached an impasse 
over slave trade suppression. He confided to his diary that the slave trade "is with us a 
forbidden topic. 46 
Crisis and Opportunity 
Rebecca Berens Matzke concluded that during Anglo-American disputes over 1838- 
1846, Britain used naval power as leverage to pressure America to capitulate. Although 
dismissing War Office "anxiety" about the US, and the resulting war plans, as simply 
the "duty of the military experts[, ]"47 she believed that London, fresh from defeating 
Ali, was then willing to use similar naval force against the United States. 48 She offered 
that the Admiralty planned to bombard American coastal cities, like New York, if 
Britain failed to get its way. 49 Divorced from a wider analysis that neither side had the 
political will for an apocalyptic confrontation, she was perplexed when the Maine-New 
Brunswick border dispute failed to erupt into war. Britain's failure to "park warships off 
the US coast, as it might have done against an underdeveloped nation" were also 
43 IUP, vol. 19, (Class D) [Further Series, 1840], United States, 56, no. 85, John Forsyth to H. S. 
Fox, 12 February 1840. 
46 John Quincy Adams, 21 March 1841, Memoirs, vol. 10,450. 
47 Rebecca Berens Matzke, "Britain Gets Its Way: Power and Peace in Anglo-American 
Relations, 1838-1846, " War in History 8: 1 (2001): 43. 
48 Matzke, "Britain Gets Its Way, " 25-27. 
49 Matzke, "Britain Gets Its Way, " 23. 
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problematic. Matzke concluded that Palmerston hoped the Americans would "give way 
when in the wrong[, ]" but besides tracking intelligence on America, she was unsure of 
how Britain dealt with the risk that domestic American opinion might accidentally push 
the nation to war. 50 Matzke avoided entirely the component of the Webster-Ashburton 
treaty that provided a mechanism for controlling the very sea power that she believed 
was the deterrent against America. 51 
During 1837 and 1838, a rebellion erupted in Canada against the British. But 
within the impasse, the Caroline crisis and the Northeast boundary dispute offered an 
opportunity to resolve outstanding Anglo-American issues, including slave trade 
suppression. The crisis is significant because it revealed how Anglo-American interests 
and connections overcame their disagreements. The Americans were under pressure to 
police the slave trade, but also desired to protect and promote legitimate US commerce 
along the West African coast. In Britain, rather than seek confrontation, new Prime 
Minister Sir Robert Peel, and his Foreign Secretary, Lord Aberdeen, sought conciliation 
with the United States. The result was a compromise. The nations formulated a 
mechanism, using their navies, which both hoped would end the controversy over slave 
trade suppression. Both believed that the compromise over the use of sea power in the 
equatorial Atlantic would be a conduit in their relations and reduce Anglo-American 
tension. Their navies would cruise together off West Africa to suppress the slave trade 
to refrain from offending the national sensibilities of either nation. 
During the failed Canadian rebellion, the rebels chartered an American ship, the 
Caroline, to transport "passengers" and "supplies" to an island stronghold. The British 
became aware of the plan, attacked the Caroline, and sunk her on the American side of 
Niagara Falls, a severe violation of American sovereignty. While Washington worked to 
calm its citizens, the British sent Lord Durham to study the cause of the rebellion, 
50 Matzke, "Britain Gets Its Way, " 37-40. 
s' Matzke, "Britain Gets Its Way, " 32. 
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recommending Responsible government. Soon thereafter, a new hot spot flared along 
the disputed Maine-New Brunswick border. Secretary of State Daniel Webster worked 
to calm all sides, and after President William Henry Harrison's death, the British 
accepted liability for the Caroline affair. Governmental changes in London also 
helped. 52 
Sir Robert Peel, the free trader, in power "briefly" from 1841 to 1846, took the 
"tread softly" and "big stick" approach with the Americans and wanted a negotiated 
settlement. The New York Herald editorialised that the United States should take the 
opportunity of the new British government to settle the outstanding issues. Peel 
forwarded the Herald's view to Lord Aberdeen, his new Foreign Secretary. Peel 
understood how British actions in stopping and searching American-flagged vessels 
during peacetime might lead to war. He believed that the Royal Navy should take steps 
to ensure that needless British visits to vessels along the African stopped. To resolve the 
disputes, Peel and Aberdeen sent Alexander Baring, Lord Ashburton, to the United 
States. Ashburton owned land in Maine, although not in the disputed region, knew 
Daniel Webster, had an American wife, and treaty-negotiating powers as a special 
ambassador. 53 
Ashburton was also a member of the Baring banking family. As early as 1797, 
Alexander Baring promoted the benefits of investing in a new, growing country like the 
United States. 54 But participating in informal peace talks to end the War of 1812, Baring 
confessed the rigidity of British maritime doctrine and admitted that London would 
never abandon the right of impressment. 55 Still, after the war, he had been president of 
the Board of Trade from 1834-35, the last time Peel was in power, and was respected by 
52 Jones, To the Webster-Ashburton Treaty, 19-60. 
53 Norman Gash, Sir Robert Peel: The Life of Sir Robert Peel after 1830 (London and New 
York: Longman, 1972; revised edition 1986), 498-499. 
54 Platt, Foreign Finance, 163. 
55 Hickey, War of 1812,284. 
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many Americans. 56 His dispatch sent a message that London was concerned about the 
financial implications of an Anglo-American dispute, but also that Washington should 
remember where funding for critical aspects of American economic development was 
raised. Baring Brothers was known as the bankers of the American government, 
including at some State levels. They also provided financial capital for American 
expansion, Baring's resources surpassing those of local, American, houses "at least until 
the 1850s and 1860s. , 57 
Platt concluded that financing, like that provided by the Baring Brothers, gave 
the United States "cheapened credit and it accelerated growth. "58 Consequently, Boume 
concluded that Ashburton "represented pacifying factors of Anglo-American trade 
which men like Aberdeen and Peel, though not Palmerston, believed was already so 
much more important than squabbles over frontiers or even national honour. "59 
Therefore, it was in both British and American interests to settle the disputes that had 
accumulated. The Americans would maintain access to British credit, and the investors 
the potential to see returns. Aberdeen explained that he thus sent Ashburton with full 
powers to settle all issues including that of the right of search. 60 But Aberdeen knew that 
the Americans would never submit to a mutual right of search treaty, and the request 
would not be resubmitted. 61 Instead, the nations developed a compromise over the use 
of sea power that they hoped would mitigate immediate and subsequent Anglo- 
American tensions. 
56 Jones, To the {Vebster-Ashburton Treaty, 95-102. 
57 Platt, Foreign Finance, 144 and 150. See also, this study's Chapter Two, 52-53. 
58 Platt, Foreign Finance, 163. 
59 Bourne, Foreign Policy of Victorian England, 50. 
60 NA, RG 59, Dispatches, Britain, no. 5, Edward Everett to Daniel Webster, 31 December 1841, 
with apparent postscripts dated 3 and 4 January 1842. 
61 IUP, vol. 21, Correspondence with Foreign Powers, relating to the Slave Trade, (hereafter, 
Class D), 1841,267-269, no. 273, Aberdeen to A. Stevenson, 13 October 1841. 
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Anglo-American Interests and the Webster-Ashburton Treaty 
The change in Washington over 1841-1842 is significant because those in the Executive 
were willing to use sea power overseas. They were sympathetic to merchants with West 
African interests and willing to compromise with the British to move their individual 
commercial policies forward. Previous US administrations, like those of James Monroe 
and John Quincy Adams, preferred to deploy American sea power reactively against 
threats like piracy close to home waters. The White House now had a Secretary of the 
Navy willing to protect and promote American trading interests over the long term with 
the navy. In December 1841, Secretary of the Navy Abel P. Upshur explained to 
Congress the navy's role. A stronger navy was needed to patrol the Brazilian and West 
African coasts to suppress the slave trade and protect American trading rights. 62 The 
early 1840s thus coincided with a period of Anglo-American relations that opened the 
door to the settling of some outstanding issues between the countries and the 
establishment of a US West African squadron. 
Upshur opined that so many nations contested the trade of that region that the 
nation's navy must be there as a show of force and protection for American 
businessmen over the long term. But the situation along the West African coast was 
worse during 1842. Due to the small budget of that year, no vessels patrolled the coast 
and Upshur reported that American trade had suffered as a result. Natives had also 
attacked American vessels and murdered the crews. One such case was that of the 
schooner Mary Caner. The navy sent a warship to the area to demand reparations, with 
little success, and Upshur concluded that American commerce with Africa needed more 
vessels to patrol the area. He believed that the recent agreement with the British gave 
the Americans an opportunity to protect American interests on the West Africa coast. 63 
62 United States, Congressional Globe, 27th Cong., 2nd sess., Appendix, 17-20, Upshur, "Report 
of the Secretary of the Navy, 4 Dec 1841. " 
63 United States, Congressional Globe, 27th Cong., 2nd sess., Appendix, 17-20, Upshur, "Report 
of the Secretary of the Navy, 4 Dec 1841" and United States, Congressional Globe, 27`x' Cong., 2nd sess., 
Appendix, 39, Upshur, "Annual Report of the Secretary of the Navy, December 1842. " 
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The agreement that settled the slave trade suppression issue until the Civil War 
was negotiated within the milieu of growing American concern for their overseas trade 
and the political considerations of both governments. The focus of the talks was the 
boundary dispute between Maine and New Brunswick, but the negotiators formulated a 
plan for joint naval patrols of the West African coast. The plan meant to allay American 
fears over the right of search and British concerns over the lack of American slave trade 
suppression. The arrangement was based partly on the European Quintuple Treaty and a 
co-operation agreement between Royal Navy and US Navy officers along the West 
African coast that was earlier disavowed. The result was a compromise that initially met 
British and American goals. 
The Quintuple Treaty 
The talks that began in Washington in 1842 were a continuation of the Quintuple Treaty 
talks of the European powers. The latter treaty laid out rules of engagement for 
multinational naval forces patrolling the West African coast, to prevent disputes 
between the great powers. Initiated by the British, in late 1841, Aberdeen convinced the 
Russians, Prussians, and Austrians to meet in London to discuss a mutual right of search 
agreement. The treaty, known as the Quintuple Treaty, was finalised in December and 
the British asked the Americans also to become party. The new American Ambassador, 
Edward Everett, reported that the British seemed willing to abandon the right to 
impressment, and limit their anti-slavery activities to the African coast, if the Americans 
came on side. M Lord Ashburton had discussed the Quintuple Treaty with him and 
Everett asked Webster if an Anglo-American exchange of notes would be sufficient to 
seal the deal. The British abandonment of the right of impressment and stopping 
Americans ships- involved in the "coasting" slave trade would relieve "the chief 
64 Jones, To the Webster-Ashburton Treaty, 74-75. 
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objections to our joining in the General Agreement. "65 Respected Massachusetts 
maritime jurist Judge Joseph Story also supported the Quintuple Treaty and suggested 
the United States participate in the plan. 66 
But President John Tyler, who had slaves, disagreed. He was also wary about 
becoming entangled in agreements with foreign powers, something that went against 
traditional American foreign policy. In the meantime, the US Ambassador to Paris, and 
Presidential hopeful, Lewis Cass, stirred discontent by speaking out against the 
Quintuple Treaty. Perhaps seeking political capital, he professed that the treaty violated 
America's freedom of the seas. Probably because of his influence, the French also 
rejected the treaty, although it was signed by the other powers minus the United 
States. 67 Because the Americans rejected it, London pursued a bilateral agreement that 
addressed specific American concerns. Meanwhile, as will be revealed in Chapter Six, 
Britain grew wary of the separate French naval presence along the West African coast. 
The British reaction to maintain watch on their traditional rival would later strengthen 
American suspicion of London's true intentions. 
Regardless, the Quintuple Treaty was a sound compromise that laid the 
groundwork for international co-operation to police the slave trade, while respecting the 
differing opinions of the various parties over the application of "peacetime" sea power. 
Warships were only permitted to stop a vessel on "reasonable grounds" that it was 
involved in the slave trade, being equipped for the trade, or having been involved in the 
trade during its voyage. But the "high contracting parties" were aware of the strategic 
implications of such a use of sea power, and its potential to cause conflict. Undoubtedly 
65 Charles M. Wiltse and Harold D. Moser, (eds. ), The Papers of Daniel Webster, 14 vols. 
(Hanoever, NH: Published for Dartmouth College by the University Press of New England, 1974-1989), 
Diplomatic Papers, vol. 1,491496, Edward Everett to Daniel Webster, 21 January 1842, "Private. " 
(Hereafter, Daniel Webster Papers, set and volume number). 
66 Daniel Webster Papers, Diplomatic Papers, vol. 1,537-538, Joseph Story to Daniel Webster, 
19 April 1842. 
67 Jones, To the Webster Ashburton Treaty, 74-76 and Daniel Webster Papers, Diplomatic 
Papers, vol. 1,717-721, Lewis Cass to Daniel Webster, 3 October 1842, no. 161. 
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the French, British, Russians, and other regional powers would have objected to such a 
right on any number of grounds. Therefore, they mitigated its ability to harm their 
diplomatic relations. The treaty stipulated that the "said mutual right of search shall not 
be exercised within the Mediterranean Sea. " Finally, naval officers were ordered to co- 
operate with other naval forces where practicable. 68 
It was in this atmosphere that the Webster-Ashburton talks addressed specific 
American concerns. Webster was from New Hampshire and a Federalist until the party 
collapsed, and then he joined the Republicans. Like many Americans, he had been wary 
of war with the British in 1812 and now as Secretary of State he took a conciliatory 
approach. 69 But Webster also wanted to uphold American rights. On 29 January 1842, 
Webster wrote Everett and recounted the Creole Case. Webster explained that the 
vessel, travelling from port-to-port along the American coast, carried slaves along with 
other goods. The British had no right to interfere with the vessel to free the slaves, as no 
British laws were, in Webster's opinion, broken. Webster asked Everett to bring the 
government's position to the attention of London. He also asked for compensation for 
the vessel based on Lord Palmerston's opinion of 1837, in the cases of the Enterprise, 
Encomium, and Comet, that people in legal possession of slaves, who were interfered 
with in British territories by British "functionaries, " were entitled to compensation. The 
Secretary noted that it was unreasonable to afford non-British entities a British character 
and give them "English privileges, " and freedom, in such cases. 70 
The ramifications were clear to Webster: "Would any one [sic] contend that the 
fact of their [slaves] having been carried into England by force, set them free? " even 
68 Britain, BFSP, vol. 30,272-29 1, "Quintuple Treaty. " 
69 William H. Rehnquist, "Foreword: Daniel Webster and the Oratorical Tradition, " in Kenneth 
E. Shewmaker, (ed. ), Daniel Webster "The Completest Man" (Hanover and London: University Press of 
New England, 1990), ix; Richard N. Current, "Daniel Webster: The Politician, " in Shewmaker, (ed. ), 
Daniel Webster, 1-2; and Howard Jones, "Daniel Webster: The Diplomatist, " in Shewmaker, (ed. ), Daniel 
Webster, 203-224. 
70 Daniel Webster Papers, Diplomatic Papers, vol. 1,177-185, Daniel Webster to Edward 
Everett, no. 9,29 January 1842. 
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though they might be slaves being legally transported on the American coast? 
Furthermore, he was also concerned that legitimate US coastal trade, near British 
possessions along Florida and in the Gulf, was threatened. To mitigate Anglo-American 
tension, Webster proposed a modification to both nations' use of sea power. Webster 
held the liberal ideal that each country must uphold the "doctrine of non-interference" in 
each other's trade and "domestic regulations, " or world peace "will be always in 
danger. " He hoped that Lord Ashburton's visit would settle the matter. 71 As a 
compromise, Webster suggested that America and Britain keep separate naval forces on 
the West African coast. The forces would "act in concert ... 
in order that no slave ship, 
under whatever flag she may sail, shall be free from visitation and search [emphasis in 
original]. "72 British and American warships would cruise in pairs. The US Navy would 
search American-flagged ships and the Royal Navy, those of other nations. The 
compromise would allow Anglo-American relations to move forward, reduce and 
prevent tensions, while each nation pursued their wider, and often divergent, objectives. 
Tucker-Paine Agreement 
The Tucker-Paine Agreement is significant as a barometer of how Anglo-American 
interests shaped their diplomatic and naval relations. It moulded their use of sea power 
for "peaceful" purposes; conflict avoidance with each other, while furthering economic 
goals. Where once divergent interests meant the disavowal of the agreement, now that 
their interests converged sufficiently, it became the basis for compromise. Webster and 
Ashburton based the implementation of the joint-cruising proposal on an agreement 
between Royal Navy Commander William Tucker and US Navy Lieutenant John S. 
Paine. The agreement was disavowed by the previous US administration, but Webster 
71 Daniel Webster Papers, Diplomatic Papers, vol. 1,177-185, Daniel Webster to Edward 
Everett, no. 9,29 January 1842. 
72 Daniel Webster Papers, Diplomatic Papers, vol. 1,543-544, Daniel Webster to Edward 
Everett, 26 April 1842. 
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decided to use it as a basis for solving the impasse over the Quintuple Treaty so that the 
nations would patrol in pairs; "hunt in couples. "73 Ashburton agreed that if the plan was 
put into the treaty, the issue of the right of search would "settle itself. "74 
The Tucker-Paine agreement was reached in March 1840. Lieutenant Paine had 
sailed in the US warship Grampus to the West African coast to join the warship 
Dolphin, already there under the command of Lieutenant Charles H. Bell. The Grampus 
was sent on two missions: to protect US "mercantile interests" and ostensibly to stop the 
abuse of the US flag by slavers. West Africa's senior Royal Navy officer, Commander 
William Tucker, proposed to Paine that the two co-operate to suppress the slave trade. 
They agreed to seize any vessel engaged or thought to be engaged in the slave trade. If it 
was American, the British would turn it over to the Grampus, or another US warship; 
otherwise, the British would send it for trial under the terms of treaties with other 
powers. 75 
Lord Palmerston was pleased with the agreement and forwarded related 
documents to Washington. Meanwhile, it proved successful along the coast. For 
example, on 3 March 1840, the Royal Navy brig Bonetta seized a suspected slaver, the 
Sarah Anne from New Orleans, after receiving information that it was operating in the 
Rio Pongo. The ship was outfitted for slaving, with a deck being constructed to house 
the slave children, enough water and food for slaves, and firewood. While the British 
tried to free the ship from shallow water, gunfire erupted. They returned fire, captured 
the ship, and the captain of the British warship asked Lieutenant Paine if he could turn 
the Sarah Anne over to him; the latter agreed. 76 
73 IUP, vol. 24, Correspondence with Foreign Powers, not Parties to Conventions, giving right of 
search of vessels suspected of the Slave Trade, From January I" to December 315', 1842 (hereafter, Class 
D), 202-203, no. 149, Ashburton to Aberdeen, 25 April 1842. 
74 IUP, vol. 24, (Class D), 203, no. 149, Ashburton to Aberdeen, 25 April 1842. 
75 IUP, vol. 20, (Class D), 76-77, enclosures in no. 89, William Tucker to Lieutenant Paine, 10 
March 1840, J. S. Paine to Commander Tucker, 10 March 1840, and "Agreement, " 11 March 1840. 
76 IUP, vol. 20, (Class D), 78-80, enclosures in no. 90, John L. Stoll to Lieutenant Paine, 16 
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The British made other seizures of US flagged vessels, justified under the terms 
of the Tucker-Paine agreement, but once the ships were sent to the United States the 
results were less promising. The courts freed one vessel, the Tigris, and her owners 
were compensated. There was also outrage in Washington over Paine's actions. Navy 
Secretary J. K. Paulding, originally appointed secretary of the Board of Navy 
Commissioners by President Madison in April 1815, naturally told Paine that he had 
exceeded his powers. Under no circumstances were British warships allowed to stop 
and seize American-flagged vessels, regardless of whether they would be handed to an 
American warship. 77 But the Tucker-Paine agreement laid the groundwork for the slave 
trade suppression provisions of the Webster-Ashburton Treaty. 
The new administration saw the benefits of using sea power to further long-term 
goals of promoting commerce and mitigating diplomatic disputes over slave trade 
suppression. During the negotiations, Webster consulted Bell and Paine about the West 
African coast. The officers believed that American "fair traders" were "sometimes 
obstructed" by "armed British merchantmen, sustained by British cruisers. " The British 
merchantmen and naval officers made trade agreements with natives, which secured for 
the British "the exclusive trade with the tribe or district. " Bell and Paine suggested that 
the Americans make similar treaties, but they "should not be made to the exclusion of 
other mercantile powers trading on the coast, as has sometimes been done; and all 
treaties should contain a prohibition of the slave trade. " Finally, Bell and Paine believed 
that Americans and British should co-operate and cruise in pairs. 78 
With the Quintuple Treaty and the Tucker-Paine agreement as terms of 
reference, the British and Americans agreed to a joint-patrol provision that was placed 
in the Webster-Ashburton Treaty. Word of the finalisation of the treaty reached London 
" W. Patrick Strauss, "James Kirke Paulding, " in Paolo E. Coletta, (ed. ), American Secretaries 
of the Navy, 2 vols. (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1980), vol. 1,165; Jones, To the Webster- 
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by September 1$42. Everett reported that American press proclamations against some 
provisions of the boundary settlement "will not be without an influence in' 
recommending them to the favor of the British public. " Everett concluded that the 
ratification of the treaty would also please the government as a policy success, and 
allow Britain to free troops from North America for the "Chinese and Afghan wars[. ]"79 
President Tyler agreed with the basic plan, but made some modifications. Tyler 
clarified the treaty to ensure that it applied only to the African coast, and only to enforce 
agreements with the American government. Congress and Parliament both approved the 
treaty, although it had detractors. 80 Senator Thomas Hart Benton thought an African 
squadron was too expensive. Then-Congressman James Buchanan believed that the 
treaty was not reciprocal and the British could do as they pleased. Southerners, 
meanwhile, were more interested in expanding their cotton market in Britain, although 
some voiced concerns that the treaty failed to protect slavery. But the historian of the 
treaty, Jones, concluded that many Senators were tired of talking about the subject and 
offered few comments. The Senate approved the treaty thirty-nine to nine and the public 
seemed supportive. In Britain, Palmerston, temporarily out of office, was jealous that 
someone else had negotiated the treaty. Finally, Lewis Cass, still ambassador to Paris, 
opposed the treaty, called it "maritime metaphysics, " and questioned whether the British 
had acquired a right of search or visit. 81 Cass" opposition is important because when the 
issue climaxed in the late 1850s, he was Secretary of State under James Buchanan. Yet, 
Britain and the United States would again modify their sea power policies rather than 
threaten Anglo-American relations. 
" NA, RG 59, Dispatches, Britain, no. 21 and no. 24, Edward Everett to Daniel Webster, I 
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Conclusion 
Over the 1830s and early 1840s, British and American leaders believed that sea power 
could be used to police maritime markets and encourage trade growth in the equatorial 
Atlantic. But they differed on the priority of slave trade suppression and the right of the 
British to search American-flagged vessels. During this period, the British maintained 
pressure on the United States to police the slave trade yet avoided war. London, for 
example, presented the Americans with cases that showed that the US flag covered the 
traffic. British pressure went so far as to bring suspicious US vessels to New York. The 
Americans objected, prosecuted the cases, but the Queen's advocate told Palmerston to 
curtail his efforts to twist the American hand. 
Informal Anglo-American talks resumed in this climate. Meanwhile, the British 
continued to stop ships they felt illegally flew the US flag along West Africa and 
interfered "accidentally" with legitimate US commerce, as in the case of the Edwin from 
Salem, Massachusetts. Yet, because of internal American political considerations, the 
British concluded that pressure on the Americans was futile and London was unwilling 
to push the issue into war. Instead, the Maine-New Brunswick border dispute, growing 
US industrialisation in the North, and receptive administrations in London and 
Washington, opened an opportunity to settle the dispute over the application of 
peacetime sea power. The Webster-Ashburton agreement marked their commitment to 
fight the slave trade from the West African side, while reducing tension and preventing 
conflict that might arise over the immediate, tactical, use of navies. 
With an American squadron present, the Royal Navy no longer needed to stop 
American-flagged ships. The treaty appeased both sides. By 1844, Aberdeen reported 
that Anglo-American co-operation helped suppression, the number of Royal Navy 
cruisers along the Brazilian coast would be reduced, and more resources devoted to 
West Africa. Upshur, now Secretary of State, told Everett that the British could no 
longer interfere with the US flag: the US Navy protected American commerce and 
155 
suppressed the slave trade. 82 The presence of the US Navy might help British strategy, 
but legal problems in the United States would curtail American activity against slavers, 
just as sympathetic US commanders hoped to act. In the end, the US priority was 
commerce protection and expansion, and the navies rarely cruised in pairs. 
Anglo-American naval deployment reveals that the Americans focussed on trade 
protection and "showing the flag" to further long-term economic growth. In contrast, the 
Royal Navy combined slave trade suppression and the implementation of free trade. The 
navies implemented their nations' policies using sea power, but their strategies differed 
and affected their naval relations. The reality off West Africa was different from what 
was hoped for because the nations had different objectives. As differences grew, 
tensions rose. But their decision to use sea power to further long-term goals peacefully 
also meant that they were willing to solve their disputes by modifying the uses of their 
navies in a continual process of accommodation. Sea power provided a mechanism 
through which the nations related, and furthered their objectives, without going to war. 
82 NA, RG 59, Dispatches, Britain, no. 164 and no. 168, Edward Everett to John C. Calhoun, 18 
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Cliapter Six: The Royal Navy and West Africa, 1843-1857 
By the 1840s, the Royal Navy was along the West African coast as a British mechanism 
to further long-term objectives to suppress the slave trade and, short of war, relate with 
other powers. The Royal Navy was one of the main instruments of British trade policy 
and, unlike Washington, British humanitarian efforts merged with their trade and 
strategic policies. At home, the government had to overcome the demands of radical 
free traders to disband the squadron and allow unfettered commerce, even if slave 
produced. But the government supported those who felt that only slave trade 
suppression would encourage legitimate commerce. A unified West African strategy 
suited the nation's economic and strategic needs and maintained the squadron's 
presence. Consequently, Royal Navy activities were different from US Navy actions, 
although both shared the belief that sea power could further long-term goals 
"peacefully. " However, their different strategies created the conditions whereby Anglo- 
American tension might rise. 
In Britain, the elite dominated and secured their objective of using sea power to 
push African "factors of production" away from the slave trade and into legitimate 
commerce. The Royal Navy also eagerly signed trade treaties with natives to match 
similar French activities and counter their traditional rival. The British installed native 
leaders sympathetic to Britain, as at Lagos in 1851, and enforced agreements with 
recalcitrant native chiefs. Thus, the British captured 634 slavers, dwarfing the total 
American effort during the same period. But London also wanted peace maintained 
with other nation-states and selected naval officers for the West African coast, like Sir 
Charles Hotham, with a reputation for diplomacy. Nevertheless, British actions 
reinforced American unease that Britain sought to dominate the coast, while Britain 
believed that US involvement in the slave trade grew as the trade continued. Mutual 
suspicion increased Anglo-American tension and created the potential for an Atlantic- 
1 Eltis, et at., Slave Trade: A Database. 
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wide war, France and America against Britain, a scenario that Britain wished to avoid. 
The Abolitionist North and Free Traders 
In Britain, there were divergent views on the economics and morality of slavery that the 
government overcame to move policy forward. In the abolitionists, the government 
usually found supporters for a West African policy that involved the suppression of the 
slave trade and the encouragement of legitimate commerce. In contrast, while the free 
trade movement opened the possibility of developing Africa, radicals believed in strict 
non-interference, and free trade in goods, no matter how produced. Nothing should 
interfere with the natural order of things. Nevertheless, the early abolition movement 
thrived on morality and in areas with low unemployment and a growing economy where 
one might expect support for slavery to compensate for inflationary pressures with 
cheap goods. Drescher concluded that abolition was more a "geographic" phenomenon, 
centred on the industrial masses of Northern England. 
After 1846, and the end of the duty on sugar, British opposition to the Royal 
Navy's blockade of the African slave coast increased. Many believed that it was 
uneconomical and blocked slaves from the West Indies where they could produce cheap 
sugar. The radical free traders saw it as a contradiction to support free trade in sugar, 
while contemporaneously limiting the supply of the "labour" that produced it. The 
campaign to end the naval patrols began with William Hutt in Parliament in 1845. He 
wanted to encourage the development of African trade, but like many other radical free 
traders wanted a regulated slave trade. Some, like Jose E. Cliffe, testified before Hutt's 
committee studying the issue that Africans were "Natural Slaves" created by God and 
for the British to stop them went against His Will .3 
2 Drescher, Capitalism and Antislavery, 10-16. 
3 Curtin, Image ofAfrica, 443-447 and Lloyd, Navy and the Slave Trade, 101-114. 
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Semmel concluded that the radicals succeeded in repealing the Navigation Acts, 
and then set their eyes on British naval strategy. They and other liberals believed that 
Britain's strategy that used force to stop another's trade "was both immoral and opposed 
to her true interests. "4 Hutt and his supporters adhered to strict laissez-faire. Through 
the natural course of events, slaves would rebel and overthrow their masters. But 
supporters of abolition, like the African Institute and Buxton, had a higher ideal and 
countered that the Royal Navy was needed to suppress the slave trade and protect 
legitimate commerce. A free black population would till their soil and produce goods 
for export, rather than be taken to foreign lands. 5 
While Hutt worked to abolish the squadron, the Lords established another 
committee in 1849 to study the slave trade. 6 Most witnesses were naval officers, 
including Commodore Sir Charles Hotham, recently returned from his African 
command, who believed the squadron should remain. Even so, the most significant 
witnesses testified about the need for force to suppress the slave trade on economic 
grounds. With such high profits from slavery, Africans had to be forced to move factors 
of production into producing legitimate export products. Otherwise, trade would be one 
way: British goods sold into the slave trade for barter for slaves then brought to 
countries like Brazil and Cuba. Witnesses concluded that British industry, and tariff 
collectors, would see little benefit. Slave traders had little compunction about 
underselling legitimate merchants while bartering for slaves. The elite, symbolised by 
the Lords, concluded that the only way to further British economic goals was to use sea 
power to push Africans into legitimate commerce; the government agreed and moulded 
its naval policy accordingly. 
° Semmel, Liberalism and Naval Strategy, 53-57. 
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The most important testimony came on 5 July 1849, from James MacQueen, the 
famous geographer. Jeffrey Pardue concluded that MacQueen advocated expanding the 
"British Empire at a time when it was of little interest to most people in his country. " 
But MacQueen, from Glasgow, also moved in gentlemanly circles. The Scotsman's 
family had no connections, but "[o]ver the years, he did build up a network of 
influential friends, from powerful West India merchants and banking men, such as John 
Irving and Lord Ashburton[. ]" He accepted "his subordinate position in this hierarchy, 
which helped define his role as an `agent' for powerful metropolitan interests[. ]" In this 
role, MacQueen acted as the Colonial Bank's agent, founder of the Royal Mail Steam 
Packet Company, and geographic information broker. Pardue explained that the "ties 
with which MacQueen helped bind the periphery and the metropolis" also "helped 
centralize power in the metropolis. " 7 
In the emancipation debate, MacQueen, with ten plantations and 1000 slaves, 
defended West Indian slavery. In the end, he accepted emancipation, but disagreed on 
its timing. 8 But he also realised that the West Indian colonies were "on the decline" and 
he looked toward "Africa for new imperial opportunities. "9 In 1821, he advocated 
expansion in a number of regions, like Fernando Po and the Niger. Later, he forged 
uneasy alliances with former foes, like Buxton, to further development plans for 
Africa. 10 As an Africa expert, and moving in elite circles, he was "solicited by the 
Colonial Office to be its agent for the Niger Expedition of 1841" although he did not 
take the position. But Pardue remarked that "his constant promotion of Africa, in the 
hopes of `selling' the public and the government on the continent's potential to Britain, 
was much like an agent's. " MacQueen was an intermediary, another tool, that the elite 
7 Jeffrey David Pardue. "Agent of Imperial Change: James MacQueen and the British Empire, 
1778-1870" (PhD diss., University of Waterloo, 1996), 1-5 and 18. 
8 Pardue, "James MacQueen, " 100-102 and 106-108. 
Pardue, "James MacQueen, " 61,84 and 96. 
10 Pardue, "James MacQueen, " 222-223. 
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called upon to support their case, even if MacQueen disagreed with policy decisions, 
such as slave trade suppression. )1 He believed that the African squadron was a waste of 
money, but conceded that if the government was intent on the task, half-hearted 
measures were insufficient. African factors of production had to be pushed away from 
the slave trade to create a level field for legitimate commerce. 
MacQueen hoped to encourage African agricultural development and offered a 
strong explanation of the current dynamic of the African economy. 12 British merchants 
benefited from increased commerce, the side effect of a growing slave trade, as their 
products entered the slave-trade cycle. 13 If the squadron was withdrawn, British 
exporters might see their trade increase "tenfold. " But MacQueen admitted that because 
the slaver's profits were made in places like Brazil, they had no problem "undersell[ing] 
the legal trader" so long as slaves were obtained in return. 
14 Quantity sold might 
increase, but the value of products would stagnate. Furthermore, if a legitimate British 
merchant went to the African coast for palm oil, he would encounter British produce 
having already fallen into the slave trade economy and African workers traded to 
foreigners. It had a detrimental impact on the palm oil industry; ironically, MacQueen 
opined, palm oil production only increased if "domestic slaves increase. "15 
MacQueen explained that Africa was capable of producing "to an unbounded 
extent" legitimate products, especially cotton. The only thing preventing such expansion 
was "the disturbance which the Slave Trade everywhere creates"16 It competed for 
factors of production that were needed to generate a favourable balance of trade 
11 Pardue, "James MacQueen, " 2-3, and 224. 
12 Curtin, Image of Africa, 428-431. 
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between Africa and Britain. If the goal of the gentlemanly capitalists, and others, was to 
increase commerce between Britain and Africa, it had to flow both ways to benefit 
Britain domestically, increase the value of trade, and hence government revenue and 
City financiers. Of those involved in the African trades, MacQueen confirmed, they had 
supporters in Parliament. A number were Liverpool firms, including Horsfall's, 
Jackson's, and Tobin, plus Matthew Forster of London. When prompted by the 
committee, MacQueen noted that Jackson and Forster were MPs. '7 
Others also offered testimony that slave trade suppression benefited commerce. 
On 18 June 1849, Robert Stokes, involved with African affairs since 1800, testified that 
imports from West Africa to Britain over 1783-1787, never exceeded £90,500 and 
British exports to the region never exceeded £50,000 annually. 18 But after the ban on the 
slave trade, he professed that imports to Britain from Africa had risen to £535,577 and 
exports from Britain to £693,911 by 1810.19 The rise in palm oil was the most dramatic 
component of the trade, increasing from 2,599 cwts. in 1790 to 414,570 cwts. by 1846. 
The increasing commerce provided governments with more revenue. The Customs 
House on the Gold Coast, in 1839,1840, and 1841, collected "32,687 1.4s. 0%d. " at a 
tariff rate of about 3%, "indicating the value of the importations in those three years to 
have been upwards of a million sterling[. ]" Stokes found equivalent values for exports 
and for trade at Gambia. 20 
Ralph Dawson, was involved in the Africa trades from 1827 to 1839 with the 
merchant house of Wilson and Clegg. He told the committee on 22 June 1849, that he 
used three ships that could load upward of 1,000 tons of palm oil. But Liverpool houses 
dominated because of the port's history with the slave trade; Africans looked upon 
17 Lords Committee, 273. 
18 Lords Committee, 191. 
19 Lords Committee, 192. 
20 Lords Committee, 192. 
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vessels from London or Bristol with scepticism. 21 He concluded that natives had no 
incentive to shift their factors of production into legitimate commerce. The Committee 
asked, "Might not machinery be introduced with advantage into the palm-oil trade 
supposing Europeans were to go out there, and set up mills, would not he be able to 
make a great profit? " Dawson replied, "I think not; the climate is so much against it. " 
Local production factors were needed, and they were scarce if devoted to the more 
profitable slave trade. 22 The slave trade provided some profits to British merchants, but 
it would expand dramatically, some testified, if only the slave trade was suppressed. But 
in the end, the radicals who wanted to end slave trade suppression, lacked the power and 
influence to overcome the cohesive group of merchants, abolitionists, and the 
gentlemanly capitalist elite, who wanted suppression to continue. 
The Lords concluded that the slave trade prevented the growth of legitimate 
African commerce. They believed, for example, that "[c]otton and almost all tropical 
productions might, it appears, be largely produced in Africa if this one master 
impediment [the slave trade] were removed[. ]" The Lords recommended that "the cost 
of the Squadron should be set against the advantage of nourishing and maintaining a 
valuable and increasing lawful trade, which must be utterly extirpated if the Cruisers 
were withdrawn, and which might be developed to an unlimited extent if the Slave 
Trade were suppressed. " The opportunity cost of withdrawing the squadron was clear to 
the elite. Rather than disband it, the squadron should be improved. 23 Moreover, wider 
parliamentary opinion supported the Lords when the issue finally came to a vote. 
Cain and Hopkins explained that the land-owning, military and financial classes 
dominated the economic interests of MPs at mid-century, especially conservative 
members. The latter class, the authors established, had aristocratic roots; averse to 
21 Lords Committee, 211-217. 
22 Lords Committee, 218-219. 
23 Lords Committee, 590-592. 
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Figure 6.1 Royal Navy Vessel Deployment Atlantic, 1843-1861 
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Figure 6.2 Royal Navy Armament Deployed, 1843-1861 
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making money with their hands they preferred investments. 24 The economics of slave 
trade suppression were clear to the elite; only the presence of the Royal Navy would 
encourage legitimate commerce and substantial economic growth. While Hutt rejected 
the Lords' report in Parliament on 19 March 1850, Whig Prime Minister Lord John 
Russell rose to the squadron's defence, made the issue a confidence vote, and the House 
rejected Hutt's motion to disband the squadron 232 to 154.2$ The Royal Navy was 
needed to further British economic and strategic objectives for the region. 
With support in London for the nexus of British goals, the station's strength 
grew during the 1840s and 1850s. Figure 6.1 reveals that British naval commitment to 
the coast rose from 23 vessels in 1843, to peak at 41 vessels over 1847-53. Figure 6.2 
signifies a corresponding pattern for the total armaments deployed on British warships 
along the coast. Although the Mediterranean maintained its strategic importance, 
especially during the Crimean War, as indicated by its majority in guns deployed, in 
terms of number of warships, Africa became the largest station in the Atlantic theatre. 
There, the Royal Navy implemented free trade agreements to further British commerce, 
suppressed the slave trade, and kept watch on other nations, like France. 
But with a liberal mentality for foreign policy, the government selected 
commodores, like Sir Charles Hotham, that they hoped would maintain peace and 
mitigate disputes. Force was only used on rare occasions, and against non-nation-state 
powers, like to install a new ruler of Lagos more sympathetic to British objectives. 
Conflicts with other nations were avoided. London hoped that the Webster-Ashburton 
Treaty would enable Anglo-American co-operation against the slave trade and would go 
far in furthering British objectives. But London's strategy raised suspicion on the 
American side as the British seemed to consolidate and increase their dominance of the 
24 For example, in 1868,45.9% of conservative MPs had landowning interests, but only 26.1% 
of liberals (Cain and Hopkins, British Imperialism, 132). 
25 Lloyd, Navy and the Slave Trade, 112-113 and Murray, Odious Commerce, 214. 
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West African coast. The conflicting goals of the Royal and US navies increased Anglo- 
American tensions and had to be relieved. 
Royal Navy Operations, Slavers, and Free Trade 
Against the background of competing interests over West Africa and slave trade 
suppression, the government maintained its commitment to slave trade suppression and 
the nation's strategic needs. While slave trade suppression and border disputes were 
settled, London feared that France and America would unite against Britain. Aberdeen 
held out the hope that he could sever Franco-American friendship by allying with 
France to guarantee Texan independence. But British relations with France soured when 
the latter began activities in North Africa, and attacked Morocco in 1844, while their 
relations in other regions also deteriorated. Again, Aberdeen turned to the United States, 
and settled the Oregon boundary dispute. 26 The British remained wary of global French 
intentions. Along West Africa, this meant that Britain maintained a check on French 
moves through the presence of the Royal Navy. The navy was tasked with 
implementing trade treaties with natives to counter similar French actions. But London 
also selected commodores they hoped would keep Anglo-French relations from 
spiralling out of control. Nevertheless, the side effect of overall British strategy 
reinforced US suspicions of British motives. 
British attitude toward the French varied with its monarchical or republican 
leanings. London maintained a balance of power strategy, but it was a careful doctrine 
meant to contain France without sparking war or a Franco-American alliance. Along 
West Africa, the primary French settlements were Senegal and Goree, but policy 
formulation in France against the slave trade was more difficult than in Britain. Kielstra 
has shown that French abolitionists lacked the power and influence of their British 
counterparts. French abolitionist goals failed to form a nexus with the wider political 
26 Bourne, Foreign Policy of Victorian England, 54-55. 
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and economic powers: "Colonists, merchants and manufacturers called it [the slave 
trade] a life-line; nationalists, a reaffirmation of French power. " After the wars, French 
"merchants, colonists and nationalists looked to" the rival of the slave trade to "restore 
fortunes devastated by a quarter-century of war. "27 Co-operation with Britain was 
impossible. When France rejected the Quintuple Treaty, they instead dispatched their 
own naval force to the West African coast. 28 
While tensions with other nations remained high, Britain hoped to contain, 
rather than exacerbate them. By 1848, revolutions in Europe spread from Italy, to 
France, and to Austria, and removed Louis Philippe and Metternich in the process. Only 
Russia, Britain, and Belgium were spared turmoil. In response, Britain and Russia 
hoped to "preserve the Balance of Power, and especially to contain revolutionary 
France. "29 In London, Palmerston was concerned about the new French Republic, but 
believed that "the Powers should not stimulate republican aggression by taking too 
strong a line. " He reiterated Britain's non-interference policy and declared London 
would recognise newly established regimes. 30 In the end, Palmerston worked to prevent 
French dominance and interference in the revolutions in the other countries, to varying 
degrees of success. But Bourne concluded that "he was always careful in 1848-49 to put 
Britain's interests and the preservation of the Balance of Power first. "31 
Palmerston confirmed his foreign policy philosophy before Parliament in March 
1848. He declared that his goal was to maintain peace and friendly relations with other 
countries, so long as it was in Britain's interests. The government had sought to extend 
27 Paul Kielstra, The Politics of Slave Trade Suppression in Britain and France, 1814-48: 
Diplomacy, Morality and Economics (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2000), 16-17 and 21. 
28 Ward, Royal Navy and the Slavers, 120-121. 
29 Bourne, Foreign Policy of Victorian England, 63. 
30 Broadlands MSS., GC/WE no. 189, reprint in Bourne, Foreign Policy of Victorian England, 
Doc., 48, Extract from Palmerston's private letter to Lord Westmorland (Minister in Berlin), 29 February 
1848. 
31 Bourne, Foreign Policy of Victorian England, 68. 
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and protect British commercial endeavours and provide them with security. While 
countries may work together, he concluded that "it is our duty to make allowance for the 
different manner in which they may" implement their policies, even if they differed with 
British goals, for Britain wanted the same. But, he exclaimed, "I would adopt the 
expression of Canning, and say that with every British Minister the interests of England 
ought to be the shibboleth of his policy. "32 British goals and strategy were clear and are 
reflected in how London and her naval and diplomatic representatives dealt with other 
nation-states that operated along the West African coast. Consequently, London would 
check the French presence along the coast, but realised that open conflict with Western 
nations, like France and the United States, had to be avoided. 
Sir Charles Hotham, French Relations, and Deterrence in West Africa 
British strategy to counter the French along Africa had ramifications for the entire 
equatorial Atlantic. Anglo-French relations could drag the region into a war and the 
British could face a war on "two fronts" with France and the United States as they had 
in 1812.33 Therefore, London implemented a sea power policy to maintain peace on the 
African coast. Gough concluded that the Royal Navy linked "the metropole to its 
peripheries" in both economic and military policy. Station commanders "answered to 
the Lords of the Admiralty, who in turn took their cue from the Cabinet and invariably 
the Secretary of States for Foreign Affairs. "34 The command of Commodore Sir Charles 
Hotham, from 1846 to 1849, best illustrates this nexus for West Africa. Hotham had to 
suppress the slave trade, but London also wanted the squadron to monitor carefully 
French moves while the squadron advanced British economic and strategic objectives. 
32 Britain, Hansard, 3rd series, xcvii, 121-123, reprint in Bourne, Foreign Policy of Victorian 
England, Doc. 49, Extract from Palmerston's reply to his critics in the House of Commons, 1 March 
1848. 
33 Hamilton, Anglo-French Naval Rivalry, 13. 
34 Gough, "Profit and Power, " 75. 
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London ordered Hotham to counter French activities that threatened to give 
them a foothold in Africa that might threatened British interests. For this purpose, 
Hotham signed treaties with natives for slave trade suppression and the furtherance of 
free trade. London meant the treaties to counter similar French activities without 
sparking war. With uncertainty in Europe, London was fearful that any conflict might 
spread across the ocean and involve the United States. Meanwhile, Hotham also sought 
to show that the squadron effectively suppressed the slave trade, to counter opposition 
from radicals in Parliament. But overall British strategy reinforced American suspicions 
that London sought to drive other nations from avenues of growing commerce, 
rekindling Anglo-American tension. 
Hotham had a reputation for balancing strategic and diplomatic imperatives, and 
London concluded he was ideal for the West African command. He was a member of 
the gentlemanly elite, a member of the Yorkshire landholding Hotham family. After the 
typical time spent as a young officer, Hotham was appointed to command the steamship 
Gorgon in 1842. By December, they sortied to the Plata region, unstable following the 
wars of independence. After a war with Brazil over the Banda Oriental, Britain worked 
to maintain peace in the region and helped Plata and Brazil reach an agreement that 
Uruguay would remain independent. But "the sovereignty of Uruguay remained in 
dispute for another forty years. "35 
When Hotham arrived, the ports of Montevideo, Uruguay's capital, and Buenos 
Aires, were in such rivalry that the Buenos Aires navy had blockaded Montevideo. 
Meanwhile, the army of Manuel Oribe, the deposed President of Uruguay, laid siege to 
Montevideo and threatened American, French and British citizens. Shirley Roberts 
concluded that the Royal Navy had to balance protecting British subjects, furthering the 
nation's commercial interests, while avoiding becoming embroiled in the local disputes. 
35 Shirley Roberts, Charles Hotham: A Biography (Carlton, Victoria: Melbourne University 
Press, 1985), 35-39. 
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Hotham took the position that he should remain neutral while he tried to reconcile the 
"conflicting interests" of various parties. 36 
But a dictator, Juan Manuel Rosas, was in power in the Republic, he waged 
almost constant war on the nations around him, and the turmoil threatened to drag in 
foreign countries to protect their citizens. 37 The French and British decided to wait 
Oribe out, but Montevideo looked about to collapse, and Oribe's threat to attack 
thousands of French and British citizens looked to be realised. Meanwhile, Rosas' 
blockaded the Parana River, an important "communication and trade route for inland 
centres in Argentina, Uruguay and Paraguay. " If Rosas succeeded, it would have 
terminated all trade in the region. The British and French decided to act to end the 
threat. Hotham was in charge of the British side and worked with his French 
counterpart, proving his ability to balance British strategic needs and international 
relations in a highly contested region. They secured the Parana River and broke the 
blockade at Obligado. The re-opening of the Parana River was met with applause in 
Britain. But diplomats were more pleased that it marked renewed friendship between 
Britain and France. 38 
Hotham's sister, Anne Barlow, concluded that London was eager to exploit the 
opportunity. Therefore, she wrote, "the Admiralty were extremely anxious he [1lotham; 
emphasis in original] should take it [the African command], as it was at that moment of 
great consequence to have peace with France, and they thought him most acceptable to 
the French on account" of their successful co-operation along the South American 
coast. 39 Roberts noted that Captain Joseph Denman already had experience along the 
36 Roberts, Charles Ilotham, 39-41. 
37 Roberts, Charles Ilotham, 50-53. 
78 Roberts, Charles Ilotham, 53-61. 
"Britain, University of I lull, l3rynmor Jones Library, Archives and Special Collections, Ilotham 
Family Papers, (hereafter, BJL Archives and collection number), DDIIO 10147, Sir Charles Ilotham, 
biographical notebook by Mrs. Anne Barlow. 
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African coast, "was dedicated to the anti-slavery cause" and had a slavcr-catching 
strategy of close blockade of suspected slaver ports. But London's support for him 
dissolved when "the Government was obliged to provide his legal defence and to accept 
responsibility for his actions" when he destroyed Portuguese trading facilities and freed 
slaves at Gallinas in 1841. When the Admiralty sought to replace Commodore L. T. 
Jones, they looked to Hotham, who had the "discretion and diplomatic ability, to avoid 
international and legal wrangles[. ]i40 
Matzke wrote that in March 1846, Lord Ellenborough believed that "the Royal 
Navy must be capable of crushing the US Navy within six months of the start of 
hostilities to prevent France from declaring war. "41 But while prepared for the worst, 
Ellenborough and other British policy makers hoped to prevent relations in the Atlantic 
from spiralling into conflict. Hotham received his appointment from Ellenborough on 
20 May 1846 and Ellenborough wrote that no other officer "could be entrusted %%ho 
would carry out the very delicate and difficult duties ... with judgement and discretion, 
or with more cordial cooperation in the part of our allies the French. "42 George Eden, 
Lord Auckland, was educated at Christ Church, Oxford, served in several \Vhig 
ministries, and replaced Ellenborough as First Lord of the Admiralty with Lord John 
Russell's rise to office in 1846.43 Auckland was preoccupied with parliamentary 
discussion over disbanding the squadron, and was concerned about revolutionary 
France, slave trade suppression and trade promotion. 
The Royal Navy was meant to counter French designs that might threatened a 
route to India during this period of unpredictability. But the British adhered to a 
pragmatic liberalism: further their slave trade objectives, but contain potential conflicts. 
40 Roberts, Charles flotham, 64.76. See also, Lloyd, Navy and the Slave 7We, 92.100. 
41 Matzke, "Britain Gets Its Way, " 36. 
42 BJL Archives, DDIIO 10/I, Sir Charles I lotham, General Correspondence, Lord Lllcnboruugh 
to Commodore Sir Charles I lotham, 20 May 1846. 
43 Dictionary of National Biography, s. v. "Eden, George, Earl of Auckland. " 
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In Auckland's first letters to Hotham he told him to remain vigilant, exercise "very 
sound discretion, " and keep him informed about the French squadron. Auckland warned 
that "the keenness of appetite for gain is too great to give you any certainty of mercy. , 44 
Furthermore, Liverpool merchants pressed Auckland to increase naval protection along 
the coast; with the French navy there, French "traders have advantages in consequence. " 
But Auckland doubted the reports and reminded Hotham that collecting "debts" on the 
part of merchants was beyond the squadron's mandate 45 
When the revolutions began engulfing Europe in 1848, and threatened the 
integrity of the British realm, London feared a general war in the Atlantic. In February 
1848, Auckland told Hotham to honour the integrity of the British flag, but to be 
cautious with the French. 46 Lord Dundas, at the Board of Admiralty and MP for 
Greenwich, was more explicit in his concerns. He feared that Revolutionary France 
might be involved in intrigues, in particular in Ireland, that might "plunge us into war. " 
Therefore, the African squadron must also guard against the French in West Africa. 
Consequently, Dundas believed that the calls in Parliament to abolish or reduce the 
African squadron were unwise. 47 British naval policy for the West African coast must 
be interpreted in this light. The squadron's activities reflected London's hope to counter 
French moves, while furthering British objectives without sparking a general war. 
Hotham was aware of the strategic importance of the African coast, in particular 
during periods of crisis. In a secret dispatch to Auckland in March 1848, he remarked 
that the possession of St. Helena, for example, "would give them [the French] the 
44 BJL Archives, DDHO 10/2, Sir Charles Hotham, Letters from Lord Auckland, Lord Auckland 
to Commodore Sir Charles Hotham, 9 and 10 August 1846. 
43 BJL Archives, DDHO 10/2, Sir Charles Hotham, Letters from Lord Auckland, Lord Auckland 
to Commodore Sir Charles Hotham, 23 August and 24 September 1847. 
46 BJL Archives, DDHO 10/2, Sir Charles Hotham, Letters from Lord Auckland, Lord Auckland 
to Commodore Sir Charles Hotham, 24 February 1848. 
47 Dictionary of National Biography, s. v. "Dundas, Sir James Whitley" and BJL Archives, 
DDHO 10/3, Sir Charles Hotham, Letters from Lord Dundas, Lord Dundas to Charles Hotham, 30 July 
1848. 
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command of our Indian Trade and be a capital coal depot for their steamers[. ]" Given 
the French proclivity for the guerre de course, Hotham concluded that they made "no 
secret of their intention to avoid [direct] combat, & destroy in every possible way our 
trade[. ]"48 But he concluded that the British West African squadron had little to fear 
from the French "unless by an accident a shot is exchange[d. ]"49 Hotham believed that 
French officers were "too much occupied with the late events" to concern themselves 
with the British. S° The situation was tense, Hotham and London were wary, but they 
hoped to match French moves while keeping relations from degenerating. 
The African squadron provided deterrence, but the British were keen to prevent 
the spread of any conflict across the entire Atlantic. As early as December 1847, 
London asked Hotham if he had considered plans for war with France. Auckland 
believed that the African squadron was adequate and "you would [be] able to clear the 
African seas of the French flag[. ]"51 But as the 1848 revolutionary crisis deepened, 
Hotham, for example, took the French fleet seriously and feared the ramifications across 
the entire Atlantic if war erupted. He noted that "the subject of greatest anxiety ... will. 
probably be the attitude assumed by the United States. " If Britain adhered to the right of 
search during war, it would undoubtedly draw the United States into the conflict. 
Therefore, he believed that Britain should be prepared to strike and defeat the United 
States first to "leave us comparatively disengaged and able to cope with more 
formidable enemies" rather than fight a two-front war. 52 
48 BJL Archives, DDHO 10/11, Sir Charles Hotham, Secret Letter Book, Charles Ilotham to 
Lord Auckland, 21 March 1848. 
49 BJL Archives, DDHO 10/11, Sir Charles Hotham, Secret Letter Book, Charles Hotham to 
Admiral Dundas, c. June/July 1848. 
so BJL Archives, DDHO 10/11, Sir Charles Hotham, Secret Letter Book, Charles Ilotham to 
Hamilton, August 1848 and Charles Hotham to Lord Auckland, undated, c. September 1848. 
51 BJL Archives, DDHO 10/2, Sir Charles Hotham, Letters from Lord Auckland, Lord Auckland 
to Commodore Sir Charles Hotham, 20 December 1847. 
52 BJL Archives, DDHO 10/11, Sir Charles Hotham, Secret Letter Book, Charles Ilotham, 
"Memorandum drawn up by order of the I st Lord of the Admiralty, " 24 November 1848. 
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Free Trade Treaties and Deterrence 
The historiography of slave trade suppression has concluded that the treaties that Britain 
signed with native African rulers was to further economic or slave trade policy. 53 But in 
reality, London also meant it as a subtle way for the navy to neutralise the French threat 
without sparking war. In November 1846, Hotham confided to Captain Brisbane that the 
Admiralty warned that the French were active in "obtaining Commercial Treaties on 
different parts of the coast. " Hotham concluded that the Royal Navy had neglected 
undertaking a similar task because officers "considered themselves tied by the tenor of 
the slave instructions[. ]" But, consistent with Auckland's orders, Hotham now ordered 
Brisbane to investigate French activities. If they had signed commercial treaties with 
natives, then he was to "collect an imposing force and use all your endeavours" to do 
the same. Nevertheless, Hotham warned that "I need hardly add that transactions of this 
character require the strictest secrecy combined with prudence and caution[. ]"54 
Hotham further explained the strategic importance of the treaties to Alexander 
Murray, captain of the Favourite, who became the primary treaty-making commander. 
The French were obligated to keep a force along the coast for slave trade suppression, 
but were "eager to turn the powerful force ... to advantage[. 
]" British treaties with 
natives would help contain France. The French, Hotham explained, had signed nine 
treaties with natives, and it sowed "the seeds for future commercial advantages[. ]" Even 
so, in this era of peace, the British could not stop the French moves with war. But 
Hotham exclaimed that "we can neutralize [sic] their schemes by a similar course of 
action, and it is here that I require your services[. ]" He ordered Murray to cruise the 
coast, collect intelligence about the French, then gather an "imposing force" and 
convince the natives to sign treaties with the British. Ideally, Hotham wrote, the treaty 
should include provisions for slave trade suppression, but at minimum it should be the 
53 For example, see Eltis, Economic Growth, 88-89. 
sa BJL Archives, DDHO 10/8, Sir Charles Hotham, Letter Book, Charles Ilotham to Captain 
Brisbane, 16 November 1846. 
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same as one signed with the French. 55 Hotham believed that the French would 
immediately be jealous once they discovered British countermoves. Consequently, he 
told Auckland of the cautious way in which he proceeded: "I shall be careful to insert 
the clause reserving equal power to both countries -I shall avoid making a mystery 
where no real occasion exists. -)556 The treaties were to counter the French; the free trade 
provisions to maintain a balance of power and ensure that jealousies were mitigated. 
Royal Navy treaty-making efforts were the most significant aspect of their work. 
They reveal how, in this era, the Royal Navy was an instrument of foreign policy and 
provided a mechanism through which Britain could relate with other nation-states and 
avoid war. In the beginning, the British signed treaties with African powers along the 
East African coast, for example Zanzibar and Muscat. By 1838, the Foreign Office 
suggested that they extend the practice to West Africa and the duty fell upon the Royal 
Navy. At first the treaties called for the end of the slave trade; respect for British 
property; permission to trade with anyone along the African coast; and most-favoured- 
nation status for Britain. But David Eltis concluded that "[t]hese were sweeping 
provisions that reflected the broader cultural goals of British policy. " The Africans were 
reluctant to agree with the British terms, and London had to settle for only most- 
favoured-nation status and anti-slave trade provisions in the treaties. 57 West Africa 
marked a different approach in British naval deployment philosophy: in the Gulf of 
Mexico they were concerned with securing exclusive economic advantages, and the 
Royal Navy played only a policing role. 
By 1848, Hotham reported that his squadron was doing all it could to help 
British merchants along the coast. While the government had adopted a free and 
55 BJL Archives, DDHO 10/8, Sir Charles Hotham, Letter Book, Charles liotham to Captain A. 
Murray, HMS Favourite, 25 November 1846. 
56 BJL Archives, DDHO 10/8, Sir Charles Hotham, Letter Book, Charles Hotham to the Earl of 
Auckland, 13 February 1847. 
57 Eltis, Economic Growth, 88. 
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peaceful trade policy, he discovered that merchants had a cut-throat philosophy and 
"expect a man-of-war to come in and fight their battles. " Nevertheless, while Murray 
cruised and signed treaties, Hotham believed that the Royal Navy's presence, like that 
of the US Navy, helped maintain peace and "friendly relations" with the natives. He 
concluded that Britain should continue operating in a quiet and peaceful manner to 
promote legitimate trade with the Africans. 58 
Treaties signed between the Royal Navy and natives over the spring of 1847 
provide a significant indication of how British goals formed a nexus. The treaties 
adhered to a format issued by London, intent on shifting African production factors into 
legitimate commerce, while they also met Britain's strategic needs. On paper, the 
treaties intended to end the slave trade in coastal and river regions with the co-operation 
of natives. Where the natives lacked the power to suppress the trade, Britain obtained 
permission to do it on their behalf. For example, in January and February, the British 
signed a treaty with the chiefs of Manna, in the Gallinas region. Hotham was pleased 
that the chiefs had approached him about a treaty. They wished to "alter the character of 
the trade of their country, and substitute palm-oil for slaves. " As planned, they agreed 
"to show no favour and give no privilege to ships and traders of other countries which 
they do not show to those of England. "59 By May 1848, the British had signed twelve 
more treaties with African chiefs. Furthermore, Britain signed treaties with native 
groups that Murray admitted never even had domestic slavery; the treaty-making effort 
was part of British trade and strategic efforts. For example, the treaty with Sherbro was 
58 IUP, vol. 36, Correspondence with British Commissioners and other representatives abroad 
and with Foreign Ministers in England together with reports from the Admiralty relative to the Slave 
Trade (hereafter, Class A and B), 248, no. 182, Chas. Hotham to Secretary of the Admiralty, 14 March 
1848; IUP, vol. 34, Correspondence with British Commissioners and Foreign Powers Together with 
Proceedings of Vice-Admiralty Courts and reports from Naval Officers relative to the Slave Trade 
(hereafter, Class A and C), 293, no. 261, Charles Hotham to Secretary of the Admiralty, 11 February 
1847; and IUP, vol. 36, (Class A and B), 247-248, no. 182, Chas. Hotham to Secretary of the Admiralty, 
14 March 1848. 
59 IUP, vol. 34, (Class A and C), 300-305, no. 266, Commodore Sir Charles Ilotham to the 
Secretary of the Admiralty, 3 May 1847, with treaty enclosures, and 291-293, no. 290 and enclosure 2 in 
no. 290, Chas. Hotham to Secretary of the Admiralty, no. 260,11 February 1847 and "Agreement with 
the Chief of Manna. " 
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significant because Sierra Leone carried on timber trade and the Sherbro chief was 
"about to open the forests on the River Kazamanca"6o 
The British had met some of their goals. The treaties numbered forty-five by 
1857, and provided the Royal Navy with the justification needed to go ashore and 
destroy slave establishments if the treaties were not upheld. 61 On 16 March 1847, for 
example, Murray met with the chiefs at Cape Mount and presented them with evidence 
that the property of Theodore Canot still carried on the slave trade and they agreed to 
destroy the facilities. The British also used their show of force to persuade Africans to 
sign treaties. For example, in July 1849, Commander Hugh Dunlop and eighty-six men 
of the Second West India Regiment met with natives to restore peace to the region 
around Sherbro. But Dunlop told Commodore Arthur Fanshawe that "care has been 
taken to secure the commercial interests of the colony [Sierra Leone] by clauses inserted 
"62 [in the peace agreements] for the protection of British subjects and trade. 
Countering the Radical Free Traders 
Kenneth Bourne concluded that the drive for treaties might have started as a way to 
reduce naval commitments to the African coast. 63 But the purpose of the West African 
squadron was to protect British interest from French intrigue, while being cautious to 
prevent any dispute from drawing France and American together. Fearing overt 
confrontation with the French, the government justified its presence to parliamentary 
committees, calling for its termination, in terms of slave trade suppression and 
60 IUP, vol. 36, (Class A and B), 251-265 and 296-298, no. 187 and no. 227, Chas. Hotham to 
Secretary of the Admiralty, 3 May 1848 with treaty enclosures and observations from Commander 
Alexander Murray and Chas. Hotham to Secretary of the Admiralty, 10 January 1849 and enclosure 2. 
61 Eltis, Economic Growth, 89. 
62 IUP, vol. 34, (Class A and C), 308, no. 268, "Minute of a meeting with the Chiefs of Cape 
Mount, " 16 March 1847 and enclosure 3; and IUP, vol. 37, Correspondence with British Commissioners 
and other representatives abroad and with Foreign Ministers in England together with reports from the 
Admiralty relative to the Slave Trade (hereafter, Class A and B), 275-277, no. 190 and enclosure I in no. 
190, Commander Hugh Dunlop to Commodore Fanshawe, 16 July 1849. 
63 Bourne, Palmerston, 622 and Ward, Royal Navy and the Slavers, 202. 
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commercial advancement. In 1847, Lord Auckland told Hotham that people at home 
were beginning to question the point of the squadron, given the cost in money and life. 
64 
But Auckland concluded that they were mistaken in their objections. He told Hotham 
that "the withdrawal of your squadron would throw back all those seeds of civilisation 
and of legitimate commerce which may yet thrive under your protection[. ]"65 
Auckland opined that discussions in Parliament were fraught with "partisanship 
and exaggeration[. ]" The goal of British sea power had to be clear in the wake of the 
criticisms. Auckland wrote, "if not for the suppression of the slave trade, [then] at least 
for the protection of British commercial interests & the maintenance of [the] treaties 
with the African chiefs" the squadron must remain in force. 66 He concluded that British 
commerce with the region was increasing and "[t]he merchants, some of whom are now 
crying out and ready to censure whatever is done by our cruisers, would be the first and 
loudest to complain if they were withdrawn[. ]"67 Hotham agreed, was against any 
legalisation of the slave trade, and believed that only total suppression would further 
British goals. Otherwise, slavers would undersell Britons in either legitimate trade or the 
slave trade. Besides, Hotham countered, "we are not such losers as he [Hutt and others] 
would imagine ... every article sold on the coast 
is manufactured in England[. ] 68 
To counter criticisms, on 19 July 1848, Hotham filed a specific comparison of 
Royal Navy activities over a four-year period. For a 21-month period, from 1 April 
1844 to 31 December 1845, under Commodore Jones' command, the squadron captured 
64 BJL Archives, DDHO 10/2, Sir Charles Hotham, Letters from Lord Auckland, Lord Auckland 
to Commodore Sir Charles Hotham, 13 March 1847. 
65 BJL Archives, DDHO 10/2, Sir Charles Hotham, Letters from Lord Auckland, Lord Auckland 
to Commodore Sir Charles Hotham, 30 December 1847. 
66 BJL Archives, DDHO 10/2, Sir Charles Hotham, Letters from Lord Auckland, Lord Auckland 
to Commodore Sir Charles Hotham, 12 June 1848. 
67 BJL Archives, DDHO 10/2, Sir Charles Hotham, Letters from Lord Auckland, Auckland to 
Commodore Sir Charles Hotham, 6 October 1848. 
68 BJL Archives, DDHO 10/8, Sir Charles Hotham, Letter Book, Charles Hotham to Earl of 
Auckland, 5 December 1847. 
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96 slavers and freed 5965 slaves. During the same length of time, from 14 October 1845 
to 13 July 1848, under Hotham, they captured 131 slavers and freed 11,214 slaves. 
69 
Later, Hotham testified before the committees in support of the maintenance of the 
squadron. He too believed that it was impossible to suppress the slave trade along the 
entire length of the coast. But he believed that if the squadron was withdrawn, the slave 
trade would increase as more people entered the business. Furthermore, he concluded 
that piracy would also grow and it would drive legitimate merchants from the coast 
entirely. 70 Only the presence of the Royal Navy and force against natives would 
advance British goals. 
Enforcing British Goals 
Historians have worked from the "whiggish" assumption that British African activity 
was a prelude to the scramble for Africa late in the century. Lloyd wrote, for example, 
that the "story of the annexation of Lagos shows how slowly, and almost accidentally, 
the British began to embark on a policy which ultimately gained for her those 
possessions in Africa[] 01 But British actions were part of an overall strategy for the 
coast. Only Britain enforced combined free trade and slave trade treaties with West 
African natives to advance wider objectives. London also appointed consuls to the 
African coast, like John Beecroft, to impress upon Africans the benefits of increased 
trade. The Royal Navy launched military strikes, with the co-operation of sympathetic 
native allies, to enforce British policies, as with the attack on Lagos (1851). Where in' 
the Gulf of Mexico Downing Street feared naval action would hurt its trade policies, 
here London enforced its new informal free trade empire with sea power, installing new 
rulers with whom the gentlemanly English capitalist could deal. But the significance of 
69 IUP, vol. 36, (Class A and B), 275, no. 200 and enclosure in no. 200, Chas. Hotham to Secretary of the Admiralty, 19 July 1848. 
70 Roberts, Charles Hotham, 80-82. 
71 Lloyd, Navy and the Slave Trade, 149. 
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London's enforcement activities is that they only undertook them against lesser, weak, 
native powers where forceful encounters could further British objectives without 
widening a conflict to the entire Atlantic. When Britain blockaded or attacked native 
powers, they ensured that they notified their nominal allies along the coast, such as the 
United States. 
London's consuls for the West African coast were representatives of the elite 
and, with the navy, used force against natives to further British objectives by installing 
allies with whom they could deal. For example, on 30 June 1849, Palmerston appointed 
John Beecroft as the British consular agent for the Bights of Benin and Biafra. 
Palmerston instructed Beecroft to prevent any disputes between natives and British 
vessels that stopped in regional ports. Palmerston hoped that it would encourage growth 
of legitimate trade to displace the slave trade. In the spirit of freer trade, he told Beecroft 
to "impress upon the minds" of native leaders the benefits of trading with Americans 
and Europeans. In the meantime, to further gentlemanly objectives, Beecroft was to 
gather intelligence about coastal and interior commerce and note what "European 
commodities" were most desired. 72 British policies were linked: the freer trade 
mentality; promotion of legitimate British commerce; and the suppression of the slave 
trade with naval support to maintain influence in Africa to counter that of France. It 
neutralised other powers without sparking war, while advancing British interests. 
Downing Street firmly articulated British policy in a 15 November 1850 memo. 
In marked contrast to its earlier policy toward Central America, Downing Street wanted 
other European powers assured that Britain wanted all nations placed on an equal 
footing in West Africa. Palmerston believed that commerce was the best method to 
bring "civilisation" to Africa. The nexus with the freer trade philosophy was clear: 
"there is room enough in the West & populous countries of Africa for the commerce of 
72 PRO, FO 84/775, Africa (West Coast): Consular, Mr. Duncan, Mr. Beecroft, 1849, Palmcrston 
to Beecroft, no. 1,30 June 1849. 
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all civilized nations[. ]"73 Consequently, the British undertook efforts to enforce treaties, 
but rarely attacked any extensive part of the African coast, with the exception of Lagos 
in 1851, where British goals met continual resistance. 
Since April 1850, Palmerston, through his African representatives, had tried to 
"induce" the Chief of Lagos to sign a treaty. The navy had blockaded the Whydah 
region West of Lagos, the major slave port. The slave trade then moved to the next best 
location, the region of creeks and lagoons that stretched about 150 miles around Lagos. 
Palmerston told Beecroft that a treaty with Lagos would help end the slave trade along 
the entire African coast North of the equator. He ordered the consul, in concert with 
Commodore Fanshawe, to undertake steps necessary to convince the Chief of Lagos to 
sign an enclosed a copy of the treaty. It bound him to suppress the slave trade and make 
laws forbidding anyone within his territory from conducting the trade, including any 
Europeans or other citizens. It also gave the Royal Navy policing powers over Lagos 
territory and if any slaves were ready for sale, they would be freed into British colonies. 
The last two articles of the treaty governed free trade and included an offer to the 
French to be party to the agreement. Palmerston told Beecroft to tell the natives that 
legitimate commerce was more important than the slave trade, and to warn them that if 
"the Chief should show a disposition to refuse compliance, you should beg him to 
remember that Lagos is near to the sea, and that on the sea are the ships and the cannon 
of England[. ]"74 
Still, talks with Lagos languished and by September 1851, Palmerston lost his 
patience. The government ordered a blockade of the Dahomey coast until that chief 
signed an agreement, but Palmerston had other plans for Lagos. The British would 
73 Lloyd, The Navy and the Slave Trade, 112-113; Ward, Royal Navy and the Slavers, 193-201; 
PRO, FO 2/4, Africa: (West Coast). Consuls Beecroft Fraser Consular Domestic. January to December 
1850, Herman Merivale to Addington, 15 November 1850 and P[almerston] 20/12 50, Memo, with 
Herman Merivale to Addington, 15 November 1850. 
74 Ward, Royal Navy and the Slavers, 205; Britain, British Sessional Papers, 1852, vol. LIV, 309 
and 311-312, Palmerston to Consul Beecroft, no. 23,20 February 1851, with treaty enclosure and 
Palmerston to Consul Beecroft, no. 25,21 February 1851. 
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reinstall the previous chief, Akitoye, whom slavers had removed after he planned to 
sign a treaty with the British. Palmerston concluded that if the slave trade was expunged 
from Lagos, then it and the nearby river would become a haven for legitimate trade: 
"instead of being a den of barbarism, [it] would be a diffusing centre of civilization. " 
Consequently, on 14 October, the Admiralty ordered Commodore Henry Bruce to 
blockade the coast and attack Lagos in a manner of "your discretion and judgement. "75 
A British force, along with Beecroft, assembled and tried again to negotiate with 
the Chief of Lagos, but talks failed and the British attacked. They opened fire with 
"shrapnel shell and round-shot" and the HMS Niger fired shells as the boats stayed out 
of the range of the shore. Lord Granville, Palmerston's replacement, told Beecroft that 
he had acted inappropriately and failed to warn the Chief of Lagos about the 
consequences if he failed to capitulate. 76 But events had overtaken the slow 
communications along the coast and with London. On 30 November 1851, boats from 
the sloop HMS Harlequin and the steamer HMS Volcano destroyed slaving stations, 
and other vessels. Then, on 17 December, Commodore Bruce told Beecroft that he had 
orders from London to attack Lagos and put Akitoye on the throne. 77 
The attack began on 26 December, under heavy opposing gunfire, and ended on 
Sunday, 28 December. A chief from a nearby village came to the British and told him 
that Lagos was evacuated and the British were victorious. By 1 January 1852, the newly 
installed King Akitoye met with Bruce on the HMS Penelope and signed the treaty. It is 
unclear if the British attacks on Lagos had any impact on the opinions of the King of 
Dahomey, but the blockade of that region probably induced him to a friendlier 
75 Britain, British Sessional Papers, 1852, vol. LIV, 361-362, Palmerston to the Lords 
Commissioners of the Admiralty, no. 43,27 February 1851 and 138, Lords Commissioners of the 
Admiralty to Commodore Bruce, 14 October 1851. 
76 Britain, British Sessional Papers, 1852, vol. LIV, 375-376 and 393-395, Commander L. G. 
Heath to the Secretary of the Admiralty, 17 December 1851, enclosure 1 in W. A. B. Hamilton to Lord 
Stanley of Alderley, no. 56,7 January 1852, Earl Granville to Consul Beecroft, no. 64,24 January 1852. 
77 Britain, British Sessional Papers, 1852, vol. LIV, 413-416, John Beecroft to Viscount 
Palmerston, no. 69,3 January 1852. 
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disposition. By late December 1851, British representatives reported his change of heart 
and treaty signing ceremonies were arranged. Granville was now pleased given the 
satisfactory outcome and the treaty with Lagos. 78 In the end, the rulers of Lagos proved 
weak and by 1861, the British formally annexed Lagos, although parliamentary debate 
over keeping the limited British possessions continued. 79 
Nevertheless, Martin Lynn opines that Britain had little power along the West 
African coast; the attack on Lagos was the power of the "Man on the Spot, " Beecroft. 
Lynn speculated that "questions of policy played a very minor role in the actual seizure 
of Lagos itself' although he agreed that Palmerston had linked slave trade suppression 
and British economic expansion. It was after unsuccessful talks with Dahomey, Lynn 
professes, that Beecroft, in a 22 July 1850 memo, advocated a more forceful approach 
before hearing of Palmerston's approval. But it is unreasonable to assume that the West 
African policy adopted by London was solely the result of Beecroft. Lynn admits the 
consul was a poorly educated and arrogant negotiator who was "clearly ill at ease in his 
relations with his superiors in Whitehall. "80 Instead, it is logical to surmise that Beecroft 
anticipated Palmerston's wishes, representing the "gentlemanly capitalist" goals for the 
West African coast. Beecroft was part of the system of gentlemanly " `decision-makers' 
who ran the imperial government from Whitehall and the `men on the spot' who 
administered the possessions overseas - both the mandarins and the guardians of 
s8 empire. 1 With the navy, Beecroft helped install rulers sympathetic to British goals. 
78 Britain, British Sessional Papers, 1852, vol. LIV, 413-418 and 434-436, John Beecroft to 
Viscount Palmerston, no. 69,3 January 1852, with treaty enclosure, Secretary of the Admiralty, J. Parker, 
to Mr. Addington, no. 73,17 February 1852, with enclosures, and Granville to Consul Beecroft, no. 75, 
23 February 1852. 
79 Ward, Royal Navy and the Slavers, 219. 
8° Martin Lynn, "Consul and Kings: British Policy, `the Man on the Spot, ' and the Seizure of 
Lagos, 1851, " Journal ofImperial and Commonwealth History, 10: 2 (1982): 150-167. 
81 Raymond E. Dumett, "Exploring the Cain/Hopkins Paradigm: Issues for Debate, Critique and 
Topics for New Research, " in Dumett, (ed. ), Gentlemanly Capitalism and British Imperialism, 9. 
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While the British undertook forceful actions against natives, the Royal Navy was 
careful to advise Western nations, like the United States, of impending forceful actions, 
to prevent misunderstandings. Under pressure at home to show results, and with an 
increase in the slave trade from the Gallinas region, Hotham authorised an attack on 3 
and 4 February 1849.82 During the attack, they destroyed slave factories at Solyman and 
Gallinas. But Hotham explicitly told vessels under his command to refrain from 
interfering with other nations' warships, and merchant vessels were to be informed of 
the blockade and stopped. Distinct from the American position, Hotham declared that as 
"the trade of Gallinas has been proved to be connected with slave exportations, and the 
goods imported used for that sole purpose, you will make no difference between vessels 
of any nation loaded with any description of cargo. "83 
The right of blockade was one factor in Anglo-American tension before the War 
of 1812. Americans believed that blockading powers had to give neutrals proper notice 
of a blockade, and have a sufficient force to enforce it. Donald R. Hickey wrote that 
"[t]hese were the principles that the British recognized in theory but did not always 
follow in practice. s84 But off West Africa, Hotham took steps to notify the Americans of 
the blockade. He asked his American counterpart to alert all "American Citizens trading 
on the West Coast of Africa. " Meanwhile, Commander Alexander Murray, HMS 
Favorite, noted that Hotham had instituted a blockade with "sufficient and effective 
force on the territory of Gallinas" and told the Americans that the blockade extended 
from 11°35" West to 11°45" West. Consequently, US Commodore Benjamin Cooper 
recognised the blockade and told Washington that he had directed his vessels to respect 
82 Lloyd, Navy and the Slave Trade, 100-101 and 120. 
83 IUP, vol. 36, (Class A and B), 298-299, no. 228 and enclosure 1 and 2 in no. 228, Chas. 
Hotham to Secretary of the Admiralty, 10 February 1849, "Orders issued by Commodore Sir Charles 
Hotham, " 3 [misdated as 8 February] February 1849, and Chas. Hotham to the Commodore of the French 
Squadron, 4 February 1849. 
94 Hickey, War of 1812,12. 
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it "agreeable to the laws of nations. " 85 The British used sea powers to further their goals 
and assured that other powers were aware of Britain's "peaceful" intentions toward 
them; a courteously that was respected. 
Increase in the Slave Trade 
Whether from naval actions and treaties, or the laws of supply and demand, to the 
British, their policy appeared at first to be successful. In the wake of'sugar duty re1i6rm, 
the slave trade increased, as more slave were needed in Cuba. But slave trade scholars 
conclude that the slave trade from West Africa declined after 1850, corresponding with 
the renewed British commitment to suppression off West Africa. But alter 1853-54, the 
slave trade again rose after the death of 16,000 slaves in C'uha from cholera, and 
renewed demand for slaves on sugar plantations (see figure 6.3). 9`' 
Figure 6.3 Slaves Embarked and Disembarked, 1841-1865 
250 
200 
150 
100 
fr- 
50 
0 
1841-45 1846-50 1851-55 1856-60 1861-65 
Years 
Slaves Embarked   Total disembarked 
Source: Eltis, et al., Slave 7radle. A Dalahase. 
Note: The period 1866-1870 was not plotted because the slaves embarked totalled only 
858, while those disembarked totalled 700. 
85 NA, RG 45, Letters Received by the Secretary of' the Navy Iron Commanding Officers tit' 
Squadrons ("Squadron Letters"), vol. 107, African Squadron, (hereafter Squadron Letters, volume, 
squadron name), Chas. Hotham to Commodore Bolton, 4 February 1849, Alex Murray to Commodore 
Cooper, 7 February 1849, and Benj. Cooper to J. Y. Mason, 7 February 1849. 
86 Murray, Odious Commerce, 208 and Soulsby, Right o/ Search, 138. 
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Consequently, by late 1856 and early 1857, the British concluded that the only major 
demand and destination for slaves must be to the United States, and indirectly through 
Cuba. The Americans, London believed, must be the only ones standing in the way of 
the successful implementation of British policy. The British and Americans had 
different objectives that once more caused Anglo-American tension to rise despite the 
Webster-Ashburton Treaty and the care Britain took in implementing naval policy along 
West Africa. 
Legal and political conditions in the United States in the mid-1850s contributed 
to the increased use of the US flag in the slave trade. American courts had placed limits 
on who could be held responsible for the voyage, and the types of incriminating 
evidence. In the US political climate, no political party thought to introduce legislation 
to tighten the law and "[o]nly with the end of the slave trade did the decisions of the 
Southern New York district cease to harass law enforcement officers. s87 By 1855, those 
with a vested economic interest in the South and slavery called for the repeal of anti- 
slave trade laws and international commitments to slave trade suppression. Each year 
the Southern States, for example, held the Southern Commercial Convention and passed 
resolutions against slave trade suppression and the Webster-Ashburton Treaty. There 
was building momentum against the continued suppression of the slave trade. A similar 
backlash against slave trade suppression gripped Congress. 88 
Under these conditions, Britain concluded that three American ports dominated 
the traffic and were responsible for British difficulties. Vessels from New York and 
Baltimore often sailed directly to the African coast, while those from New Orleans 
sailed first to the Canary Islands with flour and there gathered information about slave 
markets. In New York, Spanish and Portuguese slavers, like one J. A. Machado, became 
naturalised American citizens with the accompanying protective rights. Machado had 
87 Howard, American Slavers and the Federal Law, 155-159 and 167-169. 
88 Du Bois, Suppression of the African Slave-Trade, 169-175. 
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operated legitimate activities in Gambia and Sierra Leone, while in Whydah and 
surrounding ports he was involved in the slave trade and legitimate commerce. J. V. 
Crawford, acting British consul at Havana, also believed that the Americans were to 
blame. Over 1857 and 1858, he tabulated that one Norwegian, one Peruvian, seven 
Spanish, and fifty American-flagged vessels had sailed from Cuba for the trade. 89 
Vessel sales and slaver operations hid easily in New York amongst the 
legitimate vessels. For example, Figaniere, Reis & Co. on 81 Front Street was a front 
company for slavers; in Havana suspicion arose whenever a US vessel was sold. Slaver 
operations from New York, by 1857, also coincided with an increase in slave demand 
caused by increased agriculture in the United States and Cuba. A depression in 1857 
also added incentive for slaving voyages and for American shipbuilders to sell vessels 
into the trade. Slavers outfitted from New Orleans during the spring of 1857, but they 
moved their operations to Havana after one vessel was seized. 90 By spring 1857, the 
increased slaver activities echoed along the West African coast and harmed Anglo- 
American relations. 
A variety of British sources, connected to gentlemanly capitalist, ranging from 
the Foreign Office to its consuls, the Admiralty and its officers, over 1857 and 1858 
blamed the Americans for the continued slave trade. The warship Alecto, at the Congo 
on 14 December 1856, for example, encountered the American vessel Ellen. The British 
boarded the ship, inspected her papers, and discovered she was from New York. But the 
master refused to open his hatches, and having no evidence to detain the ship, the 
British released her. In April 1857, meanwhile, Commodore John Adams told London 
that one of his officers visited Palma and found the "great and increasing trade in palm 
oil" had replaced its slave trade. Still, the only remaining problem was the Americans. 
89 PRO, Adm 123/164, B. Campbell, Consul, Lagos, to Commodore Wise, IlMS Vesuvius, 16 
November 1857; and PRO, Adm 123/177, J. V. Crawford, acting British consul, Havana, to Lord 
Malmesbury, 3 September 1858. 
90 Howard, American Slavers and the Federal Law, 50-59. 
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Table 6.1 Slaver Port of Origins 
Year New New Baltimore Havana Other Total 
York Orleans 
1841-45 020 41 598 641 
1846-50 1003 714 718 
1851-55 11 10 10 105 127 
1856-60 30 18 1 42 145 236 
1861-65 10 10 15 88 114 
1866-70 000033 
Source: Eltis, et al. Slave Trade. - A Database. 
Figure 6.4 Relative Origins of Slaves, 1841-1865 
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He blamed the lack of American warships on parts of the coast, and hoped that London 
would convince Washington to do more. 91 
The pattern is generally confirmed by The Trans Atlantic Slave Trade: A 
Database on CD-ROM (1999). Table 6.1 reveals that the number of slavers from New 
York and New Orleans had increased over 1856-60 from the previous five-year period. 
Slave trade statistics also reveal that the trade was becoming extinct in some areas, but 
remained in others. Figure 6.4 shows that the Bight of Biafra and Southeast Africa 
(including the Cape of Good Hope) declined as a relative source of slaves from 1851-55 
compared with later periods. From 1856 onwards, the slave trade was primarily 
focussed in West-Central Africa and the Bight of Benin at the limit of the American 
patrol from their base at the Cape Verde Islands. 92 
Moreover, the destination of American slavers from suspect ports was 
concentrated in similar African locales. For the period 1856-60, for example, the thirty 
vessels whose port of origin was originally New York obtained 82.5% of their 9878 
slaves from West-Central Africa; 10.10% from the Bight of Benin; and 7.44% from 
other unspecified African regions. Similarly, the eighteen slavers originally from New 
Orleans obtained 80.3% of their 6202 slaves from West-Central Africa; 6.88% from the 
Bight of Benin; and 12.9% from other unspecified African regions. About 70% of the 
slaves obtained by New York vessels found their way to Cuba, and about 60% of those 
obtained by New Orleans vessels were landed at Cuba. 93 
91 Britain, British Sessional Papers, 1857-58, vol. LXI, 117-118, no. 151, no. 152, and 
enclosures 2,3, and 1 in no. 152, John Adams to Secretary of the Admiralty, 18 April 1857, John Adams 
to Secretary of the Admiralty, 1 May 1857, Commander Hunt to Commander Mickley, 15 January 1857 
and Commander Hickley to Commodore Adams, 17 February 1857. 
92 Eltis, et at., Slave Trade: A Database. Eltis concluded that many shifts were the result of 
supply and demand and that "legitimate" trade did not replace the slave trade. While the former became 
profitable, the combined revenues from both were so small that they did not compete with each other for 
African "factors of production. " But his own statistics show that slaving from Lagos dropped from 82 
vessels in 1841-1850 to 5 vessels over 1851-1860, values too dramatic for the influence of naval activity 
to be excluded fully (Eltis, Economic Growth, 164-165,182-184 and 253-254, Table A. 10, "Ships 
Embarking and Intending to Embark Slaves, Major Port of Embarkation by Decade, 1811-67"). 
93 The remaining percentages were distributed, in small amounts, over a variety of other 
destinations (Eltis, et al. Slave Trade: A Database). 
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On both sides of the Atlantic, British representatives reported that the Americans 
were to blame for the continuance of the slave trade. A British judge on the Mixed 
Commission court at Havana reported on 12 April 1857 that the Cuban slave trade was 
extensive. At least fifteen ships involved had sailed from New Orleans within the 
previous two months. Vessels from other American ports had also sailed, while "several 
vessels have also gone from this Port [Havana] and Matanzas. " In addition, Consul 
Benjamin Campbell, at Lagos, believed there was an American conspiracy to continue 
the slave trade to populate Cuba with slave labour as a prelude to annexation. 
Palmerston, now Prime Minister but still with an eye on foreign affairs, noted that 
Campbell's dispatch explained "some of the reasons why the US govt severely 
encourage the slave trade to Cuba[. ]" But Palmerston remained convinced that an attack 
on the African side of the slave trade was best. If any chiefs had broken their treaties 
with the British, they should be punished like those of Lagos. 94 
Conclusion 
Britain had to balance its strategic needs with domestic political demands. But with the 
elite behind the squadron, the Royal Navy maintained its commitment to slave trade 
suppression, implementing free trade policies, and countering the French threat. Equally 
important, British strategy was also to keep on good relations other powers along the 
coast, including the United States. The Royal Navy carefully pursued treaties with 
natives and gave other powers the option to join them. The Royal Navy was also 
forceful against those natives who refused to capitulate, but the squadron was careful to 
inform other Western powers, like the United States, of impending actions like 
blockades. One goal of the Webster-Ashburton Treaty was to govern the use of sca 
power along the West African coast, to reduce and prevent Anglo-American tension 
94 PRO, Adm 123/177, Shelburne, Foreign Office, to Admiralty, 8 May 1857 and J. P. Crawford 
to Earl of Clarendon, 13 April 1857; and PRO, FO 84/1031, Bight of Benin (Lagos): Consul Campbell, 
1857, Campbell to Earl of Clarendon, Her Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 1 August 
1857 and Palmerston's attached minute on the letter, 6 October 1857. 
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through the presence of both the Royal and US Navy. With the US Navy along the 
coast, Royal Navy vessels would no longer need to stop US-flagged ships and the 
British hoped that the Americans would suppress their involvement in the slave trade. 
But British and American objectives were different. While the Royal Navy 
combined most aspects of British strategic policy for the West African coast, American 
goals were separate. Despite the opinions of some US officers - usually on the coast for 
no longer than a year - slave trade suppression was a distant secondary objective to 
furthering US commerce and protecting it from British interference. As the differences 
between British and American strategies accumulated, tensions again rose. 
Consequently, despite British care, their different strategies conflicted with each other. 
Britain remained irritated as American involvement in the slave trade continued. 
Furthermore, British power along the coast grew and exacerbated American suspicions. 
However, modifications to both nations' use of sea power provided the mechanism 
through which Britain and America could relate, reduce tension, and avoid war. 
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Chapter Seven: The US Navy and West Africa, 1843-1857 
The deployment of the US West African squadron is significant because their duties 
reflected the government's goals. Its main duty was to protect and promote American 
commerce and prevent British interference with US-flagged ships. Slave trade 
suppression was too contentious an issue at home for the US Navy to focus on off West 
Africa. They captured some slavers and sent them to the United States, but because of 
the squadron's small size, legal constraints, and the squadron's primary goal, Americans 
failed to patrol the entire coast just for slavers. Instead, the American attack on Berriby 
(1843) epitomised the squadron's purpose. It instilled in natives "respect" for 
Westerners and their traders, to the pleasure of both British and American observers. 
American and British goals differed, but sea power furthered their objectives with the 
presence of both navies. To those ends, the small US force periodically cruised the 
coast, collected commercial intelligence, "showed the flag, " and occasionally used force 
to show that Americans were serious. 
Nevertheless, home waters remained important, as during the Mexican- 
American War (1846-1848) when West African deployment was further curtailed, and 
those warships that remained had to also protect American shipping in the Eastern 
Atlantic from potential attack by Mexican privateers. With commerce protection and 
promotion the primary objective, individual views on slavery rarely rose beyond 
occasional operational comments. Policy was set by a Washington unsympathetic to 
slave trade suppression, but wanting commerce protected; naval officers carried out 
their duties. Only officers like Andrew Hull Foote, sympathetic to the cause of the 
Colonisation Society and slave trade suppression, offered greater enthusiasm for the 
secondary objective. 
With slave trade suppression and commerce protection separate issues, the 
British were sceptical of American sincerity. In turn, Americans feared British 
commercial advances, in particular the growth of British steam shipping that provided 
190 
regulation communications between the African coast and Britain. American 
commodores, like Issac Mayo, believed that unless the government acted, American 
merchants would be driven from the African coast by more efficient British counterparts 
aided by regular steam lines and Royal Navy protection. Despite the intention of the 
Webster-Ashburton Treaty, and some mutually beneficial effects of sea power, the 
separate objectives and corresponding strategies of the Royal Navy and US Navy 
generated tension between the countries. 
The New American Squadron 
Commodore Matthew Perry, the first commander of the US African squadron, was 
familiar with the West African coast, having sortied there during the piracy crisis. 
Desensitised to the horrors of the slave trade from his youth, and with little government 
appetite for slave trade suppression, Perry's concern was with protecting American 
commerce and settlements. Perry, brother of Oliver Hazard Perry, was from Newport, 
Rhode Island, a maritime community that delved into "speculative ventures" like the 
legal slave trade. Schroeder concluded that Perry's youth "taught him that both [slavery 
and the slave trade] were acceptable and tolerable[. ]" Perry's brother Raymond married 
into the "D'Wolfe family, " who had slaves on their Cuban plantation. Senator James 
D' Wolf, Raymond's father-in-law, had voted against the earlier plan to give the British 
the right of search over American-flagged vessels. Still, Matthew supported the goals of 
the Colonisation Society, but his objections to slavery remained muted. He believed that 
it was a Southern problem. ' Off West Africa, Perry underestimated the extent of the 
slave trade in the 1820s, but his ship was rarely off West Africa. 
In contrast to support for commerce protection and promotion, Washington's 
commitment to slave trade suppression was less enthusiastic. Upshur supported naval 
expansion, but he and President Tyler were Virginians and owned slaves. Soon after 
1 John H. Schroeder, Matthew Calbraith Perry: Antebellum Sailor and Diplomat (Annapolis, 
MD: Naval Institute Press, 2001), 3-9,15-21, and 40-41. 
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Perry's deployment, James K. Polk, Democrat from Tennessee, rose to the White 
House, but he too owned slaves. Moreover, the domestic slave trade continued, even in 
Washington, DC. During Perry's command, the position of Secretary of the Navy also 
changed five times; of the new secretaries, three were Southerners. Schroeder surmised 
that John Quincy Adams' opinion illustrated the national mood. Adams concluded that 
the administration was insincere about the slave trade, but that the British were equally 
mischievous because of their continued disrespect for freedom of the seas. Therefore, he 
supported Upshur's instructions to Perry. 2 
In addition to the tactical use of the navy, its "role began to change in other 
significant and unforeseen ways[. ]" The American economy and foreign trade were 
growing and "[p]oliticians, public officials, and newspaper editors all predicted a future 
bonanza for Americans in the vast reaches of the Pacific. " In commerce protection and 
promotion American political leaders were unified. The navy was used overseas to 
"show the flag" and carry out diplomatic duties. Where in war an "impulsive and 
heroic" officer like his brother Oliver Hazard was effective, in peacetime Matthew 
Perry's "deliberate, careful, and thoughtful" behaviour was more appropriate to further 
American interests along a coast embedded with diplomatic sensitivities 3 During this 
time, many Americans believed that naval officers needed to be diplomats. Some, like 
Upshur, advocated the creation of a Naval Academy, in part to provide officers with an 
education suited to a variety of roles as the nation's needs evolved. 4 Perry, like Hotham, 
symbolises the use of sea power in this era. He deployed to West Africa, later advised 
2 Schroeder, Matthew Calbraith Perry, 97-101. 
3 Schroeder, Matthew Calbraith Perry, 22-25 and 97. 
4 Mark C. Hunter, " `... With the Propriety and Decorum which Characterize the Society of 
Gentlemen': The United States Naval Academy and its Youth, 1845-1861" (MA diss., Memorial 
University of Newfoundland, 1999), 39-47. 
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Navy Secretary George Bancroft on the establishment of the Naval Academy, and then 
"opened" Japans 
Given the national sentiment, it is understandable that Upshur reminded Perry 
that American commerce along the coast was "becoming every day more and more 
valuable" and it needed protection. But Upshur also reminded Perry to be respectful of 
the rights of other nations. Foreign warships, like Britain's, acted at their peril if they 
boarded a US-flagged vessel to ascertain its true nationality. If the vessel proved to be 
American, then the foreign country was liable for damages if the masters and owners 
sought redress, otherwise Perry was forbidden to act. Nevertheless, Upshur hoped that 
Perry would co-operate with the British, but gave him wide discretion. 6 
Washington wanted American rights protected, while preserving relations with 
other nations like Britain. Significantly, Washington renewed the instructions given to 
Perry with each subsequent commodore with little variation, and little further strategic 
or tactical communication. The Secretary ordered Perry to cruise from Madeira and the 
Canary Islands to the Bight of Biafra, then along the African coast to 30° West and 
further if necessary. Upshur advised that slavers rarely exhibited signs that they were 
involved in the illegal trade and often disguised themselves as legitimate traders. The 
slavers arrived on the coast, ran "into some river" and dropped off any slave trade 
implements. Then they made deals with coastal slave dealers and sailed about the coast 
conducting legitimate trade until the appointed time to return to collect their human 
cargo. 7 
Perry's orders to his officers generally reflect the spirit and letter of Upshur's 
instructions. He told them they were authorised to use all necessary means to protect 
American-flagged ships from searches by other nations. But he also reminded them to 
Schroeder, Matthew Calbraith Perry, 125-126 and 164-183. 
1843. 
1843. 
6 H. RDOC. No. 104,35`x' Cong., 2nd sess., 3-5, A. P. Upshur to Commodore M. C. Perry, 30 March 
7 H. RDoc. No. 104,35th Cong., 2nd sess., 5-7, A. P. Upshur to Commodore M. C. Perry, 30 March 
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inform foreign warships if a suspected vessel had no right to American protection! 
Schroeder opined that Perry simply carried out his government's orders in focusing on 
commerce protection: "[g]iven the horror of the slave trade, it is tempting to fault Perry, 
but that would place him in a historically inaccurate context. "9 Perry's specific orders to 
several vessels, meanwhile, show the American concentration on vessel protection, with 
few comments about the slave trade. The Decatur, for example, was to collect as much 
intelligence on the legal and slave trade as possible, but was to concentrate on that of 
Americans and keep "a special eye to the protection and advancement of American 
trade. s1° The Porpoise, Lieutenant Commander Arthur Lewis commanding, for 
example, was already on station off the West African coast and waiting for supplies. 
Perry's first order to Lewis was to check on American traders and settlements in 
the region. Perry told him that this was "with a view to protection of the lawful 
commerce of the United States, and the suppression of the Slave Trade when prosecuted 
under the American Flag. " In late 1843, Perry ordered the Porpoise, under Lieutenant 
Commander Thomas T. Craven, to sail the coast to Goree then go to the English 
settlement on the Gambia. Perry remarked that, "you will take pains to inform the 
authorities and the principal head men that a sufficient number of American vessels of 
war is [sic] upon the coast to punish any interference with American lawful trade[. ]"11 
The reports of Commander Joel Abbot, of the Decatur, and that of Commander 
Henry Bruce of the Truxton, are indicative of American activities and opinions during 
the squadron's early years. On 18 January 1844, the Decatur arrived at King Cass 
8 NA, RG 45, Letter Books of Commodore Matthew C. Perry, March 10,1843 - February 20, 
1845 (hereafter, Perry letter books), M. C. Perry, General Order No. 1,21 June 1843, M. C. Perry, General 
Order No. 2,3 July 1843, M. C. Perry, order, 1 August 1843 and M. C. Perry, General Order no. 10,24 
November 1843. 
9 Schroeder, Matthew Calbraith Perry, 260. 
10 NA, RG 45, Perry letter books, M. C. Perry to J. Abbott, letter 1,22 December 1843, M. C. 
Perry to David Renshaw, 25 December 1843 and M. C. Perry to J. Abbot and M. C. Perry to Thomas T. 
Craven, 4 March 1844. 
" NA, RG 45, Perry letter books, M. C. Perry to Arthur Lewis, 17 April 1843 and M. C. Perry to 
Thomas T. Craven, 12 October 1843. 
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Town, the site of an American missionary settlement. They hoped that the presence of a 
US warship along the coast near Gaboon would help their cause, US commerce, and 
"the suppression of the slave trade. " Abbott noted that traders carried out legitimate and 
slave trade several degrees East and South of Perry's cruising limits. By late January 
1845, the US warship Truxton, Commander Henry Bruce, had completed another cruise. 
Bruce believed that the slave trade was still carried on most prominently from Gallinas, 
but emphasised that Americans were increasingly involved in legitimate trade. 12 
While Commodore Perry continued his operations, Washington proceeded with 
finding his replacement, Commodore Charles W. Skinner. When Skinner took 
command, he continued operations and that spring a prize, the schooner Spitfire, arrived 
in Boston harbour for trial and was confiscated. 13 But Secretary of the Navy George 
Bancroft, historian from Massachusetts, told Skinner that because of budget constraints 
the Navy Department was unable to send reinforcements. He approved of Commodore 
Skinner's operations and hoped soon to be able to relieve him and a portion of his 
squadron. 14 
In contrast to their concern over commerce protection and promotion, the 
squadron reported little slaver activity and operations against the slavers were minimal. 
Perry reported on 18 May 1844, that Commander Joseph Tattnall had captured two 
suspected slavers, the brig Uncas and the Crawford, although the courts later released 
them. 15 Nevertheless, Perry told Secretary of the Navy David Henshaw, from 
12 NA, RG 45, Squadron Letters, vol. 105, African Squadron, Extract of report from Joel Abbot, 
enclosure in M. C. Perry to Secretary of the Navy, 18 May 1844 and Henry Bruce to Commodore M. C. 
Perry, 25 January 1845. 
13 Howard, American Slavers and the Federal Law, Appendix A, "Vessels Arrested by American 
Officers for Violation of the Slave-Trade Acts, 1837-1862, " 214. 
14 NA, RG 45, Secretary of the Navy, Record of Confidential Letters (hereafter, Secretary of the 
Navy Confidential Letters), Sept. 12,1843 to Feb. 28,1849, George Bancroft to Commodore Skinner, 18 
June 1845; and NA, RG 45, Secretary of the Navy, Letters Sent, Mar. 11- Dec. 6,1845, Geo. Bancroft to 
Como. Chas. W. Skinner, 7 November 1845. 
15 NA, RG 45, Perry letter books, M. C. Perry to Secretary of the Navy, letter 4,18 May 1844. 
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Massachusetts, that he had seen no indication of American involvement in the slave 
trade, although he was aware of slaver tactics and strategies to avoid detection. He 
wrote that when in the West Indies, if a US warship approached a slaver, "she displays 
Spanish colors and exhibits her Spanish papers[. ]" Meanwhile, she displays "her the 
American Flag and papers and fictitious log book" to prevent British warships from 
seizing her. Given the disadvantages, Perry felt that it was impossible for the squadron 
to stop and detect "all these abuses" everywhere along the West African coast. 16 
Skinner, Perry's replacement, also emphasised commercial matters and offered 
few comments on the slave trade beyond the operational requirements of the squadron. 
Skinner believed that the US Navy should use as many vessels as possible to cover the 
entire coast and maintain a constant presence, but he believed large armaments were 
unnecessary. 17 He reported on West African commerce, yet admitted that his knowledge 
of the slave trade was "vague and unsatisfactory, " although more time might provide 
more detail. In the end, for the year April 1845 to March 1846, the squadron captured 
only six slavers. 18 Meanwhile, in total between 1843 and 1850, the United States 
captured only 17 slavers. 19 Regardless of individual opinion, with commerce protection 
and promotion the squadron's primary objective, officers offered few comments on 
slave trade suppression beyond what was required of the distant secondary goal. 
Berriby and a Show of US force 
While the US was limited in its ability and willingness to police the slave trade, their 
16 NA, RG 45, Perry letter books, M. C. Perry to David Henshaw, 25 December 1843 and M. C. 
Perry to Secretary of the Navy, letter 4,18 May 1844. 
17 NA, RG 45, Squadron Letters, vol. 106, African Squadron, no. 8, Chas. Wm. Skinner to J. Y. 
Mason, 16 March 1846 and no. 17, Chas. Wm. Skinner to Secretary of the Navy, 20 June 1845. 
18 NA, RG 45, Squadron Letters, vol. 106, African Squadron, no. 47, Chas. Wm. Skinner to 
George Bancroft, 17 January 1846. 
19 Eltis, et al., Slave Trade: A Database. The total 17 is technically for this CD-ROM's period 
1841-50, but there were no US captures until 1843. While this database is useful, this researcher must 
point out the difficulty involved in customising queries beyond the pre-sets provided by the software. 
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wider goal of protecting US interests allowed them to undertake limited military strikes, 
against lesser native powers, in support of American strategy. The most important 
example of this strategy was the attack on Berriby (1843). The action against Berriby on 
the Ivory Coast was in revenge for the attack on the schooner Mary Carver. The action 
is significant because it had long-term consequences for Americans along the coast. The 
outcome reinforced the American's belief that their West African strategy was correct, 
although it made relations with the natives tense. But the British also concluded that the 
American use of sea power against Berriby made natives more receptive to British 
policy. 
The Secretary of the Navy had reported to Congress in 1842 that natives had 
attacked the Salem merchant ship Mary Carver. On the coast, Perry's officers reported 
signs that Americans were in the middle of disputes. Thus, the US squadron's duty was 
to make its presence known to the locals, but Washington left to the commodore's 
discretion the squadron's tactics. Soon after Perry arrived along the coast, he wrote the 
governor of Cape Palmas and told him that it was time for revenge. Perry told Secretary 
Upshur that Governor Joseph Robert of Liberia believed that force would "have a 
salutary influence in impressing upon the natives greater awe of the American flag. " 
Perry concluded that "it is my purpose to communicate with all the various tribes along 
the Coast and to admonish them of the necessity of receiving and treating the American 
trading vessels in a friendly manner. , 20 Late in 1843, Perry attacked because he 
believed that slow reprisals had only emboldened the natives against American traders. 
He opined that his actions would restore the friendly trading relationship between 
legitimate traders and the Berriby people, as the traders could then safely return. 21 
20 NA, RG 45, Perry letter books, M. C. Perry to Governor or Person in Charge of the American 
Colony at Cape Palmas Coast of Africa, 17 April 1843 and M. C. Perry to A. P. Upshur, 3 August 1843. 
21 NA, RG 45, Perry letter books, M. C. Perry to John B. Russwurm, 10 August 1843, M. C Perry 
to Jno D. [sic] Russwurm, 12 August 1843 and M. C. Perry to David Henshaw, 21 December 1843. 
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Perry went so far as to advocate "ethnic cleansing" by January 1844. He was 
knowledgeable about the workings of the native African economy and advocated 
attacking it to secure American trading interests. The Americans should destroy the 
villages along the coast where Americans were treated poorly. He rationalised his plan 
with the understanding that the Cracow people were foreign to the coast and the original 
inhabitants, who were friendly toward US traders, would return. Lieutenant Craven, 
commanding the Porpoise, provided some indication of the natives' reactions to Perry's 
actions. The people of Little Berriby had moved inland and wanted Perry's permission 
to rebuild their settlement along the coast. Craven thought that the natives now 
respected American power and would give its citizens aid. Commander Abbot found a 
similar situation. The natives were peaceful toward foreigners because of Perry's attack 
on Berriby. 22 
Where Britain used sea power to push African factors of production into 
legitimate commerce; Americans used it to intimidate natives into trading with US 
citizens, while doing little against the slave trade. Nevertheless, the results were similar. 
When Commodore Skinner arrived on the coast, he had a different opinion of the attack 
on Berriby. When he passed Berriby, in the Jamestown, the natives fled in horror; he 
met similar cases of fear along the coast and was aghast at what had occurred. 23 But he 
too believed that the pacification of Berriby added to American prestige. Thereafter, he 
believed that trades in hides, gold dust, palm oil, ivory, and camwood flourished in 
exchange for products made in the United States. The benefits of US sea power had 
22 NA, RG 45, Perry letter books, M. C. Perry to David Henshaw, 15 January 1844; NA, RG 45, 
Squadron Letters, vol. 105, African Squadron, T. T. Craven to Commodore M. C. Perry, 24 April 1844; 
NA, RG 45, Squadron Letters, vol. 105,331, African Squadron, Joel Abbot to Commodore M. C. Perry, 6 
November 1844. 
23 NA, RG 45, Squadron Letters, vol. 106, African Squadron, no. 9, Chas. Wm. Skinner to J. Y. 
Mason, 17 March 1845. 
198 
even reached into the African soul: "the lone missionary experiences and acknowledges 
the advantages arising from the protection of a flag at once feared and respected. q124 
The British also noted with pleasure the benefits of the American attack on 
wider British strategy for the coast. The American presence fit perfectly with London's 
treaty-making strategy. Murray noted that the character of the region had changed 
significantly since the American naval action in December 1843. In 1848, the Royal 
Navy was able to sign one of their treaties with the Chiefs of Grand Berriby; the Chiefs 
knowing what would happen if they defied a naval power. Murray noted that the Kroo 
and Fishmen tribes of the region never undertook the slave trade. But the first three 
articles of the new treaty dealt with ending the slave trade, the fourth with free trade for 
the British, while the fifth was an offer for the French to join in the treaty. 25 Despite 
divergent strategies, US "peacetime" policy seemed to observers to have a positive 
impact on both American and British objectives. 
The Mexican-American War and Curtailment of US West African Activities 
Still, potential trade growth in emerging regions, like Africa, remained subservient to 
US home waters and with the acquisition of California American expansive dreams 
looked West and into the Pacific. Consequently, home commitments mitigated US naval 
effectiveness off West Africa and contributed to British beliefs that American efforts 
were insincere. The strategic inflexibility that Smith Thompson feared during the 1820s, 
was a reality by the Mexican-American War. The increased tension with Mexico, and 
the resulting war, shaped American response to the West African coast as the small US 
Navy had to be concentrated near home waters for immediate war purposes. 
The United States annexed Texas in 1845, and on 13 May 1846 war erupted 
24 NA, RG 45, Squadron Letters, vol. 106, African Squadron, no. 8, Chas. Wm. Skinner to J. Y. 
Mason, 16 March 1846 and no. 17, Chas. Wm. Skinner to Secretary of the Navy, 20 June 1845. 
25 IUP, vol. 36, (Class A and B), 254-255, no. 187 and enclosures 5 and 6 in no. 187, 
"Agreement with the Chiefs of Grand Bereby, " 25 February 1848 and Alexander Murray, "Observations 
of Commander Murray on the Agreement with the Chiefs of Grand Bereby, " 26 February 1848. 
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with Mexico. That day, Congress authorised armed private merchant ships and the 
completion of naval construction to aid the war. The Americans instituted a blockade of 
the Mexican coast and used Anton Lizardo, near Vera Cruz, as a coal station for steam 
vessels. By October 1846, the US Navy seized Tampico, and by March 1847, land 
forces seized Vera Cruz. Meanwhile, the Pacific squadron sailed North from Peru, 
blockaded the Pacific Mexican coast, and took San Francisco Bay. By 4 July 1846, the 
California Republic was created and American territory had dramatically expanded 
West 26 
The Americans duly informed the British of the war and the blockade, although 
American diplomats observed that many Britons eyed the war with unease. Ambassador 
McLane found that the outbreak of war was unexpected it Britain, and American 
participation in the conflict was "unpopular. " The British feared that the US would 
settle the boundary with Mexico before that of Oregon with Britain, and McLane feared 
the war with Mexico would stall any further talks with the British. But in this era of the 
emerging "New Rule, " McLane warned that privateers and warships should be careful 
not to interfere with "the rights and commerce of neutrals" so that even in war, the use 
of sea power would not harm Anglo-American relations. 27 It would set an example for 
the British. 
Nevertheless, figure 7.1 shows the gathering US sea power in the West Indies in 
1846, during the Mexican crisis. In response, the African squadron also took on more 
tasks, without an increase in their share of deployment, and watched for Mexican 
privateers. It was a force meant to exercise a subtle presence along the coast, rather than 
provide wartime support. Consequently, from 1846, into late 1849, the combined weight 
of problems pushed the US Navy to the sidelines in West Africa, while the Royal Navy 
continued making free trade treaties and suppressing the slave trade. 
26 Paolo E. Coletta, The American Naval Heritage, 3`d Edition (Lanham, MD: University Press of 
America, 1987), 117-118. 
27 NA, RG 59, Dispatches, Britain, no. 54, Louis McLane to James Buchanan, 3 June 1846. 
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Off Africa, by October 1845, Commodore Skinner received information from 
newspapers that relations between the United States and Mexico had deteriorated. 
Combined with the navy's budget restrictions, the newspapers should have provided 
Skinner with a reason why reinforcements were lacking. By 29 December 1845, 
Secretary Bancroft dispatched Commodore George C. Read to relieve Skinner. Because 
of the conflict with Mexico, however, Bancroft ordered Read to guard against the 
depredations of privateers[. ]" Bancroft also told Skinner to "exercise the utmost 
vigilance in protecting American commerce and interests" en route from West Africa to 
Boston, and pay particular attention to Matanzas and Havana for Mexican privateers. 
During Read's outward voyage he encountered many ships, but no Mexican privateers. 
After Read arrived on the coast he had an opportunity to assess the American squadron 
and its duties. lie also wished for more vessels and concluded that the squadron would 
be unable to carry out all its assigned tasks. 28 
28 NA, RG 45, Squadron Letters, vol. 106, African Squadron, no. 34 and no. 38, Chas. Win. 
Skinner to George Bancroft, 12 October 1845 and Chas. Wm. Skinner to George Bancroft, 20 October 
1845; H. R. Doc. No. 104,35`x' Cong., 2" a sess., 1 1-12, G. Bancroft to George C. Read, 29 December 18.15 
NA, RG 45, Secretary of the Navy Confidential Letters, Sept. 12,1843 to Feb. 28,1849, George l1ancroll 
to George Read, 21 May 1846 and George Bancroft to Commodore Skinner, 21 May 1846; and NA, RG 
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The squadron was under pressure to protect a wide area during the war. Consul 
William Carrol, at St. Helena, for example, worried over newspaper reports that 
Mexicans were inflicting reprisals on US merchant vessels. He wanted the West African 
squadron's protection, but Read replied that St. Helena was too far away and that the 
best protection would be a fleet to convoy American merchant vessels. Read exclaimed 
that he knew the character of the American people too well and the merchant vessels 
would refuse to wait for other vessels to form a convoy, fearing lost opportunities to the 
first to arrive on the coast. The commodore concluded that "if the protection you 
suggest should become necessary, " ask the Brazilian squadron for help. The African 
squadron was drained of resources and Read told Secretary J. Y. Mason that "I pray 
continually for a peace with Mexico to get these miserable sailing craft relieved. s29 
Other regions also requested immediate protection by the African squadron. On 
31 January 1847, the Secretary of the US legation at Madrid, Thomas Reynolds, took it 
upon himself to write to "the officer in command of any armed vessel" of the United 
States. He was concerned about the Mexican-American War and the lack of any US 
naval protection for US interests away from home waters. On 31 May 1847, Read 
acknowledged Reynolds' letter. By then Read had newspapers and correspondence from 
the United States that supported Reynolds' request for assistance. In response, Read 
dispatched the warship Marion to Gibraltar. Read shared Reynolds' concern about the 
threat to US commerce from Mexican privateers if they succeeded in outfitting from 
England or Spain. But Read warned that the Marion, after being on the West African 
coast for so long, was "by no means fit to cruise for privateers, " although it was the only 
vessel capable of carrying out such duties. 30 
45, Squadron Letters, vol. 82 (pt. ), African Squadron, Geo. C. Read to Geo. Bancroft, 26 June 1846. 
29 NA, RG 45, Squadron Letters, vol. 82 (pt. ), African Squadron, Geo C. Read to Wm. Carrol, 12 
March 1847, enclosure in Geo. C. Read to Jno. Y. Mason, 26 March 1847 and Geo. C. Read to Jno. Y. 
Mason, 26 March 1847. 
30 NA, RG 45, Squadron Letters, vol. 82 (pt. ), African Squadron, Thomas Reynolds to the 
Officer in Command of any armed vessel of the U. States, 31 January 1847, enclosure in Geo. C. Read to 
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In contrast, Read told Washington that he had met with the senior British and 
French naval officers on the coast, and the Royal Navy had a formidable force. Their 
ships were numerous and large, and this enabled them to stay off the slave trading 
stations for longer periods than the smaller American warships. Read opined that even if 
the US deployed three times as many warships to the coast, they would still need two 
vessels off each suspected slaving station to stop and search adequately every vessel. 
Meanwhile, the other naval commanders noted that they had not seen a US warship 
along the coast "for several months before" Read's arrival. Read felt that the whole 
situation hurt his crew's morale. Many, he professed, arrived on the coast with hopes of 
suppressing the slave trade, supporting their nation's honour, and making names for 
themselves. He opined that US efforts were futile unless Congress enacted tighter 
legislation against those involved in the slave trade. The squadron might be able to meet 
its obligations to protect legitimate US commerce, but "they are not likely to meet the 
expectations of those who desire the slave trade annihilated. 01 
Over 1846 and 1847, the ongoing dispute between the Mexicans and Americans 
affected adversely US naval operations along the African coast and Anglo-American 
naval co-operation. Palmerston pressed the Americans to increase their naval presence 
off Africa, and in particular to send vessels to the East African coast to suppress 
American involvement in the slave trade of that region. But British Ambassador 
Richard Pakeham told Palmerston that he would not pressure the Americans further, for 
"the whole of its available naval resources being required for the prosecution of the war 
with Mexico[. ]"32 Until the strategic situation improved, US operations stalled much to 
Jno Y. Mason, 12 May 1847 and Geo. C. Read to T. C. Reynolds, Secretary of the US Legation at Madrid, 31 May 1847. 
31 NA, RG 45, Squadron Letters, vol. 82 (pt. ), African Squadron, George Read to George 
Bancroft, 16 September 1846. 
32 IUP, vol. 33, Correspondence with Foreign Powers (Class D- 1846), 147-148, no. 95, R. 
Pakeham to Viscount Palmerston, 13 December 1846. 
203 
Britain's displeasure, but they refrained from pushing the Americans too hard. 
However, legal problems also contributed to the declining US effort. 
Legal Problems Curtail US Navy Efforts 
For political, legal, and strategic reasons the US West African squadron was left on its 
own, stretched with too many tasks, and focussed more on commerce protection than 
slave trade suppression. Courts in the United States also handed the limited anti-slavery 
operations a defeat over 1846-47. The cases, and Washington's reaction, are significant 
because they reveal how the courts tied the American squadron's hands. But they also 
reveal Washington's insistence on uninterrupted trade; slave trade suppression played 
little role in the development of American wealth. For example, when in 1846 the 
British warship Actaeon found the Malaga, from Beverly, Massachusetts, loaded with 
goods thought used in the slave trade, they concluded that the Malaga was guilty under 
US law of "aiding and abetting the slave trade. " But New England Judge Charles L. 
Woodbury, and later another Judge Benjamin R. Curtis, ruled that such vessels violated 
no such laws unless they had a direct stake in the slave trade. Thereafter, the case 
against the Malaga was dropped and the owners sued. 33 
Secretary of the Navy Mason, lawyer from Richmond, Virginia34, told 
Commodore Read that several such cases had occurred. He understood the difficulty 
under which the US officers worked, and "by no means desir[e]d to check or sensure 
[sic] the vigilance of American cruisers, " but the free flow of trade was more important. 
Mason wrote that to prevent "interruptions to lawful commerce" and to stop 
"complaints from innocent traders" the US Navy had to be more careful when seizing 
suspected slavers. 35 The result was further prioritising of trade protection over slaver 
33 Howard, American Slavers and the Federal Law, 102-104. 
1,238. 
34 K. Jack Bauer, "John Young Mason, " in Coletta, (ed. ), American Secretaries of the Navy, vol. 
35 NA, RG 45, Secretary of the Navy Confidential Letters, Sept. 12,1843 to Feb. 28,1849, J. Y. 
Mason to Commodore Read, 16 November 1846. 
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suppression, and fear in officers along the West African coast of the legal and career 
ramifications if they stopped any vessel. The result for slaver activities was ominous: 
Read told Washington that reports had reached him that the Malaga and Casket had 
returned to the African coast, loaded slaves, and departed unmolested 
36 
Howard concluded that the result was a "mass shirking of assigned duties, 
carefully concealed from the American public" that lasted for about two years until the 
damage suits against the US Navy were settled. 37 But the shift in the American focus 
was at Washington' insistence and conformed to their focus on trade. The immediate 
American goal of using sea power to protect trade is significant because it failed to form 
a nexus with suppressing the slave trade. The reality of US naval deployment therefore 
contradicts Harmon's thesis that American naval deployment to protect commerce 
resulted in the US Navy suppressing the slave trade. 38 American policy also had 
implications for Anglo-American relations as again Britain questioned the American 
commitment to slave trade suppression. 
The US Navy and Commercial Goals, 1847-1854 
With legal and relief problems, the US West African squadron carried out its duties as 
best it could, but focussed increasingly on commercial protection. In the regions that 
they patrolled, American officers, like their British counterparts, noted areas of 
increased commerce and avenues of potential advancement. In October 1846, the 
Americans believed that the slave trade was largely suppressed by the Royal Navy's 
vigilance, and to some small extent by that of the French Navy. Commodore Read was 
serious about his work and even declined Secretary Bancroft's personal request to stop 
36 NA, RG 45, Squadron Letters, vol. 89 (pt. ), African Squadron, Geo. C. Read to John Y. 
Mason, 11 December 1846, letter 1, G. W. Read to Jno. Y. Mason, 10 March 1847, and Geo. Read to Jno. 
Y. Mason, 31 March 1847. 
37 Howard, American Slavers and the Federal Law, 105. 
38 Harmon, "Suppress and Protect, " 1-3. 
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at Madeira for wine. The cruise of the US warship Marion from October 1846 to April 
1847 is typical of that undertaken by the Americans during this period. During a visit to 
the Bight of Benin, Captain Simonds, for example, reported that commerce there had 
declined and he had seen no American ships. By 28 January they arrived off Cape 
Lopez and visited Cabinda. The commander of the British warship Larne, the only ship 
there, informed the Americans that "no Americans had been there for months. " 
Commodore Benjamin Cooper's cruising orders from 1849 to Captain A. G. Gordon of 
the US warship Porpoise are also indicative of the American patrol pattern near the end 
of this period. In July, Cooper ordered the Porpoise to sail South from Porto Praia and 
pay particular attention to the Bight of Benin. The Porpoise was to visit Monrovia, 
Bassa Cove, Sinon, Cape Palmas, the Bight of Benin, then Whydah. The Porpoise could 
sail farther along the coast at the captain's discretion. 39 
The Americans still captured slavers, but the results were disappointing because 
of the court decisions. On 2 August 1846, the Marion captured the Casket, from 
Beverly, Massachusetts, near the Congo River and sent it to Boston for trial, but the 
court dismissed the case. 0 Meanwhile, in 1847, the Chancellor had escaped from the 
British and was captured by the Americans. Read had reports that the Chancellor was 
involved in the slave trade and dispatched the warship Dolphin to find her. But 
Commodore Read also feared the British could fire on a legitimate US trader as they 
had the Chancellor. By April, the Dolphin succeeded and sent the Chancellor to New 
York for trial but the court also dismissed the case. There was little comment from 
39 NA, RG 45, Squadron Letters, vol. 82 (pt. ), African Squadron, L. E. Simonds to Com. Geo. C. Read, 9 October 1846, Geo. C. Read, "Private, " to George Bancroft, 5 October 1846, and L. E. Simonds to 
Commodore Read, 20 April 1847; and NA, RG 45, Squadron Letters, vol. 107, African Squadron, Benj. Cooper to A. G. Gordon, 10 May 1849 and Benj. Cooper to A. G. Gordon, 29 July 1849. 
40 NA, RG 45, Squadron Letters, vol. 106, African Squadron, no. 48 with enclosures A through H, Chas. Wm. Skinner to George Bancroft, 27 January 1846 and postscript dated 31 January 1846; and Howard, American Slavers and the Federal Law, Appendix A, "Vessels Arrested by American Officers for Violation of the Slave-Trade Acts, 1837-1862, " 214-233. 
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Washington about the squadron's operations. Secretary Mason simply approved the 
squadron's actions and acknowledged receipt of dispatches. 1 
By 1849, the lacklustre American performance generated concern in their British 
counterparts. In autumn 1849, for example, Commodore Fanshawe, Royal Navy, told 
Commodore Francis H. Gregory, US Navy, that American merchant vessels were 
involved in the slave trade at Benguela, Angola, and the Congo. Fanshawe was 
disappointed that the British had not even encountered an American warship South of 
the equator. Irritated, he concluded that the use of the American flag hurt British goals 
and the Royal Navy could do nothing, legally, about it. 42 But that autumn the courts 
ruled in favour of the American officers sued by vessel owners, and the United States 
began greater deployment farther South allowing greater co-operation with the British. 
Regardless, the squadron continued implementing national policy by supporting 
American colonies and commercial activities; their importance actually increasing with 
the growth of American business for California. 
On 12 February 1850, Gregory provided an indication of his squadron's focus. 
He reported that a number of US merchant ships had arrived at Porto Praia for 
California and the navy had provided assistance to those in need. He thought that 
American economic and strategic interests along the West African coast were even 
increasing. 43 John Marston, commander of the US warship Yorktown, also believed that 
the region's economy was good, with exports of palm oil, camwood, ivory, and coffee, 
among other items. Marston even called on the American Colonisation Society to send 
41 NA, RG 45, Squadron Letters, vol. 82 (pt. ), African Squadron, Jno. Pope to Commodore Geo. 
C. Read, 5 March 1847, Geo. C. Read to Jno Y. Mason, 12 May 1847, Geo. C. Read to J. Y. Mason, 15 
July 1847, and Geo. C. Read to John Y. Mason, 6 August 1847; and NA, RG 45, Secretary of the Navy 
Letters Sent, June 12,1848 - Apr. 16,1849, J. Y. Mason to W. C. Bolton, 31 August 1848; and H. R. Doc. No. 104,35th Cong., 2nd sess., 13-14, J. Y. Mason to Commodore Benjamin Cooper, 10 November 1848. 
42 H. KDoc. No. 104,35th Cong., 2"d sess., 13-14, Wm. Ballard Preston to Captain F. H. Gregory, 
17 August 1849; and IUP, vol. 37, (Class A and B), 301, no. 208 and enclosure 1 in no. 208, Commodore 
Fanshawe to Commodore Gregory, 26 December 1849 and Arthur Fanshawe to Secretary of the 
Admiralty, 1 January 1850. 
43 NA, RG 45, Squadron Letters, vol. 108, African Squadron, F. H. Gregory to Wm. Ballard 
Preston, 12 February 1850. 
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more settlers. Furthermore, in early 1854, Commodore Isaac Mayo told Washington 
that he would, as ordered, send a vessel to the aid of Charles Hoffman, from Salem, who 
had difficulty with merchants who operated between Sierra Leone and Cape Roxo. 
Hoffman received the US naval support he long desired. Only after those tasks were 
completed, would the Dale then sail to the Southern coast and relieve the Perry. 
45 
Mayo, like his gentlemanly British counterparts, believed that the appointment 
of consuls to the West African coast were important for US commerce, would take 
some weight off the US Navy, and help suppress the slave trade. For example, he felt 
that American commerce with the Loanda region was important and the "presence of an 
American consul" was needed. Loanda was also "the centre of trade and the chief sea 
port on the South Coast of Africa. " Undoubtedly, Mayo must have also surmised that 
such an appointment would provide an American presence on land that would help 
relieve some of the pressure on his small squadron. He told Washington that a 
permanent consul would inspect ship's papers and cargo that arrived in the region. He 
noted that "too many of them, I fear, have of late employed our flag, while in the 
prosecution of the slave trade. " Mayo appointed several consuls during his tenure, 
including to Sierra Leone, the English settlement of Bathurst, and to the Angola 
region. 46 But such proactive US naval officers were the minority. 
The US Navy and the Slave Trade, 1850-1857 
While the British solidified their West African policy, the US Navy maintained support 
for US commerce along West Africa, separate from the contentious issue of slavery and 
slave trade suppression that divided the nation. Nevertheless, its post-1849 deployment 
44 NA, RG 45, Squadron Letters, vol. 108, African Squadron, John Marston to Frans. If. 
Gregory, 8 April 1850. 
45 NA, RG 45, Squadron Letters, vol. 110, African Squadron, I. Mayo to J. C. Dobbin, 25 January 
1854. 
46 NA, RG 45, Squadron Letters, vol. 110, African Squadron, 1. Mayo to J. C. Dobbin, 17 
November 1853 and I. Mayo to J. C. Dobbin, 3 April 1854, and enclosure Wm. C. Whittle to COMM. I. 
Mayo, 11 February 1854. 
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against slavers became less complicated after favourable court decisions in the United 
States. The US Navy, freed from some of its legal restraints, increased efforts against 
the slavers and continued to protect and promote legitimate American commerce. But 
economic growth and slave trade suppression remained separate. In 1849, Judge John 
K. Kane, Eastern Pennsylvania District, concluded that the Malaga had indeed operated 
under suspicious circumstances. He eased legal restrictions and found that the evidence 
that the vessel was chartered to a known slaver and carrying known slaving goods, was 
sufficient for an arrest. American patrols resumed South of the equator by 1850, and 
"really suspicious vessels were arrested. " 7 
Because using sea power to suppress the slave trade was of secondary 
importance, suppression efforts were subject to the whims of individual commodores 
and officers committed to the cause. Commodores who disliked the African coast, or 
felt their squadron was too small to prove effective, curtailed deployment. Those who 
supported slave trade suppression also believed that the US squadron's base needed to 
be farther South to prove effective against the illegal activity. By the late 1850s, like 
their British counterparts, American warships found that the slave trade was increasing, 
becoming better organised, and originated from New York. But combined with their 
suspicion of the British, the stage was set for a renewed conflict with their nominal 
allies along the West African coast. The American deployment South lagged behind the 
British because of the earlier legal and naval re-enforcement problems that curtailed US 
naval activities. The British operated farther South and had a base at St. Helena. 
Logistics were easier, while the Americans were forced to operate a long supply line 
from Porto Praia. 
In the immediate wake of favourable court decisions, several US officers along 
the West African coast showed initiative, beyond commercial objectives, to suppress the 
slave trade. Nevertheless, British activities outpaced the separate US efforts, leading to 
47 Howard, American Slavers and the Federal Law, 106-108. 
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Figure 7.2 Commodore Francis H. Gregory's Spring and Summer 1850 Cruise 
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original. 
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American fear that the prominent Royal Navy would drive Americans from the coast. 
Commodore Francis H. Gregory, in the sloop Portsmouth, took command of the force 
of five vessels in 1850.48 Meanwhile, the Perry was on patrol and under the command 
of Andrew Hull Foote. Gregory took the initiative, deployed the squadron farther South 
and concentrated efforts along the Bights of Benin and Biafra to disrupt American slave 
traders that supplied the Brazilian market. But the remote nature of the American supply 
depot put the squadron at a disadvantage: with only a maximum of three months' 
provisions, warships would have to sail down the coast and back, then rest at Madeira. 
He recommended that the depot move to St. Helena or that supply ships be dispatched. 49 
Gregory's March to May cruise illustrates the logistical problems and overall US' 
strategy. It was closest to the coast, while the second, June to August portion, was 
farther out to sea during the rainy season (figure 7.2). 50 
Gregory's orders to his friend Lieutenant Commander Andrew Hull Foote, 
another zealous officer, are indicative of Gregory's strategy. On 9 January 1850, 
Gregory ordered Foote, in the Perry, to sail South of the equator to Cape St. Mary's at 
13° South. Gregory told him that his purpose was to protect lawful American commerce 
and stop the US flag from being used by slavers. Foote was to pay particular attention to 
known slaving ports like Gallinas, Benguela, Loanda, and Ambriz. Gregory had 
information that Americans might be involved in the slave trade between Cape St. 
Mary's and Cape Lopez. By 27 April 1850, Foote reported that he had encountered no 
slavers and the British only captured one during the period . 
S1 Nevertheless, Foote was 
committed to the cause. 
48 H. RDoc. No. 104,35th Cong., 2nd sess., 13-14, Wm. Ballard Preston to Captain F. H. Gregory, 
17 August 1849. 
49 NA, RG 45, Squadron Letters, vol. 108, African Squadron, F. H. Gregory to Wm. Ballard 
Preston, 26 March 1850. 
50 NA, RG 45, Squadron Letters, vol. 108, African Squadron, F. H. Gregory to Wm. Ballard 
Preston, 3 September 1850 and F. H. Gregory to Secretary of the Navy, 14 October 1850. 
51 NA, RG 45, Squadron Letters, vol. 108, African Squadron, F. H. Gregory to Lieut. Comdt. 
A. H. Foot [Foote], 9 January 1850 and Andrew Hull Foote to Commodore Francis H. Gregory, 27 April 
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This was also an age of moral reform in American society, and the maritime 
community in particular. It spawned seamen's friends' societies, improvement 
organisations, and found many advocates in the US Navy. 52 Andrew Foote was one 
such man who believed, among other things, in temperance and regular church 
attendance. Foote's pious beliefs extended to the West African coast, where he hoped to 
help his fellow man. He supported the American Colonisation Society and, later, 
exclaimed that Christianity would bring civilisation to the Africans. 53 As a result, Foote 
and the Perry made successful slaver seizures. On 6 June 1850, for example, he spotted 
a suspicious vessel windward off Ambriz and sent a boat to investigate. The vessel was 
the Martha from New York and flew the US flag. Her captain later explained that he 
believed that the Perry was a British vessel, as he had information that the Perry was no 
longer on that part of the coast. Foote seized the ship at 6 P. M. and her captain 
exclaimed that if the Perry had failed to seize her, he was ready to load a cargo of slaves 
and leave the African coast. Foote sent her to New York for trial. The US District Court 
at New York condemned the vessel; the captain skipped bail, while the mate was 
sentenced to two years in prison. But the Secretary of the Navy, William Ballard 
Preston, from Virginia, had little to say about Foote's actions and simply noted 
approval. 54 Preston was a known advocate of Jefferson's philosophy of the gradual 
elimination of slavery, rather than radical abolition. 55 
1850. 
52 Harold D. Langley Social Reform in the United States Navy, 1798-1862 (Chicago: University 
of Illinois Press, 1967), 44-66. 
53 Spencer C. Tucker, Andrew Foote: Civil War Admiral on Western Waters (Annapolis, MD: 
Naval Institute Press, 2000), 55-60 and 68. For details on Foote's beliefs in temperance, see Tucker, 39- 
51. 
54 NA, RG 45, Squadron Letters, vol. 108, African Squadron, Andrew H. Foote to Commodore 
Francis H. Gregory, 7 June 1850; Andrew H. Foote, Africa and the American Flag (New York: D. 
Appleton & Co., 1854), 287-293; and NA, RG 45, Secretary of the Navy Confidential Letters, Mar. 1, 
1849 to Feb. 28,1853, no. 2, Wm. Ballard Preston to Commodore Gregory, 9 July 1850. 
ss Harold D. Langley, "William Ballard Preston, " in Coletta, (ed. ), American Secretaries of the 
Navy, vol. 1,243. 
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In July 1850, Millard Fillmore became president after the death of Zachary 
Taylor. Fillmore was from New York and supported the navy. His administration also 
supported limited naval expansion and exploration squadrons, such as Matthew Perry's 
mission to Asia. 56 But the President also wished to preserve the Union and he respected 
States' rights. At the urging of Southerners, Fillmore selected William A. Graham, from 
North Carolina, as Secretary of the Navy. 57 By May 1851, Graham ordered Commodore 
Eli A. F. Lavallette to relieve Commodore Gregory. Despite the lofty goals of some 
Americans, others, like Lavallette, believed that the slave trade was suppressed North of 
Cape Palmas. He also believed that the British had enough steamers in the Bight of 
Biafra to suppress the remaining trade. Meanwhile, Lavallette exclaimed, there was 
never any slave trade carried on North of Liberia, and little American commerce. The 
US needed to move its base to St. Helena, as the squadron had been deployed as far 
South as possible to St. Paul de Loanda. It had protected commerce, American citizens 
and settlers, and Lavallette believed it helped suppress the slave trade. 58 
John P. Kennedy, from a wealthy Baltimore merchant family, replaced Graham 
when the latter decided ran for Vice President. Kennedy also believed in the potential 
for African economic expansion and dispatched Commander William F. Lynch to 
survey the coast from Liberia to the Gaboon. Kennedy hoped Congress would provide 
more money for the service, but Congress disagreed. The survey mission was at the 
behest of the Pennsylvania branch of the American Colonisation Society, and Congress 
increasingly feared the divisive issue of slavery, regardless of the survey's mission. 
56 Schroeder, Shaping a Maritime Empire, 95-99. 
57 Harold D. Langley, "William Alexander Graham, " in Coletta, (ed. ), American Secretaries of 
the Navy, vol. 1,257. 
58 H. R. Doc. No. 104,35th Cong., 2nd secs., 14-16, William A. Graham to Commodore Eli A. F. 
Lavallette, May 1851 and NA, RG 45, Squadron Letters, vol. 109, African Squadron, Eli A. F. Lavallette 
to William A. Graham, 20 May 1851, Eli A. F. Lavallette to William A. Graham, 13 November 1851 and 
E. A. F. Lavallette [c. February 1853]. 
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Focussed on commerce promotion, Kennedy believed that if the squadron was intended 
only for slave trade suppression, perhaps it should be disbanded. 59 
On 9 December 1852, he ordered Commodore Isaac Mayo, who would be in 
command about two years, to relieve Lavallette. Mayo's force was smaller than 
Lavallette's, and yet he was expected to cover the same territory. Meanwhile, 
Washington's commitment, by 1853, declined further. President Franklin Pierce 
advocated a strong foreign policy, but also wished to avoid the contentious slavery 
issue, again strengthening the squadron's resolve only on commerce protection and 
development. In turn, Mayo expressed his angst that the squadron had only three or four 
vessels to patrol the coast. The warships thus passed "singly, from point to point in 
succession, and two of them rarely meet. " It was "a force very inadequate" for the 
government's task. 60 But focussed on trade, with little will in Washington or on station 
to suppress the slave trade, American officers were concerned that Britain was 
achieving a dominance over Americans along the African coast. It interfered with the 
long-term American goal and touched on sensitivities that all at home could agree upon. 
In turn, British exacerbation at increasing American involvement in the slave trade 
combined to generate tension between them that had to be relieved or face war. 
British Dominance and American Decline 
The Americans observed British actions both in support of their trade policy and against 
American-flagged vessels the British suspected of involvement in the slave trade. By 
the 1850s, US Navy officers not only feared the impact of British warships on US trade, 
but also that her merchants, and newly established steam lines, were agents of 
imperialistic control. The Americans found that US traders were scarce along many 
59 Harold D. Langley, "John Pendleton Kennedy, " in Coletta, (ed. ), American Secretaries of the 
Navy, vol. 1,269-271. 
60 H. RDoc. No. 104,35' Cong., 2nd sess., 16, John P. Kennedy to Commodore Isaac Mayo, 9 December 1852; Schroeder, Shaping a Maritime Empire, 117-128; and NA, RG 45, Squadron Letters, 
vol. 110, African Squadron, I. Mayo to J. C. Dobbin, 29 September 1854. 
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parts of the African coast, while those regions had ample British mercantile 
representation. The Americans believed that it was the presence of the Royal Navy and 
the regular use of steam technology in the private sector that gave the British an 
advantage over their American counterparts. To suspicious American observers, the 
British, her navy, colonial officials, and merchants - the gentlemanly capitalists - were 
achieving their goals. 
Early in the history of Anglo-American shipping competition, cheaply built 
American wooden ships threatened to outpace their British counterparts. But Britain 
took advantage of iron and steam technologies to outstrip Americans in carrying 
capacity and trade routes. The result was that Britain enjoyed a grasp on shipping that 
became unmatched by other nations. World-wide in 1850, the British owned 52% of 
steam tonnage, while the Americans only twenty-two percent. 61 Freer trade thus allowed 
Britain to acquire cheap resources, export to countries under lower tariffs, and maintain 
dominance with her industrial and shipping capacity. All Britain had to worry about was 
protecting trade from predators and "subsidised" products like slave-produced goods. 
Although the African coast was favoured by the East India Company because 
they could ship goods to and from India without transhipment through hostile territory, 
steam lines took awhile to be established along the African coast. Early steam engines 
were large with low-pressure boilers, and they consumed large amounts of coal. The 
technology, while increasing speed, posed logistical problems. Headrick concluded that 
"at sea they had to either bring along an enormous supply of coal or be supplied by 
sailing ships. "62 But Kubicek discovered that British colonial officials clamoured for 
steamers. They believed that it would increase colonial commerce, in particular with 
inland regions, and would increase the prestige of colonial officials in African and 
European eyes. The establishment of regular steam communication also allowed the 
61 S. G. Sturmey, British Shipping and World Competition (University of London: The Athlone 
Press, 1962), 1,9 and 12-14; and Harding, Seapower and Naval Warfare, 15-16 and 35-36. 
62 Headrick, Tools of Empire, 131-133. 
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Figure 7.3 US Exports to the Gold Coast (£ thousands), 1846-1861 
50 
40 
Cl) 
30 
m 
ý 
20 
10 
0 
/ 
/ 
"/ 
`/,, 
/ 
1846 1849 1852 1855 1858 1861 
Years 
--"- Total from US - Tobacco "-- Rum 
Source: Calculated from Brooks, Yankee Traders, Appendix G, "Value of Gold Coast 
Imports, 1846-1885 (in sterling), " 309. 
Note: Total US Exports also include lumber and cotton goods from 1856, valued only 
about £500 per annum. Flour exports were also present, but ranged between £500 and 
£2000 per annum. Because of the low values, these items were omitted from this graph. 
Figure 7.4 US Imports from the Gold Coast (£ thousands), 1846-1861 
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British better control over supply and demand; it increased efficiency, and allowed a 
broader spectrum of British merchants to operate. 63 The competitive advantage 
threatened to drive American traders from the region. 
Table 7.1 Import Sources, Africa and Canada, £ 
Years Africa Canada 
1844-6 2,898,000 5,559,000 
1854-6 5,218,000 5,740,000 
Source: Davis, Industrial Revolution, Table 40, Imports (£000), 93. 
As discussed in Chapter Two, African exports to Britain rose during this period, 
while political leaders like Palmerston adhered to a policy of informal empire and the 
gentlemanly ethic. African imports had doubled from the period 1844-46 to 1854-56 so 
much so that Africa now rivalled Canada as a source of primary resources (see table 
7.1). In contrast, Africa-America trade, while still rising, was far less. Figure 7.3, 
illustrates that American exports to the Gold Coast, for example, rarely exceeded 
£40,000 per year, and were largely composed of rum. Figure 7.4, shows that exports 
from the region rarely exceeded £50,000 and were largely palm oil and gold dust. They 
peaked during 1849-1854, but then declined, largely because of the decline in the value 
of gold dust, possibly as demand for the commodity dried up with greater access to 
American domestic gold supplies. 
The British endeavours, despite their caution, raised American concerns 
especially when combined with the establishment of regular steam communications 
between Britain and Africa in the 1850s. The Liverpool African Steamship Company, 
for example, started mail service in 1852 that went as far South as Fernando Po. 
Another company, the Iron Steam Ship Company, also established a regular steam line 
to the African coast by 1853. Previously, Mayo observed, small 5- to 30-ton transient 
vessels from the United States serviced the coast. But English merchants "now order 
63 Robert V. Kubicek, "The Colonial Steamer and the Occupation of West Africa by the 
Victorian State, 1840-1900, " Journal ofImperial and Commonwealth History, 18: 1 (1990): 9,12-13,19, 
and 21. 
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them [supplies] from England; calculating almost to an hour, the time when they will be 
received; the returning steamers enables them to send back at a fixed period the produce 
of the country that has accumulated in their hands. " Americans were able to compete, 
but would soon be driven from the region if they were unable to obtain a similar 
advantage. Mayo concluded that the British government "brought the great motive 
power of the age, to ... drive all commercial rivals 
from the field[. ]"64 
Americans perceived the benefits Britain achieved through their presence and 
use of force against lesser, native, powers, but remained wary. The Americans made 
trade agreements with the natives that contained pledges of equal access or "free trade, " 
but they were less extensive than British treaties. Mayo had obtained a trade treaty with 
the King of Lagos, for example, putting American commerce on an equal footing with 
that of other nations. But he also knew that Lagos was an important region and Britain 
had used force to achieve their objectives when treaty talks failed. Even so, when the 
slave trade in a region was suppressed, Mayo believed that the British continued to use 
sea power to achieve their overall economic objectives. Mayo correctly surmised the 
British strategy for the coast and that the British had integrated the US Navy into their 
strategic plan. Probably because of the growing crisis with Russia and the Crimean War, 
Mayo observed that the British had reduced their fleet along the coast and offered no 
objection to the Americans securing trade access. 65 
Mayo told Washington that "[t]he willingness with which the British Consul 
encouraged the King to take this step [the agreement with the Americans], probably 
sprung from" strategic considerations that resulted from their reduced naval 
commitment. But he warned that "[t]his [Lagos] is one of the most important 
commercial points on the West Coast of Africa & the English Government seem to be 
64 Ward, Royal Navy and the Slavers, 203 and NA, RG 45, Squadron Letters, vol. 110, African 
Squadron, I. Mayo to J. C. Dobbin, 31 July 1854,1. Mayo to [Secretary of the Navy, ] 22 August 1853, and 
1. Mayo to [Secretary of the Navy, ) 22 August 1853. 
65 NA, RG 45, Squadron Letters, vol. 110, African Squadron, I. Mayo to J. C. Dobbin, 9 August 
1854 and I. Mayo to J. C. Dobbin, 9 August 1854. 
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fully alive to the fact. " Lagos was thriving, by 1854 had a population of 18,000, "and 
must from its position become the centre of a very valuable trade. " Mayo thus believed 
that the King's pledge to the Americans might prove useful if the French or British 
"should at any time attempt to obtain exclusive [trade] privileges. "66 But to American 
observers, it appeared that the British strategy to push African production factors into 
legitimate commerce worked to the detriment of American traders. 
While other factors undoubtedly contributed to the stagnation of African- 
American trade, Mayo's remarks also correspond with the period of sharp decline in 
American exports to Africa, and African imports to America (see figures 7.3 and 7.4). 
In response to British advances Mayo advocated a "line of steamers between Africa, and 
one of our Southern ports" to regain the trade that "in its infancy was fast falling into 
our hands when the foresight of the British ... snatched it from us[. ]" Moreover, by 
1855, Commodore Thomas Crabbe, Mayo's replacement, feared that the British would 
even drive Americans out of their original colonies at Liberia. He told Washington that 
the French and British treaties "are said to grant to the subjects of those countries equal 
rights in trade with the citizens of the Republic" of Liberia. Many in Liberia disliked 
those provisions but "England, however, appears to be well established in the affections 
of Liberia, and will not patiently yield to any [treaty] alternation" adverse to her trade. 67 
The level of British interest and development along West Africa from 1850 to 
1856 bred suspicions in American officers. While American officers were impressed 
with the British actions at Lagos, they also believed that the British only allowed them 
along the coast as part of overall British strategy during the Crimean War. This period is 
critical in the establishment of Pax Britannica: the British achieved regional economic 
dominance and with the end of the Crimean War they had a global naval force with no 
66 NA, RG 45, Squadron Letters, vol. 110, African Squadron, I. Mayo to J. C. Dobbin, 9 August 
1854 and Ricd. L. Page to Commo. I. Mayo, 16 June 1854, enclosure in I. Mayo to J. C. Dobbin, 7 July 
1854. 
67 NA, RG 45, Squadron Letters, vol. 110, African Squadron, I. Mayo to [Secretary of the Navy, ] 
22 August 1853 and NA, RG 45, Squadron Letters, vol. 111, African Squadron, Thomas Crabbe to J. C. 
Dobbin, 12 December 1855. 
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rival. Rather than counter the British along West Africa, the Americans turned 
increasingly inwards and toward the Pacific. In response to British sea power, Andrew 
Lambert concluded that after 1856 the United States, and other nations, realised that 
efforts were futile and they "abandoned all pretence at deep water capacity in favour of 
coast defence, shore batteries and monitors[. ]"68 
Furthermore, Anglo-American tension over slave trade suppression remained. 
From the British perspective, suspicion about American motives increased as the slave 
trade continued and American actions stagnated. On 24 October 1853, for example, the 
British warship Crane, off Cabinda, encountered the American-flagged vessel H. N. 
Gambrill. The British were suspicious, inspected her on 28 October, but released her 
again. That evening, the Crane came upon the US warship Constitution with 
Commodore Mayo on board, and provided him with information about the H. N. 
Gambrill. Rear Admiral Bruce told London that the information then led to Mayo 
capturing the vessel fifteen miles from the Congo. But Bruce felt that the H. N. Gambrill 
had almost escaped because it raised the US flag. He told London that the Gambrill's 
master even had the "audacity" to raise the British flag when the American warship 
approached, and claimed he was a legitimate trader working for "Hatton and Cookson, 
Liverpool merchants trading at Ambriz. "69 
By late 1854, British and American warships also observed an increase in 
American involvement in the slave trade based out of New York and Havana. En route 
South in late 1854, the US warship Marion arrived at Loanda and fell in with the British 
warship Philomel. On 24 October 1854, John M. D. Skene, commanding Philomel, 
reported to the Marion the presence of two US-flagged ships in Loanda harbour. They 
68 Andrew D. Lambert, "The British Naval Strategic Revolution, 1815-1854" in Jackson and 
Williams, (eds. ), Shipping Technology and Imperialism, 156-160. 
69 Howard, American Slavers and the Federal Law, "Appendix A: Vessels Arrested by 
Americans Officers for Violation of the Slave-Trade Acts, 1837-1862, " 217; NA, RG 45, Squadron 
Letters, vol. 110, African Squadron, I. Mayo to J. C. Dobbin, 10 November 1853; and Britain, British 
Sessional Papers, 1854, vol. LXXIII, 201, no. 140, H. W. Bruce to Secretary of the Admiralty, 10 January 
1854. 
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were the Wild Pigeon and the Oxford, manned with foreign crews. The former, from 
New York, had arrived on 7 October with a consignment for a known slave trader, 
Francisco Antonio Flores, whom the British had called on locals to expel. The Oxford 
was from New London and one of Skene's officers had boarded her off St. Helena, and 
found her "partly equipped for the slave trade[. ]" Skene provided intelligence about the 
vessels to the Marion so that the latter's commander could take such steps as needed to 
stop the abuse of the American flag. 70 
Conditioned by a fear of increased British control of the region, the Americans 
eyed British actions with suspicion. Commander H. Y. Purviance told Commodore 
Mayo that he met Skene in person to discuss the matter and then sent one of his men to 
inspect the vessels, but found no cause to detain them. Instead, Purviance remarked that 
"I am perfectly satisfied myself that both vessels were engaged in lawful trade. " He 
took the word of the Oxford's master that the extra water casks were for transporting 
palm oil and whiskey. The American officers concluded that the British must simply 
have concluded that the Oxford was involved in the slave trade purely because she was 
an American ship. 71 Regardless of the outcome, it was clear that over this period 
American involvement in the slave trade appeared to be increasing from the British 
perspective. But their combined scepticism kept Anglo-American relations cool. 
Commodore Thomas Crabbe, who relieved Mayo in 1855, was the last US West 
African commodore before the next Anglo-American crisis developed. 72 During his 
tenure, the squadron focussed on commerce and colonial protection. But he was 
reluctant to undertake slave trade suppression and quickly asked to be relieved of 
70 NA, RG 45, Squadron Letters, vol. 110, African Squadron, H. Y. Purviance to I. Mayo, 30 
November 1854, I. Mayo to J. C. Dobbin, 7 February 1855, John M. D. Skene to the Commander of the 
United States Corvette Marion, 24 October 1854, enclosure in I. Mayo to J. C. Dobbin, 7 February 1855. 
71 NA, RG 45, Squadron Letters, vol. 110, African Squadron, H. Y. Purviance to I. Mayo, 30 
November 1854, enclosure in I. Mayo to J. C. Dobbin, 7 February 1855. 
72 H. RDoc. No. 104,35'h Cong., 2nd sess., 16-20, J. C. Dobbin to Captain Thomas Crabbe, 17 
April 1855; and NA, RG 45, Secretary of the Navy Confidential Letters, Feb. 1,1853 to Oct. 17,1857, 
J. C. Dobbin to Captain Thomas Crabbe, "Confidential" 3 April 1855. 
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command. 73 During a cruise down the African coast to Whydah and Princes Island, 
from December 1855 to early January 1856, Crabbe observed no slavers even in the 
notorious Whydah and Bight of Benin. 74 Nevertheless, he observed changes in British 
deployment, and by February 1857, he made a startling discovery: the slave trade was 
continuing in a conspiracy centred on Havana and managed from New York. 
During the investigation into the suspicious vessel Flying Eagle, Crabbe 
discovered papers that indicated there was a slave trade conspiracy "carried on to some 
extent by an organised company" of New York and Havana residents. For example, the 
brig P. Soule delivered 479 slaves from the Benguela coast to Havana by February 
1856. Crabbe concluded that American-flagged vessels involved in the slave trade were 
Portuguese owned, sailed from New York, manned largely by foreigners, and covered 
by dubious American citizenship papers. 75 Furthermore, in mid-1856, Crabbe noted that 
within one week thirteen British war steamers had passed through the area, "bound for 
the West Indies. s76 Unbeknownst to Crabbe, the British warships were headed to the 
West Indies because of the activities of private citizens waging private wars in the Gulf 
and Central America. It was only a matter of time before more complaints arrived from 
US-flagged vessels of British "interference" in more sensitive American home waters. 
Conclusion 
The US Navy focussed on commerce protection and promotion along the West African 
coast. Slave trade suppression was a separate issue that rarely entered the equation. The 
73 NA, RG 45, Squadron Letters, vol. 111, African Squadron, Thomas Crabbe to J. C. Dobbin, 18 
April 1855, Thomas Crabbe to J. C. Dobbin, 8 June 1855, Thomas Crabbe to J. C. Dobbin, 9 July 1855, 
Thomas Crabbe to J. C. Dobbin, 26 July 1855, Thomas Crabbe to J. C. Dobbin, 7 August 1855, Thomas 
Crabbe to J. C. Dobbin 2 October 1855 with Secretary's hand-written notation of 30 October 1855, and 
Thomas Crabbe to J. C. Dobbin, 25 February 1856. 
74 NA, RG 45, Squadron Letters, vol. 111, African Squadron, Thomas Crabbe to J. C. Dobbin, 21 
January 1856. 
75 NA, RG 45, Squadron Letters, vol. 111, African Squadron, Thomas Crabbe to J. C. Dobbin, 21 
January 1856 and 14 February 1857. 
76 NA, RG 45, Squadron Letters, vol. 111, African Squadron, Thomas Crabbe to J. C. Dobbin, 30 
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Mexican-American War, legal restraints, and the squadron's primary duty curtailed 
slaver seizures. Instead, the squadron collected commercial intelligence and revenged 
attacks on Americans. Because of discouragement at home, only zealous officers like 
Andrew Hull Foote, pursued slave trade suppression with any vigour. But American 
officers also watched British advancements, caused by the unified nature of British 
strategy, with suspicion. In turn, Britons looked upon American inaction with dismay. 
Consequently, the separate goals, strategy and tactics of the Royal Navy and US Navy 
threatened Anglo-American relations as each questioned the sincerity of the other. Yet, 
rather than go to war, their shared belief that sea power could be used to further long- 
term objectives "peacefully" - at least with other nation-states - provided a mechanism 
through which they could relate. They maintained their commitment to their interests, 
co-operated when goals overlapped, and modified their use of sea power when 
objectives clashed. In this way, sea power allowed the Anglo-American relationship to 
be dynamic even when their interests clashed. 
June 1856 with enclosure, J. H. Ward, "Memorandum of English Man of War Steamers ... " 26 June 1856. 
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Chapter Eight: Conflict Aividance in the Equatorial Atlantic 
Britain and America deployed naval forces to the West African coast, but divergent 
policies often interfered with each other and generated tension. Britain combined slave 
trade suppression, economic, and strategic polices. In contrast, the United States kept 
slave trade suppression and commerce protection separate. The contrasting polices 
brought them into conflict as continued American involvement in the slave trade 
threatened British goals and Americans feared that London meant to dominate and 
secure African trade for herself. But the role of sea power in furthering long-term goals 
"peacefully, " without war with other nation-states, provided a mechanism through 
which Britain and America could prevent tensions from spiralling into war. By 
modifying their naval policies, sea power provided a safety valve that could be adjusted 
to preserve relations, a balance of power, and commercial endeavours. 
Several interrelated cases in the equatorial Atlantic illustrate how Britain and 
America dissipated tension by controlling their use of sea power. To reduce the chances 
of conflict, they kept most of their slave trade suppression focussed on the West African 
coast, away from their sensitive commercial traffic in the Western equatorial Atlantic. 
They tried to co-operate by sharing intelligence, rather than making questionable 
searches of vessels flying dubious flags. Moreover, when conflict arose, both remained 
calm and censured overzealous naval officers, making them "scapegoats" to preserve 
relations. Such sensitivity was particularly important in the Western equatorial Atlantic. 
Here, US interests in connecting her East and West coasts through the Central American 
isthmus were paramount. 
Close to home waters, Americans saw little difference in the Royal Navy 
searching US-flagged ships for slavers or filibusters, private citizens waging an 
expansive war against Cuba and Central America. Rather than risk war, London 
acquiesced to American sensitivities and modified British naval policy accordingly. 
Rather than continue forceful actions against the slave trade, that might drive places like 
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Cuba into American hands, the Royal Navy patrolled for filibusters and London reined 
in naval officers and disavowed the forceful actions of British representatives. The 
government would not let Northern abolitionists drag the country into war over slave 
trade suppression close to American waters. London showed restraint. 
In turn, Washington. for the sake of peaceful co-existence and development, 
eventually condemned filibuster activities and dispatched naval forces to stop them. By 
1859, under continued British and domestic pressure, the United States deployed a 
steamer force to patrol Cuba for filibusters, slavers, and protect US interests; another 
force would do the same off Nest Africa. In the end, with slavery a Civil War rallying 
cry in the North. Washington gave Britain the right to search suspected US slavers, but 
London remained wary of being dragged into the Civil War. Finally, to avoid any future 
conflict on the application of sea power, both nations agreed on passports for vessels 
involved in legitimate transport of Africans. Across the equatorial Atlantic, the role of 
peacetime sea power to foster long-term interests allowed Anglo-American naval 
relations to be a mechanism to reduce tensions and further separate interests. Anglo- 
American naval relations in the equatorial Atlantic reveal that their relationship was 
pliable as neither wanted war. 
Britain, America, and Patrols from the Eastern Atlantic 
The Royal Navy, even after the 1820s piracy crisis, operated in the Western equatorial 
Atlantic. But even there London wanted peace maintained; the £10 million in 
investments in South America teas the most important consideration. Captains were 
warned to be careful of taking sides in disputes, or using too much force, "so as not to 
be seen as agents of British commercial bullying. " Thus, "gunboat diplomacy" was rare 
with the exceptions of the occupation of the Falkland Islands (1832), Malvinas (1833), 
and against the Brazilian slave trade. Instead, the British used sea power largely to 
uphold gentlemanly ideals: "to secure a bank's assets, to dissuade the patriots from 
making a forced levy on British merchants, or to protect a customs house against 
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interference. " Gough concludes that "in Latin American affairs, H. M. warships were a 
symbol of security to nervous merchants and anxious creditors. "' 
Figure 8.1 Relative Slave Destinations. Southeast Brazil and Cuba, 1841-1870 
Source: Calculated from Eltis, et al., Slave Trade. A Database. 
Note: Total percentage also includes other regions that were of such small percentages 
that they failed to appear on the graph and were thus omitted. 
Off Brazil, the Royal Navy had some success against the slave trade, stopping 
11 slavers from December 1835 to April 1839. But the First Lord of the Admiralty, 
Lord Minto, exclaimed to Parliament in 1838 that further efforts were futile without 
greater naval force or better anti-slave trade treaties. 2 In 1845, Parliament gave the 
government the power to act against a Brazil that had "never lifted a finger to enforce 
her own laws against the slave trade[. ] ,3 Meanwhile, Don Pacifico, in Greece had his 
house destroyed in an anti-Semitic attack in 1847 and claimed British citizenship; the 
Royal Navy blockaded Piraeus in January 1850. Palmerston accepted French mediation, 
rather than go to war, while Parliament generally condemned Palmerston's actions. But 
he had public support with his proclamation that the English government would protect 
1 Barry M. Gough, "Sea Power and South America: The "Brazils" or South American Station of 
the Royal Navy 1808-1837, " American Neptune 50: 1 (1990): 29-31. 
2 Leslie Bethell, The Abolition of the Bra: ilian Slave Trade: Britain, Bra: il uncl the Slave Trade 
Question 1807-1869 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970), 150. 
3 Harmon, "Suppress and Protect, " 145-155; Ward, Royal Navy, and the Slavers, 165; and 
Bethell, Abolition of the Bra_ilian Slave Trade, 242-266. 
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her subjects anywhere. Lloyd concluded that with renewed gusto Palmerston 
prosecuted the Brazilian slave trade. By June 1850, the British entered Brazilian ports 
and seized suspected slavers. On 4 September 1850, the Brazilians capitulated and 
passed a law deeming the slave trade as piracy. 5 
After the abolition of slavery in the West Indies in the early 1830s, the region's 
economic importance to Britain began to decline. Lambert concludes that "the falling 
value of local produce were rapidly transforming it from an economic motor into a 
backwater. " Meanwhile, the combined weight of British sugar duty reform, West Indian 
bank failures and the desertion of sugar estates during the 1840s, further weakened the 
region's economy and London "would do little to help, simply waiting for better 
times. "6 While London took a firm stand against Brazil, the commercial sector feared 
disruption of trade, and radicals like Cobden remained amicable toward America. 
British free trade fuelled the demand for cheap Cuban sugar in the 1840s, and increased 
the Cuban slave trade. But David R. Murray concluded that Britain was more cautious 
with Cuban than Brazilian strategy for fear that "British intervention in Cuba could lead 
to what no British government wanted - the American annexation of the island. " 
7 
The Monroe Doctrine professed that the Western Atlantic was American and 
other powers interfered at their peril. But after the 1820s piracy crisis, the Americans 
offered few objections to the presence of the Royal Navy and British settlements near 
American home waters. After American strategic interests shifted to their West Coast, 
their interest grew in Central America as a faster transit point between the Atlantic and 
Pacific. This interest put the Americans in conflict with British holdings in the region. 
The British had several early settlements in Central America, in particular the Mosquito 
4 Chamberlain, Lord Palmerston, 72-74. 
s Klein, Atlantic Slave Trade, 190 and Lloyd, Navy and the Slave Trade, 139-148. See also, 
Bethell, Abolition of the Brazilian Slave Trade, 327-363. 
6 Lambert, Trincomalee, 48-49. 
7 Murray, Odious Commerce, 208. 
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Coast and Belize; both later significant because they commanded potential isthmian 
routes between the Atlantic and Pacific. 8 Allen concluded that many disputes touched 
closely, in terms of geography, more on America than Britain. He opined that from 
1847 to 1861, Anglo-American tensions centred mainly on Central America and control 
of the isthmus .9 But rather than go to war the British and Americans settled their 
problems in the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty (1850) whereby each party agreed not to 
colonise any transit zone; their navies patrolled the peace for those who might upset the 
deal. 
Figure 8.2 The Nicaraguan Isthmus 
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Note: Locations and boundaries are approximate and not necessarily indicative of 
historical boundaries. 
London was only concerned about its sovereignty in the transit zone if it was 
threatened by other nations. London sought a negotiated settlement over the status of the 
Belize settlement, first with Spain who had nominal sovereignty over the territory, and 
then with the new Central American states when they encroached on areas settled by 
8 Mary Wilhelmine Williams, Anglo-American Isthmian Diplomacy, 1815-1915 (New York: 
Russell & Russell, Inc., reprint 1965), 28-36. 
9 Allen, Great Britain and the United States, 49 and 422-436. 
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Britons. When the Americans professed concern over the region because of its strategic 
importance connecting the Atlantic and Pacific, London desired peaceful resolutions to 
their disputes, rather go to war over a distant settlement. In turn, the Americans 
reciprocated. While the area was strategically important, Washington realised the 
benefits to commerce of peaceful resolution of disputes over access. 
The main British settlement was Belize, originally settled by British 
"freebooters" preying on Spanish trade. The Mosquito Coast, nearby, commanded the 
Atlantic side of the San Juan River that led inland to Lake Nicaragua. Britain gained 
control of Belize during the European wars, but by the Treaty of Amiens (27 March 
1802), sovereignty was returned to Spain and confirmed by the Treaty of Madrid in 
1814. But there were British settlers in Belize, and Spain failed to exercise governance 
there, a weakness that increased after the Spanish American revolutions. Consequently, 
Britain exerted practical sovereignty over the region, appointed superintendents 
accountable to the Governor of Jamaica, but refrained from declaring it an official 
colony. Nevertheless, British loggers fanned out from the principal settlements into 
areas unpopulated but for natives. 10 
The status quo was satisfactory until Spain lost control of its colonies in the 
1820s. The Central American states formed the short-lived United Provinces of Central 
America (1824), composed of Costa Rica, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Honduras and 
Guatemala. As discussed, the United States soon settled its differences with Spain and 
recognised new Central American states. But Britain wavered; when Canning believed 
that conditions were ripe to make commercial treaties with new nations like Mexico, 
they were unable to agree on the status of Belize. Consequently, the 1826 Anglo- 
Mexican treaty failed to define who controlled the disputed region, Spain, Britain, or 
Mexico, and Britain continued its de facto administration of Belize. " 
10 R. A. Humphreys, The Diplomatic History of British Honduras, 1638-1901 (London: Oxford 
University Press, 1961), 10-17. 
11 Humphreys, British Honduras, 18-27. 
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Britain asked Spain on several occasions to formally cede sovereignty over 
Belize to Britain. In 1835, the Spanish foreign minister, Martinez de la Rosa, agreed 
verbally to the proposal, but with continued political instability in Spain, talks stalled. 
Meanwhile, British settlers and companies, such as the Eastern Coast of Central 
America Commercial and Agricultural Company, based in London, had received land 
grants from the Guatemalan government in the disputed border region. Nevertheless, the 
status of British Honduras - Belize - was left unresolved as the Central American 
nations continued to evolve. 12 
In 1841, Macdonald, British Superintendent of Belize, went to the mouth of the 
San Juan River, raised the Mosquito flag, and declared the Mosquito Coast a British 
protectorate, with initial support from London. 13 Macdonald knew the strategic 
importance of the region. If another country possessed the Bay Islands, for example, it 
"would be a death blow to Commerce of British Honduras" in the event of war. 14 
Meanwhile, the population had grown from 10,000 in 1835, to 13,000 by the end of the 
decade. But in London, Palmerston concluded that "the best thing to do was `to let the 
Spaniards forget it. "' His successor, Aberdeen, took the same stand "out of respect for 
Spain. " 15 It was a quiet policy, so long as British interests could develop in safety. 
During the Crimean War, Britain's ambassador to Washington was expelled for 
British war recruitment in the United States. Some called for retaliation, but Cabinet 
continued a conciliatory approach and allowed US Ambassador Dallas to stay in 
London. Palmerston told Parliament in 1856 that taking a bellicose attitude with the 
United States was no way to "persuade the American people to cultivate the most 
12 Humphreys, British Honduras, 38-46. 
13 Williams, Isthmian Diplomacy, 2-25 and 37-42. 
14 PRO, Adm 128/34, pp. 169-170 and 283-291, George Grey, [Under Secretary of State for the Colonies], to John Barrow, 6 August 1835, J. Russell, 3 April 1841, and A. MacDonald to John Russell, 
January 1841. 
15 Humphreys, British Honduras, 43-46. 
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friendly relations with England[. ]"16 Cabinet even ordered "the naval commander in 
Central American waters ... to avoid anything that might be construed as provocation. 
" 
Palmerston remained inimical toward the United States. Southern slavery still offended 
him, and even in 1855, he speculated that Britain could defeat the United States. But 
Steele believed that Palmerston's bravado was countered with the realisation that there 
was little support in Britain for war with America. Therefore, Britain adopted a realistic 
policy toward the United States that led to "acquiescence in the American demand that 
Britain should retire from her Central American territories with the exception of British 
Honduras. " 17 
After the Crimean War, Britain was wary of war, newspapers urged peace, and 
Palmerston concluded that Britain and America had "too many interests in common" to 
go to war. 18 Palmerston felt it was safe to complain to France and the United States 
about differing interests because the strong commercial ties with those nations would 
help prevent conflict. He "insisted that Britain should practise an assertive diplomacy 
while reflecting that for good reasons it would not lead to war with her main rivals. "19 
Palmerston wanted to protect British interests in the British West Indies, but issues 
away from sensitive British holdings concerned the British public less and less. For 
example, as another dispute was on the horizon over islands off Vancouver Island in the 
Pacific Northwest, Argyll told Russell in December 1859 that the public would not 
support a government in a conflict over "a matter which concerns them so remotely. " 
Therefore, London also decided to withdraw from its Central American possessions 
farther away in the disputed isthmus region, although Colonial Secretary Newcastle 
16 Palmerston quoted in Evelyn Ashley, The Life and Correspondence of Henry John Temple 
Viscount Palmerston, 2 vols. (London: Richard Bentley & Sons, 1879), vol. 2,336-337. 
17 Steele, Palmerston and Liberalism, 56-57. 
18 Williams, Isthmian Diplomacy, 212-223 and 227-266. 
19 Steele, Palmerston and Liberalism, 246. 
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protested on part of the British inhabitants. 20 
Figure 8.3 US Navy Vessel Deployment, 1852-1860 
Source: Calculated from United States, Annual Reports of the Secretary oJ' the Nart y, 
1842-1860. 
Note: EI = East Indies, SA = South America. 
In contrast, while the era began with American maritime interests focused on 
foreign trade, coastwise trade grew in importance. With the close of the Mexican- 
American War, the amount of American coastline interests grew and along with it 
American shipping, naval interests, and sensitivity to the Central American region. The 
1850s marked a significant shift in American strategic outlook. Southern expansionists 
believed that the Gulf of Mexico and Central America offered a new land where the 
slave South could expand its power relative to the Northern States. The Senate 
Committee on Foreign Relations advocated American annexation of the Yucatan and 
Ambassador James Buchanan advocated American possession of Cuba to counter 
British commercial influence. Finally, the thought of a lucrative transportation route to 
the newly acquired Pacific coast attracted American investors and shipping magnates 
20 PRO 30/22/25, Russell Papers, Argyll to Russell, 19 and 21 December 1859, quoted in Steele, 
Palmerston and Liberalism, 294. 
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like Cornelius Vanderbilt, to the isthmus. 21 
US naval deployment reflected this shift in American focus. Figure 8.3 reveals 
that during the 1850s, deployment in the Western equatorial Atlantic and the Pacific 
totalled between 70% and 90% of total American naval deployment. In contrast with the 
African coast, Congress supported this strategic shift and authorised the navy and the 
postal service to contract private companies to service Oregon. The rise in traffic 
between the East and West coasts of America was dramatic and epitomised the shifting 
American interest. West-East gold shipments, for example, rose from $4,140,200 in 
1849 to a staggering $40,233,915 by 1852, dwarfing the value of American trade with 
Africa. 22 American interests were growing in the region, while London wished to avoid 
frivolous conflicts over distant holdings far from a war-weary public. Consequently, the 
nations resolved their disputes rather than go to war and modified their use of sea power 
to release the tensions that had accumulated between them. 
Britain and America believed in the freedom of commerce in the Western 
equatorial Atlantic and focussed most of their use of sea power along the West African 
coast during their dispute over slave trade suppression. In 1850, the Admiralty asked its 
officers for their opinion on the best strategy to stop the slave trade. Hotham, for 
example, articulately phrased the reason for general British strategy: on the Brazilian 
side, for instance, it would be difficult to stop a "slaver amongst a herd of [merchant] 
vessels[. ]"23 Moreover, with the Americans protesting any strong British actions, the 
Royal Navy was also afraid of sparking a diplomatic incident closer to American 
interests. Consequently, Lloyd concluded that the British focussed largely on the West 
21 Charles H. Brown, Agents of Manifest Destiny: The Lives and Times of the Filibusters (North 
Carolina: University of North Carolina Press, 1980), 5-6,16-18 and 29-39. 
22 Brown, Agents of Manifest Destiny, 224. 
23 PRO, Adm 123/173, "Reports from Various Officers as to the Best Means to be adopted for 
the Abolition of the African Slave Trade. 1850" and Charles Hotham to Sir Francis Baring, March 1850. 
230a 
Figure 8.4 Royal Navy Slaver Seizures, 1840-1848 and 1855-1864 
Source: Britain, British Sessional Papers, 1850, vol. LV, 89, and 1861, vol. LXIV, 359, 
and IUP, vol. 91. "Return of Slave-Vessels Captured by Her Majesty's Ships of War 
during the Years 1860 to 1864. " Plotted using AGLS 1.62. 
Note: Plots are for slaver seizures for which head money was awarded. Plots also only 
represent those seizures for which latitude and longitude were given (481 of 794). 
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African coast, with Denman's strategy of close blockade. 24 Thus, Eltis found that 85% 
of slavers captured were stopped off the African coast. 25 Meanwhile, plotting of Royal 
Navy slaver seizures (see figure 8.4) provides further evidence of the Royal Navy's 
focus. 
The US Navy faced similar problems and reached a similar conclusion. The 
threat to capitalist endeavours was clear if sea power was too forceful. Andrew Hull 
Foote told the American Colonisation Society that if patrols were only on the American 
side of the Atlantic, slavers would scatter once leaving Africa and be hard to find 26 The 
Americans also had difficulty differentiating slavers and legitimate traders along the 
American side of the Atlantic. For example, in November 1858, Judge Alexander G. 
Magrath declared that in such cases he was unable to differentiate legal and illegal 
cargo. 27 Deployment in the Western Atlantic would hurt trade, prolong the suffering of 
the slaves, and jeopardise international relations. After the Mexican-American War, the 
region closer to American shores became important strategically for connecting the East 
and West coasts of the United States. Washington became more sensitive to British 
activities in the Central American zone that could connect the East and West coasts of 
the United States. 
The deployment of a larger US Navy force in the late 1850s was meant to 
maintain the uneasy peace between London and Washington over the isthmus and slave 
trade suppression. The American naval force was divided into two theatres: the Western 
Atlantic, covering the Gulf of Mexico and the Central American coast, and the West 
African coast. It was to protect American commerce from undue harassment by the 
Royal Navy and to intercept American filibusters whom London believed acted as a 
24 Lloyd, Navy and the Slave Trade, 165. 
25 Eltis, Economic Growth, 100-101. 
26 A. H. Foote, The African Squadron: Ashburton Treaty: Consular Sea Letters (Philadelphia: 
William F. Geddes, Printer, 1855), 13. 
27 Howard, American Slavers and the Federal Law, 95-100. 
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prelude to wider American territorial expansion. Still, Americans saw no difference in 
Britain stopping US-flagged ships for slavers or filibusters, but for the sake of good 
relations, London accepted the American position on Central America. From 1857, 
London realised that the Americas were sensitive to the United States; London 
interfered at her peril. 
Naval deployment along West Africa thus suited the goals of both countries. 
Policing from the African side concentrated the Royal Navy force and prevented 
interference with the legitimate trade of the Atlantic that could spark conflict with 
America. Focussed largely on the West African coast, Washington and London sought 
to reduce and mitigate potential conflicts. The governments preferred squadron 
commodores who took a calm approach. Those officers who threatened Anglo- 
American relations were reprimanded, whole ships were recalled, and political 
overseers on both sides told their navies to maintain good relations with the other for the 
sake of wider Anglo-American relations. 
British Conflict Resolution Strategy 
Off West Africa, London sought to avoid conflict with the US Navy to preserve Anglo- 
American relations and prevent Atlantic-wide war. This objective was clear soon after 
the Americans established their permanent West African squadron. On 12 December 
1843, the Admiralty wrote its squadron about the 1842 treaty and provided guidelines. 
The squadrons were to share intelligence and join each other when they stopped vessels 
of any flag. But if a suspicious vessel flew the American flag, even if it carried slaves, 
then the Royal Navy was forbidden to interfere. They could only detain such a vessel 
with the co-operation of the US Navy. If a ship proved to be American, the squadron 
was to report the incident to London immediately. 28 The goal of the treaty was to 
28 H. RDoc. No. 104,35th Cong., 2nd sess., 22-24, G. Cockburn and W. H. Gage to Captain John 
Foote, 12 December 1843. 
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preserve Anglo-American relations through protocols that governed the use of sea 
power. 
The maturation of Britain's conflict avoidance strategy, as applied to naval 
relations, is illustrated best during the command of Sir Charles Hotham, from 1846 to 
1849. Hotham, selected because of his diplomatic reputation, told Lord Auckland that 
"an angry shot or a blow here may in spite of both governments [French and British] 
bring us into war. " Therefore, he would not provoke the French "consciously" but 
would "do my duty, giving praise where it is due, & throwing blame on the shoulders of 
those [British officers] who merit it. "29 Hotham also hoped to placate other countries to 
reduce tension, and told his officers that if any nation objected to British searches, the 
British were to deny any deliberate interference in trade. 30 
Auckland confirmed that Hotham was "right in repressing your officers in the 
instances in which they have committed acts of haste and indiscretion[. ] '01 The Royal 
Navy was to carry out its duties, but reprimand officers who threatened wider 
diplomatic relations. Hotham confided to Commander Dunlop that London's goal was 
to remain at peace with all her "allies" while carrying out their tasks. Hotham warned 
that "[i]f they [any country] have violated any treaty then it becomes an affair between 
the two govt & with which we as naval officers have no concern. "32 The British applied 
this concept to Anglo-American relations along both sides of the Atlantic, and the 
Americans reciprocated. In London, for example, with unease in 1848 Europe, Lord 
29 BJL Archives, DDHO 10/8, Sir Charles Hotham, Letter Books, Charles Hotham to Earl of 
Auckland, 25 September 1847. 
30 BJL Archives, DDHO 10/11, Sir Charles Hotham, Secret Letter Book, Charles Hotham to 
Commander Moneypenney, 26 August 1848. 
31 BJL Archives, DDHO 10/2, Sir Charles Hotham, Letters from Lord Auckland, Lord Auckland 
to Commodore Sir Charles Hotham, 20 December 1847. 
32 BJL Archives, DDHO 10/11, Sir Charles Hotham, Secret Letter Book, Charles Hotham to 
Commander Dunlop, 28 May 1848. 
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Dundas feared a general war. He warned that "we may keep out of it[, ]" but "when ever 
[sic] a shot is fired - we ought to be well prepared - on both sides of the Atlantic. 9933 
Anglo-American Co-operation off West Africa, 1840s and 1850s 
Britain defined its strategy, applied it to Anglo-American relations, and hoped for co- 
operation with the United States to further objectives and reduce tension. Both Britain 
and the United States believed that sea power could further long-term goals, but they 
used their navies differently, and co-operative efforts were limited. The US Navy 
protected American interests off West Africa while the Royal Navy combined slave 
trade suppression, commercial objectives, and countering the French. The effect of the 
difference was clear to Perry. He told Commodore John Foote, Royal Navy, on 20 May 
1844, that his squadron was small, had other duties, a large cruising ground, and joint 
cruising would be "less effective than might be desired. "34 
Four of the Perry brothers had fought in the War of 1812, and Matthew Perry 
still eyed the British with suspicion. 5 Perry expressed his suspicions in a private 
memorandum to the Secretary of the Navy in May 1844. He was wary of Britain's 
continued desire for a mutual right of search and believed they hid their true motives 
under the claim of slave trade suppression. But Perry lived up to his reputation for calm 
thoughtfulness and told the Secretary that he might have misjudged the British; his 
comments should remain confidential. 6 Perry met accusations of unwarranted British 
interference with American shipping, and despite his opinion developed a working 
relationship with his British counterparts. Nevertheless, British and American vessels 
33 BJL Archives, DDHO 10/3, Sir Charles Hotham, Letters from Lord Dundas, Lord Dundas to 
Charles Hotham, 31 October 1848. 
34 NA, RG 45, Squadron Letters, vol. 105, African Squadron, M. C. Perry to John Foote, 20 May 
1844 and H. RDoc No. 104,35d Cong., 2nd sess., 21, M. C. Perry to Secretary of the Navy, 21 May 1844. 
35 Schroeder, Matthew Calbraith Perry, 116. 
36 NA, RG 45, Perry letter books, M. C. Perry to Secretary of the Navy, "Private Memorandum of 
Commodore Perry addressed to the Hon[erable] Secretary of the Navy, " 21 May 1844. 
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rarely cruised in company, and "co-operation" was mostly restricted to intelligence 
sharing as the next best strategy. 
The rules for sea power were most successful when American and British 
vessels cruised in company. The joint patrols that occurred South of the equator in 1850, 
for example, marked the first since the Tucker-Paine agreement for any extended 
period. The Perry cruised with the Cyclops, off Ambriz, in April and May 1850, with 
little tactical result. Meanwhile, the John Adams, cruising with the Cyclops, captured the 
American slaver Excellent. British Commodore Fanshawe exclaimed that it was the 
"first fruit of our renewed co-operation[. ]"37 But in the absence of joint cruising, the 
treaty provided an incentive for the British to find a US warship to handle a suspect 
ship, rather than board it and sour diplomatic relations. 
In a speech to the American Colonisation Society, Andrew Hull Foote concluded 
that without the Webster-Ashburton Treaty, "British officers would not have gone in 
search of an American cruiser to report" suspected slavers. 38 In August 1844, for 
example, Commodore John Foote told Perry that he suspected the American vessel 
Imogene was a slaver. Perry thought it was prudent to investigate a report from the 
senior British officer. 39 But the most important dynamic of the Anglo-American 
relationship along the West African coast was conflict and its resolution. Up and down 
the "chain of command, " at the naval and political levels, Britons and Americans 
worked to mitigate their disputes over the application of sea power, rather than threaten 
Anglo-American relations further. 
37 Foote, Africa and the American Flag, 273-278 and 311-318 and NA, RG 45, Squadron Letters, 
vol. 108, African Squadron, Arthur Fanshawe to Commodore Gregory, 17 May 1850. 
38 Foote, African Squadron, 5-6; Foote, Africa and the American Flag, 301-323; and NA, RG 45, 
Squadron Letters, vol. 108, African Squadron, Andrew H. Foote to Commodore Francis H. Gregory, 14 
September 1850. 
" NA, RG 45, Squadron Letters, vol. 105, African Squadron, M. C. Perry to John Y. Mason, 28 
November 1844 with enclosures A and B. 
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Anglo-American Conflict along West Africa, 1840s and 1850s 
Historians, like Robert L. Robinson, concluded that by the end of Perry's tenure the 
British were of little threat to the United States. 40 But Perry's successor, Skinner, 
believed that on the West African coast "we most frequently come in contact with our 
great commercial rival; here, under the pretext of ascertaining nationality, our vessels 
are liable to be boarded[. ]"41 Americans became increasingly wary of British dominance 
along the coast. British treaty-making efforts, ostensibly to establish free trade, suppress 
the slave trade, and counter French moves, drew American suspicion. The Americans 
believed that other powers, especially the British, sought to carve up the African coast 
for their exclusive domain. 
Perry, for instance, believed that only with diligence would the local people 
accept American goods, like cotton cloth. He opined that the British enjoyed a 
monopoly under the protection of the Royal Navy and the Americans "enjoy but a share 
of what is left[. ]9-42 Perry, as Hotham later concluded, also believed that the French were 
attempting to establish outposts along the African coast to annoy "the numerous 
American and English Merchant vessels that are constantly traversing the Northern and 
Southern Atlantic" in the event of war. 43 But the British counter-plan to French actions 
raised equal concern in American eyes. 
They eyed the treaty-making commander Alexander Murray with suspicion 
when, in 1847, he and Governor Joseph Roberts of Liberia discussed British recognition 
of the colony's independence. 44 The Americans were also suspicious when Murray 
40 Robert L. Robinson, "Commodore Matthew C. Perry and the Protection of American Rights in 
West Africa, 1843-45, " Southern Quarterly, 5: 1 (1966): 63. 
41 NA, RG 45, Squadron Letters, vol. 106, African Squadron, no. 44, Chas. Wm. Skinner to 
George Bancroft, 15 December 1845. 
42 NA, RG 45, Perry letter books, M. C. Perry to David Henshaw, 29 January 1844. 
43 NA, RG 45, Perry letter books, M. C. Perry, "Memorandum "AA" to accompany 
communication No. 76 to Navy Department, " 18 November 1844. 
44 NA, RG 45, Squadron Letters, vol. 82 (pt. ), African Squadron, Geo. C. Read to John Y. 
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arrived at Cape Palmas, near another American settlement, and also "engaged in making 
treaties with the native chiefs who owned the territory contiguous to the settlements in 
Liberia. "45 A protectionist outlook coloured American naval reaction to the British, not 
understanding their true intentions. British actions in stopping American-flagged 
vessels, and her economic policy, contributed to the tension along the coast. But several 
incidents reveal that the nations, and their naval officers, sought to prevent relations 
from degenerating. 
In early 1844, for example, the British stopped an American-flagged vessel, the 
Roderick Dhu, on suspicion of slaving. Perry exclaimed that the HMS Spy had passed 
the Roderick Dhu at a "cable's length" and must have seen it was a legitimate trader. 
Perry reminded John Foote that it was unjust for the British to stop US-flagged vessels 
in international waters. He also reminded Foote that Britons were also involved in the 
slave trade; British goods found their way into the slave-trade cycle. But Perry 
biographer John H. Schroeder concluded that Perry "refused to let these exchanges 
escalate[, ]" passed reports of problems with the British to Washington, and "let the 
matter stand. 1946 Perry moderated his views and confessed that Americans often sold 
ships into the slave trade and convicting them was difficult. 47 
Foote also tempered his squadron's use of sea power and told Perry that rather 
than board several suspected American slavers, like the barque Eleanor, he reported 
them to the Americans. Perry and Foote seemed to respond to each other's desire for a 
cordial relationship. Perry told Foote that both governments were sincere in their goals. 
He trusted that the officers of both nations would emulate each other as their 
Mason, 11 December 1846, Alex Murray to Governor Roberts, 8 December 1846, letter A, and Roberts to 
Captain Alex Murray, 10 December 1846, letter B, enclosures in Geo. C. Read to John Y. Mason, 11 
December 1846. 
`S NA, RG 45, Squadron Letters, vol. 82 (pt. ), African Squadron, Geo. C. Read to Jno. Y. 
Mason, 12 May 1847. 
46 Schroeder, Matthew Calbraith Perry, 118-119. 
47 NA, RG 45, Perry letter books, M. C. Perry to John Foote, 4 March 1844. 
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governments had instructed, while "being careful not to interfere with the duties of each 
other. " Perry thanked Foote for the polite manner Foote supplied information, and 
wished him the best for his return to England. 48 
But at the political level, both nations also used their officers as "scapegoats" to 
calm their diplomatic relations. From the British perspective, if the Americans made 
serious objections, London investigated and punished. Washington also reprimanded 
commodores they believed threatened Anglo-American relations. Captain P. C. Dumas, 
of the merchant ship Cyrus, for example, told the Secretary of the Navy that during a 
voyage to Cabinda in June 1844, the HMS Alert treated them like a pirate ship. A crew 
boarded without uniform under British officer C. J. Bosanquet, took the ship's papers, 
and refused to give them back. Perry concluded that if the Cyrus was sold into the slave 
trade, then Bosanquet's actions were justified 49 Lord Aberdeen supported the officer, 
but told Ambassador McLane that Bosanquet was overzealous, and was disciplined. 
Consequently, Aberdeen hoped that the Americans would pursue it no further. 50 
The decade closed along the West African coast with continued American 
objections to overzealous British officers. It led in late 1858, to London again 
reprimanding officers for the sake of Anglo-American relations. In September, for 
example, the Admiralty ordered the Alecto home after it seized the American-flagged 
vessel, Caroline, although London defended the actions of the officers against what they 
believed was a slaver. 51 In 1859, the Americans accused the Royal Navy of telling US 
vessels they would be sent to the United States, tried as pirates and put to death if they 
kept flying the US flag. London doubted the claim, but to appease the Americans, the 
48 NA, RG 45, Perry letter books, M. C. Perry to John Foote, 4 March 1844. 
49 NA, RG 45, Perry letter books, M. C. Perry to Commodore William Jones, 6 January 1845; 
IUP, vol. 29, Correspondence with British Commissioners Relative to the Slave Trade (Class A), 99-100 
and 110-111, enclosures 209 and 233 in no. 9, P. C. Dumas to Secretary of the Navy, 15 August 1845 
[misdated, actually 15 August 18441 and C. J. Bosanquet to Commodore Jones, 12 May 1845. 
so NA, RG 59, Dispatches, Britain, no. 5, Aberdeen to Louis McLane, 15 September 1845, 
enclosure in Louis McLane to James Buchanan, Secretary of State, 18 September 1845. 
51 PRO, Adm 123/164, J. W. Grey to Secretary of the Admiralty, 13 November 1858. 
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Under-secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Seymore Fitzgerald, told the Admiralty. 
The Admiralty responded and warned its officers to make no such threats against US 
vessels, nor destroy evidence like US flags. They told Rear Admiral Frederick William 
Grey to "warn the officers under your command to guard against any just cause of 
complaint being given to the Government of the United States[. ]"52 
The Americans exerted similar restraint over their officers. In late 1845, for 
example, the British accused the Americans of avoiding patrolling certain regions, like 
Cabinda. Commodore Skinner, upset, declared that he had sent the Yorktown there "to 
protect the American flag from violation" and that any foreign warship that visited 
American-flagged vessels did so at their peril. 53 But in Washington, Secretary of the 
Navy Mason wanted good Anglo-American relations maintained. He confided to 
Commodore Read, Skinner's replacement, that the British Ambassador to Washington, 
and Lord Palmerston in London, were concerned about Skinner's belligerent comment 
that further British action "may interrupt the harmony which happily exists between our 
respective Governments. " Therefore, Mason impressed on Read that "care must be 
taken to give no just cause for" complaint by London. 54 
Along the West African coast, Britain and the United States shared intelligence 
and sometimes co-operated. Furthermore, for the sake of Anglo-American relations, 
they worked to contain potential conflicts and reduce tensions so that the separate 
objectives of each nation could continue. Officers with reputations for calm and 
reasoned decision-making were called upon while those who threatened peace were 
reprimanded, vessels recalled, and orders issued for both navies to be respectful toward 
52 PRO, Adm 123/164, Seymore Fitzgerald, Foreign Office, to Secretary of the Admiralty, 30 
April 1859 and Admiralty to Rear Admiral F. W. Grey, 4 May 1859. 
53 IUP, vol. 33, Correspondence with Foreign Powers (Class D- 1846), 124-127, enclosure 2; 3, 
and 4 in no. 77, Chas. Wm. Skinner to Commodore Jones, 4 November 1845, W. Jones to Commodore 
Skinner, 25 and 27 December 1845, and W. Jones to R. T. Lowry Corry [Secretary of the Admiralty], 31 
December 1845. 
54 NA, RG 45, Secretary of the Navy Confidential Letters, Sept. 12,1843 to Feb. 28,1849, J. Y. 
Mason to Commodore Read, 16 November 1846. 
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each other. The use of sea power, navies and men, were a safety valve through which 
Anglo-American disputes could be contained. On the American side of the Atlantic, 
where the consequences of conflict had broader ramifications because of the closeness 
of sensitive American home waters, their naval relations also provided a release 
mechanism to reduce tensions when Anglo-American relations clashed. 
Anglo-American Relations and Central America 
Despite British influence over Belize and Superintendent Macdonald's activities, 
Washington remained unconcerned until Britain pursed Texas in its war against the 
slave trade, and when tensions between Mexico and America degenerated into war. On 
18 October 1840, Palmerston told General J. Hamilton of Texas that Britain would 
recognise Texan independence if they entered into an agreement with the British for 
slave trade suppression. Palmerston's efforts proved futile and Texas was "annexed" in 
1845.55 Then, in December 1845, President James K. Polk warned European powers 
that an attempt at a "balance of power" strategy within North America was 
unacceptable. Under the fear of British influence in the region, New Granada, or 
Colombia, and the United States signed a treaty in 1846 that gave the United States the 
non-exclusive right to the Panama isthmus for lawful commerce. 56 The region was in 
turmoil in the wake of the collapse of the United Provinces. Soon, private American 
citizens, the filibusters, aided in the wars. With new American interest in the region, 
London realised that outstanding issues had to be settled with the co-operation of the 
only substantial power with interests in the region, the United States. 
Palmerston, again in the Foreign Office by 1846, saw the ramifications of the 
American acquisition of California. In response, he extended the boundaries of British 
55 IUP, vol. 20, (Class D), 68-70, no. 84, Palmerston to General Hamilton, 18 October 1840. See 
also, Humphreys, British Honduras, 52. 
56 United States, Congressional Globe, 29th Cong., 1" sess., Appendix, 1-8, James K. Polk, 
"Message of the President of the United States, " 2 December 1845. See also, Williams, Isthmian 
Diplomacy, 45-46 and 53-54 and Bemis, Diplomatic History of the United States, 244-246. 
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territories to control the San Juan River and potential transit route. The British, 
controlling a force of Mosquitans, took control of San Juan del Norte in 1848 and 
renamed it Greytown. The Americans failed to do anything overt to repel the British, 
but signed a treaty with the Nicaraguans giving the United States the exclusive right to 
build and protect a canal through nearby Nicaraguan territory. The British responded by 
signing a similar treaty with the Costa Ricans for the potential Greytown Atlantic 
terminus. But when the British negotiator convinced a local Royal Navy officer to seize 
Tigre Island on the Pacific Coast and run up the British flag, Palmerston disavowed the 
action. 57 Central America was becoming embroiled in a diplomatic game of chess that 
threatened Anglo-American relations. 
Palmerston told Ambassador George Bancroft, former Secretary of the Navy, 
that Britain had no desire to exploit its Central American possessions; it had enough 
colonies already and Britain and the United States had common interests in the region. 
Bancroft remained wary, and Palmerston was suspicious of American talk of Manifest 
Destiny. He agreed to the seizure of San Juan simply to keep the Americans from 
securing a monopoly on a transit route. But The Times advised peaceful settlement of 
matters between all parties. 58 Bourne surmised that Palmerston knew he had to modify 
British strategy toward America because of the nation's growth from the Atlantic to the 
Pacific. Bourne concluded that "the best Britain could now do was very cautiously to 
contain the expansion of the United States into Central America and the Caribbean. " 
The resulting compromise to allow America into the region, was the Clayton-Bulwer 
Treaty. London sent Sir Henry Bulwer, a "friend and protege of Palmerston's, " to 
Washington to negotiate a settlement. 59 
250. 
s' Williams, Isthmian Diplomacy, 51 and Bemis, Diplomatic History of the United States, 247- 
52 Williams, Isthmian Diplomacy, 68-74 and 80-109. 
59 Bourne, Foreign Policy of Victorian England, 56-60. 
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The free and open access philosophy that emerged over Anglo-American access 
to any isthmian transit route was similar to, and consistent with, Britain's West African 
policy. Rather than precipitate war, Britain sought equal access under the protection of 
naval power. The Clayton-Bulwer Treaty (1850) committed that neither would control, 
fortify, nor colonise in the isthmus. Secretary of State John M. Clayton and Sir Henry 
negotiated in a tense atmosphere as Americans still express discontent over Britain's 
Central American possessions. But after the treaty was signed, London's problem was 
how to implement the treaty while American expansionists roamed the isthmus. If the 
United States continued to actively pursue control of Central America, in violation of 
the newly signed treaty, it was difficult for the British to abandon her settlements. The 
result was a slow series of negotiations with Central American states, whereby British 
rights and honour were protected, while London transferred locations like the Mosquito 
Coast and Bay Islands back to Central American sovereignty. 60 
The Filibusters 
During the late 1840s, American commercial, territorial, and strategic interests focussed 
on the North American continent making America more sensitive to events in their 
home region. Many Americans coveted Cuba as a potential slave state, while the 
Central and Southern American states were weak and susceptible to anyone with 
scheming plans such as industrialists and filibusters who advocated the "Manifest 
Destiny" of American hegemony. 61 Filibusters were Spanish-American nationalists and 
American expansionists who led private military expeditions against other nations, 
usually in Central and South America, using the United States as a base. 62 America's 
60 Bemis, Diplomatic History of the United States, 249-250; Williams, Isthmian Diplomacy, 73- 
74 and 80-109; and Humphreys, British Honduras, 55-58. 
61 Janice E. Thomson, Mercenaries, Pirates, and Sovereigns: State-Building and Extraterritorial 
Violence in Early Modern Europe (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), 78 and 118-119. 
62 Filibusters, originally from the Dutch term vrybuiter; the free booty pirates (Brown, Agents of Manifest Destiny, 17-18. 
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interests in Central America are significant because it reveals the strategic importance 
that Americans placed in the region. 
Such interests placed them in direct opposition to historical British interests. 
Consequently, London often feared that the filibuster expeditions were preludes to 
American annexation of strategically important islands, like Cuba, while the slave trade 
that continued from the island thwarted wider British economic goals. Nevertheless, 
British leaders believed that forceful action would simply drive the island into American 
hands. Furthermore, the regions farther South in Central America, were increasingly far 
from the public's interest. London was wary of war over minor disputes in distant 
regions and sought to pacify the Americans. Eventually, the Americans reciprocated and 
the US Navy and Royal Navy, while maintaining a watchful eye on each other, patrolled 
for filibusters who threatened their relations. Anglo-American tension escalated during 
the filibuster crisis, but rather than go to war, both nations showed restraint. 
Filibuster raids from American territory into Cuba and Central America had 
been a problem since the 1840s. Expansionist Southerners called for the annexation of 
Cuba and its half-million slaves as a "good sort of population for a slave state. " 
Contemporaneously, some Cuban whites were upset with the arbitrary rule of the 
Spanish Captain-General. The nexus of interests brewed conditions whereby Cuban 
nationalist filibusters, like Narciso Lopez, although officially condemned by President 
Taylor, launched raids from the United States against Cuba. Southerners like Jefferson 
Davis, Calhoun, and locals around New Orleans supported them. But Lopez's 
endeavours ended in August 1851, when Spanish authorities captured and executed him 
at Cuba. 63 
The filibusters also raised concerns in France and Britain that the Americans, 
fresh from their territorial gains against Mexico, were bent on annexing Cuba. During 
the Lopez expeditions, the governor of the Bahamas, John Gregory, remarked in June 
63 Bemis, Diplomatic History of the United States, 314-316. 
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1850 that if the Americans seized Cuba, it would be as significant as British possession 
of Gibraltar in the Mediterranean. It would give the Americans the power to lock up the 
trade of the Gulf. Palmerston agreed, but slavers continued to operate from Cuba, 
undermining British efforts to support Spain. Palmerston felt able to take stronger 
actions farther South, with Brazil, but he also realised that because the Cuban upper 
class prospered from slavery, such a policy against Cuba might push them into 
American arms. Instead, Royal Navy vessels, such as Trincomalee, were diverted to 
Havana to protect British interests "and warn off American invasions, official or 
unofficial. 9965 When Lopez's operations continued, Britain and France united to preserve 
the status quo. The Admiralty ordered West Indian forces to "give Spain any assistance 
she required to defeat any future American filibustering expeditions against Cuba. " But 
by January 1852, the orders where rescinded when the threat declined. 66 
Rather than push the Americans further, France and Britain suggested, as others 
had during the piracy crisis, an agreement to protect Cuba's independence. The British 
believed that even if rejected, the offer would eliminate the US expansionist cry that 
Cuba was about to fall into British hands. President Fillmore and Secretary of State 
Webster wished to agree to the terms, but it was an election year. Fillmore lost the 
election and Webster died. Edward Everett, interim Secretary in the dying 
administration, noted the British and French assurances, and reiterated that the US had 
no desire to acquire Cuba. But he cautioned the other powers that it was a strategically 
important island along important trade routes. 67 Nevertheless, Bemis concluded that 
Britain and America "let the matter drop. i68 
64 Murray, Odious Commerce, 224-225 and fn. 60. 
65 Lambert, Trincomalee, 56-57. 
66 Murray, Odious Commerce, 227. 
67 Bemis, Diplomatic History of the United States, 317-319. 
68 Bemis, Diplomatic History of the United States, 319. 
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Tensions remained high between the nations, but they never went to war. Farther 
South, while America and Britain settled their differences over the Canal Zone, 
American industrialists, like Vanderbilt, continued activities. In 1853, Vanderbilt's 
Accessory Transit Company and Greytown disagreed over the placement of coal 
facilities. The latter destroyed some company buildings in protest and the US warship 
Cyane was dispatched. But Washington relinquished when it was revealed that the 
company violated agreements with Greytown. 69 In 1854, after a company captain killed 
an African citizen of Greytown, the residents pillaged company property. The Cyane 
was again dispatched. Her captain asked the commander of HMS Bermuda to intervene, 
but the latter simply protested "the contemplated bombardment" of the town. Faced 
with no response from Greytown, the Cyane bombarded the town on 13 July, the 
Bermuda observing events. In America, Congress demanded answers. 70 
President Franklin Pierce told Congress that the Cyane was ordered to show 
restraint, had paused between salvos, and "there was no destruction of life. " The people 
of Greytown, "blacks and persons of mixed blood[, ]" were no better than pirates. While 
there were protests from London, it was more complaints "of harshness than of justice. " 
Furthermore, Pierce implied, the British had bombarded communities less offensive 
than Greytown "with much greater severity, and where not cities only have been laid in 
ruins, but human life has been recklessly sacrificed, and the blood of the innocent made 
profusely to mingle with that of the guilty. "71 In response, while upset, London avoided 
military confrontation over the incident. The British were embroiled in the Crimean 
War and the London Globe declared that aboriginal rights were too insignificant for war 
69 Williams, Isthmian Diplomacy, 171-174. 
70 United States, Senate Journal, 33d Cong., 2"d sess., 28 July 1854 and President Franklin 
Pierce to US Congress, 4 December 1854, in Senate Journal, 4 December 1854. 
71 United States, Senate Journal, 33d Cong., 2"d sess., President Franklin Pierce to US Congress, 
4 December 1854. 
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with America. 72 
Instead, by the 1850s, the conflict avoidance and resolution strategy that used 
sea power modifications prevented war. The operations of the Central American 
filibusters also became embroiled in the commercial rivalries, working with rival parties 
for control of the San Juan River and Lake Nicaragua. 73 The presence of these 
filibusters hurt Anglo-American talks over implementing the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty. 
Pierce's administration had prosecuted British agents who had recruited for the Crimean 
War within the United States; he had to act against US citizens undertaking similar 
activities or face renewed criticism from London. While little could be done about the 
commercial rivalries, the US Navy was dispatched to stop filibusters, while the Royal 
Navy stood watch, ready to protect British citizens. 74 
Pierce warned American citizens against filibustering and disavowed the local 
US representative's premature recognition of the new Nicaraguan government, headed 
by filibuster William Walker. In the midst of the Kansas-Nebraska controversy75 over 
the extension of slavery, Northerners hardly wanted Southern expansion into Central 
America. 76 But the British were wary of American activities and feared that Washington 
secretly supported Walker as a means to control the Central American isthmus. In 
72 Williams, Isthmian Diplomacy, 174-186. 
73 Vanderbilt wanted a fast steamer, the Prometheus, to run from New York to San Juan del 
Norte, while the 1,000-ton steamer Pacific would run from San Juan del Sur to San Francisco, and other 
vessels would run the San Juan River and Lake Nicaragua. He created the American Atlantic and Pacific 
Ship Canal Company then spun off its Nicaraguan operations into the Accessory Transit Company. For 
details of how Vanderbilt and his rivals Charles Morgan, Cornelius K. Garrison, Edmund Randolph and 
Alexander P. Crittenden, used the conflict in wrestling for control of isthmus shipping, see Brown, Agents 
of Manifest Destiny, 240-243,320-321,352-355 and 378-380. 
74 The Neutrality Act of 1794, and subsequent laws consolidated in the Neutrality Act of 1818, 
forbade US citizens from serving in foreign services, outfitting armed vessels within the United States for 
the use of a "foreign belligerent" or against anyone with whom the United States was at peace (Thomson, 
Mercenaries, Pirates, and Sovereign, 78 and 118-119). 
75 The Kansas-Nebraska Act was passed in 1854 and allowed for citizens of Kansas and 
Nebraska to decide if they wanted slavery in their regions. But Nebraska also bordered on Iowa, a 
stronghold of Northern antislavery activists. 
76 Thomson, Mercenaries, Pirates, and Sovereigns, 127-128 and Williams, Isthmian Diplomacy, 
189-191 and 194-197. 
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response, by July 1856, London dispatched ten warships to Greytown "as a reminder to 
Walker (and to the United States) [parentheses in original] of British Power until his 
collapse[. ]" Walker was president of Nicaragua by June, and led by Costa Rica, the 
Central American states went to war with Nicaragua to oust the foreigner. 77 
President Pierce publicly condemned filibuster activities in 1856, but also 
warned that the isthmus was as important to Washington as the Suez to "the maritime 
Powers of Europe[. ]" But he wanted free and open access for all nations and was 
disappointed when Britain seized San Juan del Norte and renamed it Greytown. 78 Once 
Walker was ousted, the naval strategy was to patrol for any renewed filibuster activity 
that threatened to upset the region and Anglo-American relations. The USS St. Mary's, 
Charles Henry Davis commanding, was dispatched to San Juan del Sur on the Pacific 
coast to prevent Walker and his forces from interfering with American interests. Walker 
launched several other expeditions, and each time tried to evade detection. But 
Americans increasingly saw Walker as a fanatic and few objected when Honduras 
executed him. 79 
Democrat James Buchanan, the next President, also condemned filibuster 
activities and wanted good relations with Britain, and, now, peaceful American 
expansion. 80 He told Congress that filibuster expeditions interfered with Washington's 
desire for free access to the isthmus. He declared that "[w]e desire, as the leading Power 
on this continent, to open, and ... protect every transit route across the 
isthmus, not 
n Francis X. Holbrook, "The Navy's Cross - William Walker, " Military Affairs, 39: 4 (1975): 
198 and Williams, Anglo-American Isthmian Diplomacy, 200-201 and 211. 
78 Britain, BFSP, vol. 47,1856-1857, Franklin Pierce to the Senate and House of 
Representatives, 15 May 1856. 
79 Holbrook, "The Navy's Cross, " 119-201 and Brown, Agents of Manifest Destiny, 418 and 451- 
457. 
80 Bemis, Diplomatic History of the United States, 327-330; John Bassett More, (ed. ), The Works 
of James Buchanan: Comprising his Speeches, State Papers, and Private Correspondence, 12 vols. (New 
York: Antiquarian Press, Ltd., 1960), vol. 10,103, James Buchanan to Lord Clarendon, 23 February 
1857; and Frederick Moore Binder, James Buchanan and the American Empire (Selensgrove: 
Susquehanna University Press, 1994), 221-225. 
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only for our own benefit, but that of the world[. ]"81 To maintain the route's neutrality, 
Washington encouraged the Central American states to settle with Britain. Therefore, 
treaties were signed between Britain and Honduras on 28 November 1859 and with 
Nicaragua on 28 January 1860. British settler rights were respected on the Bay Islands, 
while Britain agreed to release its protectorate into Nicaraguan sovereignty. 82 
Washington's policy is significant because they worked to calm rivalries while British 
and American naval officers agreed to leave disputes to the diplomats. Britain and the 
United States maintained an uneasy peace, while naval forces patrolled for those who 
might upset it. War would have disrupted the wider interests of both nations. 
Accommodation and Policing the Equatorial Atlantic 
With the renewed strategic sensitivity of Western waters for American shipping 
between the Atlantic and Pacific, Royal Navy seizures of American-flagged slavers also 
contributed to heightened tensions. But the British handled the crisis as they had the 
Central American issue; London saw no point in war with the United States over the 
slave trade. The Gulf of Mexico was different than West Africa, and Britain modified its 
naval policy in the former to reduce Anglo-American tension. By 1858, the Law 
Officers of the Crown solidified British naval strategy: it was best to police the slave 
trade along the African coast, away from the legitimate trade of commercial rivals. 
Meanwhile, because of the Royal Navy seizures, the Americans agreed by 1859 to 
dispatch a stronger naval force of steamers to the Gulf of Mexico and to the West 
African coast, ostensibly to patrol for slavers. Many in the US believed that Britain had 
no right to stop US-flagged ships near US waters, but they also admitted fault for failing 
to suppress the slave trade. Both nations modified their sea power policies as a method 
to accommodate each other and reduce diplomatic tensions. 
81 United States, Congressional Globe, 35th Cong., 2nd sess., 216-217, James Buchanan to the 
Senate of the United States, 7 January 1858. 
82 Williams, Isthmian Diplomacy, 212-223 and 227-266. 
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Some studies claim a deliberate British naval "build-up" to pressure the 
Americans into action against the slave trade, but there is little evidence, beyond 
American opinion at the time, to support this claim. 83 With the increased Cuban slave 
trade by 1857, the British dispatched four additional gunboats to Cuban waters to assist 
the Spanish authorities police the slave trade. But at the urging of the Law Officers of 
the Crown, the gunboats were ordered to only stop slavers without papers or flags. Over 
the spring of 1858, the gunboats captured 2 slavers, later condemned in Vice-Admiralty 
courts, but in the process they also stopped 61 American vessels. Nevertheless, London 
reined in the navy when it threatened to drag Britain into an unwanted war with the 
United States. After American protests, Lord Malmesbury, Foreign Secretary, told 
Parliament that the dispatch of the gunboats was poor judgement and British efforts 
should have remained on Africa. 84 
The American press, diplomats, and politicians condemned Britain's right of 
search, but it raised particular concern with incidents on the American side of the 
Atlantic. After several American ships were stopped near US coastal waters in 1858, the 
New York Times demanded that the government stop the slave trade to placate the 
British. But it also believed that Washington needed to act against the "the British fleet" 
whose actions seemed part of "some preconcerted [British] schemes which require 
further explanation[. ]"85 In London, Ambassador Dallas provided the British with 
several examples from both sides of the Atlantic that showed Royal Navy activities 
interfered with American trade. 
The warship Styx, he noted, reportedly stopped an American vessel carrying 
wood from Jamaica to New York in March. Meanwhile, at least three American vessels 
were boarded at Sapra La Grande and inspected by a British warship, probably the 
83 For example, see Appendix: Piracy and Slave Trade Studies, and Harmon, "Suppress and 
Protect, " 136-138 and McNeilly, "United States Navy, " 209-210. 
84 Murray, Odious Commerce, 262-264. 
85 The New York Times, 20 April 1858,4, column 5 and 13 May 1858,8, columns 4 and 5. 
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steamer Buzzard; the Americans also reported numerous other incidents, particularly in 
the Gulf of Mexico. 86 In response, Dallas believed the United States should abandon the 
1842 treaty, but President Buchanan now believed otherwise. Instead, in May 1858, he 
asked Congress for more power to increase the strength of the US squadron in the Gulf 
of Mexico "and confront the British when they halt American ships at sea. "87 
In Congress, many emphasised British interference with American coastal trade. 
Democratic Senator Robert Toombs, Georgia, for example, exclaimed that the 
Constitution protected Americans from such searchers in their own homes. Yet, Britain 
"without any forms of law" claimed a similar right "in the Gulf of Mexico at our own 
doors" and it was an act of war. 88 But some echoed the New York Times and believed 
they should listen to the British and stop the slave trade. Soulsby concluded that Senator 
Stephen Douglas, Democrat from Illinois, "followed the traditional Western attitude of 
extreme hostility" toward the British. 89 But in reality he appreciated American 
culpability. Douglas demanded that Washington address London's concerns and send 
better warships to the West African and Cuban coasts to suppress the slave trade. 
Nevertheless, Douglas declared that the government must first focus on commerce 
protection in the Gulf of Mexico. 90 
Despite British claims that they issued orders to their ships to stop harassing 
American-flagged vessels, the acts had continued and stirred political and public 
outrage in the United States. 91 Therefore, Congress gave the President the power to 
86 PRO, Adm 1/5699, Dallas to Earl of Malmesbury, 7 July 1858. 
87 United States, Congressional Globe, 35`s Cong., 1" sess., 2495-2496, Senate, 29 May 1858. 
88 United States, Congressional Globe, 35`s Cong., 1" sess., 2495-2496, Senate, 29 May 1858. 
89 Soulsby, Right of Search, 159-160. 
90 United States, Congressional Globe, 35`s Cong., 1s` sess., 2496-2498, Senate, 29 May 1858 
and Binder, James Buchanan, 261-262. 
91 Soulsby, Right of Search, 165. 
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act. 2 Under these circumstances, the navy dispatched a force into the Caribbean headed 
by Flag Officer Edward McCluney. But the status of the coastwise American slave trade 
was nebulous and American efforts to seal their Southern coast met with a lack of 
Federal commitment. 93 In London, on 31 May 1858, Ambassador Dallas told Lord 
Malmesbury that British actions around Cuba, the Gulf of Mexico, and off the West 
African coast were "sudden and seemingly systematised assaults" on American 
commerce. Dallas told Washington that Malmesbury seemed impressed by the 
ambassador's urgent briefing; the issue receiving press in the London Times of that 
morning. It declared that Britain would be equally upset if the US Navy had committed 
such acts against British-flagged vessels. 94 
Britain was willing to settle the dispute rather than risk war with the United 
States over an issue that was largely the cause of Northern abolitionists. Dallas reported 
that "I have the assurance of the leading men among the [free trade] Radicals that they 
are averse to this system of meddling with the rights and business of others[. ]"95 
Meanwhile, on 2 June 1858, British Ambassador Lord Napier told Secretary of State 
Lewis Cass that London would not "sanction or support any system of supervision over 
the traders of the US in the narrow seas almost within sight of their own shores. " The 
reason, Napier confided to Lord Malmesbury, was that London would not let Northern 
crusaders push London into war. 96 In July, Hutt tried to capitalise on the diplomatic 
dispute and again called for the African squadron to be disbanded. But again "Tories 
92 United States, Congressional Globe, 35`h Cong., 1°1 sess., 2496-2498, Senate, 29 May 1858 
and Binder, James Buchanan, 261-262. 
93 McNeilly, "United States Navy, " 210-211; Harmon, "Suppress and Protect, " 136-138; Du 
Bois, Suppression of the African Slave-Trade, 161; and Howard, American Slavers and the Federal Law, 
148,152 and 154. 
94 NA, RG 59, Dispatches, Britain, no. 104, G. M. Dallas to Lewis Cass, 1 June 1858. 
95 NA, RG 59, Dispatches, Britain, no. 106, G. M. Dallas to Lewis Cass, 4 June 1858. 
96 PRO, Adm 1/5699, Napier to Earl of Malmesbury, 7 June 1858. 
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and Whigs combined" and defeated his motion 223 to 24.7 Regardless, in response to 
American protests, London reined in warships and hoped that the powers could develop 
procedures for nationality identification and search. 98 
The Crown Law Officers clarified Royal Navy procedures to avoid conflict and 
restrict naval activity to the African coast. They concluded that naval actions in the 
"Bights of Benin or Biafra, will be subject to very different [strategic] considerations 
[than] if attempted in the Florida Gulf Stream" where there was heavy legitimate 
commercial traffic. 99 Consequently, on station, over summer 1858, British Commodore 
Kellett replied to American representatives that he had ordered a stop to searches and 
the withdraw of his forces from Cuban waters. '°° Farther South, Captain W. Cornwallis 
Aldham, HMS Valorous, at Greytown, told Commodore McIntosh, the US commodore, 
that the British had the right to search any vessels at Greytown, which was a British 
protectorate. On 11 November 1858, the British received reports of filibusters in the 
area and questioned vessels for information. McIntosh protested that he saw no 
difference in searching American ships for " `Filibusters' or Africans[. ]" But it was not 
worth a confrontation and, as off West Africa, they concluded that diplomats, rather 
broadsides, should settled such disputes. '°' 
As the incidents continued, by June 1859, Washington sent war steamers (see 
below, table 8.1) to the Gulf of Mexico and the West African coast. 102 The squadron 
97 Murray, Odious Commerce, 266. 
98 Soulsby, Right of Search, 163. 
99 PRO, Adm 123/167, J. D. Harding, Fitzroy Kelly, and H. M. Cairns [illegible], to Earl of 
Malmesbury, 16 June 1858. 
100 NA, RG 45, Squadron Letters, vol. 102, Home Squadron, Jas. McIntosh to Commander 
C. H. A. H. Kennedy, 18 June 1858 and Jas. McIntosh to Isaac Toucey, 12 July 1858. 
101 NA, RG 45, Squadron Letters, vol. 102, Home Squadron, W. Cornwallis Aldham to James 
McIntosh, 28 November 1858, Jas. McIntosh to Sir W. C. Aldham, 26 November 1858, Jas. McIntosh to 
Sir W. C. Aldham, 29 November 1858, W. Cornwallis Aldham to Jas. McIntosh, 30 November 1858 and 
Jas. McIntosh to Isaac Toucey, 3 December 1858. 
102 The vessels were originally meant to confront Paraguay. In 1855, Paraguay fired at the US 
warship Water Witch while it conducted scientific research. In 1858, the Americans dispatched a 
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around the Americas was to protect "trade and commerce, and to resist the unlawful 
search or seizure of American vessels[. ]" The force was also "to arrest and prevent all 
unlawful expeditions from the United States" to Central America that threatened 
regional stability. '03 
Table 8.1 US Navy Deployment to West Africa and the Gulf of Mexico 
Station Name Propulsion Guns 
Africa San Jacinto 
Mohican 
Sumter 
Mystic 
4 vessels total 
Gulf of Mexico 
Fulton 
Crusader 
Wyandotte 
Mohawk 
Water Witch 
5 vessels total 
Steam Propeller 17 
Steam Propeller 7 
Steam Propeller 6 
Steam Propeller 6 
36 guns total 
Side Wheel Steamer 4 
Steam Propeller 6 
Steam Propeller 6 
Steam Propeller 6 
Side Wheel Steamer 3 
25 guns total 
Source: PRO, Adm 123/164, enclosure in Lyons to Lord John Russell, 21 July 1859. 
But Cass also assured Lord Lyons that the Cuban force would look for slavers and 
intercept those that "may escape the vigilance" off Africa. '04 As off West Africa, the 
Royal Navy would no longer have to interfere in American rights. Rather than go to 
war, both sides settled their dispute by modifying the use of their navies. Further talks 
stalled, and Cass refused to attend an international conference in London on the right of 
commissioner, 2500 sailors, and nineteen warships, to "settle" outstanding issues between the countries. 
Paraguay capitulated, apologised for the attack and signed a commerce and friendship treaty (Binder, 
James Buchanan, 259-261). 
103 United States, Congressional Globe, 36th Cong., 1" sess., Appendix, 15, Isaac Toucey, 
"Report of the Secretary of the Navy, " 2 December 1859 and Howard, American Slavers and the Federal 
Law, 59. Earl E. McNeilly deemed the subsequent West African deployment of some of these vessels as 
the "Buchanan Offensive. " But his chronology was blurred and he failed to consider that the first, 1858, 
deployment of US naval forces was for filibuster patrols (McNeilly, "United States Navy, " 204-230). 
104 PRO, Adm 123/164, Lewis Cass to Lord Lyons, 7 June 1859 and Lyons to Lord John Russell, 
21 July 1859; and United States, Congressional Globe, 36th Cong., 1" sess., Appendix, 13, Isaac Toucey, 
"Report of the Secretary of the Navy, " 2 December 1859. 
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search. '°5 Nevertheless, Secretary of the Navy Isaac Toucey told African commodore 
William Inman that joint cruising was "highly desirable" and Washington was 
"sincerely desirous" to end the slave trade and prevent interference with American- 
flagged ships. 106 
Over 1860, the task of the British and American commanders was clear. When 
Anglo-American economic interests were threatened, the navies even co-operated. In 
February 1860, for example, trading company agents wanted protection and asked the 
British and American navies for help. The US warship Marion, with men from the 
British warship Falcon provided protection for the two British factories. When an attack 
came, the Anglo-American force formed a defensive line and detached a unit towards 
the natives, who then fled. The Americans concluded that "our force and that of the 
English ... co-operated in concert & harmony. "' 
07 As Anglo-American tensions eased 
co-operative efforts occurred. But with the outbreak of the Civil War, complications 
arose. With slavery as a war-rallying cry, Washington believed that if the Royal Navy 
policed the slave trade, it would help the blockade against the Confederates. 108 
Nevertheless, Britain remained wary, and again avoided becoming embroiled in war. 
The Civil War and American capitulation 
In Britain, the coming of the Civil War was uncertain as it seemed more likely that the 
US would continue its Southern enlargement. Palmerston tolerated the United States 
and believed that its expansion South would provide regional stability and a people with 
105 Soulsby, Right of Search, 173. 
106 PRO, Adm 123/164, Isaac Toucey to Captain William Inman, 6 July 1859, enclosure in 
[Admiralty] to [Rear Admiral Grey, Cape of Good Hope], 5 August 1859. 
107 NA, RG 45, Squadron Letters, vol. 114, Thomas W. Brent to Wm. Inman, 6 March 1860, 
enclosure in Wm. Inman to Isaac Toucey, 28 July 1860. 
108 Lincoln blockaded the South's coast and it received recognition from Britain. But the US 
Navy had to reorganise its force, purchase idle merchant vessels, and start construction of new vessels to 
make the blockade effective (William M. Fowler, Jr., Under Two Flags: The American Navy in the Civil 
War [New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1990], 39-59). 
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a "gentlemanly" ethos with whom Britain could deal. Furthermore, if the United States 
grew South, it reduced the possibility that she would attempt intrigues against Canada. 
Steele concluded that "the second Palmerston government, like the preceding Tory 
administration, carried appeasement of the United States to lengths scarcely 
imaginable[. ]"109 The Confederate States caused a problem for Britain and the Foreign 
Office told the Admiralty to act with caution. But a cautious approach again best suited 
British designs. 
The Law Officers concluded that if the British seized Southern-flagged ships, 
delivered intelligence to US Navy ships about them, or co-operated in their seizure, it 
might violate British neutrality laws. The Admiralty feared being drawn into the conflict 
and modified its strategy accordingly. London declared neutrality and the Royal Navy 
ceased sharing intelligence with the US Navy. 110 However, in November 1861, the US 
warship San Jacinto, recently withdrawn from Africa, boarded the British mail steamer 
Trent and took two Confederate representatives, en route to Britain, into custody. 
The Trent affair epitomised Anglo-American maritime relations during the post- 
1812 era. Charles Francis Adams, American ambassador to London, concluded that for 
"centuries" British policy toward the sea was "dictatorial, and especially towards the 
United States[. ]""' Yet now the Americans had boarded a British ship. The British 
prepared for war and ordered Lord Lyons, in Washington, to prepare to come home with 
"the archives of his office[. ]" Meanwhile, the Admiralty ordered Rear Admiral Baldwin 
Walker, on the African coast, to prepare to protect commerce and destroy enemy trade. 
By 15 January 1862, Walker dispatched the warship Penguin with orders to 
109 Steele, Palmerston and Liberalism, 292-293. 
110 PRO, Adm 123/166, Wodehouse to Admiralty, 28 February 1861; PRO, Adm 123/167, J. D. 
Harding, Richard Bethell and [illegible], Law Officers, to Earl Russell, E. Hammond, Foreign Office, to 
Secretary of the Admiralty, 16 and 17 May 1861 and Romaine, Admiralty, to Rear Admiral Sir B. 
Walker, 18 May 1861. 
111 NA, RG 59, Dispatches, Britain, no. 67, Charles Francis Adams to Earl Russell, 6 November 
1861, enclosure in Charles Francis Adams to William H. Seward, 8 November 1861. 
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commanders to immediately attack Americans on the African coast upon notice of 
war. 112 But diplomatic events overtook Walker. 
Palmerston believed that anti-British sentiment in America left Lincoln and 
Secretary of State William H. Seward with little manoeuvring room. But Ernest N. 
Paolino concluded that Seward, an advocate of American expansion, believed in co- 
operation with other powers, and force only when needed, to further American interests 
like in the Pacific after the Civil War. With American naval resources devoted to the 
Civil War, and the virtual abandonment of the West African coast, Seward also gave 
way to Civil War pragmatism. Washington granted London the mutual right of search 
they long desired so that British sea power might increase the effectiveness of the 
blockade on the South. Finally, Britain's unease about Canada, its trade with the North, 
and Washington's concern about fighting a two-front war, combined with French 
support for Britain, to also help settle the affair. 113 
Therefore, on 13 November 1861, Lyons and Seward signed an informal 
memorandum of understanding. British and American cruisers were permitted to stop, 
search, and detain each other's ships within thirty leagues of the West African coast. 114 
Soulsby believed the agreement was a "war-time measure" to gain European support for 
the North while freeing US Navy resources for use against the South. 115 The agreement 
was ratified on 20 May 1862 as the Anglo-American Treaty (1862), virtually identical 
112 PRO, Adm 123/166, Romaine to Rear Admiral Baldwin Walker, 4 December 1861, Paget, 
Admiralty, to Rear Admiral Sir Baldwin Walker, or Senior Officer at Sierra Leone, 18 December 1861 
and B. W. Walker to Captain Alan Gardner, 15 January 1862. 
113 Steele, Palmerston and Liberalism, 297, Ernest N. Paolino, The Foundations of the American 
Empire: William Henry Seward and U. S. Foreign Policy (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 
1973), 32 and 145, and Arthur Power Dudden, The American Pacific: From the Old China Trade to the 
Present (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), 60-6 1. 
114 NA, RG 59, Dispatches, Britain, no. 82, Charles Francis Adams to William H. Seward, 3 
December 1861, no. 95, Charles Francis Adams to William H. Seward, 27 December 1861, and no. 97, 
Charles Francis Adams to William H. Seward, 2 January 1862; PRO, Adm 123/166, Lyons to Earl 
Russell, 13 November 1861 and Lyons and Wm. H. Seward, "Informal Memorandum, " 13 November 
1861. 
115 Soulsby, Right of Search, 174. 
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to the Quintuple Treaty that the Americans had earlier rejected. ' 16 Where once 
Americans objected to British actions, Seward also now hoped that "foreign" fleets in 
the Gulf would "employ not only additional influence, but also additional force in 
suppressing the slave trade[. ]"' 17 
London had experience with operations in such a volatile region. Lord John 
Russell, Palmerston's Foreign Secretary, was wary about the "complications that might" 
ensue if the British attempted to "[v]erify the character of vessels" around Cuba even if 
authorised by Washington. Therefore, the British stayed clear of the war and focussed 
their efforts on the West African coast. 118 But to prevent a potential future crisis, 
London and Washington made one final agreement over the application of sea power. 
To prevent unintended seizures, the British planned to issue passports, signed by a 
British government minister, to vessels involved in legitimate voyages, such as the 
transportation of free Africans. Washington agreed to do the same and by September, 
the British and American Mixed Commission courts at the Cape of Good Hope, Sierra 
Leone, and New York, were prepared to receive captured vessels. 119 
Conclusion 
In the end, Palmerston worked to further British objectives, while avoiding war with the 
116 PRO, Adm 123/166, C. Paget, Admiralty, to A. H. Layard, Foreign Office, 16 January 1862; 
Lyons to Earl Russell, letter one, 11 February 1862, [illegible, by Admiralty Office] to Rear Admiral Sir 
Baldwin Walker, 5 June 1862 and NA, RG 59, Dispatches, Britain, no. 163, Charles Francis Adams to 
William H. Seward, 22 May 1862. 
1" NA, RG 59, Diplomatic Instructions of the Department of State, 1801-1906, Great Britain, 
no. 169, William H. Seward to Charles Francis Adams, 24 January 1862. 
18 NA, RG 59, Dispatches, Britain, no. 116, Charles Francis Adams to William H. Seward, 18 
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Secretary of the Admiralty, 4 October 1862. 
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United States. Although he wanted an independent South for British economic and 
strategic interests, he reconciled that with his desire to end the slave trade. He realised 
that the British public would never sanction an end to the Civil War that allowed slavery 
to continue. Furthermore, when the Confederates began buying British built ships, after 
the initial Alabama controversy, London bought Southern vessels that were under 
construction at Mersey, rather than face more protests from Washington. 120 Along the 
equatorial Atlantic, from the West African coast to slaver and filibuster patrols along 
Central America, the United States and Britain worked to reduce tensions, maintain the 
balance of power, and prevent future conflicts. They modified their use of sea power, 
and set conditions on its application, so they could pursue their separate objectives for 
the equatorial Atlantic while avoiding war with each other. 
120 Steele, Palmerston and Liberalism, 298-301. 
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Conclusion: Sea Power and the Equatorial Atlantic, 1819-1863 
From 1819 to 1863, Britain and the United States used sea power in the equatorial 
Atlantic tactically and strategically. Tactically, they hunted pirates and slavers, 
depending on their level of political commitment. Strategically, both deployed their 
navies to protect and promote commerce and check the activities of other nations. The 
British had clear objectives, backed by unified support from the government and 
commercial class. In contrast, American policy could only focus on commercial affairs 
until the Civil War dealt domestic slavery a blow. When their separate, tactical, uses of 
sea power conflicted with their other goals, it generated Anglo-American tension. But as 
Britain and the United States wished to pursue their objectives and avoid war with each 
other, this common philosophy allowed sea power to be a mechanism to reduce the 
tension in their relationship. To accommodate each other, they modified its use. 
British gentlemanly capitalism, humanitarianism, and liberalism formed a nexus 
with emerging American commercial goals and allowed peaceful use of sea power. 
Through this device, Britain and America related, furthered their clashing interests and 
avoided war. They tried to co-operate over divisive issues, like slave trade suppression, 
reined in naval officers who threatened Anglo-American relations, and deployed those 
who were more diplomatic than confrontational. Anglo-American naval relations in the 
equatorial Atlantic reveal that the nations were neither friends, nor enemies. Instead, 
their relationship was dynamic as each avoided conflict that would disrupt their wider 
interests. This study therefore clarifies the nature of that relationship during the early 
nineteenth century and contributes to the wider field of Anglo-American relations' 
studies. 
Bourne concluded in his study of Anglo-American relations on the North 
American continent, for example, that each nation was suspicious of the other. ' This 
suspicion percolated into their diplomatic and naval relations over piracy and slave trade 
1 Bourne, Balance of Power in North America, 3-10. 
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suppression. American suspicion of Britain was greatest over slave trade suppression 
because of the contentious nature of slavery in the United States and America's fear that 
British naval efforts interfered with American commercial endeavours. Meanwhile, 
British fears of American motives, in particular in the Gulf of Mexico and Central 
America, were illustrated by British unease over the US Navy deployment to fight 
pirates and filibusters. Anglo-American mistrust often clouded their naval relations in 
the equatorial Atlantic. Matzke concluded that the Royal Navy was a warning to 
America to contain her passions. But those in power in both nations wished to avoid 
war. Sea power allowed "peaceful" communication of their policies, and objections, and 
gave each the opportunity to modify the behaviour that the other disliked. 
Lambert describes the Royal Navy, in particular between the Crimean and First 
World Wars, as "the world's most powerful political instrument[. ]"3 But Richmond 
concluded that rivalries harmed the effectiveness of sea power. Athens, for example, 
reached the height of power, but then fell for "want of a wise policy of mutual support 
and mutual sacrifice in the maintenance of her sea power. s4 An opposite dynamic 
occurred during the early nineteenth century. This study revealed that London believed 
that it was better to further objectives peacefully than face war with other nations. 
Britain found that rather than drive the US from the sea, it needed co-operation with the 
United States to further goals like piracy and slave trade suppression, and the 
development of the equatorial Atlantic. 
The British gentlemanly capitalist ideal, the free trade mentality, and liberalism, 
combined during this period with traditional strategic objectives - countering French 
moves and protecting West Indian interests - to mould British naval policy and relations 
with the United States. Cain and Hopkins, and their "gentlemanly capitalist" thesis, 
2 Matzke, "Britain Gets Its Way, " 19. 
3 Lambert, Foundations, 12. 
4 Richmond, Sea Power in the Modern World, 20-21. 
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have been criticised for coming too close to seeing " `Great Britain', `the USA' or the 
whole of `the City of London' as if these were organic entities making a decision or 
advocating a particular line of action. "5 But this analysis revealed that throughout the 
British system, from Whitehall, the Admiralty and its officers, and representatives in the 
regions, Britons worked to further overall national goals in the equatorial Atlantic while 
they avoided provoking interference by other nations. 
Canning, for example, worked to secure British interests with the rebel Spanish- 
American states, but only when the time was "ripe" In turn, the Royal Navy was 
deployed at the insistence of pressure from home to protect British commercial 
interests. Meanwhile, the humanitarian goal of slave trade suppression combined with 
the desire to further economic growth, and shaped British naval policy along the West 
African coast. The British sought to move African production factors into expanding, 
two-way, legitimate commerce, and maintain peace with other nation-states. Although 
the Cain and Hopkins's model is controversial for the era of imperial decline6, it holds 
for the narrower era under consideration in this work. It helps provide an explanation 
for one component of the dynamic of Anglo-American relations in the early nineteenth 
century. For the gentlemanly capitalists and their allies, war would undermine the 
peaceful development of overseas trade. Consequently, sea power had its limits. 
The combined political objectives and philosophies limited the extent to which 
Britain would use sea power against other nation-states, like the United States, to 
compel them to do her bidding. Of the nineteenth century, Hobsbawm concluded that 
"the British government rarely lost its cool ... Diplomacy, the `great game' 
between 
secret agents, even the occasional war, were not confused with the apocalypse. " 7 This 
was also true in her naval relations with the United States. British policy makers 
S Dumett, "Exploring the Cain/Hopkins Paradigm, " 11. 
6 Dumett, "Exploring the Cain/Hopkins Paradigm, " 25-37. 
7 Eric Hobsbawm, On History (New York: The New Press, 1997), 259. 
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avoided all-out war that was in no one's interests, as when disputes arose over the right 
of search, especially close to American shores in the 1850s. 
The United States developed its naval policy from a different perspective, but 
the result was the same, a desire to avoid conflict. During the piracy crisis, the Monroe 
administration deployed forces to the Gulf of Mexico to protect trade. Others in the 
administration, like Thompson, were concerned about strategic over-stretch if they also 
deployed forces to the West African coast to meet Britain's slave trade suppression 
demands. Nevertheless, they tried to appease the British and convince them that they 
were acting against the slave trade. Similarly, during the 1840s, as the potential for 
American economic expansion overseas grew, leaders like Upshur and Webster agreed 
that sea power was important to nurture those interests. But they also realised that co- 
operation with Britain was important to keep the Royal Navy from interfering with 
American shipping. As Buchanan, Cass, and Seward learned, such "appeasement" was 
critical to solve access disputes over the Central American isthmus and to keep Britain 
out of the Civil War. 
Therefore, this study advances the wider field of Anglo-American relations' 
studies that has operated along a continuum of extremes. At one pole, the British and 
Americans were enemies with a gradually formed friendship. At the opposite, they were 
friends whose disputes were anomalies as each learned to relate to one another after the 
Revolutionary War. Instead, a comparative approach revealed that British and American 
naval relations, moulded by their underlying political policies, kept the lines of 
communication open between them. They managed disputes through modifications to 
naval policy to address, as least temporarily, the concerns expressed by the offended 
party. In this way, the wider commercial and strategic objectives of both nations could 
continue. Most previous studies have sought to explain how similar or different 
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historical Anglo-American relations are to today's special friendship. 8 Few have 
endeavoured to explain the relationship beyond this paradigm. 
Crawford, however, revealed that conduits communicated each nation's views of 
the other. His study of The Times of London and its close connection with the political 
elite revealed that misunderstandings accumulated when communications were one 
way. Britain relied more on newspaper accounts from the North than the South. But 
with the Civil War, the South became upset when Britain failed to support their cause 
on economic grounds, like cotton supply. The North became disillusioned when Britain 
declared neutrality despite her support for anti-slavery. In turn, Times' editorials 
objected to Lincoln's emancipation plans, continued to attack the North, yet was 
subdued in its coverage of the Trent affair. Crawford concluded that while the British 
were ideologically close to the South, they increasingly identified more with the 
"rapidly industrializing, bourgeois North, the power of cotton, the transitory lure of free 
trade, and the mythical `cavalier' spirit notwithstanding. "9 
Certainly, an additional conduit in the Anglo-American relationship was 
required to aid this identity connection during this period and release accumulated 
tension. The sea provided one such interface between Britain and America. Both nations 
worked to maintain two-way "communication" along this conduit and solve their 
diplomatic disputes. Therefore, this study revealed, Britain and America were not 
friends, but they kept their relationship from spiralling into war. Nevertheless, for this 
period, their philosophy was intended to further their separate interests, rather for the 
altruistic goal of a "special" relationship. 
Through the conduit of the sea, the "dialectical process" that Gelber postulated 
conditioned Anglo-American relations. He concluded that "the English-speaking 
peoples diverge and then, on a new plane, reconcile clashing interests for the sake of a 
t See this study's Chapter One, 10-15. 
9 Crawford, Anglo-American Crisis, 3-5,13-14 and 135-138. 
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still higher common interest "10 In this case, their "common interest" was furthering 
their own separate objectives. Both used sea power for trade protection, but also realised 
that it could support long-term commercial expansion; reconciling their differences was 
to their mutual advantage. Interest groups - merchants like Hoffman, the gentlemanly 
capitalists and the Lords, and anti-slave traders like Wilberforce, Buxton and the ACS - 
demanded their governments use sea power to support long-term policy. Liberalism and 
the rise of free trade in Britain, and leaders like Palmerston, Peel, Upshur and Webster, 
then facilitated the use of sea power to further these long-term goals and avoid war. 
In this context, this study also opens several avenues of further research. The 
analysis could be expanded geographically to assess Anglo-American relations in the 
Pacific during this period. Arthur Dudden, for example, recognises British, French, and 
American rivalry there, in particular over Hawaii. In December 1842, President Tyler 
warned the other powers against annexing Hawaii. Later, in 1843, the HMS Carysfort, 
commanded by Lord George Paulet, declared the Sandwich Islands a British 
protectorate. But London, as in the regions in my study, "repudiated Paulet's brash act" 
for the sake of diplomatic relations. " During the 1850s, London also feared US 
filibuster raids against Hawaii and Trincomalee was often at the islands as deterrence. 12 
Furthermore, during the Crimean War, Gough concluded that Britain again feared a 
coalition of her enemies, this time Russia aided by American privateers outfitted in 
California. Consequently, Rear Admiral David Price dispatched Artemise and 
Amphitrite to California to defend British interests. 13 
Further work could also broaden the academy's understanding temporally into 
the post-Civil War period and the controversial era of British imperial decline. In 1898, 
10 Gelber, America in Britain's Place, 14. 
11 Dudden, American Pacific, 58-59. 
12 Lambert, Trincomalee, 94-95. 
13 Barry M. Gough, The Royal Navy and the Northwest Coast of North America, 
1810-1914: A 
Study of British Maritime Ascendancy (Vancouver. University of British Columbia 
Press, 1971), 114. 
265 
Yerxa, for example, concluded that Britain was forced to withdraw from the Caribbean 
when its forces were needed closer to home waters to counter the German threat. 14 After 
the Civil War, the United States turned inward and became a stronger federal state. In 
the Eastern equatorial Atlantic, the scramble for Africa began. In Europe, Bismarck 
used the military to establish the German Empire. Imlah concluded that he renewed "the 
notion that war could be a useful and profitable instrument of national policy. " 
Consequently, nations retrenched under protectionism and growing conscript armies. 
London remained the financial centre of the world, but Berlin the focus. 'S But what 
occurred in Anglo-American naval relations between 1865 and Yerxa's era? 
Because of the socio-economic changes that occurred during the nineteenth 
century, historians can also advance the social history of naval officers. Lewis, for 
example, analysed the British naval officer class and concluded that in had to be 
created. Medieval thought reasoned that Britain needed those of the "higher classes" for 
military leadership; simple seamen were inadequate. 16 Cain and Hopkins, and others, 
surmised a "nexus" between the gentlemanly capitalists directing the "economics and 
politics of the empire" and the "command hierarchies of both the army and navy[ . ]"17 
This study strengthens this theory. Officers like Rowley, son of a naval officer, were 
wary that the West Indies squadron would be stretched if it met more demands from 
14 Donald A. Yerxa, Admirals and Empire: The United States Navy and the Caribbean, 1898- 
1945 (South Carolina: University of South Carolina Press, 1991), 5-6. For their relations in the Pacific, 
see Hugh B. Hammett, "The Cleveland Administration and Anglo-American Naval Friction in Hawaii, 
1893-1894, " Military Affairs, 1976 40(1): 27-32. 
'S Imlah, Economic Elements in the Pax Britannica, 17-19. 
16 Michael Lewis, England's Sea-Ofcers: The Story of the Naval Profession (London: George 
Allen & Unwin, Ltd., 1939, reprint 1948), 34-41. Although dealing with officers and men, the tradition 
continued with Lewis, A Social History of the Nary, 1793-1815 (London: Allen & Unwin, 1960), 
Christopher Lloyd, The British Seamen, 1200-1860: A Social Survey (London: Collins, 1968), and 
N. A. M. Rodger, The Wooden World. - An Anatomy of the Georgian Navy (London: Collins, 1986). More 
recent studies, for example, include Brian Vale, "Appointment, Promotion and `Interest' in the British 
South America Squadron, 1821-3, " Mariner's Mirror 88: 1 (February 2002): 61-68 and Gregory C. 
Kennedy, "Britain's Policy-Making Elite, the Naval Disarmament Puzzle, and Public Opinion, 1927- 
1932, " Albion 26: 4 (Winter 1994): 623-643. 
17 Dumett, "Exploring the Cain/Hopkins Paradigm, " 40 and fn. 66. 
266 
merchants. In contrast, the ruling elite selected officers like Hotham, with his 
aristocratic Yorkshire connections, for their ability to relate diplomatically with other 
powers to further British strategic and commercial goals. 
Meanwhile, my previous work revealed that the background of US officers 
evolved over 1845 to 1861 to include more from the commercial class. 18 Yet Karsten 
revealed that US officers, like Academy Superintendent Louis Goldsborough and Alfred 
Thayer Mahan, son of the army's Professor Mahan, despised merchants. Goldsborough 
believed they were greedy. Mahan, the prophet of US naval expansion, held "the 
Academy disdain for those who `attach to the making and having [of] money' a value in 
excess of what Mahan thought proper. "19 Views opposite the British gentlemanly 
capitalists, some American politicians and some fellow officers. Yet, despite personal 
opinions on slavery, the navy supported commercial endeavours and officers, like 
Mayo, offered opinions on economic development. Clearly, the attitude of US officers 
reflected the changing American society. An important aspect of comparative analysis 
would be to assess what impact class connections and education had on professional 
beliefs over the nineteenth century as nations rose and economies changed. A "paired 
study" of Britain and America, with different dominant or rising classes, would 
highlight any trends. ° 
IS Hunter, "Naval Academy and its Youth, " Chapters Three and Four. See also, Hunter, "Youth, 
Law, and Discipline at the US Naval Academy, 1845-1861, " The Northern Mariner/Le Marin du nord, 
10: 2 (April2000): 23-39. 
19 Peter Karsten, The Naval Aristocracy: The Golden Age of Annapolis and the Emergence of 
Modern American Navalism (New York: The Free Press, 1972), 186-189. For a similar study, see 
Christopher McKee, A Gentlemanly and Honorable Profession: The Creation of the US. Naval Officer 
Corps, 1794-1815 (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1991). McKee used "gentlemanly" as a 
descriptor for the officers. He concluded that the US Navy developed a good officer corps because it 
selected good men from the beginning and moulded them to the navy's requirements. Most midshipmen 
in the pre-1815 navy were from maritime regions, had a family maritime tradition, but although from the 
"middle class" they were financially insecure. Still, most obtained midshipmen appointments through 
immediate family political and naval connections (McKee, xi-112). 
20 Dealing with the twentieth century, such a study is Dirk Bönker, "Naval Professionalism and 
the State in Tum-of-the-Century Germany and America, " in William M. McBride and Eric P. Reed, 
(eds. ), New Interpretations in Naval History: Selected Papers from the Thirteenth Naval History 
Symposium (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1998), 111-138. Bönker concluded that German and 
American officers "pursued comparable domestic agendas predicated on the creation of an autonomous 
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National goals shaped the individual differences behind applying sea power in 
the equatorial Atlantic. These differences then fomented Anglo-American conflict when 
the opposing views of the "interest aggregations" clashed. Nevertheless, both nations 
believed that they could use sea power to further their economic objectives peacefully. 
The American strategy to use their navy to nurture and protect trade, and Britain's 
pragmatic liberalism, allowed sea power to be a mechanism of accommodation in their 
relationship. Because of their grander objectives, London and Washington were able to 
maintain peace between their nations. Their wider strategies meant that when tensions 
mounted they modified their use of sea power to accommodate each other, while each 
furthered their separate goals. In the Anglo-American relationship, both were realists, 
pragmatists, and possibly opportunists, rather than friends. 
politico-institutional space beyond any serious civilian control" (BÖnker, 111). Meanwhile, R. L. Davison, 
protege of Barry Gough, is discovering a conservative Royal Navy officer class confronting the decline of 
empire and its ramifications for the officer class and its political connections (Davison, "The Dismissal of 
Admiral Sir John Jellicoe December 1917 -A Naval Revolution, " paper presented to the Society for 
Military History, Knoxville, TN, 3 May 2003). 
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Appendix: Piracy and Slave Trade Studies 
My study revealed that navies played a role in Anglo-American relations in the 
equatorial Atlantic. Naval relations provided a mechanism through which London and 
Washington related and reduced tensions rather than go to war. Jan Glete concluded that 
during the nineteenth century navies were involved in several interrelated tasks 
associated with national interests: piracy suppression, responding to attacks on Western 
interests and property, and slave trade suppression. ' By their nature, issues involving 
piracy and the slave trade dealt with the national economic and strategic concerns of 
several maritime nations, in particular Britain and the United States. This study added to 
the academy's understanding of piracy and slave trade suppression. Furthermore, the 
analysis of how the United States and Britain formulated policy regarding these issues, 
in a geographically contiguous zone, revealed the role of sea power in furthering 
economic goals and in the Anglo-American relationship. 
Within this context, piracy and slave trade studies have neglected what British 
and American policies, and their use of sea power, reveal about Anglo-American 
relations in the early nineteenth century. Paul Kennedy analysed economic change, but 
its ramifications on international maritime relations were only that many powers were 
sceptical of Britain's free trade mentality. 2 Even for him, piracy suppression was just 
another duty of the Royal Navy to free "the seas for trade[. ]" Meanwhile, despite his 
claim that the Royal Navy was used to enforce an informal empire and support free 
trade, he made little of its West African activities. He concluded that British problems 
were "as much a comment upon the obstructionism of other governments and the 
cunning of the slavers as upon the effectiveness of British sea power. "3 Beyond 
Britain's fear of the rise of general American and French naval power, naval relations 
Glete, Navies and Nations, 419,442-443 and 475. 
2 Kennedy, British Naval Mastery, 152. 
3 Kennedy, British Naval Mastery, 164-165. 
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during this period were not his concern. 4 Specific piracy and slave trade studies also 
suffer from a lack of analysis linking naval and Anglo-American relations. 
But connecting the geopolitical asides and the political and economic analysis 
established by the fields of piracy and slave trade studies revealed their potential as 
evidence in an analysis of international relations. Robert Ritchie (1986), in his study of 
Captain Kidd, remarked that as the Atlantic economy expanded, and goods became 
more readily available, pirate activities conflicted with national goals. Consequently, 
Britain began policing the piracy that hurt its trade. The British established Vice- 
Admiralty courts, put pirates on trial, and provided the Royal Navy with rewards for 
pirate captures. 5 Meanwhile, Marcus Rediker (1987), although studying pirate life, 
concluded that authorities began policing pirates because they had established 
themselves in opposition to the interests of the ascending capitalist society. 6 Finally, 
Janice E. Thomson (1994) offers the most theoretical illumination of how piracy shaped 
international relations, in a wide study of numerous "non-state actors, " including those 
on land and sea. She concluded that the state wrestled control of violence away from 
these non-state actors because of pressure from other states to control the violent and 
private actions of citizens. 7 
Several other authors have also analysed the circumstances surrounding the rise 
and fall of piracy that are useful because they reveal a relationship between political 
problems, economic interests, and policing the seas. Jenifer Marx (1992) studied piracy 
° Kennedy, British Naval Mastery, 157. 
s Robert Ritchie, Captain Kidd and the War against the Pirates (Cambridge, MA and London, 
England: Harvard University Press, 1986), 12. See also, Ritchie, "Government Measures against Pirates 
and Privateering in the Atlantic Area, 1750-1850, " in David J. Starkey, E. S. van Eyck van Heslinga, and 
J. A. de Moor, (eds. ), Pirates and Privateers: New Perspectives on the War on Trade in the Eighteenth 
and Nineteenth Centuries (Exeter: University of Exeter Press, 1997), 10-28. But Ritchie deals almost 
exclusively with the eighteenth century and concludes with the "end" of privateering after the Crimean 
War. 
6 Marcus Rediker, Between the Devil and the Deep Blue Sea: Merchant Seamen, Pirates, and the 
Anglo-American Maritime World, 1700-1750 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 261-262. 
7 Thomson, Mercenaries, Pirates, and Sovereigns, 4-20. 
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from the seventeenth to twentieth centuries. She opined that piracy arose during times of 
political upheaval and weak law enforcement. 8 Basil Lubbock's work (1993) on piracy 
and slave trade suppression is incomplete notes and preliminary conclusions. But he 
believed that piracy ended around Cuba in the nineteenth century only when the Royal 
and United States Navies squeezed the island from both ends. 9 David J. Starkey (1994), 
J. L. Anderson (1995), and Richard Pennell (1995) have focused on the economic and 
political factors that gave rise to piracy. Anderson divided piracy into three forms: part 
of the local economic system (intrinsic); connected with the degree of trade (parasitic); 
and connected with trade disruption (episodic). 10 Meanwhile, Pennell discussed Spain's 
political and economic weakness, use of privateers, and how they undertook 
i "unauthorised" or "pirate" actions. " 
But Starkey analysed the relationship between changing market conditions, the 
role of the state, and the occurrences of piracy. He divided piracy into five long and 
short waves. The long waves were a result of "chronic deficiencies" in North African 
and Caribbean economies, while the short waves occurred largely because of the 
"oversupply in the market for seafarers" after the major wars of 1603,1714 and 1815. 
Starkey analysed pirates in terms of the microeconomics of business: the supply and 
demand of goods and services. He concluded that piracy occurs when there is market 
disequilibria, in particular an oversupply of seafaring labour. To gain employment, these 
seafarers entered piracy and flooded the market with cheap pirated goods. The supply of 
cheap pirated goods "to buyers" in an "alternative market" from that to which the goods 
were originally intended sustained the demand for piracy. Until the economy reallocated 
8 Marx, Pirates and Privateers of the Caribbean, I and 284-291. 
9 Basil Lubbock, Cruisers, Corsairs & Slavers: An Account of the Suppression of the Picaroon, 
Pirate & Slaver by the Royal Navy during the 19'h Century (Glasgow: Brown, Son & Ferguson, Ltd., 
1993), v-10 and 86. 
10 Anderson, "Piracy and World History, " 180-194. 
11 Pennell, "State Power in a Chronically Weak State" 353-355 and 368-372. 
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the "production factors, " and the labour market returned to equilibrium, this trend 
continued. Meanwhile, the state supported "piracy" when it too consumed their services 
and authorised or condoned attacks on a rival's commerce. Consequently, Starkey 
concluded that piracy arose "when substantial disequilibria emerge between the demand 
and supply of commodities, military services and the production factors of shippers. " 12 
Starkey's theory is significant because of its explanation for the decline of piracy 
and accompanying state intervention with sea power to police the "marketplace. " The 
state, consumers, and merchants supported pirate activities when there was demand- 
supply disequilibria. During times of disequilibria, piracy filled the gap between supply 
and demand for goods and seafaring labour. Slowly, during such short waves of piracy 
as occurred after 1815, legitimate commerce began to fulfil the needs of consumers and 
the labour-market oversupply was cleared. Piracy declined as the equilibrium was 
restored, then in the interest of the merchant and state interest-aggregation "the violence 
of the courts and the navy were deployed to eliminate pirates" from the competition. 13 
My study revealed that sea power was used in peacetime, against piracy and the slave 
trade, when it met the demands of the nexus of government and private interests to 
further their economic goals. Therefore, the reaction of the state and those interests to 
piracy and the slave trade illuminated their objectives and relationships with other 
nations, in particular commercial rivals in the same region. 
The state of slave trade suppression historiography is similar to that of piracy. 
Recent literature has focused largely on the abolition movement or the actual slave 
trade, rather than slave trade suppression. Nonetheless, several authors have discussed 
the role of the slave trade in the Atlantic economy, a zone where the economic interests 
of several nations have traditionally met. Joseph C. Miller (1988) postulated that the 
slave trade became part of the West African economy in the form of reciprocity in 
12 Starkey, "Pirates and Markets, " 59-61. 
13 Starkey, "Pirates and Markets, " 61,71 and 77-78. 
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human beings. He focussed on the role of the slave trade in the African economy and 
how it became integrated with the Atlantic economy. 14 Other authors have focussed on 
the British abolition movement. Seymour Drescher (1987) believed that ideas were 
important in ending the slave trade because it was an economic endeavour that brought 
enough benefits to those who utilised it. 15 
In contrast, David Eltis (1987) drew the most significant conclusions related to 
economic beliefs and policy making. He opined that a fundamental belief in the free- 
labour market guided British leaders more than any moral outrage against slavery. 
While the slave trade was economically beneficial to Britain, the upper class determined 
policy. Among them were Lord Stanley, who authored the Emancipation Act that freed 
slaves in the West Indies, and a range of political leaders from Lord Aberdeen, to Lord 
Palmerston, and Lord John Russell. Eltis conducted a basic statistical analysis of Royal 
Navy West African deployment. At its peak, he found that Britain devoted about 15% of 
her total warships to slave trade suppression, but the commitment varied. It was 
reduced, for example, when ships were needed during the Crimean War. 16 Nevertheless, 
Eltis offered little further link between policy, naval deployment, and Anglo-American 
relations, thus providing an avenue of further research. 
Specific naval slave trade suppression studies have been limited to a small 
number of works by several naval historians. As with piracy studies, these works focus 
almost exclusively on the suppression policies and practices of one country, the United 
States or Britain. There is little policy comparison let alone any systematic attempt to 
use comparisons to illustrate the dynamics of sea power and the Anglo-American 
relationship. Christopher Lloyd (1949) and W. E. F. Ward (1969) wrote the two major 
14 Miller, Way of Death, 6-7. 
15 Drescher, Capitalism and Antislavery, 5. Thomas also opined that philosophical beliefs, like 
those of the Quakers, were important in establishing the abolition movement, while the press was 
important in propagating those ideas (Thomas, Slave Trade, 459-471). 
16 Eltis, Economic Growth, 4-18 and 91-94. 
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works on Royal Navy efforts against the slave trade. Lloyd believed that diplomatic 
constraints hampered the Royal Navy's effort, but he mentioned only briefly the United 
States. 17 Ward focussed his study on repeated encounters between the Royal Navy and 
slavers. He concluded that Royal Navy efforts were impaired by Foreign Office failures 
to secure suppression agreements with other countries. But Anglo-American diplomatic 
and naval interaction was not the focus of his study. 18 Both Lloyd and Ward depict 
Americans as guilty, corrupt, or simply indifferent parties. 
American slave trade suppression studies suffer from a similar dearth of 
analysis. American studies deal exclusively with the US Navy with only minor remarks 
about relations with the Royal Navy. Some American authors concede the role trade 
played in creating the US West African squadron in 1842. For example, George M. 
Brooke, Jr., implied in an article (1961) that trade was the primary American goal, and 
American naval commanders sought to "stimulate" American-African trade, but he 
failed to elaborate. 19 As with their British counterparts, most American authors seek to 
analyse American naval deployment from the perspective of its success or failure at 
slave trade suppression, rather than draw broader conclusions about sea power and the 
Anglo-American relationship. 
The exception is John H. Schroeder's biography of Matthew Perry. It includes a 
chapter about younger Perry on patrol in the West Indies for pirates and about his brief 
trips to Africa in the 1820s. In the separate chapter on Perry's West African command, 
Schroeder notes that Perry was suspicious of the British because of his experience 
during the War of 1812, but he was able to relate cordially with his British counterpart. 
Nevertheless, the work is a standard American naval biography and says little about 
17 Lloyd, Navy and the Slave Trade, 12,63-65 and 182. 
18 Ward, Royal Navy and the Slavers, 100,161 and 277. A newer work on Royal Navy actions 
against the slavers is by Raymond Howell, The Royal Navy and the Slave Trade (New York: St. Martin's 
Press, 1987), but his work focuses on the East African slave trade. 
19 George M. Brooke, Jr., "The Role of the United States Navy in the Suppression of the African 
Slave Trade, " American Neptune, 21: 1 (1961): 28-41. 
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Anglo-American relations, how the nations co-existed, or avoided war. As with most 
stories of Perry, the focus leads to his "opening" of Japan. 20 
Nevertheless, from the American naval perspective, two PhD dissertations offer 
the best analysis of American West African naval activity. Earl E. McNeilly (1973) 
concluded that the American squadron was ineffectual because of the lack of 
congressional support. McNeilly mentioned Anglo-American relations briefly, but only 
commented that Anglo-American co-operation was at its height and most effective after 
the outbreak of the Civil War. 21 Judd Scott Harmon's dissertation (1977) examines the 
US Navy's efforts to suppress the slave trade in the equatorial Atlantic. He concluded 
that American suppression efforts were a successful by-product of commerce 
protection, but he offered little insight into the latter policy. While mentioning the Royal 
Navy, Harmon offered little comparison beyond a contrast of Royal and US Navy 
capture ratios. Based largely on this evidence, he concluded that the US Navy was as 
effective as the Royal Navy, but Harmon's study failed to illuminate any trends in 
Anglo-American relations or sea power. 22 Significantly, this study countered many of 
these and other conclusions. 
While other authors have largely ignored Anglo-American relations and naval 
deployment, Hugh Soulsby (1933) studied slave trade suppression within the context of 
Anglo-American relations, but he relegated naval deployment and relations to 
secondary analytical importance. Nonetheless, he concluded that the White House, 
under the influence of John Quincy Adams, was unyielding in its belief that the British 
had no right to search American-flagged vessels for any reason. The American West 
20 Schroeder, Matthew Calbraith Perry, 22-42 and 95-122. Samuel Eliot Morison included one 
chapter on the American West African squadron in his biography of Perry. But Morison focussed on 
Perry's mediation efforts between American colonists and natives, while Anglo-American relations were 
mentioned only briefly ("Old Bruin" Commodore Matthew C. Perry: 1794-1858 [Boston and Toronto: 
Little, Brown and Company, 1967], 163-178). 
21 McNeilly, "United States Navy, " ix-x and 240-242. 
22 Harmon, "Suppress and Protect, " 110-142 and 204-210. 
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African squadron was meant to eliminate Britain's need to stop American-flagged 
vessels. 23 Robert L. Robinson (1966) offers the only significant comment on what naval 
deployment against the slave trade revealed about Anglo-American relations, but for the 
narrow 1843-45 period. He concluded that Anglo-American naval relations were 
initially cool along West Africa because the Americans were suspicious of the British. 
Yet, by the end of Matthew Perry's tenure, Robinson believed, the British offered no 
threat to American interests. 24 This study also proved this notion incorrect. 
Previous studies have contributed little to the understanding of Anglo-American 
naval relations over slave trade suppression and the few conclusions that they have 
drawn have often been misleading. Soulsby, for example, failed to link broader issues 
beyond slave trade suppression in his discussion of the debates in Congress over Anglo- 
American tension in the Gulf of Mexico in the late 1850s. Consequently, he made 
inaccurate remarks about this critical crisis. 25 The period 1857-1858, for example, is 
more complex than other authors believe because they failed to consider the interaction 
of Anglo-American relations, the West African and West Indies theatres. Therefore, this 
study offered a substantial contribution to this phase in Anglo-American diplomatic and 
naval relations. Furthermore, it revealed that naval relations were a conduit in Anglo- 
American diplomacy and conflict avoidance. 
In the naval realm, Harmon and McNeilly, for example, claim a deliberate 
British naval build-up in the West Indies, in the late 1850s, in response to the poor 
suppression efforts of the United States. 26 Yet Lloyd remarked that by 1858, the Cuban 
slave trade was growing to such an extent the Americans had to do something to control 
it and they suggested that the British become more involved around. Spanish 
23 Soulsby, Right of Search, 27-37,88-93 and 159-160. 
24 Robinson, "Matthew C. Perry, " 47-51. 
25 Soulsby, Right of Search, 159-160 (see this study, Chapter Eight, 250). 
26 Harmon, "Suppress and Protect, " 136-138 and McNeilly, "United States Navy, " 209-210. 
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territories. 27 But Lloyd did not cite his sources, nor does he discuss the mechanics of 
Anglo-American diplomatic and naval relations during that period for that region. 
Meanwhile, the resulting American deployment after 1858 has led other historians to 
make several unsubstantiated conclusions. 
McNeilly, for example, contradicted Lloyd, and believed that the Americans 
responded to the so-called British build-up and deployed naval reinforcements, which 
he called the "Buchanan Offensive. "28 Klein further confuses the issue by claiming that 
in 1859 the US Navy actually joined "the British patrols in the Caribbean, though 
initially they could only seize ships carrying slaves. "29 I could not assess Klein's source 
because his work does not contain footnotes. Meanwhile, I showed that McNeilly 
misunderstood the nature of the US naval deployment in the late-1850s because he was 
too focussed on slave trade suppression as the sole determining factor. It was meant to 
stop filibusters, slavers, and the British. But Ward avoids the subject altogether and 
moves from the British seizure of Lagos (1851) to Lincoln's emancipation 
proclamation. 30 Only Murray (1980), admits that the British "build-up" was simply four 
gunboats. 31 
Early in the research design for this study, I discovered these seeming 
contradictions and sought to explain them. I combed primary sources at the Public 
Record Office, London, and the National Archives, Washington, in search of evidence 
of a deliberate British naval build-up in 1858, followed by a specific American naval 
response, and any subsequent co-operation. Instead, I discovered overzealous Royal 
Navy officers on both sides of the Atlantic, with London almost on a weekly basis 
ordering them to stop searching American-flagged vessels. Meanwhile, the minimal 
period. 
27 Lloyd, Navy and the Slave Trade, 170. 
28 See McNeilly, "United States Navy, " Chapter Six. 
29 Klein, Atlantic Slave Trade, 191. In fairness to Klien, his work is a textbook that covers a long 
30 See Ward, Royal Navy and the Slavers, Chapters Nine and Ten. 
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American naval activity occurred largely to stop private American citizens - filibusters 
- from waging private wars in Central America that threatened peace and stability. 
There was no Anglo-American naval co-operation in the Caribbean during 1859 as 
Klein implied. This study showed that Anglo-American interests clashed resulting in no 
substantial co-operation. Both nations sought to reduce tensions generated between their 
naval forces. London realised that it was dangerous to use sea power close to America's 
shores, while with the Civil War, Washington believed that British sea power might 
check Southern slavers. 
The problems in the historiography are caused by studies conducted without 
considering the broader temporal or geographic contexts. Anglo-American interests 
overlapped regarding piracy, a threat to both their traders, although tension remained. 
As with their relationship during the war on piracy, Anglo-American relations were 
strained over slave trade suppression, but they fell short of war. Britain had banned 
slavery and the slave trade, and combined its suppression with other objectives, while 
the United States maintained separate strategies for the slave trade and furthering their 
commercial interests. But rather than spark war, Britain and the United States often 
rearranged their naval forces and maritime polices in hope of minimising the potential 
for conflict. The issues of piracy and slave trade suppression therefore provided an 
important point of comparison for how nations use navies to implement national policy 
and relate with one another in the same region. 
31 Murray, Odious Commerce, 262-263. 
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